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1. Introduction
1.1 Argument quality in persuasion research
Persuasion can be described as "a successful intentional effort at 
influencing another’s mental state through communication in a 
circumstance in which the persuadee has some measure of freedom” 
(O’Keefe, 2002, p. 5). It is used to implement attitude change. 
Campaigns have been launched to change the way people think 
about a variety of issues, varying from substance abuse to fire risk. 
Politicians attempt to influence opinions toward their policies. In 
advertising, companies are trying to sell their products by changing 
the ways in which consumers evaluate their products. The study of 
persuasion and attitude change is not new; it has fascinated 
rhetoricians for centuries and up till now, scholars have been 
interested in the question which message components determine the 
impact of a persuasive attempt1. Many empirical and theoretical 
studies have been conducted to find out how various message 
characteristics influence persuasion processes (see, for reviews, 
O’Keefe, 2002; Perloff, 2003).
Persuasion research is concerned with discovering the factors 
that influence the effectiveness of persuasive messages and 
providing explanations for these effects. Probably the most influential 
approach to persuasion is offered by the Elaboration Likelihood 
Model (ELM) developed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986a, 1986b)2. The 
ELM3 suggests that under different circumstances, people vary in the 
degree to which they are likely to engage in careful thinking (termed 
‘elaboration’) about message arguments. Sometimes they will 
consider the message arguments attentively and sometimes they will 
take refuge in less effortful thinking, relying on heuristics such as 
‘credible sources are usually right’ or ‘if many people like a movie, it is 
probably good’. Depending on the degree of elaboration, two different 
kinds of persuasion processes can be involved. The central route 
represents the persuasion process involved when elaboration is
For a review of historical and contemporary persuasion scholarship, see Perloff 
(2003, pp. 3-35).
2 There is a variety of alternative perspectives on persuasion. For a recent 
overview of these perspectives, I refer to O'Keefe (in press). I will focus on the 
ELM in this dissertation, as this is probably the most influential theory of 
persuasion.
3 The following characterization of the ELM is partially borrowed from O'Keefe 
(2008). See O'Keefe (2002, pp. 137-168) for a more detailed treatment of the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model.
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relatively high and the peripheral route represents the persuasion 
process involved when elaboration is relatively low. As the ELM 
proposes that persuasion can occur as a result of two different 
processes, it is called a dual process-theory.
A number of factors can influence the degree of elaboration 
and hence influence which route to persuasion is activated. These 
factors can influence either elaboration motivation or elaboration 
ability. Elaboration motivation can be influenced by factors such as 
the degree of topic involvement (the extent to which the topic is 
personally relevant to the receiver) or the tendency to engage in 
careful thinking, generally referred to by ‘need for cognition’. 
Elaboration ability can be influenced by factors such as the degree of 
distraction or relevant background knowledge. For example, when 
someone is involved in the topic, enjoys careful thinking, is not 
distracted or has prior knowledge of the subject matter, elaboration is 
likely to be high and the message will be processed along the central 
route. However, when someone is uninvolved, does not like careful 
thinking, is distracted or lacks relevant prior knowledge, elaboration is 
likely to be low and the message will be processed along the 
peripheral route.
Although many studies have approached the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model theoretically and empirically, the concept of central 
processing still lacks a clear definition. Petty and Cacioppo remain 
somewhat vague in their descriptions of central processing, as 
illustrated by the following citation:
“One [route to attitude change], called the central route, says that attitude 
change results from a person’s careful consideration of information that 
reflects what that person feels are the true merits of a particular attitudinal 
position. According to this view, if under scrutiny the message arguments 
are found to be cogent and compelling, favorable thoughts will be elicited 
that will result in attitude change in the direction of the advocacy. If the 
arguments are found to be weak and specious, they will be counterargued 
and the message will be resisted -  or boomerang (change opposite to that 
intended) may even occur.” (1984, p. 70).
It becomes clear from Petty and Cacioppo’s characterizations that 
central processing involves careful consideration of the message 
arguments, which may result in a positive evaluation of the arguments 
(“cogent and compelling”) or a negative evaluation (“weak and 
specious”). A positive argument evaluation, in turn, leads to favorable 
thoughts in response to the communication, whereas a negative 
argument evaluation leads to unfavorable responses.
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Petty and Cacioppo also explain that during central 
processing, "the most important determinant of the nature of the 
cognitive responses elicited resides in the quality of the arguments 
presented in the communication” (1983, p. 7). They are indefinite, 
however, when it comes to what exactly an evaluation of argument 
quality involves (cf. Schellens & De Jong, 2004). So, taking the 
central route should involve a critical evaluation of message content, 
but what happens during that critical evaluation remains unclear. 
More research is needed to ascertain what exactly language users do 
when they take the central route to persuasion.
The ELM suggests that under conditions of high motivation 
and ability, argument quality should play an essential role in the 
persuasiveness of the message. The outcome of the persuasion 
process depends on the argument quality: strong arguments will lead 
to persuasion, whereas weak arguments will not. Considering the 
leading part argument quality is predicted to play in the central route 
to persuasion, one would expect a very clear notion of argument 
strength in the ELM. However, this appears not to be the case. It has 
been stated regularly that although argument quality is a basic 
construct in persuasion theory, there is a lack of focus on the 
question of what exactly characterizes a strong or a weak argument 
(e.g. Fishbein & Ajzen, 1981; McGuire, 2000; O’Keefe, 2002, 2008; 
O’Keefe & Jackson, 1995; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b). Despite 
several calls to pay more attention to argument quality, the nature of 
argument quality still lacks sufficient clarification.
The way in which the concept of argument quality is 
operationalized in the ELM has been a frequent topic of discussion 
and object of criticism (e.g. Areni, 2003; Areni & Lutz, 1988; Hornikx, 
2005a; O’ Keefe, 1995, 2002; Van Enschot-Van Dijk, Hustinx & 
Hoeken, 2003). In the ELM, argument quality has been defined in an 
empirical way. First, the researchers themselves developed 
arguments that they intuitively regarded as either strong or weak. 
Second, a pre-test was conducted to assess the extent to which naive 
participants shared this distinction, by having them rate these 
arguments for persuasiveness. Third, the arguments that were 
perceived as strong (or weak) by both the researchers and the 
participants were entered into a second pre-test. Respondents were 
instructed to think about messages containing arguments rated as 
either high or low and to record their thoughts during processing. A 
‘strong argument’ message was defined as one that elicited 
predominantly favorable thoughts during careful thinking, whereas a 
‘weak argument’ message was one that yielded predominantly
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unfavorable thoughts under such conditions. When the ‘strong 
argument’ and ‘weak argument’ messages were presented to another 
group of respondents in a subsequent experiment, strong arguments 
were generally found to be more effective than the weak arguments 
under conditions of high elaboration.
Operationalizing argument quality in terms of its observed 
persuasive effects makes it impossible to test ELM-predictions 
concerning the relationship between argument quality and persuasive 
effects. Under conditions of high elaboration, people are motivated 
and able to carefully examine the arguments in the message. The 
ELM predicts that if the arguments are considered weak, unfavorable 
thoughts are likely to be evoked and hence, the message will 
probably be ineffective. If the arguments are considered strong, 
however, they will probably lead to favorable thoughts, after which 
persuasive success is more likely to occur (O’Keefe, 2008). If a 
message that is supposed to be a strong argument message would 
not lead to greater persuasion under conditions of high elaboration, 
the conclusion would not be that ‘the ELM-prediction has been 
disconfirmed’. Instead, the conclusion would be that ‘the manipulation 
of argument quality or amount of elaboration was inadequate’, as by 
definition, stronger arguments lead to greater persuasion when 
people are scrutinizing them (O’Keefe, 2002). Therefore, this called 
for a conceptually meaningful definition of argument quality and better 
insight into the specific characteristics that determine argument 
strength, in order to develop standards to manipulate argument 
quality in a way that does not depend on the judgments of 
participants (see, e.g. Areni, 2003; O’Keefe, 1995, 2002, 2008; Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986a).
Not only does the ELM predict a connection between 
argument quality and persuasive outcomes, the model also predicts 
what factors influence the effect variations in argument quality have 
on persuasiveness. Whether or not argument quality matters may be 
dependent on such factors as topic involvement, need for cognition, 
and the presence of distraction or relevant background knowledge. A 
variety of other factors are believed to play a role in the relationship 
between argument quality and persuasiveness, such as the mood of 
the receiver and other emotional states (Petty, Fabrigar & Wegener, 
2003; Wegener & Petty, 1996)4. To be able to test the validity of 
predictions regarding (modifying) persuasion variables, the quality of 
arguments should be operationalized in an adequate way.
4 For a review of various persuasion variables, I refer to Petty (1994), Petty and 
Wegener (1998), and Petty, Wegener and Fabrigar (1997).
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Differences in argument quality also play an important 
methodological role in persuasion research, as they can be used to 
assess whether or not respondents have been scrutinizing the 
message. Only participants who pay close attention to the arguments 
will notice the difference between messages containing strong or 
weak arguments. Therefore, if respondents reject the message claim 
supported by weak arguments or accept the claim supported by 
strong ones, they have been scrutinizing the message. Respondents 
who do not respond differently to messages containing strong or 
weak arguments are believed to have processed the message more 
superficially. So, if argument quality is not adequately operationalized, 
it cannot be determined whether or not respondents have been 
processing the message carefully (cf. Van Enschot-Van Dijk, Hustinx 
& Hoeken, 2003, p. 320).
1.2 Argument quality in argumentation studies
According to Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans
(1996), the study of argumentation deals with the problems involved 
in the production, analysis, and evaluation of argumentative discourse 
in light of the actual circumstances in which the argumentative 
discourse takes place. Broadly speaking, four problem areas in the 
study of argumentation can be identified: unexpressed elements in 
argumentative discourse, argumentation structures, argumentation 
schemes and fallacies (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck 
Henkemans, 1996, p. 12).
Argument quality is directly related to two of the four problem 
areas mentioned above. First, the quality of arguments is relevant to 
those who are interested in argumentation schemes, which are 
“conventionalized ways of displaying a relation between that which is 
stated in the explicit premise and that which is stated in the 
standpoint” (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 
1996, p. 20). In argumentation theory, different argumentation 
schemes have been distinguished. It is also determined under what 
conditions each scheme should be acceptable. Specific critical 
questions5 have been formulated to evaluate the acceptability of an 
argumentation scheme, such as (for practical, goal-oriented 
reasoning): “Are there other ways of realizing the goal G?” or “Is it 
possible for an agent a to do action A?” (Walton, 1996, p. 11).
For a discussion of argumentation schemes and critical questions, see Godden 
and Walton (2007).
15
The second area of interest related to argument quality is the 
study of fallacies. Many different definitions of fallacy have arisen in 
argumentation literature. According to Van Eemeren, Grootendorst 
and Snoeck Henkemans (1996), however, “It is now generally 
conceded that patterns of argument once considered uniformly 
fallacies are, in fact, fallacious in only some cases” (p. 181). That 
means that some patterns of argument that were traditionally 
considered to be fallacies, such as the argumentum ad hominem or 
the argumentum ad verecundiam, may in fact be acceptable variants 
depending on whether they meet certain criteria (Tindale, 2007). 
Argumentation scholars are concerned with the analysis of various 
kinds of fallacies and with the development of criteria to distinguish 
fallacious argumentation from acceptable argumentation.
From these areas of interest, it appears that the study of 
argumentation is concerned with the evaluation of argument quality. 
More specifically, it involves developing sets of criteria to distinguish 
normatively strong arguments from normatively weak arguments. 
These criteria can be more general in nature, such as the criteria of 
relevance, sufficiency and acceptability (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst 
& Snoeck Henkemans, 1996, p. 178), but they can also be specific to 
a certain argument scheme. These scheme-specific criteria are often 
formulated in the form of critical questions.
Argumentation studies may contribute to a further 
understanding of argument quality in persuasion research, as 
standards have been formulated for strong arguments, independent 
of observed persuasive effects. If an argument meets the standards, 
it should be considered strong. If an argument fails to meet these 
standards, it should be considered weak. This normative approach to 
argumentation can be useful, since “once one has an independently- 
motivated account of argument quality, it is possible to undertake 
empirical work that directly explores the relationship of argument 
quality to persuasive effects” (O’Keefe, 1995, p. 14).
Second, argumentation theory can specify what has been left 
vague in the dual-processing theories: the process of evaluating 
message content. As Schellens and De Jong (2004) put it:
“normative theories on the quality of argumentation enable us to formulate 
hypotheses about the central processing of persuasive texts. The ideal 
central processor of argumentation in persuasive texts operates in 
accordance with what normative theories about the quality of arguments 
prescribe” (p. 298).
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Normative theories of argumentation prescribe that judges of 
argumentation should assess the extent to which a specific argument 
meets the criteria for being strong, criteria that may differ between 
different patterns of argument, or argument schemes. In this way, 
normative argumentation theory can answer the question of what 
should happen when people evaluate arguments carefully.
In sum, normative approaches to argumentation provide a 
valuable framework for studying argument quality in the ELM. After 
all, they allow us to form expectations on argument evaluation during 
central processing and enable us to empirically study the relationship 
between argument quality and persuasive effects.
The study of argumentation can be normative as well as descriptive. 
Descriptive approaches to argumentation intend to describe what is 
regarded as valid, whereas normative approaches to argumentation 
intend to determine what should be regarded as valid. The most 
essential difference between both kinds of approaches is that the 
descriptive approach is more empirically-based, whereas the 
normative approach has an analytical basis (Van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 1996, p. 24). It has been argued 
that these two approaches should be closely interrelated (e.g. 
O’Keefe, 1995, Schellens & De Jong, 2004; Van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 2004; Van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2007). The rationale 
for this belief is generally as follows: observations of argumentative 
behavior can be used to start thinking about norms that 
argumentation should meet. On the other hand, argumentation- 
theoretical norms are usually intended for ordinary language users, 
which means that these norms have more relevance if they describe 
argumentative conduct well. A descriptive, empirically-based 
approach is needed to see how well norms that should govern 
argumentation describe individual behaviour.
One way in which the normative approach and the descriptive 
approach to argumentation can be brought closer together is to 
determine whether norms that have been suggested on an analytical 
basis correspond to the norms used by ordinary language users 
during argument evaluation. The agreement between theoretical 
norms and laymen norms, however, has rarely been the object of 
investigation in the field of argumentation. An exception is the 
research by Van Eemeren and his associates (for an overview, see 
Van Eemeren, Garssen & Meuffels, 2007). They carried out the 
project Conceptions of Reasonableness to find out to what extent 
ordinary language users find discussion moves that are considered
17
fallacious from a pragma-dialectical6 perspective, reasonable or 
unreasonable. The underlying principle of these empirical studies is 
that rules for critical discussion should not only be effective in 
resolving a difference of opinion or ‘problem valid’, but that the rules 
must also be intersubjectively approved or ‘conventionally valid’.
A series of experiments were conducted on several fallacies 
committed in different stages of a critical discussion. For instance, to 
test the conventional validity of the argumentation scheme rule7, the 
fallacies argumentum ad consequentiam, argumentum ad populum, 
slippery slope and false analogy were investigated, all being specific 
rule-violations. The overall results of these studies show that 
“discussion moves in which a pragma-dialectical discussion rule has 
been violated are consistently considered unreasonable, whereas 
moves in which that concerning pragma-dialectical rule has not been 
violated, are considered reasonable” (2007, p. 263, translated from 
Dutch by me, E. S.). So, positive evidence was found for the 
conventional validity of the pragma-dialectical discussion rules.
Although positive evidence was found for the conventional 
validity of the pragma-dialectical discussion rules, additional research 
into laymen norms of reasonableness is useful. More specifically: 
more insight is needed into the ideas that laymen have about the use, 
correct or incorrect, of argumentation schemes. In pragma-dialectical 
terms, this concerns the conventional validity of the argument scheme 
rule. In general terms, it concerns the question to what extent the 
normative-theoretical evaluation questions that have been suggested 
for certain argument schemes play a role in laymen’s argumentative 
competence. So far, this question has not been answered 
adequately.
First, to test the conventional validity of the argumentation 
scheme rule, the specific fallacies argumentum ad consequentiam, 
argumentum ad populum, slippery slope and false analogy were 
investigated. Although each fallacy results from an incorrect 
application of a certain argument scheme (either causal 
argumentation, symptomatic argumentation or comparison 
argumentation), there are more incorrect applications of each scheme
6 The pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation aims to integrate the study of 
critical exchanges, called dialectics, with the study of language use in actual 
communication, called pragmatics. Thus, in this perspective, a dialectical view of 
argumentative reasonableness is combined with a pragmatic view of the verbal 
moves made in argumentative discourse (Van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2006).
7 The argument scheme rule is: “Standpoints may not be regarded conclusively 
defended if the defense does not take place by means of appropriate argument 
schemes that are applied correctly” (Van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2006, p. 17).
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that do not correspond to traditional fallacies. It would be useful to 
carry out a study that would take as a starting point the argument 
scheme instead of the fallacy, and that would also try to get a grip on 
what laymen consider to be an incorrect use of such a scheme -  
regardless of whether the incorrect use results in a traditional fallacy 
or not8.
Second, getting a grip on laymen criteria for evaluating the 
soundness of a certain argument scheme presupposes an adequate 
method to retrieve them. In the Reasonableness-experiments, the 
question “Indicate briefly why you consider the [last] discussion move 
reasonable or unreasonable” (2007, p. 264, translated from Dutch by 
me, E. S.) appeared to be a difficult task: the respondents were 
hardly able to explain in explicit terms what principles they rely on 
when giving their reasonableness judgments. As Van Eemeren et al. 
conclude, “time after time it has been found that [...] for our subjects 
between the ages of 16 and 18, responding to the question of why a 
discussion move is reasonable or unreasonable is an extraordinarily 
difficult abstract matter -  a matter, really, our subjects apparently 
have never given any thought in an explicit sense” (2007, pp. 263­
264, translated from Dutch by me, E. S.). If thoughts about norms for 
reasonableness do not come naturally, perhaps subjects need ‘food 
for thought’. Although the material and instruments in the 
reasonableness expriments have been proven to be sufficient for 
generating reasonableness judgments, they might have been 
insufficient for retrieving standards of reasonableness (assuming that 
such standards are actually formed).
In sum, there is a need for additional research on the criteria 
that laymen use for judging particular argument schemes on their 
reasonableness and also for a systematic comparison between 
laymen criteria and theoretical criteria. In addition, an adequate 
method needs to be developed to retrieve laymen criteria.
A combination of a normative and a descriptive approach to 
argumentation might be considered the best way to study argument 
quality. In this dissertation, I will examine if indeed arguments that 
conform to criteria for argument quality are more persuasive than
From a pragma-dialectical perspective, such a study not only would give 
(another) indication of the conventional validity of the argumentation scheme 
rule, but it would also give more insight into the empirical reality of the 
intersubjective testing procedure, a procedure for checking the acceptability of 
an argument scheme by “determining how to scrutinize the contents of the step 
from the proposition that is expressed in the argumentation to the proposition 
that is expressed in the standpoint” (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2003, p. 
378).
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arguments that do not conform to these criteria. If there appears to be 
a relationship between argument strength and persuasiveness under 
conditions in which people scrutinize the arguments, one can tell (a) 
what it was exactly that made the arguments strong or weak, that is, 
which normative criteria these arguments did or did not meet, and (b) 
if these normative criteria matter to ordinary language users.
1.3 Pragmatic arguments: an introduction
The outcome of a persuasive attempt may depend on the type of 
argument that is used. This appears from ongoing research on the 
relative persuasiveness of different types of argument (Hoeken, 
2001a, 2001b; Hoeken & Hustinx, 2003, 2006, 2009; Hornikx, 2005b). 
These studies show that language users are sensitive to differences 
in argument type when they evaluate arguments. Therefore, it is 
necessary to investigate for different argument types what specific 
characteristics make them strong or weak. In the research program 
The quality of pragmatic arguments9, to which this dissertation aims 
to contribute, the focus is on a type of argument called ‘pragmatic 
argument’. In this section, I will explain why.
It is common in daily argumentative practice that standpoints 
are presented in which certain acts are recommended or advised 
against. Examples of such standpoints are:
(1) 17-year olds should be allowed to obtain a driver’s license.
(2) The Chinese language should be taught in secondary school.
(3) Lying in job interviews is intolerable.
(4) The referendum as a method of electing a mayor should be abolished. 
(Retrieved from a Dutch newspaper’s internet discussion: 
http://weblogs.nrc.nl/weblog/discussie/, 5th November, 2007, translated 
from Dutch by me, E. S.)
A frequently used type of argumentation to support standpoints in 
which a certain act is positively or negatively evaluated is the 
pragmatic argument10. In the positive variant of the pragmatic
9 The quality o f pragmatic arguments is a NWO-funded research program. The 
project Argument quality and probability claims, resulting in this dissertation, is 
one part of the program. The project Argument quality and desirability claims 
forms another part of the program (Timmers, to appear). A  monograph on the 
quality of pragmatic arguments, integrating the results of both projects, is also
10 expected to appear.
The pragmatic argument is also known as the argument from consequences 
(Godin, 1999; Walton, 1996) and the argument based on advantages and 
disadvantages (Schellens & Verhoeven, 1994).
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argument, the acceptability of an act is defended by referring to its 
positive effects. In the negative variant, the unacceptability of an act 
is defended by referring to its negative effects. For instance, 
standpoints (1) en (2) can be supported by the positive variant and (3) 
and (4) can be backed up by the negative variant:
(5) 17-year olds should be allowed to pass their driving tests. At least, that 
is the plan according to Minister Eurlings of Transport and Public 
Works. He wants to restrict young people, until the age of 18, to driving 
only in the presence of an experienced driver without a criminal traffic 
record. The idea is not so much to serve young people, but rather to 
improve traffic safety.
(6) China has a very rich and interesting culture and it would do everybody 
some good to at least get acquainted with it. I propose: one obligatory 
year for everybody, followed by an optional course. By the way: a 
serious counterbalance for the American/European dominance on the 
world stage would be welcome. I think that even the unsatisfied 
Muslims in the Arabic countries could calm d o w n .!
(7) If you flat-out lie during a job interview the truth will come out sooner or 
later. You will instantly lose all credibility.
(8) I am against mayor referenda (and presidential elections). It only leads 
to undesired American-style situations. Moreover, the mayor (executive 
authority) is given a direct mandate by citizens, which, in my opinion, 
appears to damage the mandate of the municipal council (controlling 
authority).
(Retrieved from a Dutch newspaper’s internet discussion: 
http://weblogs.nrc.nl/weblog/discussie/, 5th November, 2007, translated 
from Dutch by me, E. S.)
Pragmatic arguments can be found in several contexts, such as 
advertising (Schellens & Verhoeven, 1994), public information 
campaigns (Schellens & De Jong, 2004), policy documents 
(Schellens & Lagerwerf, 2003) and legal decision-making (Feteris, 
2002). Thus, the pragmatic argument is a frequently occurring type of 
argumentation in various discursive fields.
Not only is the pragmatic argument common in various areas 
of argumentation, it is also known as a popular type of argument in 
experimental studies on the persuasion process (see, e.g., Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1986a, pp. 54-59). Romero (1999) observed that 
”Persuasion researchers typically use pragmatic arguments in 
persuasive messages [...] Argumentation in persuasive messages 
used in research point to the positive consequences of a policy 
change, or the positive attributes of a particular product” (p. 164).
In sum, pragmatic arguments are frequently used in ordinary 
argumentative practice as well as in studies on persuasion 
processes. Therefore, the pragmatic argument is worthy of the 
researcher’s attention.
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1.4 Dimensions of a pragmatic argument: probability and 
desirability of consequences
To further clarify the nature of the pragmatic argument, I will present 
some characterizations of the argument type that can be found in 
argumentation literature. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca regard as a 
pragmatic argument an argument "which permits the evaluation of an 
act or an event in terms of its favorable or unfavorable 
consequences” (1969, p. 266). They perceive the pragmatic 
argument as a type of argument based on a cause-and-effect 
relation, which can only be effective if the causal link and the value of 
the consequence are apparent to the audience (cf. Van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 1996, pp. 111-112).
In line with Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Schellens (1985; 
1986) describes pragmatic argumentation as “argumentation for or 
against an intended action on the basis of the desirability or 
undesirability of its effects” and explains that pragmatic 
argumentation appeals to causal regularity “in the prediction of effects 
of the intended action” and to rules of value: “in the positive and 
negative valuation of effects, and in balancing these advantages and 
disadvantages against each other” (1986, p. 40). Schellens (1985, pp. 
174-175, translated from Dutch by me, E. S.) presents a standard 
scheme for the pragmatic argument:
Positive variant: Action A leads to B
B is desirable 
Therefore: A is desirable
Negative variant: Action A leads to B
B is undesirable
Therefore: Action A is undesirable
Walton (1996) does not use the term pragmatic argument for 
the type of argument that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca and 
Schellens refer to, but uses the label ‘argument from consequences’. 
He states that the argument from consequences is “a species of 
practical reasoning where a contemplated policy or course of action is 
positively supported by citing the good consequences of it” (p. 75). 
Walton (1996) also mentions the negative variant: “In the negative 
form, a contemplated action is rejected on the grounds that it will 
have bad consequences” (p. 75). He presents an argumentation 
scheme (1996, p. 76) that slightly deviates from Schellens’s (1985) 
argument scheme:
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If A  is brought about, then good (bad) consequences will (may plausibly)
occur.
Therefore, A should (not) be brought about.
An obvious difference between Walton’s (1996) scheme and 
Schellens’s (1985) scheme is that in Walton’s scheme, the value of 
the consequence is included in the premise expressing a causal link 
between action and consequence, whereas in Schellens’s scheme, 
the value of the consequence is expressed in a separate premise. 
However, it can be said that both schemes comprise probability and 
value.
Feteris (2002) considers various approaches to the pragmatic 
argument11 and on the basis of these ideas comes to the following 
definition: "Pragmatic argumentation can be considered as a specific 
form of practical argumentation, of argumentation which occurs in a 
practical discussion about the desirability or undesirability of a certain 
course in action” (p. 353). With respect to the nature of the 
standpoint, she notes that it is a normative expression that may 
involve a course of action, a proposal, or a plan (involving a policy in 
a political context or a decision in a legal context). Regarding the 
nature of the argumentation, she notes that it involves the 
consequences of the proposed course of action. Feteris (2002, p. 
355) presents a basic structure of the pragmatic argument:
Positive variant: Standpoint: Act X is desirable
Because: Act X leads to consequence Y 
and: Consequence Y is desirable
Negative variant: Standpoint: Act X’ is undesirable
Because: Act X ’ leads to consequence Y’ 
and: Consequence Y ’ is undesirable12
Clearly, Feteris’s (2002) scheme resembles Schellens’s (1985) 
scheme, as value (Consequence Y/Y’ is desirable/undesirable) and 
probability (Act X/X’ leads to consequence Y/Y’) are expressed in 
separate premises.
The various characterizations of the pragmatic argument that 
can be found in argumentation literature show that the argument is
11 Feteris (2002) considers argumentation theorists’ perspectives as well as legal 
theory approaches.
12 In Feteris (2002), it actually says “Consequence Y’ is desirable” (p. 355). It is 
likely, however, that a printing error was made and that it should have said: 
Consequence Y ’ is undesirable. After all, the model is formulated for the 
negative variant of pragmatic argumentation.
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divided into two parts: a descriptive statement saying that a certain 
act leads to a certain consequence and a normative statement 
expressing that this consequence is desirable or undesirable. The 
former statement expresses the consequence’s probability; the latter 
statement the consequence’s desirability. This has also been 
observed by different scholars concerned with persuasion research 
(e.g. Areni & Lutz, 1988; Hoeken, 1997, 2001a, 2001b; Hornikx, 
2005a).
1.5 The quality of pragmatic arguments
For a pragmatic argument to be strong, the consequence’s probability 
and the consequence’s desirability or undesirability should be 
accepted by the reader or listener. This has been suggested in 
normative argumentation theory for the evaluation of the pragmatic 
argument. Critical questions have been formulated to determine 
whether the proposed course of action does indeed lead to the results 
and whether these results are indeed desirable (or undesirable) (e.g. 
Feteris, 2002; Schellens & Verhoeven, 1994). Other critical questions 
for the pragmatic argument have also been suggested, such as 
whether the proposed action is feasible or acceptable (Schellens, 
1985) or whether any other (positive/negative) consequences should 
be taken into account (Walton, 1996). However, the questions of 
probability and desirability appear to be most important (cf. Feteris, 
2002, pp. 357-358; Hornikx, 2005a, p. 25).
Empirical persuasion research, too, postulates that desirability 
and probability determine the quality of the pragmatic argument. 
Hoeken (2001a), for instance, states that those who put forward a 
pragmatic argument to persuade others “claim that their option will 
probably or certainly result in desirable consequences” (p. 425). Then 
he goes on: “The strength of their argument depends on two aspects: 
The consequence’s desirability and the consequence’s probability. A 
strong argument in favor of the option would be that the option will 
certainly result in desirable consequences” (p. 425).
Thus, the quality of the pragmatic argument should be 
dependent on the acceptability of the two different statements 
comprising the pragmatic argument. This is, however, not a sufficient 
answer to the question of what characteristics determine the quality of 
a pragmatic argument. After all, one could ask: under what 
circumstances should the separate statements be accepted? The 
evident answer is: that depends on the supporting sub-argumentation
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that may be brought forward to make the statements more 
acceptable. This line of reasoning is represented in Figure 1.113:
Figure 1.1 Pragmatic argument and sub-arguments supporting separate statements.
The figure shows that jointly, statements 1.1a and 1.1b can be 
considered sufficient to support standpoint 114. Each element of the 
argument can be supported by additional arguments (In Figure 1.1, I 
simply chose to represent three additional arguments, but the number 
of additional arguments may, of course, vary). Hence, the quality of 
the pragmatic argument (made up of 1.1a and 1.1b) is dependent on 
the quality of sub-arguments supporting statement 1.1a and 
statement 1.1.b. In other words, to understand what characteristics 
determine the quality of a pragmatic argument, it is necessary to 
understand what characteristics determine the quality of an argument 
in support of a probability claim and what characteristics determine 
the quality of an argument in support of a desirability claim. This 
dissertation will address the first issue. In terms of the elements in 
Figure 1.1: this dissertation will be concerned with the relationship 
between the probability-expressing statement ‘Action A leads to B’ 
(1.1a) and its supporting sub-arguments (1.1a.1, 1.1a.2, 1.1a.3). The 
other part of the model, regarding the connection between the 
desirability-expressing statement (1.1b) and the supporting sub­
arguments (1.1b.1, 1. 1 b.2, 1.1b.3), is treated in another dissertation 
(Timmers, to appear).
13 The figure is composed according to the pragma-dialectical way of representing 
the structure of argumentation (Van Eemeren & Snoeck Henckemans, 2006, pp. 
62-65).
14 In practice however, statement 1.1b is sometimes left implicit and the conclusion 
1 unexpressed (Schellens & De Jong, 2004).
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1.6 Types of arguments supporting the probability statement
Different types of argument can be brought forward in making the 
probability statement (more) acceptable. Based on corpus-analytical 
research it appears that writers do indeed support pragmatic 
arguments with subarguments (e.g. Hornikx, Starren & Hoeken, 2003; 
Schellens & De Jong, 2004). The factors determining the quality of 
supporting arguments will be further investigated. I chose three 
different argument types for further investigation. Two criteria guided 
this selection.
The first criterion was: the argument types should be capable 
of supporting the probability statement as part of a pragmatic 
argument. That means that the argument type should be able to 
result in a conclusion in the form of ‘Action A leads to B’. In a 
pragmatic argument, this prediction is in fact a conditional sentence: if 
the action is carried out, then a certain consequence might be 
expected (cf. Schellens, 1985, p. 92). After all, action A is proposed 
and has not been executed yet. So, argument types were selected 
that could support such a conclusion.
The second criterion was: the argument types should be 
relatively uncontroversial, in the sense that argumentation scholars 
should not strongly disagree on the identification of these types. 
Thus, argument types were selected that are generally accepted in 
argumentation theory.
Three argument types meet these requirements: the argument 
from authority, the argument from cause to effect and the argument 
from example. The argument from authority is used to increase the 
acceptability of a conclusion by appealing to a certain source that is 
presumed to agree with that conclusion; the argument from cause to 
effect is used to predict that if something occurs, it will lead to 
something else; the argument from example reasons from one or 
more individual cases to a general statement.
Each type of argument meets the two requirements mentioned 
above. First, they all have the potential to support a statement of the 
type ‘Action A leads to B’ that is a part of a pragmatic argument (see 
Figure 1.2). One may appeal to a source saying that action A leads to 
B (argument from authority). The prediction that action A leads to B 
may also be inferred from either a more general causal relationship or 
from two or more predictions (argument from cause to effect). Last, 
the statement that action A leads to B may be supported by individual 
cases exhibiting the causal relationship in the statement (argument 
from example).
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Figure 1.2 Probability claim supported by the argument from authority, the argument 
from cause to effect and the argument from example.
Second, the argument types appear to be relatively 
uncontroversial in argumentation theory. This can be inferred from 
how many times these argument types have been identified in 
argumentation theory. Garssen (1997) studied seven typologies of 
argumentation schemes from different perspectives and compared 
these with the pragma-dialectical typology. He found that 
argumentation from example/generalization was mentioned in all 
eight different typologies (Ehninger & Brockriede, 1963/1978; Freeley, 
1993; Hastings, 1962; McBurney & Mills, 1964; Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Kienpointner, 1992; Schellens, 1985; Van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992). According to Garssen (1997), 
argumentation from authority and argumentation from cause to effect 
were mentioned in six of the eight typologies. Both types were not 
distinguished as a separate argument type by McBurney and Mills 
(1964) and Freeley (1993)15. Hence, the argument from authority, the 
argument from cause to effect and the argument from example often 
appear to be identified in argumentation theory.
15 For the argument from cause to effect, I rely on Garssen (1997) suggesting that 
the argument from cause to effect has been distinguished as a separate type of 
argument by Ehninger and Brockriede (1963/1978) (see p. 31, 37) and not by 
McBurney and Mills (1964) (see p. 28, 37). This, however, does not correspond 
to the overview he presents at the end of his treatise, suggesting that it is the 
other way around (1997, p. 121). Furthermore, it should be noted that although 
Freeley (1993) and McBurney and Mills (1964) do not mention the argument 
from cause to effect as a separate type of argument, they consider causal 
argumentation to be a separate category that covers both the argument from 
cause to effect and the argument from effect to cause.
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This dissertation is concerned with the quality of arguments in support 
of a probability claim. Argument types that may increase the 
acceptability of a probability claim and that are selected for further 
examination are the argument from authority, the argument from 
cause to effect and the argument from example. This leads to the 
following research aim:
Aim of research: To provide insight into the specific characteristics that 
determine the quality of the argument from authority, 
the argument from cause to effect and the argument 
from example in support of a probability claim.
A combination of a normative and descriptive approach to 
argumentation provides a valuable framework for studying argument 
quality in the ELM. As a contribution to persuasion research as well 
as to the study of argumentation, it should be investigated to what 
extent the criteria laymen use for judging a particular argument 
scheme correspond to normative-theoretical criteria. This leads to the 
following research questions:
Research question 1: To what extent do laymen criteria for the 
argument from authority, the argument from 
cause to effect and the argument from example 
correspond to those formulated in argumentation 
theory?
Research question 1a: What criteria have been formulated in 
argumentation theory to evaluate the quality of 
the argument from authority, the argument from 
cause to effect and the argument from example?
Research question 1b: What criteria do laymen use to evaluate the 
quality of the argument from authority, the 
argument from cause to effect and the argument 
from example?
According to the ELM, normatively strong arguments should be more 
persuasive than normatively weak arguments in conditions in which 
messages are processed centrally. However, there may be a 
difference between what people believe to be a strong argument and 
what actually persuades them. People might have formed certain 
ideas about what should persuade them or others, but these ideas 
might appear to be wrong in actuality (cf. O’Keefe, 1993). Several 
empirical studies have shown a low correspondence between
1.7 Aim of research and research questions
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perceived or expected persuasiveness16 on the one hand and actual 
persuasiveness on the other hand (for overviews, see Hoeken, 
2001a, p. 430; O’Keefe, 1993, pp. 229-230). Hoeken (2001a), for 
instance, demonstrated a discrepancy between the perceived 
persuasiveness and actual persuasiveness of certain arguments. 
Dillard, Weber and Vail (2007a), on the other hand, concluded from a 
meta-analysis of studies measuring perceived and actual 
persuasiveness17 of persuasive messages: the relationship between 
the two variables is positive and substantial. So, the findings 
regarding the relation between what should be persuasive and what 
actually persuades people are ambiguous. Therefore, it is possible 
that arguments that do conform to criteria for argument quality are in 
fact as persuasive as those that do not conform to these criteria. This 
leads to the following research question:
Research question 2: Are normatively strong arguments from authority, 
arguments from cause to effect and arguments 
from example actually more persuasive than 
normatively weak arguments?
By answering these research questions, I expect to shed more light 
on the specific characteristics that determine the quality of arguments 
in support of a probability claim.
1.8 Overview of the study
This dissertation consists of two different parts. In the first part, I 
focus on criteria for argument quality and answer research questions 
1, 1a and 1b. Chapter 2 deals with criteria used to evaluate 
arguments from authority, chapter 3 with criteria to evaluate
16 Hornikx (2008) explains that perceived persuasiveness should not be confused 
with expected persuasiveness, because both kinds of persuasiveness differ in 
the people at which this message is targeted. Perceived persuasiveness is 
receiver-oriented: “ In fact, it is a message recipient's judgment about how much 
a message (or argument) persuaded him or her”. By contrast, expected 
persuasiveness is sender-oriented: “How persuasive does a message sender 
(e.g., a participant in a study) think an argument is for another person” (pp. 557­
558).
17 In fact, Dillard et al. (2007a) refer to perceived and actual persuasiveness by 
perceived and actual effectiveness. There is no reason to believe, however, that 
they aim at different factors, considering their definition of perceived 
effectiveness: “we inferred a conceptual definition of PE [perceived 
effectiveness] as an estimate of the degree to which a persuasive message will 
be favorably evaluated— in terms of its persuasive potential— by recipients of 
that message” (p. 617).
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arguments from cause to effect, and chapter 4 focuses on criteria to 
evaluate arguments from example. In each chapter, I examine criteria 
mentioned in argumentation literature, criteria mentioned by laymen 
and also compare both perspectives.
In the second part of the dissertation, I address research 
question 2, concentrating on the relationship between argument 
strength and actual persuasiveness. Chapter 5 reports on a 
preliminary experimental study on the relation between perceived 
reasonableness and actual persuasiveness of normatively strong and 
weak arguments18. In chapter 6, I report on an experiment on the 
effect of meeting certain criteria for argument quality on actual 
persuasiveness. Chapter 7 presents a general conclusion and a 
discussion, in which I reflect on the studies described in both parts of 
the dissertation.
The two parts of which this dissertation consists differ in three 
important respects: in topic, in kind of argumentation research™, and 
in method of research. First of all, it can be said that the first part is all 
about norms: norms that, according to argumentation theory, lay 
people should use for argument evaluation and norms that lay people 
do use for argument evaluation. The second part is all about the role 
that these norms might play in the persuasion process. Second of all, 
it can be said that the first part reports ‘concept research’, whereas 
the second part reports ‘persuasion research’ (cf. Van Eemeren & 
Garssen, 2007). The first part deals with differences between 
theoretical conceptions of argument quality and conceptions of lay 
people. The second part deals with studies on the influence of 
message content characteristics. Third of all, part I and II differ in a 
methodological respect: in the first part the research is primarily 
qualitative in nature, whereas the second part reports on quantitative 
research.
18 This study has been published earlier (Timmers, Sorm, Schellens & Hoeken, 
2008). This publication is the result of an intensive collaboration between the first 
and the second author who contributed in equal measure to the design, 
execution, and reporting of the study.
19 See Van Eemeren and Garssen (2007, pp. 193-195), who distinguish between 
several kinds of empirical argumentation research.
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PART I: CRITERIA FOR ARGUMENT QUALITY
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2. The quality of the argument from authority
This chapter deals with the quality of the argument from authority. 
First, in section 2.1, I will discuss different types of authority and 
argue that the epistemic/cognitive type of authority is relevant to 
further investigation. I will also discuss De George’s (1985) and 
Wilson’s (1983) view on this type of authority. They both formulated 
criteria that authorities should meet, but each from a different 
perspective: De George (1985) from a philosophical perspective and 
Wilson (1983) from a social epistemological point of view. Their views 
on authority serve as a frame of reference for the argumentation- 
theoretical view on the quality of the argument from authority. In 
section 2.2, I will address the question of what criteria are used in 
argumentation theory to evaluate the quality of the argument from 
authority and explain how these relate to the criteria formulated by De 
George (1985) and Wilson (1983). In section 2.3, I will address the 
question of what criteria are used by laymen to evaluate the quality of 
the argument from authority. In the final section 2.4, I will compare the 
different sets of criteria.
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Types of authority
The concept of authority is ambiguous, as it has many different 
meanings depending on the circumstances. Distinctions have been 
made, for instance, between epistemic authority and deontic authority 
(Bochenski, 1974), between de facto authority and de jure/iure 
authority (Woods & Walton, 1974; Schellens, 1985), between 
executive authority and nonexecutive authority (De George, 1985) 
and between expertise-based and power-based authority20 (Schellens 
& Verhoeven, 1994). Walton (1997), in line with Wilson (1983), 
prefers a division between two broad types of authority:
“The cognitive (epistemic, de facto) type of authority is a relationship 
between two individuals where one is an expert in a field of knowledge in 
such a manner that his pronouncements in this field carry a special weight 
of presumption for the other individual that is greater than the say-so of a 
layperson in that field. The cognitive type of authority, when used or 
appealed to in argument, is essentially an appeal to expertise, or to expert 
opinion. By contrast, the administrative (deontic, de jure) type of authority is
20 Translated from the Dutch terms “deskundigheid’ and “bevoegdheid’ (Schellens 
& Verhoeven, 1994, p. 130).
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a right to exercise command or influence, especially concerning rulings on 
what should be done in certain types of situations, based on an invested 
office, or an official or recognized position of power” (pp. 77-78).
Goodwin (1998) even identifies three types: command, expertise and 
dignity authority. Goodwin’s distinction between command authority 
and expertise authority corresponds to the administrative-cognitive 
distinction drawn by Walton (1997) and Wilson (1983), but the third 
authority she identifies, the dignity authority, turns out to be a different 
kind. Dignity authorities cannot be distinguished by knowledge or 
power, but rather by eminence (e.g. royal persons, priests, Nelson 
Mandela, or Dalai Lama). The appropriate response to such 
authorities is not obedience (as to command authority) or prudence 
(as to expertise authority), but deference - or showing respect (cf. 
Hansen, 2006, p. 323).
Although types of authority are classified and labelled in many 
different ways, the interpretations do not differ significantly. In my 
opinion, De George’s nonexecutive authority can be considered an 
umbrella term for Goodwin’s dignity and expertise authorities as they 
are not in the position to execute commands or control (so, they are 
nonexecutive authorities). For the same reason, cognitive, expertise- 
based, de facto and epistemic authorities belong to the category 
‘nonexecutive authority’. De George’s executive authority - who is in a 
certain position to act for or on someone else - appears similar to 
Goodwin’s command authority and also to the administrative, power- 
based, de jure/iure, deontic types of authority. Table 2.1 shows the 
similarities and differences between types of authorities in the 
typologies mentioned above.
Table 2.1 Comparison between different typologies of authority.
Typology Bochenski
1974
Woods &
Walton
1974;
Schellens
1985
Schellens
&
Verhoeven
1994
Wilson
1983;
Walton
1997
Goodwin
1998
De George 
1985
Type of 
authority
deontic de
jure/iure
power-
based
admini­
strative
com­
mand
executive
epistemic de facto expertise-
based
cognitive expertise
non­
executive
- - - - dignity
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The next question to be answered is: what kind of authority is relevant 
within the framework of pragmatic argumentation? More specifically: 
what type of authority might be appealed to in supporting a statement 
that a proposed cause (probably) leads to a certain consequence? In 
fact, any of the distinguished kinds of authority might be used to 
establish such a statement. After all, all kinds of authority may 
express statements that are causal in nature. However, as the 
administrative (or deontic, de jure/iure, power-based etc.) and dignity 
kinds of authority are primarily associated with telling others what 
ought or ought not to be done - prescriptive statements, in other 
words - I consider the cognitive (or epistemic, de facto, expertise- 
based etc.) kind of authority as more relevant in support of a 
statement that A will (probably) lead to B. As a consequence, I will 
focus on this particular type of authority. Next, in section 2.1.2, I will 
discuss the conditions that a good epistemic/cognitive authority 
should satisfy according to De George (1976, 1985) and Wilson 
(1983).
2.1.2 Epistemic authority
A large number of works have dealt with authority in general, and with 
particular aspects of authority21. An insightful, philosophical analysis 
of epistemic authority is provided by De George (1976, 1985). 
According to his definition, "X is a de facto epistemic authority if there 
is some Y who considers X an authority for Y in some realm (R). With 
respect to that realm, Y considers X his superior in knowledge” (1985, 
p. 27). Furthermore, De George (1985) discusses the conditions 
under which an epistemic authority is legitimate:
"For Y ’s belief in what X says in R to be justified, it is necessary that: (1) X 
have [sic] knowledge of R (the knowledge criterion); (2) Y have [sic] good 
reason to believe that X has knowledge of R (the inductive criterion); (3) the 
p ’s [propositions] that Y believes fall within R or be so related to R that some 
aspect of X ’s knowledge of R is sufficient to justify accepting p (the 
relevance criterion); and (4) Y have [sic] good reason for believing that X is 
telling the truth or stating what X believes when X enunciates p (the 
trustworthiness criterion)” (pp. 35-36).
The first criterion, the knowledge criterion, is about the question 
whether or not there is any knowledge for someone to possess. For
21 For an overview, see De George’s Bibliographic Essay (1985, pp. 293-299).
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example22, if someone appeals to an authority specialized in the field 
of intelligent extraterrestrial life, the epistemic authority can be 
considered illegitimate because there is no such knowledge. If I 
interpret De George (1985) correctly, the knowledge criterion states 
that the epistemic authority is justified if his/her field of knowledge is a 
genuine field of knowledge23.
The second criterion, the inductive criterion, pertains to the 
question if there is sufficient reason for the audience to believe that 
the proposed authority is someone who has knowledge of the realm. 
De George (1985) acknowledges a close relation with the knowledge 
criterion, but explains that the inductive process "involves not only 
knowing that there is knowledge but also knowing who has it” (p. 49). 
So, the inductive criterion says that the epistemic authority is justified 
if the inductive basis is enough to draw the conclusion that X is 
knowledgeable in the field24.
The third criterion is the relevance criterion, concerning the 
question whether or not the statements of the proposed authority are 
in the realm of its competence. If they are in the realm, there is good 
reason to believe the proposed authority. However, "When X asserts 
some p in a field other than R, X’s knowledge of R is not usually 
sufficient to justify belief in what X says unless the second p is in a 
field closely related to R or is otherwise connected to it” (p. 52). So, 
the third standard is the relevance of the realm of competence to the 
field that the statement is in.
The fourth criterion is the trustworthiness criterion, referring to 
the question whether or not the proposed authority is a reliable 
source of information. According to De George (1985), this is a 
question of character and fairness, and "Y must have good reason for
This example is not presented by De George (1985). De George (1985), 
however, gives a similar example: "Knowledge of how the stars determine 
individual destinies is simply not available if the stars do not determine individual 
destinies. People may claim to have such knowledge, and others may believe 
them. But their belief cannot be grounded if there is no such knowledge” (p. 47).
23 In my opinion, the phrasing ‘X  have knowledge of R’ is somewhat unfortunate. It 
reads as ‘The proposed authority should have knowledge of the realm’, whereas 
that was probably not De George’s (1985) intention. If I correctly assume that the 
knowledge criterion deals with the presence of real knowledge, phrasing such as 
‘there is knowledge of R’ or ‘knowledge of R exists’ would have been more 
appropriate.
24 I find the term ‘the inductive criterion’ somewhat confusing, as judging epistemic 
authority with respect to the other three criteria may involve inductive bases as 
well. There should also be, for instance, enough inductive bases to conclude that 
someone is trustworthy.
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believing that X is telling the truth or is stating what X believes when 
X enunciates p” (p. 40). So, the fourth condition under which an 
epistemic authority is legitimate is trustworthiness.
Wilson (1983) analyzes the phenomenon of cognitive authority 
from the perspective of social epistemology rather than from 
philosophical epistemology, as De George (1985) does. He starts on 
the basis of the following definition:
"We shall say that person A is a cognitive authority for person B with respect 
to sphere of interest S to the degree that what A says about questions 
falling within the sphere S carries weight for B. A is a cognitive authority for 
me in matters of politics to the degree that what A says about political 
questions carries weight with me. If what A says carries a lot of weight, he 
has a lot of authority; if it carries no weight, he has no authority” (p. 13).
He makes three points in addition to this definition: (1) that the 
authority involves at least two people, because there has to be 
another person to be an authority for (2), that he can be one in 
different degrees, and (3) in different spheres. So far, his definition is 
very similar to De George’s, although in Wilson’s definition, the 
gradedness of cognitive authority is made explicit (expressed in "to 
the degree”).
Wilson (1983) addresses the question of how we can choose 
among sources who all claim to be experts on an issue. He mentions 
a couple of ‘bases of authority’. First of all, to answer the question 
‘What qualifies him to speak on the subject?’, he mentions the 
‘occupational specialization rule’ ("he makes his living dealing with 
that subject”, p. 21) and the ‘formal education rule’ ("he has studied 
the subject systematically and deeply and has earned advanced 
degrees in the subject”, p. 21).
Then he goes on to discuss two kinds of reputation rules to 
answer the question "Is he a great expert?”: the ‘reputation among 
peers rule’ ("we take reputation among others who are supposed to 
be experts in the same line of work or study as indication of 
outstanding competence”, p. 22) and the ‘reputation among other 
cognitive authorities rule’ ("Those already established as my cognitive 
authorities can transfer authority to another”, p. 22). Wilson (1983) 
also mentions the ‘common consent rule’ that "amounts to a 
generalization of the two other reputation rules” (p. 23). This rule says 
that someone can be identified as a cognitive authority in a certain 
sphere, if everyone recognizes him as an authority in that sphere.
In addition, Wilson (1983) mentions the ‘performance rule’, 
stating that if a person can achieve striking results in a certain area, 
he or she deserves to be recognized as a cognitive authority in that
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area. He notes, however, that there are many cases in which we 
cannot evaluate the performances ourselves, so that the performance 
rule cannot serve us and we have to rely on the reputation rule.
Next on Wilson’s list is the ‘intrinsic plausibility rule’: cognitive 
authority can be justified on the ground that he continues to tell 
plausible things. He notes that prior beliefs may determine the 
applicability of this particular test. The more the expert talks about 
matters that are distant from our own established beliefs, the less 
likely it is that we will be able to apply the test.
The last rule is the ‘personal trust rule’, saying that figures 
acquire cognitive authority, if their personality is so impressive that we 
are prepared to believe whatever they say (e.g. prophets, heroes).
If we compare Wilson’s bases of cognitive authority to De 
George’s criteria for legitimate epistemic authority, two substantial 
differences can be observed (see Table 2.2). First of all, Wilson 
(1983) does not refer to the knowledge criterion and relevance 
criterion like De George (1985) does. Second, the inductive criterion, 
identified by De George (1985), appears to be further specified by 
Wilson (1983) into several rules. All these rules may be used to 
answer the question if there is sufficient reason to believe that the 
proposed authority is someone who has knowledge of the realm.
Table 2.2 Comparison between De George's and W ilson's approach to 
epistemic/cognitive authorities._________________________________________________
De George (1985) Wilson (1983)
The knowledge criterion -
The inductive criterion Occupational specialization rule 
Formal education rule 
Reputation among peers rule 
Reputation among other cognitive 
authorities rule 
Common consent rule 
Performance rule 
Intrinsic plausibility rule
The relevance criterion -
The trustworthiness criterion Personal trust rule
In section 2.2, I will present a study on the argumentation-theoretical 
conceptions of good authorities and discuss how these correspond to 
De George’s and Wilson’s views.
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2.2 Argumentation-theoretical criteria
Traditionally, the improper use of an appeal to authority has been 
called the fallacy of argumentum ad verecundiam. According to 
Walton (1989, 1997), logic textbooks have typically defined the fallacy 
as appealing to an authority of expertise. More recently, it has been 
acknowledged that an appeal to expert opinion is not always a fallacy, 
but should be regarded as a type of argument that can be reasonable 
in some cases but fallacious in others (Schellens, 1985; Walton, 
1989, 1997). Therefore, in more recent textbooks, critical questions 
have been suggested to help readers determine whether or not an 
appeal to expertise should be considered a fallacy.
In an extensive study on appeals to expert opinion, Walton
(1997) presented a survey of the sets of critical questions proposed in 
various textbooks (pp. 199-222). He noted: "While many accounts 
appear to agree on a few fundamental points, there is in fact not a 
great deal of uniformity or consistency in their treatments of the 
subject” (p. 199). On the basis of an analysis of the textbook criteria 
for evaluation, he formulated a new set of critical questions (pp. 222­
229). Similar to Walton (1997), I made an inventory of critical 
questions for the evaluation of the argument from authority. However, 
there are some differences between his study and mine.
First, I grouped together critical questions with similar 
meanings, to be able to determine if these kinds of questions are 
used by laymen for evaluating the argument from authority. I did not 
intend to propose a new, unified set of critical questions on the basis 
of the analysis. In other words, the emphasis in my study is more on 
classification and less on identifying points of agreement and 
disagreement and solving problems by revising the textbook criteria.
Second, I included sets of critical questions in my literature 
study that Walton (1997) does not appear to have used in his. I also 
included the set of questions that Walton (1997) proposed.
Third, I report on the extent to which the evaluation criteria in 
argumentation theory correspond to the views on authority in 
philosophical and social epistemology (see 2.1.2).
In this section, the key question is: what evaluation questions 
have been suggested in argumentation theory for the evaluation of 
the argument from authority? To address this question, a literature 
study was carried out. Next, the details of the method will be 
discussed.
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2.2.1 Method
A selection of publications was made in the field of argumentation 
theory. I only took into consideration those publications treating the 
argument from authority and its evaluation. To determine which 
argumentation-theoretical approaches would be relevant, I used 
Garssen (1997) as a starting point. In his work, he deals with 
typologies of argumentation schemes from different approaches: the 
pragma-dialectical approach, argument types in American debating 
handbooks, Hastings’s typology of argument schemes, argument 
schemes in Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric, 
Schellens’s typology of arguments and Kientpointer’s approach. 
Using these as a basis, I decided to add some approaches to my 
literature study and to disregard some others.
First, I disregarded sources published before 1985, the year in 
which Schellens published his Reasonable Arguments. In this work, 
he considers existing evaluation questions associated with argument 
schemes and presents his own, modified version. Since Schellens 
had already dealt with publications before 1985, I relied on his 
Reasonable Arguments and on the work he published together with 
Verhoeven in 1994. In this book, Schellens and Verhoeven present a 
summary of occassionally adjusted evaluation questions25.
Second, I did not take into consideration the work of Perelman 
and Olbrecht-Tyteca, and Kientpointer. Although they distinguished 
different argument schemes, they have not explicitly formulated 
evaluation questions connected to these schemes.
Third, I decided to add two publications to the literature study 
that focus on critical thinking: Warnick and Inch (1989) and Reinard 
(1991). Both books aim to develop skills in constructing as well as 
refuting arguments. I decided to add these publications, since the 
perspective of critical thinking is different from other perspectives in 
that it is a domain not primarily defined by its subject -  argumentation 
-  but still concerned with the ability to evaluate arguments (see also 
Van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 1996, pp. 163­
188).
Fourth, I considered Meany and Shuster (2002). I selected this 
source, because it is more up-to-date than the debating literature 
used by Garssen (1997). They also mention the argument from
25 More recently, in a chapter on argumentation analysis, Verhoeven and Schellens 
(2008) presented argument schemes and scheme-dependent evaluation 
questions. As these are based on Schellens and Verhoeven (1994), I decided to 
disregard Verhoeven and Schellens (2008).
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authority as a separate kind of argument and formulate critical related 
questions.
Last, I included Walton’s view on the evaluation of the 
argument from authority, as published in Appeal to Expert Opinion: 
Arguments from Authority (1997).
In sum, the following works were studied: Garssen (1997), 
Schellens (1985), Schellens and Verhoeven (1994), Walton (1997), 
Meany and Shuster (2002), Reinard (1991) en Warnick and Inch 
(1989). An inventory was made of the evaluation questions 
formulated in these publications for the argument from authority. 
Then, the evaluation questions were classified on the basis of 
relationships between them. Next, the results of this classification will 
be reported.
2.2.2 Results
I classified the criteria formulated in argumentation theory to evaluate 
arguments from authority. Eight main categories can be distinguished 
with questions that apply specifically to the argument from authority. I 
found one question that can be applied not only to the argument from 
authority, but also to other argument schemes. Next, I will discuss 
each of the categories.
(I) Specific to the argument from authority
(I.1) Relevant expertise criterion
In argumentation theory, questions have been proposed about 
whether or not the authority cited is an expert in the relevant field, that 
is, the field to which the assertion pertains (see Table 2.3). This group 
of questions refers to what I call the relevant expertise criterion (I.1).
There is also a category of questions that refer to what I label 
the expert criterion (I.1.1). These questions ask whether or not the 
source is really an expert. In my opinion, it is impossible to determine 
whether or not someone’s expertise is relevant to the field to which 
the statement pertains, before the question is answered whether the 
source indeed has some kind of expertise. Therefore, I consider the 
expert criterion-category (I.1.1) a subcategory falling under the more 
general category relevant expertise criterion (I.1).
Furthermore, Reinard (1991) proposes the following criterion: 
"Is the source respected by other authorities?”26 (p. 148). As this
26 Walton (1997) suggests a similar question: “Can testimony of peer experts in the 
same field be given to support E s  competence?” (p. 223). He suggests this
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question may help to determine if someone is credible as an expert 
source, I created a special category labelled respect by other 
authorities criterion (I.1.1.1).
Table 2.3 Evaluation questions falling under the category of (I.1) Relevant expertise 
criterion.
Evaluation question Source
I.1 Relevant expertise criterion
Is the source well qualified to speak on the issue? Warnick & Inch (1989, 
p. 114)
Is E an expert in the field that A is in? Walton (1997, p. 223)
Is the person who is proposed as an authority actually 
an expert in the domain concerned?27 (preliminary 
question)
Garssen (1997, p. 11)
Is the authority of the one who makes the statement a 
sign of correctness or acceptability of that statement?28
Garssen (1997, p. 11)
Are they qualified to speak about the subject they are 
cited in?
Meany & Shuster (2002, 
p. 63)
I.1.1 Expert criterion
How credible is E as an expert source? Walton (1997)
Is the source competent? Reinard (1991, p. 147)
Is A an expert?29 Schellens (1985, p. 
186); Schellens & 
Verhoeven (1994, p. 
131)
W hat are the qualifications of the person(s) 
cited as a source?
Meany & Shuster (2002, 
p. 63)
I.1.1.1 Respect by other authorities criterion
Is the source respected by other 
authorities?
Reinard (1991, p. 148)
(I.2) Trustworthiness criterion
This category contains questions referring to the reliability of the 
authority (see Table 2.4). These questions refer to the extent to which 
the authority’s person (as opposed to his expertise) is relied upon or 
confided in. To get an idea of the trustworthiness of the cited 
authority, argumentation theorists have suggested considering the 
factors bias and honesty. Walton (1997) explains that it is acceptable
question as a critical subquestion under the 'expertise question’, which is similar 
to what I call the expert criterion.
27 In Dutch: "Is de persoon die als autoriteit wordt opgevoerd, inderdaad deskundig 
op het betreffende gebied?” (1997, p. 11).
28 In Dutch: "Is het gezag of de autoriteit van degene die de uitspraak doet wel een 
teken van de juistheid of aanvaardbaarheid van die uitspraak?” (1997, p. 11.)
29 In Dutch: "Is A deskundig?” (1985, p. 186) and "Is de aangehaalde autoriteit 
deskundig genoeg om het standpunt op zijn gezag te aanvaarden?” (1994, p. 
131).
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for someone to have a bias, but the opinion should be based on 
knowledge in the field and not on a motive for gain (a “bad” bias).
Table 2.4 Evaluation questions falling under the category of (I.2) Trustworthiness 
criterion.
Evaluation question Source
I.2 Trustworthiness criterion
Is the source unbiased? Warnick & Inch (1989, 
p. 114)
Is the source biased so much that the opinion is 
unreliable?
Reinard (1991, p. 147)
Is the source more or less biased about the topic at 
hand?
Meany & Shuster (2002, 
p. 63)
Are there any reasons to doubt A's [...] objectivity?30 Schellens & Verhoeven 
(1994, p. 131)
Is A sincere?31 Schellens (1985, p. 
187); Schellens & 
Verhoeven (1994, p. 
131)
Is E personally reliable as a source? Walton (1997, p. 223)
(I.3) Accuracy of the cited opinion criterion
This class contains questions referring to the relationship between 
what the cited authority actually asserted and what is presumed to be 
his opinion (see Table 2.5). In other words, all questions within this 
category ask whether the cited opinion was accurately inferred from 
what the individual in fact asserted. Walton (1997) calls this the 
opinion question or the assertion question and explains that it "relates 
to the opinion asserted by the expert and to how what is presumed to 
be his opinion (a proposition) was extracted or inferred from the text 
of discourse the expert actually put forward in dialogue with the 
respondent” (p. 225).
30 In Dutch: "Zijn er redenen om te twijfelen aan A ’s [...] objectiveit?” (only in 
Schellens & Verhoeven, 1994, p. 31, not in Schellens, 1985).
31 In Dutch: "Is A oprecht?” (1985, p. 187); "Zijn er reden om te twijfelen aan A ’s 
oprechtheid [...]? ” (1994, p. 131).
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Table 2.5 Evaluation questions falling under the category of (I.3) Accuracy of the 
cited opinion criterion._________________________________ ________________________
Evaluation question Source
I.3 Accuracy of the cited opinion criterion
What did E assert that implies A ? Walton (1997, p. 223)
Has the cited authority indeed claimed P?32 Schellens & Verhoeven 
(1994, p. 131)
Has P been put forward correctly? Has it not been 
taken out of context (,..)?33
Schellens (1985, p. 
186); Schellens & 
Verhoeven (1994, p. 
131)
Is P clear and unambiguous?34 Schellens (1985, p. 
186); Schellens & 
Verhoeven (1994, p. 
131)
(I.4) External consistency criterion
According to argumentation theory, another way to evaluate the 
argument from authority is asking about the external consistency of 
the expert opinion (see Table 2.6). The advanced opinion may or may 
not be consistent with the opinion of other experts or with other 
available information. It can be argued that the external consistency- 
question should serve as a sub-question to answer other questions. 
For instance, from an opinion that is externally inconsistent, it can be 
concluded that the cited individual is not a genuine expert (because 
‘genuine experts say what other experts say’), or not trustworthy (‘if 
the expert’s statements are not in accordance with statements of 
other experts, he may not be relied upon’).
32 In Dutch: "Heeft de aangehaalde autoriteit inderdaad P beweerd?” (only included 
in Schellens and Verhoeven, 1994, p. 131, not in Schellens, 1985).
33 In Dutch: "Is P ju ist weergegeven, niet uit zijn verband gerukt (...) ?” (1985, p. 
186).
34 In Dutch: "Is P duidelijk en ondubbelzinnig?” (1985, p. 186); "Is het standpunt P 
duidelijk en ondubbelzinnig onder woorden gebracht?” (1994, p. 131).
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Table 2.6 Evaluation questions falling under the category of (I.4) External 
consistency criterion.__________________________________________________________
Evaluation question Source
I.4 External consistency criterion
Is the testimony consistent with other sources of 
information?
Warnick & Inch (1989, 
p. 114)
Is the opinion externally consistent? Reinard (1991, p. 150)
Is P in accordance with statements of other 
authoritative sources?35
Schellens (1985, p. 
186); Schellens & 
Verhoeven (1994, p. 
131)
Is P in accordance with other available information?36 Schellens (1985, p. 
186); Schellens & 
Verhoeven (1994, p. 
131)
Is A consistent with what other experts assert? Walton (1997, p. 223)
(I.5) Internal consistency criterion
Other critical questions refer to the internal consistency of the opinion, 
so the extent to which the expert’s statement contradicts his or her 
other statements (see Table 2.7). Similar to external consistency, it 
can be argued that the question of internal consistency should serve 
as a sub-question to answer other questions, like the expert-question 
or the trustworthiness-question. If someone appears to have changed 
his opinion, this may raise the question if he or she is really that 
competent (‘competent people do not change their opinion or do not 
make contradictory statements’) or reliable (‘if he changes his opinion 
from time to time, he may not be relied upon’).
Table 2.7 Evaluation questions falling under the category of (I.5) Internal consistency 
criterion.
Evaluation question Source
I.5 Internal consistency criterion
Is the opinion internally consistent? Reinard (1991, p. 149)
Is P is accordance with other statements from the same 
source?37
Schellens (1985, p. 
186); Schellens & 
Verhoeven (1994, p. 
131)
35 In Dutch: "Is P in overeenstemming met uitspraken van andere gezaghebbende 
bronnen?” (1985, p.186).
36 In Dutch: "Is P in overeenstemming met andere beschikbare informatie?” (1985, 
p. 186); "Is het standpunt P in overeenstemming met [...] informatie van andere 
gezaghebbende bronnen?” (1994, p. 131).
37 In Dutch: "Is P in overeenstemming met andere uitspraken van dezelfde bron?” 
(1985, p. 186).
45
(I.6) Ability to provide evidence criterion
Walton (1997) recommends asking for backup evidence (see Table 
2.8). If the expert says something about a particular situation that 
cannot be verified by the receiver, then evidence is needed to 
understand how the expert came to have this opinion. If the proposed 
authority does not react appropriately to this request for additional 
information, then his or her opinion is less likely to be believed. A 
similar question has been suggested by Warnick and Inch (1989): 
"Has the source access to firsthand information about the issue?” (p. 
114). This question is comparable to Walton’s, as the expert should 
back up the statement with evidence that he or she personally had 
access to the situation or information pertaining to the statement. 
Again, it can be argued that the evidence test should serve to answer 
other questions. For instance, if the cited authority does not provide 
evidence on which the opinion was based, this authority may be 
valued as ‘low’ in the expert-dimension (‘genuine experts are able 
and willing to give additional information’) and on trustworthiness (‘if 
he does not comply with the request to give additional information, he 
may not be relied upon’).
Table 2.8 Evaluation questions falling under the category of (I.6) Ability to provide 
evidence criterion, (I.7) Recency criterion, (I.8) Opinion-to-conclusion relevance 
criterion and (II) Strength of conclusion criterion._________ ________________________
Evaluation question Source
I.6 Ability to provide evidence criterion
Is A ’s assertion based on evidence? Walton (1997, p. 223)
Has the source access to firsthand information about 
the issue?
Warnick & Inch (1989, 
p. 114)
I.7 Recency criterion
Is the cited statement not outdated?38 Schellens (1985, p. 186)
I.8 Opinion-to-conclusion relevance criterion
(...) has it [P] (possibly) been correctly interpreted or 
paraphrased?
Schellens (1985, p. 
186); Schellens & 
Verhoeven (1994, p. 
131)
II Strength of conclusion criterion
Is the certainty of the conclusion in accordance with the 
answers on question 1-9?40
Schellens & Verhoeven 
(1994, p. 132)
38 In Dutch: "Is de aangehaalde uitspraak niet verouderd?” (only in Schellens, 
1985, p. 186, not in Schellens & Verhoeven, 1994).
39 In Dutch: "Is P (...) (eventueel) correct geïnterpreteerd of geparafraseerd?” 
(1985, p. 186).
40 In Dutch: "Is de stelligheid van de conclusie in overeenstemming met de 
antwoorden op vraag 1-9?” (only in Schellens & Verhoeven, 1994, p. 132, not in 
Schellens, 1985).
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(1.7) Recency criterion
Schellens (1985, p. 186) included the following in his set of questions: 
"Is the cited statement not outdated?” (see Table 2.8). Even if an 
argument from authority passes all other tests (relevant expertise, 
trustworthiness, etc.), the receiver may still decide that the statement 
is outdated and not accept the supported claim. It is also possible that 
the recency-question serves as a sub-question to determine the 
degree of expertise. After all, if a statement has been made years 
ago, it is reasonable to think that the cited individual was, at the time 
he made his assertion, not as competent as those individuals who 
gained knowledge in the domain more recently.
(1.8) Opinion-to-conclusion relevance criterion
In Schellens (1994) and in Schellens and Verhoeven (1994), a 
criterion is mentioned concerning the relevance of the source’s 
presumed or cited opinion to the claim that is defended. I call this 
criterion the opinion-to-conclusion relevance criterion. It can be 
considered a scheme-specific variant of the more general relevance 
criterion. For example:
1. A leading Australian eye expert has warned that people who do not 
adopt a healthy life style can expect a loss of vision in later life. 
Therefore, an unhealthy lifestile can lead to vision loss.
2. That bag of chips you're nibbling on today could affect your eyesight 
tomorrow ... that's the warning from a leading Sydney optometrist 
published in a Brisbane newspaper. Therefore, junkfood causes 
blindness.
(The first example is based on http://www.news-medical.net/news/ and 
the second example is based on http://www.pca.com.au/healthnews.php, 
retrieved June 9th, 2009)
In the first example, the expert’s warning appears to prove the right 
conclusion, whereas in the second example, the warning appears to 
prove the wrong conclusion. Or, to avoid the right-wrong dichotomy: 
the conclusion in the first example is more appropriate than the 
conclusion in the second example. The second example appears to 
be an instance of a fallacy of relevance and more specifically, of a 
subtype that according to Walton (2004) could be correctly described 
as the wrong conclusion fallacy: "The simplest type of fallacy of 
relevance occurs in cases where the chain of argumentation starting 
from the premises proves the wrong conclusion, i.e. a proposition that 
may look like the conclusion to be proved, but is a different
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conclusion41” (p. 72). For an argument from authority specifically, it 
seems reasonable to require that the presumed opinion does not leap 
too quickly to the conclusion it is supposed to be argued for.
(II) Generally applicable to all argument schemes: strength of 
conclusion criterion
As Table 2.8 shows, I found one question that I do not consider to be 
specific to the argument from authority: "Is the certainty of the 
conclusion in accordance with the answers on question 1-9?” 
(Schellens & Verhoeven, 1994, p. 132). After all, it goes for all 
argument types that the conclusion should not be formulated in terms 
that are too absolute.
2.2.3 Conclusion and discussion
In this section, an attempt was made to answer the following 
question: what criteria have been formulated in argumentation theory 
to evaluate the quality of the argument from authority? It appears that 
the suggested criteria can be classified according to eight different 
main categories that apply specifically to the argument from authority: 
(I.1) the relevant expertise criterion, (I.2) the trustworthiness criterion,
(I.3) the accuracy of the cited opinion criterion, (I.4) the external 
consistency criterion, (I.5) the internal consistency criterion, (I.6) the 
ability to provide evidence criterion, (I.7) the recency criterion and
(I.8) the opinion-to-conclusion relevance criterion.
As I mentioned in the discussion of the various classes, it can 
be argued that some kinds of questions should serve as sub­
questions to answer other questions. More specifically, questions in 
classes (I.4)-(I.7) might be used for answering questions that fall into 
category (I.1) and (I.2). Therefore, category (I.1) and (1.2) may be 
regarded as two overarching categories.
To what extent do the classes of evaluation criteria 
correspond to De George’s and Wilson’s view to good authorities, as 
discussed in 2.1.2? First, I discuss the similarities. As Table 2.9
41 According to Walton (2004), this is the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi, or ignorance 
of refutation, described by Aristotle. He also treats another fallacy of relevance, 
which is known as red herring: “the fallacy of switching the topic of the 
discussion to some different issue that may be highly entertaining and diverting 
to the audience, distracting its attention from the real issue to be discussed” (p. 
72).
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shows, De George’s inductive criterion and most of Wilson’s rules 
correspond to the argumentation-theoretical expert criterion. I already 
argued that criteria in category (I.4)-(I.7) may be used to conclude 
that someone is a genuine expert. Therefore, it can be said that these 
categories correspond to De George’s inductive criterion. De 
George’s relevance criterion is similar to the relevant expertise 
criterion found in argumentation theory. Furthermore, De George’s 
trustworthiness criterion and Wilson’s personal trust rule correspond 
to the argumentation-theoretical trustworthiness criterion.
There are also differences between argumentation theory and 
the views of De George and Wilson. De George’s knowledge 
criterion, saying that someone should possess genuine knowledge, 
does not correspond to a general class of questions in argumentation 
theory. That does not mean that such a criterion cannot be found at 
all in argumentation theory. Walton (1997) has recommended it as a 
subquestion under what he calls the field-question: “Is the field of 
expertise cited in the appeal a genuine area of knowledge, or area of 
technical skill that supports a claim to knowledge?” (p. 224). In my 
opinion, it may rather serve as a subquestion for the expert-question, 
because someone cannot be a genuine expert if the area of 
knowledge is not genuine.
Furthermore, the argumentation-theoretical questions about 
the accuracy of the cited opinion (I.3) and the relevance of the opinion 
to the conclusion (I.8) have no equivalent in De George and Wilson. 
This can be explained by the fact that De George and Wilson try to 
answer the question ‘what is a good authority in a relationship 
between two people?’ (or between groups of people, or between a 
written document and an individual) and not necessarily ‘what is a 
good argument from authority?’ In an argument from authority, the 
authority is cited or quoted. In that case, the presumed opinion should 
be accurately inferred from the actual assertion. In addition, the 
presumed opinion should connect adequately to the claim defended. 
As De George and Wilson do not put authority in such an 
argumentative context, they are not concerned with the accuracy of 
the cited opinion or the relevance of the opinion to the conclusion.
In conclusion, the argumentation-theoretical approach to 
authority in the realm of knowledge appears to correspond to a 
considerable extent to the approaches of De George and Wilson, who 
attempted to clarify the nature of authority from a philosophical and 
social epistemological perspective respectively. So, with respect to 
what should make a strong expert opinion, argumentation theory is 
not alone in its norms.
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Table 2.9 Comparison between De George (1985), Wilson (1983) and argumentation 
theory.___________________ __________________________ _________________________
De George (1985) Wilson (1983) Argumentation theory
The knowledge criterion - -
The inductive criterion Occupational 
specialization rule 
Formal education rule 
Reputation among peers 
rule
Reputation among other 
cognitive authorities rule 
Common consent rule 
Performance rule 
Intrinsic plausibility rule
(1.1.1) Expert criterion
(1.1.1.1) Respect by other 
authorities criterion
(1.4) External consistency 
criterion
(1.5) Internal consistency 
criterion
(1.6) Ability to provide 
evidence criterion
(1.7) Recency criterion
The relevance criterion - (I.1) Relevant expertise 
criterion
The trustworthiness 
criterion
Personal trust rule (I.2) Trustworthiness 
criterion
- - (I.3) Accuracy of the cited 
opinion criterion
- - (I.8) Opinion-to- 
conclusion relevance 
criterion
2.3 Laymen criteria
In section 2.2, I discussed argumentation-theoretical conceptions of 
the quality of the argument from authority. In this section, the central 
question is: which criteria are used by laymen to evaluate the quality 
of the argument from authority? A method to uncover laymen criteria 
had not been developed yet. Therefore, a methodological study was 
conducted. A more detailed report on this study can be found in 
Sorm, Timmers and Schellens (2007).
2.3.1 Methodological study
The issue of revealing laymen theories of argument quality is complex 
and multi-faceted. One cannot simply ask laymen to give their criteria,
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because they are often not aware of them. Laymen need to be 
stimulated to think about the criteria they use to evaluate argument 
quality. Such input may come in the form of concrete arguments or 
situations, encouraging laymen to think about argument quality and 
formulate their criteria. In a methodological study, two types of 
stimulus material were used: a closed case and an open case. Apart 
from the two types of material, two different data gathering 
instruments were used: focus groups and individual interviews. This 
led to the following research question: which of the two methods, 
focus groups or individual interviews, yields a more detailed picture of 
laymen criteria?
The closed case consisted of a claim and seven supporting 
arguments. The arguments were manipulated in such a way that each 
failed to meet a different criterion that has been suggested in 
argumentation theory. For example, this argument violated the 
criterion that the cited statement should be recent: “As early as the 
1950s, Robert Oppenheimer, the father of the nuclear bomb, said that 
nuclear energy is a promising way to reduce the greenhouse effect”. 
The argument supported the claim “Greatly increasing the use of 
nuclear energy leads to a strong reduction of the greenhouse effect”. 
The task of the respondents was to arrange the arguments in order of 
strength and to explain the ranking for each argument. From their 
explanations, it could be inferred what criteria they used for 
distinguishing stronger from weaker arguments from authority.
Using only this closed case may have considerable 
drawbacks. Since the respondents’s comments were dependent on 
the arguments and the manipulations made by design, the 
respondents were likely to produce those criteria that were prompted 
by the flawed arguments. Applied to the example above, respondents 
were likely to use the criterion of recency because they were 
prompted by an argument violating that particular criterion. To get a 
realistic view on laymen criteria, a different type of case was needed 
to stimulate respondents to come up with their own arguments and to 
generate criteria spontaneously.
In the open case, respondents were asked to put themselves 
in a position in which it was natural to come up with a strong and a 
weak argument and to indicate why one argument is stronger than 
the other (and thus to give criteria for argument evaluation). 
Respondents were asked to imagine that they had applied for a job 
as an editor of a current affairs television program, whose task it was 
to invite guests for the program. They were given a fictitious claim 
and the task to name one person who could defend the claim properly
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and one person who could not defend the claim properly. Afterwards, 
they had to explain why one guest was more suitable for defending 
the claim than the other, thus giving their criteria for the quality of the 
argument from authority.
We suspected that it would be a difficult task for people to 
come up with arguments and evaluations on their own, especially if 
they could not benefit from other people’s ideas. A possible solution 
for this problem was the use of focus groups. Focus groups are group 
discussions facilitated by a moderator. The most important advantage 
of a focus group is that respondents can benefit from each other’s 
input. This interaction stimulates ideas that would not have come up 
otherwise (Krueger & Casey, 2000). It is assumed by Hartman (2004) 
and Greenbaum (1998) that the synergistic effect generated by focus 
groups can be more revealing than the sum of individual interviews.
A factor that complicates focus groups is the individual 
characteristics of the respondents (Krueger & Casey, 2000). 
Dominant talkers and self-appointed experts can inhibit others in the 
group to put forward their opinion. The reactions of the other 
respondents to specific ideas or personal behavior can be influenced 
by one or two dominant respondents (Krueger & Casey, 2000; 
Greenbaum, 1998). As this is one of the biggest concerns of critics of 
the focus group technique, we also used individual interviews. In 
individual interviews, there are no negative effects of group dynamics. 
Respondents speak their own mind and their reactions are not 
influenced by others. Since a criterion mentioned by a particular 
respondent can be ascribed to that individual, individual interviews 
have the additional advantage that the agreement on a certain 
criterion can be determined.
A total of 48 respondents, all students at Dutch universities, 
participated in this study. They received an open and a closed case. 
The open case was always presented first, to prevent the answers in 
the closed case from influencing the reactions in the open case. The 
cases were dealt with in one of two settings: a focus group or an 
individual interview. 24 respondents participated in the individual 
interviews and 24 respondents participated in the focus groups (four 
focus groups, six respondents in each group).
A content analysis of the data, consisting of transcribed 
conversations, revealed a total of 32 different laymen criteria. The 
results showed that the individual interviews generated all 32 criteria, 
whereas focus groups generated 28 out of 32 criteria. So, the 
individual interviews generated four ‘exclusive’ criteria that were not 
generated by the focus groups, whereas all criteria generated by the
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focus groups were also generated by the interviews. So, the 
individual interview appeared to be a more productive instrument than 
the focus group for determining laymen criteria.
Furthermore, we expected that the advantages of the focus 
group would be strongest in the open case, because respondents can 
benefit from each other’s suggestions. However, in the focus groups,
20 out of 32 criteria were mentioned in the open case, whereas in the 
individual interviews, 25 out of 32 criteria were mentioned in the open 
case. Hence, the expected advantage of focus groups did not appear 
in the results of our study.
We also found that the open case generated 28 out of 32 
criteria, whereas the closed cases generated 27 out of 32 criteria. 
Thus, in the open cases, five ‘exclusive’ criteria were mentioned that 
were not mentioned in the closed cases, whereas the closed cases 
yielded four ‘exclusive’ criteria that were not yielded by the open 
cases. So, both types of stimulus material appeared (approximately) 
to be equally productive.
It was concluded from the study that all instruments and 
material serve the purpose of finding laymen criteria. However, the 
individual interviews, in which both open and closed cases are used, 
appeared to yield a more detailed picture of laymen criteria. 
Furthermore, the expected advantage of focus groups, that 
respondents can benefit from each other’s suggestions in the open 
case, did not appear in the results of the study. The implication for the 
research project was that to uncover laymen criteria, it was best to 
work with individual interviews on an open and closed case.
2.3.2 What criteria do laymen use?
In the methodological study described in paragraph 2.3.1, the focus 
was on the argument from authority. This not only enabled us to 
evaluate methods, but also to answer the question which criteria 
laymen use for evaluating the argument from authority. This question 
has been answered in Sorm et al. (2007) to some extent, but as the 
main purpose in that article was to evaluate methods, less attention 
went to the criteria generated to evaluate the argument from 
authority.
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2.3.2.1 Method
Material
Open case (see appendix 2A-B). In the open case, no arguments 
were given to the respondents. The respondents got the following 
assignment: "You have applied for a job as an editor for NOVA (a 
well-known Dutch current affairs program). You are now in your job 
interview. You have to demonstrate to the HR manager that you can 
distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate guests. Therefore, 
you have to invite two guests that both agree with a claim: one guest 
who can defend the claim properly and a guest who will not be able to 
defend the claim properly” . It was emphasized that it was an 
imaginary debate, so that also people who had died or people who 
could not speak Dutch could be invited. It was also stressed that if a 
respondent could not come up with a name, a description of the guest 
would do. After identifying both authorities, the respondents were 
asked to explain why they had chosen a particular authority as 
suitable or unsuitable. From their explanations, criteria could be 
derived.
The claim to be defended was either (1) “Television 
commercials aimed at children are bad” (In Dutch: “Televisiereclame 
gericht op kinderen is slecht”) or (2) “Television commercials aimed at 
children have detrimental effects” (In Dutch: “Televisiereclame gericht 
op kinderen heeft schadelijke effecten”). The first claim was 
considered to be a desirability claim and the latter a probability 
claim42. A distinction between these two types of claims was made, 
because the study was carried out in cooperation with Timmers (to 
appear), who focused on argument types supporting a desirability 
claim. It could have been the case that the laymen criteria would differ 
for the different types of claims. It appeared, however, that it did not 
make a substantial difference for the laymen criteria whether a 
desirability claim or a probability claim was defended (but see note 
42).
Closed case (see appendix 2C-D). The closed case consisted of a 
claim and seven supporting arguments. The claim presented was 
either (1) “Nuclear energy is the best way to generate energy” (In 
Dutch: “Kernenergie is de beste manier om energie op te wekken” or
(2) “Greatly increasing the use of nuclear energy leads to a strong
42 It is debatable whether the probability-desirability-distinction was adequately 
operationalized. I will return to this point in the discussion.
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reduction of the greenhouse effect” (In Dutch: "Het veel meer 
gebruikmaken van kernenergie leidt tot een sterke terugdringing van 
het broeikaseffect”). For the same reason as indicated for the open 
case, we chose a desirability claim and a probability claim.
The arguments were the presumed opinions of authorities. 
They were manipulated on the basis of criteria formulated in 
argumentation theory. In selecting the argumentation-theoretical 
criteria, each general class of specific criteria was represented (see 
also section 2.2), except for the categories labelled ‘ability to provide 
evidence criterion’ and ‘opinion-to-conclusion relevance criterion’. 
Table 2.10 shows the evaluation criteria violated in the closed-case 
arguments.
Table 2.10 Evaluation criteria violated in the closed-case arguments (translated from 
Dutch).__________  ___________________________ ____________________________
Desirability claim Probability claim
Nuclear energy is the best 
way to generate energy.
Greatly increasing the use of 
nuclear energy leads to a 
strong reduction of the 
greenhouse effect.
Criteria violated Arguments Arguments
Violates:
(1) expert 
criterion43
(2) external 
consistency 
criterion 
(compare with 
C)44
A Some physicists of the VU 
University of Amsterdam 
think that nuclear energy is 
the best way to generate 
energy.
Some physicists of the VU 
University of Amsterdam 
think that with nuclear 
energy, the greenhouse 
effect can be greatly reduced.
Violates:
(1) recency 
criterion
(2) external 
consistency 
criterion 
(compare with 
C)
B As early as the 1950s, 
Robert Oppenheimer, the 
father of the nuclear bomb, 
said that nuclear energy is 
the best way to generate 
energy.
As early as the 1950s, Robert 
Oppenheimer, the father of 
the nuclear bomb, said that 
nuclear energy is a promising 
way to reduce the 
greenhouse effect.
Violates: C The famous soccer players The famous soccer players
43 The criterion was violated by leaving the source unidentified. According to 
Walton (1997), asking the following question is a way to determine whether 
someone is credible as an expert source: “What is E s  name, job or official 
capacity, location, and employer?” (p. 223). So, the source was made less 
credible as an expert source by not mentioning any names.
44 It was intended to make arguments A-B and D-G weak with respect to external 
consistency, in comparison with argument C. After all, argument C is the only 
argument in the list in which three different sources are cited that have the same 
opinion.
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(1) relevant
expertise
criterion
Ruud van Nistelrooij, Edgar 
Davids and Edwin van der 
Sar think that nuclear 
energy is the best way of 
generating energy.
Ruud van Nistelrooij, Edgar 
Davids and Edwin van der 
Sar think that the greenhouse 
effect can best be reduced by 
nuclear energy.
Violates:
(1) internal 
consistency 
criterion
(2) external 
consistency 
criterion 
(compare with 
C)
D Ruud van Wijk, the 
chairman of Greenpeace 
Netherlands, is of the 
opinion that there is no 
better way of generating 
energy.
Ruud van Wijk, the chairman 
of Greenpeace Netherlands, 
is of the opinion that the 
greenhouse effect can best 
be suppressed by switching 
to nuclear energy.
Violates:
(1)
trustworthiness
criterion
(2) external
consistency
criterion
(compare with
C)
E Frank Verbeet PhD, as a 
nuclear physicist connected 
to the nuclear power plant 
in Borssele, has been of the 
opinion for years that 
nuclear energy is the best 
way to generate energy.
Frank Verbeet PhD, as a 
nuclear physicist connected 
to the nuclear power plant in 
Borssele, has been of the 
opinion for years that nuclear 
energy is the best way to 
suppress the greenhouse 
effect.
Violates:
(1) expert 
criterion
(2) external 
consistency 
criterion 
(compare with 
C)
F Wil Derben, a 17-year-old 
VMBO45 pupil, also thinks 
that nuclear energy is the 
best way of generating 
energy.
Wil Derben, a 17-year-old 
VMBO pupil, also thinks that 
nuclear energy is the best 
solution to the greenhouse 
effect.
Violates:
(1) accuracy of 
the cited 
opinion 
criterion46
(2) external 
consistency 
criterion 
(compare with 
C)
G Prof. G. Verhoeven PhD, 
professor in nuclear physics 
at the Delft University of 
Technology, thinks that, 
under certain 
circumstances, nuclear 
energy can be a fairly good 
way to generate energy.
Prof. G. Verhoeven PhD, 
professor in nuclear physics 
at the Delft University of 
Technology, thinks that under 
certain circumstances, 
nuclear energy can make a 
certain contribution to the 
fight against the greenhouse 
effect.
45 VMBO (voorbereidend middelbaar beroepsonderwijs) is an educational level in 
the Netherlands, literally translated as preparatory middle-level vocational 
education.
46 The criterion was violated by making the statement unclear and ambiguous. 
After all, if a statement is unclear and ambiguous, one might wonder if the cited 
opinion was correctly inferred from what the source actually asserted.
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The respondents were asked to rank the arguments from 1 
(the best argument to support the claim) to 7 (the worst argument to 
support the claim). After the respondents had ranked the arguments, 
the interviewer asked why a particular argument was put first, why 
another argument was put second and so on. Criteria could then be 
derived from their explanations.
Respondents
The total number of respondents in this study was 48. 24 respondents 
participated in the individual interviews and 24 respondents 
participated in the focus groups. All 48 respondents were students at 
Dutch universities. The respondents were approached personally by 
the interviewers. Most respondents were female (77%). The ages of 
the respondents varied between 18 and 28, and the average age was
21 (SD = 2.40). To make sure that the respondents could be qualified 
as laymen, we verified whether they had taken courses in 
argumentation theory. Those who had, were not included in the 
research sample.
Design
Each respondent received one open case and one closed case. The 
open case was always presented first, to make sure that the reactions 
in the open case would not be affected by the answers in the closed 
case. A respondent saw either desirability claims or probability 
claims. So, if someone had seen a desirability claim in the open case, 
he or she would also see a desirability claim in the closed case. 
However, for each respondent, the claim topic in the open case 
(television commercials) was different from the claim topic in the 
closed case (nuclear energy).
Furthermore, the material was presented to a respondent in 
two different settings: either in an individual interview or in a focus 
group with five other respondents. In total, 24 individual interviews 
and four focus groups were conducted. Each focus group consisted 
of six respondents. This size corresponds to the ideal size of a focus 
group for non-commercial topics, which is usually between six and 
eight participants (Krueger & Casey, 2000). This design leads to four 
different combinations:
1) open case/ desirability claim 1; closed case/ desirability claim 2; 
individual interviews (n = 12)
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2) open case/ desirability claim 1; closed case/ desirability claim 2; focus 
groups (n = 12; 2 focus groups * 6 respondents)
3) open case/ probability claim 1; closed case/ probability claim 2; 
individual interviews (n = 12)
4) open case/ probability claim 1; closed case/ probability claim 2; focus 
groups (n = 12; 2 focus groups * 6 respondents)
Procedure
Each focus group was directed by a moderator team, which consisted 
of a moderator and an assistant moderator. The moderator was 
primarily concerned with directing the discussion, 
while the assistant helped the moderator to keep the conversation 
flowing. Each individual interview was conducted by only one 
interviewer. The interviewers and moderators were MA-students in 
Business Communication Studies at the Radboud University 
Nijmegen (the Netherlands).
The individual interviews and the focus groups followed a fixed 
pattern. First, the respondents were welcomed and told a fictitious 
purpose of the study ("to gain insight into the process of arguing"). 
Second, the moderator emphasized that there were no incorrect 
answers and that all respondents should feel free to share their points 
of view. Furthermore, the respondents were asked permission for the 
use of recording equipment and were told that their comments were 
confidential.
After the introduction, the interviewer or moderator presented 
the cases to the respondents. The open case was presented first, 
followed by the closed case. After reading a case, the respondents 
were given some time to reflect on it. In the open case, the 
respondents were asked to name one appropriate authority and one 
inappropriate authority. After naming the authorities, they were asked 
to explain their choices. In the closed case, the respondents were 
given a piece of paper and asked to rank the arguments and write 
down the result. After they had finished writing, all respondents were 
asked why they had ranked a certain authority first, second and so 
on.
In the focus groups, the moderator used some techniques to 
move the conversation along (Krueger & Casey, 2000). First of all, 
the moderator used the ‘pause-and-probe- technique’ to obtain 
additional information from the respondents. A five-second pause was 
used to elicit additional points of view or agreement with the position 
that was mentioned previously. The probe was a request for 
additional information, for instance: "Could you explain further?" and
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"ls there anything else?". In addition, the moderator made sure that 
everyone had a chance to share, by calling on the shy respondents 
and asking dominant talkers to give others a chance to speak.
The mean duration of a focus group was approximately 50 
minutes, whereas the mean duration of an individual interview was 15 
to 20 minutes. All conversations were recorded on tape and 
transcribed afterwards.
Data-analysis
The data consisted of transcripts, on which a content analysis was 
performed. The data were analyzed according to the steps of 
qualitative data analysis, as distinguished by Baarda, De Goede and 
Teunissen (1995).
The first step in the data analysis was to select relevant data 
and delete data that was irrelevant, such as utterances related to the 
task instruction (e.g. “Is everything clear so far?”) or utterances 
irrelevant to the task (e.g. “Yeah, you’re four years older than I am”).
The second step was to divide the relevant text into 
fragments. The rules for dividing a fragment were: (1) The fragment 
should be about one topic (e.g. the evaluation of one particular 
argument), (2) the fragment should be readable and understandable 
independent from the context and (3) the fragment should not be too 
short to avoid taking it out of context. This, for example, was 
considered a fragment:
(Evaluated argument G:
Prof. G. Verhoeven PhD, professor in nuclear physics at the Delft University of 
Technology, thinks that under certain circumstances, nuclear energy can make a 
certain contribution to the fight against the greenhouse effect.
Supported claim:
Greatly increasing the use of nuclear energy leads to a strong reduction of the 
greenhouse effect.)
In English:
R: He is a professor in nuclear physics, so I think he knows about it, that he is 
objective and he says “under certain circumstances a certain contribution”, so he is 
not very exaggerated in his statement and that's why I find him pretty realistic.
In Dutch:
Hij is een hoogleraar kernfysica, dus ik denk dat hij er verstand van heeft, dat hij 
objectief is en hij zegt “onder bepaalde omstandigheden een zekere bijdrage”, dus 
hij is niet heel erg overdreven in zijn stelling en daardoor vind ik hem ook vrij 
realistisch.
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The third step was to check each fragment, to see whether or not any 
criteria for evaluation were used. A criterion was defined as a norm 
applying to all arguments from authority, to avoid finding criteria 
dependent on the particular context in this study47. For example, if a 
respondent explained that he or she evaluated an argument positively 
because the authority does a lot of research, the decision was made 
that it could not be considered a criterion according to the definition. 
After all, the authority in question doing a lot of research was 
apparently inherent in the particular scientific context created in the 
study. By contrast, if someone explained that the positive evaluation 
was the result of the authority knowing about a certain subject (as in 
the exemplary fragment above), then that was considered a criterion 
according to the definition, as knowing about the subject could have 
been a requirement for all arguments from authority.
To illustrate this particular step, I will present the above 
fragment again, but now phrases are indicated in which criteria are 
used. Which criteria are used has also been indicated:
R: He is a professor in nuclear physics, so [1] I think he knows about it [1],
[2] that he is objective [2] and [3] he says “under certain circumstances a
certain contribution”, so he is not very exaggerated in his statement [3] and
[4] that's why I find him pretty realistic [4].
[1] Does he know about it?
[2] Is he objective?
[3] Is he exaggerated in his statement?
[4] Is he pretty realistic?
This shows that in this phase of the analysis, we stayed close to the 
literal verbalizations in formulating the criteria.
The fourth step was to reduce and to rearrange the set of 
criteria that was acquired in the previous step of the analysis. The 
questions that were registered in the previous step of the analysis, 
were grouped on the basis of a shared characteristic. The questions 
presented above ended up in different categories because they 
appeared to refer to different dimensions of the argument from 
authority.
The fifth step was to check whether the set of criteria was 
valid by using half of the data to come to a first set of criteria and see 
if that first set could be applied to the second half.
47 It is questionable whether or not this was a good decision, as the consequence 
may have been that valuable data were not analyzed. I will discuss this issue in 
the final paragraph of this chapter (2.4).
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Interrater agreement
To assess the extent to which fragments could be reliably related to 
criteria, interrater agreement was determined. The first raters were 
Timmers (to appear) and myself. Timmers analyzed the data 
regarding desirability claims; I analyzed the data concerning 
probability claims. The second rater was a MA-student in Business 
Communication Studies at the Radboud University Nijmegen (the 
Netherlands), who had knowledge in the field of argumentation 
theory. First, she received a written task description. This description 
stated that she was to judge a number of fragments, in which phrases 
were marked. In addition, it explained that her task would be to label 
the phrases with criteria. The rater received a list of possible criteria 
she could choose from. Each criterion on the list was clarified by 
definitions and illustrating examples. In the instruction, an example 
was also presented:
(1)48 R4: Yes I always think of him as someone who follows other 
opinions.
(2) R3: I always think of him as someone using difficult words. Not 
really interesting to listen to. Makes me think: “whatever”.
R1: He always breaks up his eight-word-sentence into three parts.
(1) Code: Criterion:
(2) Code: Criterion:
(In Dutch:
(1) R4: Ja die vind ik altijd dat die een beetje meegaat met andermans 
mening.
(2) R3: Die vind ik altijd een beetje moeilijke woorden hebben, zeg 
maar. Niet echt boeiend om naar te luisteren. Dan heb je al zoiets 
van “ laat maar”.
R1: Hij breekt altijd z'n zin van acht woorden in drie stukjes.
(1) Code: Criterium:
(2) Code: Criterium:)
The second rater also received a list with rules that were used by the 
first raters, for instance: ‘If the respondent uses a term that occurs 
literally in the list of criteria but interprets this term differently than we 
do, then choose the criterion that matches the respondent’s 
explanation’.
48 In the original instruction, the phrases were marked by different colours, not by 
different numbers.
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Five training items were presented, to give the second rater 
the opportunity to familiarize herself with the instrument and to ask for 
clarification. Afterwards, 49 randomly selected test items were 
presented.
The results showed that the Kappa Measure of Agreement 
value was .804 with a significance of p < .0005 (N = 79). According to 
Peat and Barton (2005, p. 268), this value generally represents good 
agreement. A very good agreement was nearly reached, as values 
above .81 are generally regarded as showing very good agreement 
(Peat & Barton, 2005, p. 268).
2.3.2.2 Results
Next, I will discuss the laymen criteria that were used. Criteria that do 
not correspond to theory are in italics.
Relevant expertise criterion
Laymen in this study demand that the authority should be specialized 
in the field to which his assertion is related. This is demonstrated in 
fragment (1):
________________________________ Fragment (1)________________________________
Evaluated argument (C):
The famous soccer players Ruud van Nistelrooij, Edgar Davids and Edwin van der 
Sar think that the greenhouse effect can best be reduced by nuclear energy.
Supported claim:
Greatly increasing the use of nuclear energy leads to a strong reduction of the 
greenhouse effect.
In English:
R: C, with the help of well-known football players an argument is given, whereas 
they, yes perhaps they know their facts, but they are not really specialized. So I 
would not refer to that so quickly. It don't think that's really persuasive.
I: In what way do you not find that really persuasive?
R: B e cause . They are football players, they are known for that. If they are also 
specialized in this field, you should say so. Also specialized in nuclear energy.
In Dutch:
R: C, met behulp van bekende voetballers wordt er een argument gegeven, terwijl 
zij, ja  misschien hebben ze wel verstand van zaken, maar ze zijn er niet echt in 
gespecialiseerd. Dus ik zou daar niet zo gauw op terug verwijzen. Ik denk niet dat 
dat echt overtuigend is.
I: Hoezo vind je  dat niet echt overtuigend?
R: Omdat... zij zijn voetballers, daar staan ze bekend om. Als zij ook 
gespecialiseerd zijn in dit vakgebied dan zou je dat erbij moeten zeggen. Ook 
gespecialiseerd in kernenergie._______________________________________________
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Fragment (1) indicates that the argument would have been more 
persuasive if an additional statement had been made that the soccer 
players were specialists in the field of nuclear energy49. Thus, laymen 
question whether the expertise of an individual is related to the field 
that the assertion is in.
Expert criterion
Respondents in this study appeared to determine if the cited authority 
was a genuine expert. This is illustrated in fragment (2):
________________________________Fragment (2)________________________________
Evaluated argument (A):
Some physicists of the VU University of Amsterdam think that with nuclear energy, 
the greenhouse effect can be greatly reduced.
Supported claim:
Greatly increasing the use of nuclear energy leads to a strong reduction of the 
greenhouse effect.
In English:
R: Okay, I find A, C and F bad arguments, because A it says some physicists of 
the VU University of Amsterdam. I don't find that specific enough, it cannot be 
checked. Checked out. I find that if you refer to something, that you should be clear 
about what you are referring to.
In Dutch:
Oké, ik vind A, C en F slechte argumenten, omdat A er staat sommige 
natuurkundigen van de Vrije Universiteit van Amsterdam. Dat vind ik niet specifiek 
genoeg, dat valt niet na te trekken. Na te checken. Ik vind dat als je ergens naartoe 
refereert dat je ook duidelijk moet zijn waar naar toe.____________________________
The respondent in fragment (2) states that it is impossible to track 
‘some physicists’. For that reason it is impossible to determine 
whether the physicists are really experts or not (although the 
respondent does not state this consequence explicitly).
Trustworthiness criterion
In evaluating the argument from authority, respondents concentrated 
on the trustworthiness of the cited authority. Some refer to bias, as 
illustrated in fragment (3):
49 The choice of the word ‘persuasive’ suggests that this particular respondent in 
fact ranked the arguments on the basis of expected persuasive effectiveness, 
rather than argument quality. In the data, more indications were found that 
expected persuasiveness played a role in the evaluations of the respondents. I 
will discuss this issue later.
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_________________________________Fragment (3)________________________________
Evaluated argument (G):
Prof. G. Verhoeven PhD, professor in nuclear physics at the Delft University of 
Technology, thinks that under certain circumstances, nuclear energy can make a 
certain contribution to the fight against the greenhouse effect.
Supported claim:
Greatly increasing the use of nuclear energy leads to a strong reduction of the 
greenhouse effect.
In English:
R: Number 1 is G.
I; Why do you find that one the best?
R: Because he is independent, he does not have any interests in saying if he is for 
or against it. And because he is not connected to an authority that takes advantage 
of using nuclear energy, s o .  and the more independent, the better. He is more 
capable of judging advantages and disadvantages that way. It is less subjective.
In Dutch:
R: Nummer 1 is G.
I: Waarom vind je die het allerbeste?
R: Omdat hij onafhankelijk is, hij heeft er geen belangen bij om te zeggen of hij 
voor of tegen is. En omdat hij niet verbonden is aan enige instantie die voordelen 
heeft bij het gebruik van kernenergie, d u s .  en hoe onafhankelijker, hoe beter. Zo 
kan hij beter de voor- en nadelen beoordelen. Het is minder subjectief.____________
This respondent indicates that the evaluated argument is best, 
because the authority can consider the issue objectively. Others 
referred to honesty, as the following fragment shows:
________________________________Fragment (4)________________________________
Evaluated argument (D):
Ruud van Wijk, the chairman of Greenpeace Netherlands, is of the opinion that the 
greenhouse effect can best be suppressed by switching to nuclear energy.
Supported claim:
Greatly increasing the use of nuclear energy leads to a strong reduction of the 
greenhouse effect.
In English:
I: Okay. And whom would you put on number 3?
R: Er, I think D.
I: Greenpeace, and why?
R: Yes he is sympathetic towards the environment, of course Greenpeace is only a 
e r . y e s . I  am not all that happy with them and stuff, but I think that he is being 
honest in this case.
I: W hat do you mean he is being honest in this case?
R: Yes, sometimes they tend t o .  that they only act according to their own 
interests and not to you know the common good. And as I read it like that, I think 
he is being sincere.
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In Dutch:
I: Oké. En wie zou je op nummer 3 plaatsen?
R: Eh, ik denk D.
I: Greenpeace, en waarom?
R: Ja die is vrij begaan met het milieu, natuurlijk is Greenpeace ook maar een eh... 
j a .  ik ben er niet geweldig over te spreken of zo, maar ik denk dat hij in dit geval 
wel eerlijk is.
I: Hoezo is hij in dit geval eerlijk?
R: Ja, soms zijn ze n o g a l. dat ze alleen gaan voor wat ze zelf vinden en niet voor 
het grootste belang zeg maar. En volgens mij zoals ik het zo lees is hij wel oprecht.
External consistency criterion
Respondents question whether what the cited authority says is in 
agreement with what others say. Consider fragment (5):
I_________________________________Fragment (5)_________________________________
Evaluated argument (A):
Some physicists of the VU University of Amsterdam think that with nuclear energy, 
the greenhouse effect can be greatly reduced.
Supported claim:
Greatly increasing the use of nuclear energy leads to a strong reduction of the 
greenhouse effect.
In English:
R: Then I put A in 3rd place. I didn't put it on 1, because there it also says 
“physicists of the VU University”, but here it says “some”. That means that others 
disagree with it. So that's not really much good to me.
In Dutch:
R: Dan heb ik op 3 A staan, die heb ik niet op 1 gezet, want daar staan ook weer 
“natuurkundigen van de Vrije Universiteit”, maar hier staat “sommige”. Dat betekent 
dat anderen het er weer niet mee eens zijn. Dus daar heb ik niet zoveel aan._______
To the respondent, the phrasing “some physicists” implies that their 
opinion is not shared by all physicists, which leads to a negative 
evaluation of the argument.
Internal consistency criterion
Laymen appear to refer to internal consistency, as fragment (6) 
illustrates:
________________________________Fragment (6)________________________________
Evaluated argument (E):
Frank Verbeet PhD, as a nuclear physicist connected to the nuclear power plant in 
Borssele, has been of the opinion for years that nuclear energy is the best way to 
suppress the greenhouse effect.
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Supported claim:
Greatly increasing the use of nuclear energy leads to a strong reduction of the 
greenhouse effect.
In English:
R: After that, E, also a nuclear physicist, who has had that opinion for years, I find 
that a reliable source as well. I would believe someone like that.
In Dutch:
R: Daarna dan, E, ook kernfysicus, die heeft al jarenlang die mening, dat vind ik 
ook een betrouwbare bron, dat neem ik wel aan van zo iemand.__________________
In fragment (6) the cited Frank Verbeet is seen as a reliable source, 
because he has held the same opinion for years. In other words, the 
judgment that the opinion is internally consistent leads to a positive 
evaluation of the argument.
Flexibility criterion
The decision that an argument from authority has a certain property 
may result in a negative or a positive conclusion about the argument’s 
quality. Consider the following fragment:
________________________________Fragment (7)________________________________
Evaluated argument (E):
Frank Verbeet PhD, as a nuclear physicist connected to the nuclear power plant in 
Borssele, has been of the opinion for years that nuclear energy is the best way to 
suppress the greenhouse effect.
Supported claim:
Greatly increasing the use of nuclear energy leads to a strong reduction of the 
greenhouse effect.
In English:
I: Okay, in the middle part of the ranking if I may say so was that 17-year old 
VMBO-pupil, Robert Oppenheimer, and Dr. Frank Verbeet. Hey, that’s interesting 
since he is also a nuclear physicist. Just like Dr. G. Verhoeven. Then why not Dr. 
Verbeet?
R: I get that, but the difference between the two is, he is connected to the nuclear 
power plant in Borssele. In other words: he is defending his own job. And secondly, 
he has been claiming for years that nuclear energy is the best way to suppress the 
greenhouse effect. It’s a bit too obvious for me. I just don’t think it’s reliable. It could 
have been possible that if that man had had another job, and he wasn’t so obvious, 
that I would have thought he was reliable. But this just doesn’t seem to be an 
unbiased opinion, so...
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In Dutch:
I: Oké, het middengedeelte als ik het zo mag zeggen van de rangorde, dat was die 
17-jarige VMBO-scholier, Robert Oppenheimer en dr. Frank Verbeet. Hé, dat is 
opmerkelijk want dat is ook een kernfysicus. Net als dr. G. Verhoeven. Waarom dr. 
Verbeet dan niet?
R: Ik snap je wel, maar het verschil tussen die twee is, hij is verbonden aan de 
kerncentrale Borssele. Met andere woorden: hij staat zijn eigen baan te 
verdedigen. En ten tweede is hij al jaren van mening dat kernenergie de beste 
methode is om het broeikaseffect te bestrijden. Dat ligt er allemaal dik bovenop. 
Dus dat vind ik gewoon niet betrouwbaar. Het kan best zijn dat als die man een 
andere baan had gehad en iets minder het dik er boven op had gelegd dat ik hem 
dan wel betrouwbaar had gevonden. Maar dit vind ik gewoon niet onafhankelijk 
overkomen. Dus.
Similar to the previous fragment, this respondent mentions that the 
source Frank Verbeet has had the same opinion for years (see 
underlined part). However, instead of regarding that as a positive 
characteristic, the respondent interprets that as a sign for being an 
unreliable source. It is not internal consistency that appears to be the 
criterion here, but rather flexibility, or the source’s capability of 
changing opinions from time to time.
Ability to provide evidence criterion
In evaluating the argument from authority, the respondents refer to 
the evidence to explain or justify the opinion. For instance:
I_________________________________Fragment (8)________________________________
Evaluated argument (F):
Wil Derben, a 17-year-old VMBO pupil, also thinks that nuclear energy is the best 
solution to the greenhouse effect.
Supported claim:
Greatly increasing the use of nuclear energy leads to a strong reduction of the 
greenhouse effect.
In English:
R: I don't find a 17-year old VMBO-pupil, in argument F, very convincing either. 
Look, if he had added a fantastic argument, but it says nuclear energy is the best 
solution to the greenhouse effect. Well, that's already in the claim.
In Dutch:
R: Ik vind een 17-jarige VMBO scholier, bij argument F, ook niet echt overtuigend. 
Kijk als hij er nou een geweldig argument bij had gezet, maar er staat de 
kernenergie is de beste oplossing voor het broeikaseffect. Tsja, dat staat ook in de 
stelling._____________________________________________________________________
The respondent indicates that this particular argument from authority 
would have been more persuasive, if the pupil Wil Derben had
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backed up his opinion with arguments. That is quite remarkable, as in 
each argument in the closed case, the opinion was not backed up 
with arguments. It is possible that laymen particularly want individuals 
who have relatively low credibility as genuine experts, to back up their 
assertions.
Recency criterion
It appears from this study that laymen demand that the statement of 
the authority is not outdated. Consider fragment (9):
I_________________________________Fragment (9)________________________________
Evaluated argument (B):
As early as the 1950s, Robert Oppenheimer, the father of the nuclear bomb, said 
that nuclear energy is a promising way to reduce the greenhouse effect.
Supported claim:
Greatly increasing the use of nuclear energy leads to a strong reduction of the 
greenhouse effect.
In English:
R: I ranked A above B. It's nice 'n all that he made that nuclear bomb, b u t .  we are 
not exactly in the early 1950's anymore but have come a lot further along. And I'm 
not sure if this guy has made the effort to stay up to date on the subject.
In Dutch:
R: Ik had A boven B. Leuk dat hij die atoombom heeft gemaakt, maar intussen... 
we zijn nu niet in begin jaren 50, maar intussen zijn we een stuk verder. En ik weet 
niet of je dan nog moeite neemt om de boel bij te spijkeren._______________________
The respondent notes that the assertion is outdated and therefore, he 
questions if Robert Oppenheimer himself is an up-to-date expert.
Ahead-of-his-time expert criterion
An assertion made years ago can also be taken as a clue for the 
argument being strong. Consider fragment (10):
_______________________________ Fragment (10)_______________________________
Evaluated argument (B):
As early as the 1950s, Robert Oppenheimer, the father of the nuclear bomb, said 
that nuclear energy is a promising way to reduce the greenhouse effect.
Supported claim:
Greatly increasing the use of nuclear energy leads to a strong reduction of the 
greenhouse effect.
In English:
I: Okay, you put B Robert Oppenheimer in third place. Okay, can you describe 
once again why you put Oppenheimer in third place? That is also a fairly strong
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argument if you can see that in the ranking. Why did you put him in third?
R: He also seems a man who knows his stuff, a nuclear bomb and he works with 
nuclear energy and its waste. Yes and also a little historical perspective that he 
already understood that back then. If that can still be maintained today then it could 
be a strong argument or fairly strong.
In Dutch:
I: Oké, en op nummer drie heb je dan B Robert Oppenheimer. Oké, kun je dan ook 
weer aangeven waarom je Oppenheimer op nummer drie weer hebt neergezet? 
Dat is dan ook nog wel een redelijk sterk argument als je  dat in de rangorde kunt 
zien. Waarom heb je hem op nummer drie gezet?
R: Het lijkt me ook wel weer een man die er wat van af weet, een atoombom en die 
heeft met kernenergie te maken en afval ervan. Ja en ook een stukje historisch 
perspectief dat hij dat toen al doorzag eigenlijk. Als dat nu nog overeind kan staan 
dan zou dat wel een sterk argument kunnen zijn of redelijk sterk.__________________
The respondent in fragment (10) suggests that it can be a good thing 
that a statement is made some time ago -  under the condition that 
the statement still holds - because it means that for the source, the 
issue was obvious already years ago. In other words: the source was 
ahead of its time.
Hedged statement criterion
Laymen in this study pay attention to the certainty expressed in the 
assertion. Some see uncertainty as a reason to give the argument a 
positive evaluation:
_______________________________ Fragment (11)_______________________________
Evaluated argument (G):
Prof. G. Verhoeven PhD, professor in nuclear physics at the Delft University of 
Technology, thinks that under certain circumstances, nuclear energy can make a 
certain contribution to the fight against the greenhouse effect.
Supported claim:
Greatly increasing the use of nuclear energy leads to a strong reduction of the 
greenhouse effect.
In English:
I: Which argument would you use to defend the claim?
R: I think the letter G, of Prof. Dr. G. Verhoeven.
I: And why exactly?
R: Well, when I read him, he seemed the most reliable to me, the most convincing 
also because, let’s see, when you look at A, there it is presented really simply, they 
think it can be reduced and that’s that. Then there, it’s somewhat more specific, 
that under certain circumstances, and then with the help of n u c le a r, that’s 
formulated a little more conditionally. That just sounds a little more reliable than 
just saying it can be done w ith .
I: Okay, so do you mean the fact it is somewhat more specific, makes the 
argument more reliable?
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R: Yes because it seems more precise and yeah... yeah.
In Dutch:
I: Welke argument zou jij gebruiken om de stelling te verdedigen?
R: Ik denk letter G, van Prof. Dr. G. Verhoeven.
I: En waarom precies?
R: Ja, toen ik hem zo las, kwam die mij het meest betrouwbaar over, het meest 
overtuigend ook omdat, even kijken, als je bij A kijkt, daar wordt het heel simpel 
gebracht, die denken dat het terug kan worden gedrongen en klaar. Dan daar is 
het toch iets specifieker dat onder bepaalde omstandigheden, en dan met behulp 
van k e rn . dat is iets voorwaardelijker gebracht. Dat klinkt gewoon wat 
betrouwbaarder dan dat je gewoon zegt dat lukt wel m e t .
I: Oké, dus bedoel je dat dat specifieke, dat maakt dat argument betrouwbaar?
R: Ja omdat het dus nauwkeuriger lijkt en j a .  ja._______________________________
Certain statement criterion
Others would rather like to see a certain statement:
_______________________________ Fragment (12)_______________________________
Evaluated argument (E):
Frank Verbeet PhD, as a nuclear physicist connected to the nuclear power plant in 
Borssele, has been of the opinion for years that nuclear energy is the best way to 
suppress the greenhouse effect.
Supported claim:
Greatly increasing the use of nuclear energy leads to a strong reduction of the 
greenhouse effect.
In English:
I: Okay, you told me a couple of things, but what is the main reason you chose E 
and not G or D, like the others did? What do you think are the most important 
differences between them?
R: The combination of knowledge of theory and practice as a matter of fact. And 
the clarity with which the argument is formulated, so that there is just no doubt.
In Dutch:
I: Oké, je  hebt het al een beetje verteld, maar wat is voor jou de grootste reden om 
voor E te kiezen en niet voor G of D die de anderen hebben gekozen? Wat zijn 
daar voor jou de belangrijkste verschillen tussen?
R: Dus inderdaad de combinatie van kennis van theorie en praktijk. En de 
duidelijkheid waarmee het argument wordt gebracht, gewoon dat er geen twijfel in 
zit.
So, the fragments (11) and (12) show that certainty of the statement 
may lead to opposite conclusions: the argument from authority is 
good or bad.
70
Table 2.11 shows the criteria that laymen used to evaluate the quality 
of the argument from authority. Criteria that do not correspond to 
theory are in italics.
Table 2.11 Laymen criteria for the argument from authority (per type of claim, data 
gathering instrument, type of stimulus material) and agreement among respondents 
(the number of individual interviews in which the criterion was mentioned divided by 
the total number of individual interviews) (laymen criteria that do not correspond to 
theory are in italics).____________________^ _______________________ ______________
Probability claim Desirability claim
Individual
interviews
Focus
groups
Individual
interviews
Focus
groups
Criterion
<u
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O
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Agreement 
among 
respondents 
in individual 
interviews
Relevant
expertise
+ + + + + + + + 15 of 24
(63%)
Expert + + + + + + + + 24 of 24 
(100%)
Trustworthi­
ness
+ + + + + + + + 22 of 24 
(92%)
External
consistency
+ + - - - + - + 2 of 24 
(8%)
Internal
consistency
+ + - - - + + + 5 of 24 
(21%)
Flexibility - + - - - - + - 2 of 24 
(8%)
Ability to
provide
evidence
+ + + + + + + + 14 of 24 
(58%)
Recency - + - + - + - + 13 of 24 
(54%)
Ahead-of-
his-time
expert
criterion
+ 1 of 24 
(4%)
Hedged
statement
+ + - + - + - + 16 of 24 
(67%)
Certain
statement
- + - + + + - + 3 of 24 
(13%)
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2.4 Conclusion and discussion
Conclusion
The central question of this chapter is: to what extent do lay persons' 
criteria for the evaluation of the argument from authority correspond 
to the criteria formulated in argumentation theory? It appears that the 
evaluation standards correspond to a considerable extent. However, 
we should also take into consideration the extent to which laymen in 
this study agree on criteria that are also mentioned in theory. It 
appears that more than half of the respondents who participated in 
the individual interviews mentioned the relevant expertise criterion, 
the expert criterion, the trustworthiness criterion, the ability to provide 
evidence criterion and the recency criterion. For the external 
consistency criterion and the internal consistency criterion, the 
agreement among laymen appears to be considerably lower. In sum:
Corresponding criteria with relatively high agreement among respondents:
• The relevant expertise criterion: the source's expertise should be 
relevant to the opinion.
• The expert criterion: the source should be a genuine expert.
• The trustworthiness criterion: the source should be trustworthy.
• The ability to provide evidence criterion: the source should be able 
to provide evidence.
• The recency criterion: the source's statement should be recent.
Corresponding criteria with relatively low agreement among respondents:
• The external consistency criterion: the source's statement should 
be externally consistent.
• The internal consistency criterion: the source's statement should be 
internally consistent.
Most criteria that are distinguished in argumentation theory 
are used by laymen. There are some differences, however. Laymen 
in this study do not question the accuracy of the cited opinion, which 
means that they do not question whether what the expert actually 
asserted had been correctly understood, interpreted, quoted, etc. 
Although the intention was to violate this particular criterion in the 
closed case by making the statement unclear and ambiguous, the 
respondent had no reason to believe that the opinion was incorrectly 
cited. Instead, this manipulation stimulated respondents to focus on 
the certainty with which the presumed opinion was expressed. If the 
opinion is posed with certainty, then that may cause the argument 
from authority to be evaluated as either strong or weak. This,
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however, was not suggested in argumentation theory for the 
argument from authority.
Furthermore, respondents did not use the opinion-to- 
conclusion relevance criterion, nor did they focus on the strength of 
the conclusion. This was to be expected, as the material was not 
manipulated on the basis of these aspects.
In addition, laymen use the criterion that the source should be 
flexible (in the sense of being able to change opinion) and according 
to one layman, using an expert who is ahead of his time should make 
the argument strong. This was not mentioned in argumentation 
theory.
If we take into consideration the agreement among 
participants in the individual interviews, it appears that the hedged 
statement criterion is used by a majority of participants, whereas the 
flexibility criterion, the certain statement criterion and the ahead-of- 
his-time expert criterion is used by a minority of participants. In sum, 
the non-corresponding criteria are:
Non-corresponding criteria that are not mentioned by respondents:
• The accuracy of the cited opinion criterion: the source's opinion 
should be accurately cited (theory only, as expected, because of 
material).
• The opinion-to-conclusion relevance criterion: the source's opinion 
should be relevant to the conclusion (theory only, as expected, 
because of material).
• The strength of conclusion criterion: the conclusion should not be 
too strong (theory only, as expected, because of material).
Non-corresponding criterion with relatively high agreement among
respondents:
• The hedged statement criterion: the source's statement should be 
hedged (laymen only, unexpected).
Non-corresponding criteria with relatively low agreement among
respondents:
• The flexibility criterion: the source should be flexible (laymen only, 
unexpected).
• The certain statement criterion: the source's statement should be 
certain (laymen only, unexpected).
• The ahead-of-his-time expert criterion: the source should be ahead 
of his time (laymen only, unexpected).
Discussion
With respect to criteria for the argument from authority, argumentation 
theory and laymen are generally on the same line, although some
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laymen criteria appear to be more agreed upon in this study than 
other criteria. The relevant expertise criterion, the expert criterion, the 
trustworthiness criterion, the ability to provide evidence criterion and 
the recency criterion were mentioned in the greater number of 
individual interviews; the external consistency criterion and the 
internal consistency criterion were mentioned in the smaller number 
of individual interviews.
Some differences between argumentation theory and laymen 
are revealed in this study, but these should be interpreted carefully. 
After all, a part of the differences can be explained by the stimulus 
material. It is possible that laymen had insufficient reason to believe 
that the cited opinion was not accurate, because of the setup of the 
material. If we would have added direct quotes from the expert, or 
transcripts of dialogues, to the opinion, it might have been possible to 
provoke such a criterion. The same goes for the strength of the 
conclusion criterion and the opinion-to-conclusion relevance criterion 
that were not mentioned by laymen. Had we created conclusions 
varying in strength and relevance, these criteria might have been 
provoked.
Some criteria that were only used by laymen, were only 
shared by a few laymen: the flexibility criterion, the ahead-of-his-time 
expert criterion and the certain statement criterion. This indicates that 
we should not place too much value on these differences. One 
laymen criterion that differs from theory should be given more 
significance: the hedged statement criterion, which was shared by 16 
of 24 respondents. This indicates that quite a number of laymen in 
this study want the source in the argument from authority to be 
cautious in making unqualified statements, a requirement that is not 
mentioned in theory. In general, however, theory and laymen appear 
to have the same vision on what should make an argument from 
authority strong.
How can one explain that quite a number of laymen focus on 
the certainty with which the presumed opinion is expressed, which is 
not suggested in argumentation theory? This was often stimulated by 
an argument in the closed case that aimed to violate the accuracy of 
the cited opinion criterion: e.g. "Prof. G. Verhoeven PhD, professor in 
nuclear physics at the Delft University of Technology, thinks that 
under certain circumstances, nuclear energy can make a certain 
contribution to the fight against the greenhouse effect”. Respondents 
generally did not perceive this as an unclear statement in the sense 
of ‘vaguely stated’ or ‘unclear to the mind’, but as a hedged 
statement. This property of being unsure resulted in either a positive
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or a negative evaluation. That is also understandable: if the statement 
is hedged, the source gives the impression not to overlook necessary 
qualifications or exceptions. On the other hand, the absence of 
hedges may give the impression of the expert being certain about the 
issue.
The data in this study gave insight into some other interesting 
phenomena. First of all, the phenomenon that laymen may see that 
the argument from authority has a certain characteristic, e.g. being 
certain or having the same opinion for years, but then reach different 
conclusions about the quality of the argument. Second: laymen may 
use judgments in certain dimensions in coming directly to a decision 
on argument strength, but judgments may also be used indirectly to 
form judgments in other dimensions, before a final decision on 
argument strength is made. Some, for instance, relate having the 
same opinion for years directly to argument quality, whereas others 
relate it to trustworthiness or being an expert before they make a final 
assessment of argument quality. Thus, the results indicate that 
complex considerations may underlie a decision about argument 
strength.
If the laymen criteria are compared with the criteria by Wilson 
(1983) and De George (1985) discussed earlier in this chapter, there 
is considerable overlap. One difference is that laymen in this study do 
not use De George's (1985) knowledge criterion, expressing that 
there should be genuine knowledge to be had. This can be explained 
by the fact that the material was not manipulated on the basis of that 
aspect.
This study has some limitations. The data show that some 
respondents might have focused on expected persuasiveness in 
evaluating the arguments. This can be explained by the material and 
the instruction. In the open case, the respondents were requested to 
come up with two television guests to defend a certain claim. As a 
consequence, some might have been tempted to choose authorities 
differing in rhetorical capabilities. The instruction in the closed case 
might also have provoked a ranking on the basis of persuasive 
effectiveness: "To support this claim, you can choose from the 
arguments below. Which of these arguments would you prefer to use 
to defend this claim? Which arguments, on the contrary, do you 
consider to be very weak defending the claim? Would you be able to 
rank these arguments in order of 1 to 7, with 1 as the best argument 
and 7 as the worst?” (translated from Dutch). It is not impossible that 
respondents were stimulated by the phrasing ‘best/worst' to 
distinguish between arguments on the basis of their persuasiveness
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and therefore, used different criteria than they would have used if 
they distinguished the arguments on the basis of reasonableness.
Second, the intention was to make a distinction in the material 
between desirability and probability claims, to check whether there 
would be any differences in results between these claim types. It is 
questionable if the probability-desirability distinction was 
operationalized in a valid way. First of all, the claims that were 
supposed to be desirability claims would probably not occur in a 
pragmatic argumentation scheme as a premise, because obviously 
acts are evaluated instead of effects: “Television commercials aimed 
at children are bad” and “Nuclear energy is the best way to generate 
energy”. Desirability claims like “Strong reduction of the greenhouse 
effect is a good idea” and “Children buying food high in fat, salt and 
sugar is bad” would have been more adequate as desirability claims, 
because in these claims the possible effects of proposed acts are 
clearly evaluated. Apart from this, the label ‘probability claim' for the 
claim ‘Television commercials aimed at children have detrimental 
effects' is dubious. After all, it does not express that a certain act 
(probably) leads to a certain consequence. It only says that the 
effects of the proposed act - whatever these may be - are detrimental. 
Therefore, the chosen claim might be considered inadequate in 
representing a probability claim.
Third, in the data-analysis, the decision was made to take 
criteria into consideration that applied to all authorities and to 
disregard criteria that were dependent on the context created in the 
material. It is questionable whether or not this was a good decision. 
After all, by ignoring context-dependent criteria we missed out on 
questions that might have served laymen as heuristics. For instance, 
the fact of doing a lot of research may indicate that someone knows 
about a certain subject, or that someone is a genuine specialist in the 
field. Moreover, if we had taken these criteria into consideration, we 
would have gained interesting insights into the evaluation of appeals 
to epistemic/cognitive authorities in the scientific or academic context.
All in all, we can conclude that laymen criteria for evaluating 
the quality of the argument from authority correspond to a 
considerable extent to the criteria on the basis of argumentation 
theory. There appears to be relatively high agreement between 
laymen on the relevant expertise criterion, the expert criterion, the 
trustworthiness criterion, the ability to provide evidence criterion, the 
recency criterion and the hedged statement criterion. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that these criteria are usually part of laymen's 
argumentative competence.
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3. The quality of the argument from cause to effect
This chapter deals with the quality of the argument from cause to 
effect. First, in section 3.1, I will discuss causality and the conditions 
that should be met in order to be able to speak of a causal 
relationship. I will also indicate which variant of the argument from 
cause to effect is relevant to further investigation. Subsequently, I will 
address the questions of what criteria are used in argument theory to 
evaluate the quality of arguments from cause to effect (3.2), what 
criteria are used by laymen to evaluate the quality of these arguments
(3.3) and finally, I will make a comparison between these sets of 
criteria (3.4).
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Causality conditions
The causality concept is crucial to the quality of the argument from 
cause to effect. For a causal relationship to be plausibly present, 
certain causality conditions should be satisfied. The work of Hulswit 
(2002) is useful50 in elucidating the nature of causality and the criteria 
for a causal relationship. Hulswit provides an overview of 
contemporary philosophical accounts of causality. I will discuss four 
of the five approaches he deals with and leave out the so-called 
singularist approach51, since Hulswit (2002) considers it “a minority 
view” (p. 47).
The first approach to causality is the necessary and/or 
sufficient conditions approach, associated with the philosophy of 
David Hume (1739-1740, 1978) and John Stuart Mill (1874). 
Logically, a necessary condition for the occurrence of an effect is a 
circumstance without which the effect cannot occur. A sufficient 
condition for the occurrence of an effect is a circumstance in whose 
presence the effect must occur (Copi, 1982). Hulswit (2002, p. 52) 
calls John Mackie's (1974) analysis in terms of INUS conditions52 the
50 For other reviews of approaches to causality, see White (1990) and Brady and 
Seawright (2004).
51 This approach “is characterized by the idea that causal relations are irreducibly 
individual, rather than instantiations of universal relations. Thus, one may 
describe the cause of an event B as the one single event (A) that occurs closest 
to and immediately preceding event B” (Hulswit, 2002, p. xvi).
52 Called after the initial letters of key-words in Mackie's definition of cause 
(Insufficient but non-redundant part of unnecessary but sufficient condition).
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“more sophisticated version” of an analysis in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions:
“an event A is the cause of an event B if A is a necessary part of a complex
condition C, which, though sufficient, is not necessary for the effect (B)”
(Mackie, as paraphrased by Hulswit, 2002, p. 73).
I can illustrate this definition by saying that good teamwork is the 
cause of successful sport performance, if it is the decisive (therefore: 
necessary) factor in a set of circumstances (including, for instance, 
nice weather conditions, specialized diets and good mental skills). 
This set of circumstances is sufficient for the occurrence of high sport 
performance, but not necessary, since the high sport performance 
could have been caused by another set of circumstances.
The second approach to causality that Hulswit (2002) 
describes is the counterfactual approach, associated with the work of 
David Lewis (1973, 1993). According to this approach, a cause 
makes a difference: if X  had not happened, Y  would (other things 
being equal) not have happened. For instance, saying that the 
lightning is the cause of the fire, is saying that if the lightning had not 
struck, the fire would never have existed. Many contemporary 
philosophers define causality in terms of relations of counterfactual 
dependence (Hulswit, 2002). Counterfactual dependence means that 
the cause is rendered counterfactually necessary for the effect and 
moreover, that A is linked to B through a causal chain of 
counterfactually dependent events. As Hulswit (2002) puts it: “A is the 
cause of B if and only if there is a chain of counterfactually dependent 
events linking A and B” (p. 55).
The third approach to causality that Hulswit (2002) deals with 
is the instrumental or agency approach, defended by Collingwood 
(1938, 1991) and Von Wright (1971). From this perspective, a cause 
is regarded as “an event or state that we can produce or prevent at 
will, or otherwise manipulate, in order to produce or prevent a certain 
other event as an effect’ (Hulswit, 2002, p. 56). In this respect, the 
cause-effect relationship is related to our ability to control the world as 
agents and causes are seen as means to an end. For instance, given 
this account, the boiling of water is a cause of hot water, since boiling 
water is an effective means by which we, free agents, can bring about 
the occurrence of hot water.
The next approach discussed by Hulswit (2002), is the 
probabilistic approach, represented by Patrick Suppes (1970). 
According to this approach, “an event A may be said to be a cause of 
an event B, if, given the occurrence of A, the probability of the
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occurrence of B is higher than the probability of the occurrence of B 
would have been if A had not occurred” (p. 73). For example, burning 
oil may be considered a cause of global warming if (and only if) it 
raises the probability of global warming.
In sum, the contemporary philosophical accounts of causality 
can be reduced to (I) a necessary and/or sufficient conditions 
approach, (II) a counterfactual approach, (III) an instrumental or 
agency approach and (IV) a probabilistic approach.
3.1.2 The argument from cause to effect
Argumentation theorists appear to agree that the argument from 
cause to effect concerns (a) causality and (b) prediction. Walton 
(1996), for instance, claims that the argument from cause to effect 
“takes the form of a prediction or warning that one type of event tends 
to cause another” (p. 73). Another illustration is the definition by 
Hastings (1962). According to him, reasoning from cause to effect is 
asserting “that because certain events exist, then certain other events 
can be expected to exist either simultaneously or subsequent in time 
as a result of the first events” (p. 65). As appears from various 
definitions, the argument from cause to effect is undisputedly 
regarded as making the prediction of a certain effect in the claim 
acceptable by presenting a cause in the argument that is supposed to 
lead to the effect.
Two forms of the argument from cause to effect are 
distinguished in argumentation theory. The first form is a prediction 
based on existing conditions. This form is schematically represented 
by Schellens (1985, p. 100, translated from Dutch) as:
A (generally) leads to B
Ai
Therefore: (probably) Bi
In this argumentation scheme, the conclusion that something will 
occur is based on a causal generalization that kinds of causes A lead 
to kinds of effects B and on the premise that a certain cause Ai is the 
case. Ai is a member of the category of causes A presented in the 
causal generalization.
The second form is a prediction based on hypothetical 
conditions. This type of reasoning expresses the possible 
consequences that may arise as a result of implementing a certain 
policy (Hastings, 1962; Schellens, 1985). Schellens (1985) presents 
two formal schemes corresponding to the hypothetical variant. In the
79
following scheme, an effect is predicted on the basis of a general 
causal relationship (p. 92, translated from Dutch):
A generally leads to B
Therefore: if Ai, then probably Bi
In addition, a scheme is presented in which an effect is predicted on 
the basis of two or more conditionals (p. 92, translated from Dutch):
If Ai then (probably) Bi
If Bi then (probably) Ci
Therefore: if Ai then (probably) Ci
Critical questions have been introduced that should be applied to the 
argument from cause to effect. Sometimes, these questions are 
formulated exclusively for this type of argument (e.g. Schellens & 
Verhoeven, 1994; Walton, 1996) and sometimes the same questions 
are intended for effect-to-cause reasoning as well (e.g. Warnick & 
Inch, 1989). Furthermore, in the sets of questions, no distinction has 
been made between questions applying to the ‘existing condition' 
variant and the ‘hypothetical' variant. The only exception to this rule 
appears to be Schellens (1985, p. 100).
What forms of the argument from cause to effect are relevant 
within the framework of pragmatic argumentation? In chapter 1, I 
explained that I would focus on the evaluation of argument types 
supporting one of the premises in the pragmatic argumentation 
scheme: the premise expressing that action A (probably) leads to B. 
The action A in this premise is not an existing condition, but a 
conditional, or hypothetical one. The hypothetical variant of the 
argument from cause to effect is particularly relevant to pragmatic 
argumentation, since pragmatic argumentation is about actions that 
have not been executed yet (Schellens, 1985). Therefore, this study 
will focus on the hypothetical variant of the argument from cause to 
effect.
More specifically, the focus will be on the two forms that 
Schellens (1985) distinguishes: the form in which the conclusion is 
inferred from a general causal relationship and the form in which the 
conclusion is inferred from two or more conditional predictions. Table
3.1 shows how these forms relate to the pragmatic argumentation 
scheme.
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Table 3.1 Forms of the argument from cause to effect relevant to pragmatic context.
1. Argumentation based on a general causal relation
Formal scheme Example
A generally leads to B 
Therefore: if A, then probably B
(B is desirable)
(Therefore: A is desirable)
The introduction of innovative products 
generally leads to an easier way of living. 
Therefore: if the public transport chip card is 
introduced, then using public transport will be 
easier.
(Easier use of public transport is desirable). 
(Therefore: the introduction of the public 
transport chipcard is desirable).
2. Argumentation based on two or more conditional predictions
Formal scheme Example
If A then (probably) B 
If B then (probably) C 
Therefore: if A then (probably) C
(C is desirable)
(Therefore: A is desirable)
If the chip card is introduced, then you will 
need only one card for public transport.
If you need only one card, then traveling will 
be more convenient.
Therefore: if the public transport chip card is 
introduced, then using public transport will be 
more conventient.
(More convenient public transport is 
desirable).
(Therefore: the introduction of the public 
transport chipcard is desirable).
In section 3.2, I will present a study on the argumentation-theoretical 
conceptions of strong arguments from cause to effect and discuss 
how these correspond to the views on causality as discussed in 
section 3.1.1.
3.2 Argumentation-theoretical criteria
In this section, the key question is: what evaluation questions have 
been suggested in argumentation theory for the evaluation of the 
argument from cause to effect? To address this question, a literature 
study was carried out.
3.2.1 Method
The methodological details have been discussed in chapter 2 on the 
argument from authority. Therefore, I refer to section 2.2.1 for a
81
description and justification of the selection of literature. With two 
exceptions, the same literature was employed in this study. First, I did 
not use Walton's work on the appeal from expert opinion (1997), but 
Walton's Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning (1996) 
instead. The former work is exclusively about the appeal from expert 
opinion, whereas the latter contains different argumentation schemes 
and critical questions, among which questions for the argument from 
cause to effect.
Second, I used Freeley and Steinberg (2000). I did not use 
this publication in chapter 2, because they have not formulated critical 
questions specifically for the argument from authority. In this chapter, 
however, I will consider them, because they suggested questions 
specifically for causal reasoning.
3.2.2 Results
This section shows the results of the inventory and classification of 
evaluation questions for the argument from cause to effect and also 
for causal reasoning in general. In my opinion, these questions can 
be divided into three categories. The first category contains the 
questions that are specifically useful in evaluating the quality of the 
argument from cause to effect. The second category consists of 
evaluation questions that can be applied in the evaluation of the 
argument from cause to effect, but also in the evaluation of other 
argument types. In the third category, I placed criteria that can be 
considered specific to argument schemes other than the argument 
from cause to effect. It should be explicitly noted, however, that the 
authors who suggested these criteria did so for causal reasoning in 
general, including cause-to-effect and effect-to-cause, and not 
specifically for the argument from cause to effect (Freeley & 
Steinberg, 2000; Meany & Shuster, 2002; Reinard, 1991; Warnick & 
Inch, 1989). Hence, it is certainly not the case that these authors 
erroneously formulated criteria for the argument from cause to effect 
that are in fact irrelevant. They formulated criteria that may be 
relevant to causal reasoning in general, but that can be regarded as 
irrelevant to the argument from cause to effect specifically.
Within these three more general categories, subcategories 
can be distinguished. Next, I will discuss each of these subcategories.
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(I) Specific to the argument from cause to effect
(I.1) Cause sufficiency criterion
Schellens (1985, pp. 96-97; 1994, p. 81) commented that it is only 
relevant to know whether a cause is a necessary condition, if one 
reasons from effect to cause. To reason from cause to effect, it 
should be enough to know whether a cause is a sufficient condition. 
Therefore, as he considered necessity as irrelevant to the argument 
from cause to effect, he only required that the cause be sufficient. 
Hence his question: "Is cause A in general sufficient to consider effect 
B probable?” (1994, p. 82) (see Table 3.2).
In pragma-dialectics, two questions are formulated that in my 
opinion both refer to sufficiency (Garssen, 1997). The first is: "Does 
that what is proposed as a cause (Z) indeed lead to the effect 
mentioned (Y)?” (p. 20, translated from Dutch). Furthermore, the 
pragma-dialecticians suggest that we should consider whether 
anything else, other than the cause under consideration, is missing 
for the effect to occur (Garssen, 1997). If one comes to the 
conclusion that other necessary causes should be present for the 
effect to occur, than the question of whether the cause is a sufficient 
condition, can be answered with a ‘no’. Therefore, both questions 
belong to (I.1).
Warnick and Inch (1989, p. 109) and Freeley and Steinberg 
(2000, p. 162) demand that the cause is "capable of producing the 
effect”; Reinard (1991) wants it to "carry enough force to produce the 
effect” (p. 199). It could be argued that this is a way of saying that a 
cause should be sufficient for the effect, though in terms of capability, 
or the quality of being able to produce the effect.
I created two subcategories for tests of cause sufficiency. 
Firstly, in argumentation theory, critical questions are formulated 
regarding contributing and/or counteracting factors that influence the 
chance of the occurrence of the effect (I.1.1). Contributing factors 
raise the probability of the effect; counteracting factors lower the 
probability of an effect. Thus, to determine if a cause is enough to 
bring about the effect, people should look for causal factors that 
modify the effect's occurrence.
The second category refers to the strength of a causal 
generalization (I.1.2). Walton (1996) suggests the critical question: 
"How strong is the causal generalization (if it is true at all)?” (p. 74). 
He probably tries to capture two requirements, given his argument
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scheme for the argument from cause to effect53. First, he appears to 
demand that the following premise is really true: "Generally, if A 
occurs, then B will (or might) occur” (p. 73). Moreover, he wants this 
generalization to be strong. As he explains about his scheme, "The 
bridging principle or warrant in the major premise can be variable in 
strength. In a strong attribution of causality, it might be said that if A 
occurs, then B will definitely occur. In a weaker form, it might be said 
that if A occurs, then there is a danger that B might occur” (1996, p. 
73). Thus, he wants the causal generalization to be true and 
moreover, he wants it to be invariable. Since the strength of the 
causal generalization may be used as a way to determine B’s 
probability on the basis of A, I consider it a subcategory under (I.1).
Table 3.2 Evaluation questions falling under the category of (I.1) Cause suffiency 
criterion.
Evaluation question Source
I.1 Cause sufficiency criterion
Is cause A in general sufficient to consider effect B 
probable?54
Schellens (1985, p. 100); 
Schellens & Verhoeven 
(1994, p. 82)
Does that what is proposed as a cause (Z) indeed lead 
to the effect mentioned (Y)?55
Garssen (1997, p. 20)
Are there any other factors that, together with what is 
proposed as a cause (Z), should be present to cause 
the effect mentioned (Y)?56
Garssen (1997, p. 20)
In terms o f capability:
Is the cause capable of producing the desired effect? Warnick & Inch (1989, p. 
109)
Does the cause carry enough force to produce the 
effect?
Reinard (1991, p. 199)
Is the cause capable of producing the effect? Freeley & Steinberg 
(2000, p. 162)
53 This is the scheme presented:
Generally, if A occurs, then B will (or might) occur.
In this case, A occurs (or might occur).
Therefore, in this case, B will occur (or might occur) (1996, p. 73).
54 In Dutch: "Is oorzaak A in het algemeen voldoende om gevolg B waarschijnlijk te 
achten?” (1994, p. 82). In Schellens (1985, p. 100), the formulation is slightly 
different: "Is cause A in general sufficient to consider effect B certain or 
probable?”. In Dutch: “ Is oorzaak A in het algemeen voldoende om gevolg B 
zeker of waarschijnlijk te achten?”
55 In Dutch: "Leidt datgene wat als oorzaak wordt voorgesteld (Z) inderdaad tot het 
genoemde gevolg (Y)?” (1997, p. 20).
56 In Dutch: "Zijn er nog andere factoren die samen met datgene wat als oorzaak 
wordt voorgesteld (Z) aanwezig moeten zijn om het genoemde gevolg (Y) te 
doen optreden?” (1997, p. 20).
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I.1.1 Contributing and/or counteracting factors 
criterion
Might some other cause offset the desired 
effect?
Warnick & Inch (1989, p. 
110)
Are other conditions inhibiting the causal 
relationship?
Reinard (1991, p. 199)
Are there any circumstances in this particular 
case that decrease (or increase) the chance of
B?57
Schellens (1985, p. 100); 
Schellens & Verhoeven 
(1994, p. 82)
Are there other factors that would or will 
interfere with or counteract the production of 
the effect in this case?
Walton (1996, p. 74)
Is there a counteracting cause? Freeley & Steinberg 
(2000, p. 161)
I.1.2 Strength of the causal generalization 
criterion
How strong is the causal generalization (if it is 
true at all)?
Walton (1996, p. 74)
(I.2) Cause accuracy criterion
Schellens and Verhoeven formulated the question: "Are there any 
reasons to doubt fact A?” (1994, p. 82, translated from Dutch, see 
also Table 3.3). That question can be traced back to the more general 
acceptability criterion. According to the acceptability requirement, "the 
premises of an argument should be acceptable to the arguer, the 
audience to whom the argument is directed, and generally to the 
critical community in which they are situated” (Van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 1996, p. 179). However, as the 
question is formulated so specifically that it applies only to the 
argument scheme underlying the argument from cause to effect, I 
consider it a question belonging to the category ‘specific to the 
argument from cause to effect’ (I).
It should be noted that this question is not relevant to the 
variant of the argument from cause to effect, in which the prediction is 
conditional. After all, the cause is not a fact in this variant that should 
be doubted, but a cause that may or may not occur in future (cf. 
Schellens, 1985, p. 100).
57 In Dutch: ‘‘Zijn er in dit concrete geval nog omstandigheden die de kans op B 
verkleinen (of vergroten)?” (1994, p. 82). In Schellens (1985, p. 100), it says "Bi” 
instead of "B”.
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Table 3.3 Evaluation questions falling under the category of (I.2) Cause accuracy 
criterion and (I.3) Cause relevance criterion.____________ _________________________
Evaluation question Source
I.2 Cause accuracy criterion
Are there any reasons to doubt fact A?58 Schellens (1985, p. 100); 
Schellens & Verhoeven 
(1994, p. 82)
I.3 Cause relevance criterion
Does fact A connect adequately to the applied causal 
relation?59
Schellens (1985, p. 100); 
Schellens & Verhoeven 
(1994, p. 82)
(I.3) Cause relevance criterion
Schellens and Verhoeven formulated the question "Does fact A 
connect adequately to the applied causal relation?” (1994, p. 82, 
translated from Dutch, see also Table 3.3). This appears to be a 
specification of a more general relevance criterion. After all, if fact A 
does not connect adequately to the applied causal relation, then the 
argument lacks a (clear) relation to the matter at hand. However, just 
like the question in category (I.2), the relevance criterion is given a 
specific interpretation and therefore belongs to the category ‘specific 
to the argument from cause to effect’ (I).
(II) Generally applicable to all argument schemes
(II.1) Backup evidence criterion
As Table 3.4 shows, Walton directly appeals to the arguer’s 
responsibility for producing evidence: "The second critical question 
asks for evidence cited, if any, to back up this claim” (1996, p. 75). I 
consider this a general question, because it is applicable to all 
argumentation schemes.
Table 3.4. Evaluation questions falling under the category of (II.1) Backup evidence 
criterion and (II.2) Strength of conclusion criterion.______________________________
Evaluation question Source
II.1 Backup evidence criterion
Is the evidence cited (if there is any) strong enough to 
warrant the generalization as stated?
Walton (1996, p. 74)
II.2 Strength of conclusion criterion
Is the probability or certainty expressed in the Schellens (1985, p. 100);
58 In Dutch: "Zijn er redenen om het gegeven A te betwijfelen?” (1994, p. 82). In 
Schellens (1985, p. 100), it says ‘A i’ instead of ‘A ’.
59 In Dutch: "Sluit het gegeven A goed aan bij het gehanteerde causale verband?” 
(1994, p. 82). In Schellens (1985, p. 100), the formulation is different: " Is Ai a 
clear case of A?”. In Dutch: "Is Ai een duidelijk geval van A?”
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conclusion in accordance with the answer on question 
1-4?60
Schellens & Verhoeven 
(1994, p. 82)__________
(II.2) Strength of conclusion criterion
Schellens (1985, p. 100) and Schellens and Verhoeven (1994, p. 82) 
present the question: "Is the probability or certainty expressed in the 
conclusion in accordance with the answer on question 1-4?” 
(translated from Dutch, see also Table 3.4). They appear to warn for 
the danger of formulating the conclusion as if it were beyond doubt, 
for instance: "Casual drug use usually leads to addiction. Students 
are known for casual drug use. Therefore, it is absolutely garantueed 
that they will become addicts”. Even if the argument from cause to 
effect meets all criteria, the conclusion may be formulated in such 
absolute terms that it is not acceptable. As this criterion can be 
applied to each conclusion regardless of the type of argument it is 
supported by, I consider this question to be of a more general nature.
(III) Specific to different argument schemes
(III.1) Both cause necessity and cause sufficiency criterion 
According to Warnick and Inch (1989), Reinard (1991) and Freeley 
and Steinberg (2000), the cause should be both necessary and 
sufficient for the effect (see Table 3.5). That means that one should 
question whether the non-occurrence of cause A guarantees the non­
occurrence of effect B (necessity) and whether the occurrence of 
cause A brings about the occurrence of effect B (sufficiency). It can 
be argued that questioning cause necessity is only relevant to the 
argument from effect to cause and not to the argument from cause to 
effect. After all, in order to predict an effect it is enough to confirm that 
the proposed cause is a sufficient cause (cf. Schellens, 1985, pp. 96­
97).
Table 3.5 Evaluation questions falling under the category of (III.1) Both cause 
necessity and cause sufficiency criterion._______________ _________________
Evaluation question Source
III.1 Both cause necessity and cause sufficiency 
criterion
Is the cause necessary and sufficient? Warnick & Inch (1989, p. 
109)
Is there a necessary and sufficient cause for the 
effect?
Reinard (1991, p. 199)
In Dutch: “ Is de in de conclusie uitgedrukte waarschijnlijkheid of zekerheid in 
overeenstemming met het antwoord op vraag 1-4?” (1985, p. 100; 1994, p. 82).
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Is the cause necessary and sufficient? Freeley & Steinberg 
(2000, p. 162)
(III.2) Cause necessity criterion
Reinard (1991), Freeley and Steinberg (2000), and Meany and 
Shuster (2002) formulated questions that refer to the cause as a 
necessary condition (see Table 3.6). Reinard (1991, p. 199) asks: 
"Are other causes relevant in explaining effects?” Then he explains: 
"There usually are many causes of a problem. Hence, we usually are 
skeptical of arguments that assume a single cause for a given effect” . 
So, he implies that one should look for alternative causes that may 
have preceded the effect. In other words: one should wonder if the 
supposed cause is necessary for the effect. Meany and Shuster 
(2002) suggest something similar: "Are there other causes that could 
have prompted the discussed effect?” (p. 62).
Freeley and Steinberg (2000, p. 160) also aim at questioning 
the necessity of the cause: "Is this the sole or distinguishing causal 
factor?”. This question is clarified as follows: "Advocates should 
determine whether the alleged cause is the only causal factor in 
producing the effect under consideration or, if not, whether it is the 
distinguishing causal factor” . So, again, this appears to be another 
way of asking if the supposed cause is necessary for the effect. As 
stated above for category (III.1), questioning cause necessity appears 
to be inappropriate for this particular argument type.
Table 3.6 Evaluation questions falling under the category of (III.2) Cause necessity 
criterion.
Evaluation question Source
III.2 Cause necessity criterion
Are other causes relevant in explaining effects? Reinard (1991, p. 199)
Is this the sole or distinguishing causal factor? Freeley & Steinberg 
(2000, p. 160)
Are there other causes that could have prompted the 
discussed effect?
Meany & Shuster (2002, 
p. 62)
(III.3) Association or causality criterion
The questions in this category are formulated by Reinard (1991, p. 
199) and Freeley and Steinberg (2000, p. 160): "Are the causes and 
effects related in a direct way?” and "Is the alleged cause relevant to 
the effect described?” (see Table 3.7). Although the questions differ in 
formulation, they appear to warn that association does not 
necessarily imply a causal relationship. In other words: they appear to
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warn of a post hoc ergo propter hoc61. After all, Reinard (1991) 
explains: "A causal relationship claims that there is some reason to 
think that one element influences the behavior of the other (...) We 
should be very careful about drawing causal relationships between 
things that are coincidentally associated” (p. 199).
Freeley and Steinberg (2000) too, say that one should not 
infer a causal relationship when two events follow each other, as is 
the case in superstitions: "The superstition that breaking a mirror will 
cause seven years of bad luck, for example, is based on the 
assumption that a cause-to-effect relationship exists when in fact 
there is no such relationship. Unless and until a causal link can be 
established between an alleged cause and an alleged effect, one 
cannot hope to develop causal reasoning” (p. 160).
Based on a desire for people to distinguish causal from non- 
causal relations, they actually refer to a scheme in which our 
reasoning takes us from a positive correlation between A and B to a 
causal connection62. The fundamental difference between the 
scheme, in which it is reasoned from correlation to cause, and the 
scheme from cause to effect, is that in the first scheme, it is reasoned 
from non-causal regularity whereas in the second, it is reasoned from 
causal regularity (Schellens, 1985; Schellens & Verhoeven, 1994). 
So, the questions of Freeley and Steinberg (2000), and also Reinard 
(1991), are specific to another scheme than the one underlying the 
argument from cause to effect.
Table 3.7 Evaluation questions falling under the category of (III.3) Association or 
causality criterion, (III.4) Nature of side-effects criterion and (III.5) Counterplan 
criterion.
Evaluation question Source
III.3 Association or causality criterion
Is the alleged cause relevant to the effect described? Freeley & Steinberg 
(2000, p. 160)
Are the causes and effects related in a direct way? Reinard (1991, p. 199)
61 This fallacy is committed when "a cause-effect relation is inferred from the mere 
observation that two events take place one after the other” (Van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 1996, p. 302).
62 Walton (1996), for instance, presents a separate scheme underlying the 
argument from correlation to cause
"There is a positive correlation between A and B. Therefore, A causes B" (p. 71). 
Schellens and Verhoeven (1994) present a similar scheme: "A is the case. B is 
the case. Therefore: A is probably the effect (or the cause) of B” (p. 85, 
translated from Dutch).
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III.4 Nature of side-effects criterion
Is there reasonable probability that no undesirable 
effect may result from this particular cause?
Freeley & Steinberg 
(2000, p. 161)
Have important countervailing effects been ignored? Reinard (1991, p. 199)
What other effects does the cause produce? How do 
these weigh against the already specified causes?63
Meany & Shuster (2002, 
p. 62)
III.5 Counterplan criterion
How does a new cause affect the system? Freeley & Steinberg 
(2000, p. 163)
(III.4) Nature of side-effects criterion
As Table 3.7 shows, Freeley and Steinberg (2000) present the 
question: "Is there reasonable probability that no undesirable effect 
may result from this particular cause?” Then they explain: "Usually a 
given cause will produce various effects in addition to the effect under 
consideration. Will these other effects be desirable, unimportant, or 
undesirable?” (p. 161). Reinard’s (1991) question is: "Have important 
countervailing effects been ignored?” As he explains, countervailing 
effects are "other effects” producing "results in a contrary direction” 
(p. 199). Meany and Shuster (2002) are in line with the other authors 
with their suggestion to ask how other effects weigh up against the 
ones already specified64.
There appears to be a subtle difference between Freeley and 
Steinberg (2000) on the one hand and Reinard (1991) on the other 
hand. From their presented examples, it can be inferred that Reinard 
(1991) only aims at the nature of side-effects that are in a similar 
dimension as the effect under consideration (reducing capital gains 
taxes may stimulate economic growth, which is a desirable 
consequence, but may also increase inflation, which is an undesirable 
side-effect in the same economical dimension). Freeley and 
Steinberg’s (2000) criterion is less restricted: the undesirable side- 
effect may be in the same dimension as the desirable effect under 
consideration (penicillin may cure a certain illness and thus improve 
health, but the side-effects of penicillin may be damaging to health). 
However, the undesirable side-effects may also be in a different 
dimension than the desirable effect under consideration (banning 
television commercials for sugar-laden cereals may improve
63 It is very likely that the authors in fact meant 'against the already specified 
effects’ instead of "against the already specified causes” (2002, p. 62). The 
question is presumably about (negative) effects that counterbalance the 
(positive) effects that the protagonist already specified in the argumentation.
64 See the previous note.
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childrens’ health, which is a desirable effect in the health-dimension, 
but may also result in unemployment among sugar producers, which 
is an undesirable effect in an economical dimension).
In judging the way an effect is predicted, it should be irrelevant 
if additional effects are (un)desirable, as long as the effect under 
consideration will be produced. Rather, this criterion applies to 
pragmatic reasoning, in which positive and negative consequences of 
an action are weighted.
(III.5) Counterplan criterion
Freeley and Steinberg (2000) formulate the question: "How does a 
new cause affect the system?” (p. 163, see also Table 3.7). They 
present the example of people claiming that better medical care is 
needed for slum residents and others arguing that instead of sending 
residents back to the slums after being treated, one should invest in 
providing better housing, better food etcetera. With this example, 
Freeley and Steinberg (2000) imply that one should look for better 
actions than the ones proposed. As a consequence, their question 
appears more connected to pragmatic argumentation than to the 
argument from cause to effect (cf. Schellens, 1985, p. 97).
3.2.3 Conclusion and discussion
In argumentation theory, critical questions have been formulated that 
intend to evaluate the argument from cause to effect. Critical 
questions for causal reasoning in general - i.e. for the argument from 
cause to effect as well as for the argument from effect to cause - have 
also been formulated. These questions can be classified according to 
(I) questions specific to the argument from cause to effect, (II) 
questions that are generally applicable and (III) questions specific to 
different argument schemes. Within the first category (I), three 
subcategories can be distinguished: (I.1) cause sufficiency criterion,
(I.2) cause accuracy criterion and (I.3) cause relevance criterion. 
Within the second category (I), two subcategories can be 
distinguished: (II.1) backup evidence criterion and (II.2) strength of 
conclusion criterion. Within the third category (III), a distinction is 
made between five subgroups of questions: (III.1) both cause 
necessity and cause sufficiency criterion, (III.2) cause necessity 
criterion, (III.3) association or causation criterion, (III.4) nature of side- 
effects criterion and (III.5) counterplan criterion.
It can be argued that similar to the cause relevance criterion, 
as suggested by Schellens (1985) and Schellens and Verhoeven
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(1994), there should also be an effect relevance criterion. It sounds 
reasonable to demand that not only the cause in the conclusion (Ai) is 
a clear member of the kind of causes (A) presented in the argument, 
but also that the effect in the conclusion (Bi) is a clear member of the 
kind of effects (B) presented in the argument. For the argument from 
cause to effect, the relevance criterion should apply to both cause 
and effect.
To what extent are the contemporary philosophical theories of 
causation reflected in the categories of evaluation questions? As 
Table 3.8 shows, a parallel can be drawn between the philosophical 
concepts of causality, as treated in 3.1.1 and argumentation- 
theoretical ideas about the evaluation of the argument from cause to 
effect.
Table 3.8 Comparison between philosophical and argumentation-theoretical views on 
causality conditions.___________________________________________________________
Philosophy (Hulswit, 2002) Argumentation theory
(I) Necessary and/or sufficient 
conditions approach
(111.1) Both cause necessity and cause 
sufficiency criterion
(111.2) Cause necessity criterion 
(I.1) Cause sufficiency criterion
(II) Counterfactual approach (III.2) Cause necessity criterion
(III) Instrumental/agency approach (I.1) Cause sufficiency criterion in terms o f 
capability
(IV) Probabilistic approach (1.1.1) Contributing and/or counteracting 
factors criterion
(1.1.2) Strength of the causal 
generalization criterion
First, the necessary and/or sufficient conditions approach to causality
(I) is reflected in the evaluation questions in the categories I.1 and 
III.1-2. Whether the cause should be a necessary or sufficient 
condition for the effect or both, these criteria are in line with the 
philosophical necessary and/or sufficient conditions approach.
Second, the evaluation questions that fall into the category 
'cause necessity criterion’ (III.2) also reflect the idea of counterfactual 
dependence (II): if A had not happened, B would not exist. After all, "a 
cause is the necessary condition [for] its effect, in the sense that the 
effect could not have occurred but for the occurrence of the cause. 
Saying that the short circuit was a necessary condition [for] the fire, is
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saying that, given the circumstances, this fire could not have occurred 
without this short circuit” (Hulswit, 2002, p. 54).
Third, argumentation theorists require that a cause is capable 
of producing its effect (I.1). Such a requirement fits the instrumental 
or agency approach of causality (III), in which a cause is an event that 
we can control in order to produce a desired event or to prevent an 
undesired event. The instrumental perspective on causality is also 
inherent in pragmatic argumentation, in which an act is promoted by 
saying that it is a way to bring about its desired effect.
Finally, the idea that contributing and/or counteracting factors
(I.1.1) influence the quality of the argument from cause to effect 
corresponds to the probabilistic approach to causality (IV), in which it 
is assumed that events might change the probability of other events. 
These modifying factors can be contributing, making the effect more 
likely, or counteracting, making the effect less likely.
Walton’s (1996) question about the strength of the causal 
generalization (I.1.2) also appears to match up with the probabilistic 
approach to causality (IV). After all, if a causal relationship remains 
constant under conditions, then apparently the probability of the 
occurrence of B is higher than when the relationship does not always 
hold.
3.3 Laymen criteria
In section 3.2, I reported argumentation-theoretical conceptions of the 
quality of the argument from cause to effect. In this section, the 
central question is: what criteria are used by laymen to evaluate the 
quality of the argument from cause to effect? Next, the method to 
address this question will be discussed.
3.3.1 Method 
Material
The material consisted of an open case and a closed case. Individual 
interviews, in which respondents are stimulated by an open case and 
a closed case to reflect on norms for argument quality, appeared to 
be the most effective method to uncover laymen criteria (see chapter
2 and Sorm, Timmers & Schellens, 2007). Therefore, this method 
was used again.
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Open case (Appendix 3A-B). In the open case, respondents were 
asked to imagine themselves in a job interview, applying for a job as 
a speechwriter for a particular ministry (the name of the ministry was 
dependent on the claim). Within the interview, they received an 
assignment to test whether they could write good speeches. The 
assignment was to write down one strong and one weak argument 
supporting a claim in one of the minister’s speeches. In one version, 
the claim was (1) "If the maximum permitted fat content in minced 
meat is reduced from 35 to 25 percent, the costs of health care will 
decrease” (In Dutch: "Als we het maximaal toegestane vetgehalte in 
gehakt van 35 naar 25 procent verlagen, dan zullen de kosten voor 
de gezondheidszorg dalen”). In the second version, the claim was (2): 
"If there is more greenery in and surrounding new housing estates, 
residents of these estates will use their cars less” (In Dutch: "Als er 
meer groen in en rond nieuwbouwwijken komt, dan zullen de 
bewoners van die wijken minder gebruik maken van de auto”). The 
respondents were also told that the interviewer would ask them why 
one argument was stronger than the other.
To increase the chance of the respondents coming up with the 
intended argument type, the respondents were told that they 'had 
decided to support the minister’s claim with predictions’. Moreover, 
the respondents were to complete a sentence directing them to the 
argument type I was interested in: "Because if we lower the fat 
content in minced meat, then.... /Because if the new housing estates 
are greener, th e n .”. (In Dutch: "Want als we het vetgehalte in gehakt 
verlagen, dan.../Want als de nieuwbouwwijken groener worden, 
d a n . ”).
After the respondents had written down their arguments, the 
interviewer asked them to read their arguments aloud and to explain 
why one argument was stronger than the other. The explanation 
allowed for identification of the respondents’ evaluation criteria.
Putting a respondent in the position of a speech writer during 
a job assessment created a situation where it was natural to come up 
both with a strong and a weak argument in favor of a typical policy 
claim, as well as to explain the differences between these arguments.
Closed case (Appendix 3C-D). The closed case consisted of a claim 
and five supporting arguments. The claim was either (3) "If employers 
give employees who are absent due to long-term illness the 
opportunity to telework, they will return to their regular workplaces 
sooner” (In Dutch: "Als werkgevers langdurig zieke medewerkers in 
de gelegenheid stellen om te telewerken, dan zullen ze eerder
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terugkeren naar hun gewone werkplek”) or (4) "Giving more money to 
youth drama schools will promote livability in society” (In Dutch: "Als 
er meer geld beschikbaar wordt gesteld voor jeugdtheaterscholen, 
dan zal de leefbaarheid van de samenleving bevorderd worden”). 
Each claim was introduced with a few sentences about the claim’s 
subject matter, such as a definition of telework or what happens in 
youth drama schools.
The arguments were set up according to two schemes: (1) an 
argumentation scheme based on a few conditional predictions and (2) 
an argumentation scheme based on a general prediction. 
Schematically (Schellens, 1985, p. 92, translated from Dutch; see 
also 3.1.2):
(1) If Ai then (probably) Bi 
If Bi then (probably) Ci 
Therefore: if Ai then (probably) Ci
(2) A generally leads to B 
Therefore: if Ai, then probably Bi
It should be noted that when scheme (1) was used, the number of 
conditionals in the argument varied. Hence, in fact, variants of 
argument scheme (1) were used for the closed case.
Two of the five arguments were supposed to be strong. Three 
of the five arguments were considered weak, as they violated certain 
criteria suggested in argumentation theory (see also section 3.2). The 
criteria I aimed to violate were (1) the cause sufficiency criterion (‘This 
should be enough to cause that), (2) the cause relevance criterion 
(‘The cause in the argument should connect adequately to the cause 
in the conclusion’) and (3) the effect relevance criterion (‘The effect in 
the argument should connect adequately to the effect in the 
conclusion’). Although the distinction between criteria (2) and (3) has 
not been made in theory and only the cause relevance criterion was 
revealed by the literature study, it can be argued that the relevance 
criterion should be applied to both cause and effect (see also 3.2.3). 
So, I wanted to know whether in practice people pay attention to 
relevance and if they do, whether they focus on the relevance of the 
cause, on the relevance of the effect or on both. I applied criterion (1) 
only on scheme (1) and criterion (2) and (3) only on scheme (2). 
Table 3.9 gives an overview of the evaluation criteria that the 
arguments were supposed to violate.
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Table 3.9 Evaluation criteria violated in the closed-case arguments (translated from 
Dutch).__________  ________________________________________________________
Claim (3) Claim (4)
If employers give employees 
who are absent due to long­
term illness the opportunity to 
telework, they will return to 
their regular workplaces 
sooner.
Giving more money to youth 
drama schools will promote 
livability in society.
scheme;
criterion
violated
Argument Argument
scheme (2); 
weak, violates 
cause 
relevance 
criterion
A Employees who have been ill 
for a long time and who get a 
holiday will generally return 
sooner to their regular 
workplace.
Initiatives that involve people in 
society generally lead to a 
more livable society.
scheme (1); 
weak, violates 
sufficiency 
criterion
B If employees who have been ill 
for a long time are able to 
telework, then they will be tired 
less quickly. Eventually they 
will return to their regular 
workplace sooner.
If youth drama schools get a 
financial impulse, then young 
people will be better educated 
in amateur theatre. Eventually, 
society will be more livable.
scheme (2); 
weak, violates 
effect relevance 
criterion
C Measures to let employees 
who have been ill for a long 
time work from home generally 
lead to the solution of social 
and individual problems.
Investing in youth drama 
schools generally leads to an 
enduring future.
scheme (1); 
strong, no 
criteria violated
D If ill employees can do their 
work from home behind the 
computer, then they won’t have 
to travel to work. And if they 
won’t have to travel to work, 
then they will be less 
burdened. And if they will be 
less burdened by traveling, 
then they will soon be able to 
take on a bit of work.
If youth drama schools get 
financial support, then they can 
strengthen themselves 
artistically and organizationally. 
And if youth drama schools are 
qualitatively stronger, then 
children and young people will 
be better educated there. And 
if they are better educated in 
the domain of arts and culture, 
then they will generally develop 
better as well.
scheme (1); 
strong, no 
criteria violated
E If ill employees can telework, 
then they will take on more 
work. Moreover, they can stay 
involved with work and 
colleagues. Eventually they will 
return to their regular 
workplace sooner.
If more money is put at the 
disposal of youth drama 
schools, more young people 
will get the chance to become 
involved in society. Moreover, 
young people will educate 
themselves better. Eventually, 
society will become more 
livable.
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The respondents were asked to arrange the arguments in order of 
strength, with the strongest argument in first place and the weakest in 
fifth. After the respondents had ranked their arguments, the 
interviewer asked why a particular argument was put first, why 
another argument was put second and so on. Criteria were derived 
on the basis of their explanations.
Respondents
Twenty respondents were interviewed. All respondents were visitors 
to a public library in Nijmegen, the Netherlands. Each of the 
respondents was paid ten Euros for participating. Of the respondents, 
eleven were male and nine were female. The ages of the 
respondents varied from 17 to 65, and the average age was 36. The 
level of education varied from university education (‘WO’) to 
preparatory vocational education (‘VMBO’). The majority (11) had 
received higher professional education (‘HBO’) and university 
education (‘WO’). None of the respondents had received any formal 
training in the field of argumentation theory.
Booklet
All respondents received a booklet. Each booklet consisted of five 
pages. On the first page, an instruction text was printed. It stated that 
the research was about ‘government communication’ and that there 
were no wrong answers. The second page contained the open case, 
and the third page contained the closed case. The fourth page 
contained some general questions about the respondents’ level of 
education, sex and age. The respondents also had the chance to 
write down what they thought was the purpose of the study.
On the last page of the booklet, questions were asked to test 
whether the respondents had received any formal training in the field 
of argumentation theory. The first question was if they had ever been 
in contact with argumentation studies65. If so, they were requested to 
answer the question if they had ever heard of argument types, if they 
had ever heard of argumentation schemes and if they had ever heard 
of ways to evaluate or test arguments. If they answered the last three 
questions positively, they were invited to write down what the concept
65 I acknowledge that in English as well as in Dutch (“Bent u wel eens in aanraking 
gekomen met argumentatieleer?”), the formulation is awkward. A better 
alternative would have probably been to ask if someone had ever been occupied 
with/engaged in argumentation studies.
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was (e.g. ‘an argument type i s . ’) and to give an example of the 
concept (e.g. ‘an example of an argument type i s . ’).
Design
Two open cases and two closed cases were created. Each case 
revolved around a different claim so that the criteria would not be 
claim-dependent. The open case was always presented first, to make 
sure that the responses would not be influenced by the reactions in 
the closed case. This design led to four different combinations:
1) open case/ claim 1; closed case/ claim 3 (n = 5)
2) open case/ claim 1; closed case/ claim 4 (n = 5)
3) open case/ claim 2; closed case/ claim 3 (n = 5)
4) open case/ claim 2; closed case/ claim 4 (n = 5)
Procedure
The respondents were personally approached by the interviewer at 
the entrance of the public library. They were asked to participate in an 
interview that would take approximately 30 minutes and that would be 
rewarded with ten Euros. Visitors willing to participate were brought to 
a separate room in the library. Before the actual interview started, the 
interviewer informed the respondents that the topic of the interview 
would be ‘government communication’. In addition, they were told that 
there were no ‘wrong’ answers.
After the introduction, the open case was presented. When the 
respondents had mentioned the arguments, they were asked why one 
argument was stronger than the other. Subsequently the closed case 
was presented. When the respondents had arranged the arguments 
in order of strength, they were asked why they had put a certain 
argument first, second and so on. The interviewer used some 
techniques to get more information, without directing the respondents. 
She asked questions like ‘Can you explain that?’ and ‘What/how do 
you mean?’.
After the actual interview, the respondents were asked 
whether they had any comments on the interview. Afterwards, they 
filled in personal details (age, sex and level of education), an answer 
to the question as to what they thought the purpose of the study was 
and answers to questions regarding their knowledge of argumentation 
theory.
Finally, they received a ‘thank you’ for their cooperation and 
were paid ten Euros. On average, it took approximately 30 minutes to
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complete an interview (including introduction and additional 
questions). All interviews were recorded on tape and transcribed 
afterwards.
Data-analysis
To analyze the data, I used the same technique as used in the study 
on the argument from authority: a content analysis (see chapter 2). 
Here, I will only present an outline of the data-analysis performed for 
this study and give some examples for illustration purposes. As the 
performance of the content analysis differed slightly from the one 
performed for the argument from authority, I will also indicate these 
differences. The data, consisting of transcripts, were analyzed 
according to the following steps:
(1) Selecting relevant data and deleting irrelevant data, such as 
utterances related to the task instruction: ‘E h .w e ll I think, eh. Can I 
read it again?’ or ‘So eh this was the first case, let’s go on to the 
second’. (In Dutch: ‘E h .  nou ik denk, eh. Mag ik hem nog een keer 
doorlezen?’ or ‘Dan eh was dat de eerste casus, dan gaan we door 
naar de tweede’).
(2) Dividing relevant text into fragments, on the conditions that one 
fragment would be about one topic (e.g. the evaluation of one 
particular argument), comprehensible and not taken out of context. 
For example:
(1) Yes, er, I put E on 1, because it says, then more young people will 
get the chance to be involved in society. And I think that it is simply 
important that more people are involved in society.
(In Dutch:
Ja, eh, E heb ik op 1 gezet, omdat er staat, dan krijgen meer 
jongeren de kans om betrokken te worden bij de maatschappij. En 
ik denk dat het gewoon belangrijk is dat meer jongeren betrokken 
worden bij de maatschappij.)
(Argument E was:
If more money is put at the disposal of youth drama schools, more 
young people will get the chance to become involved in society. 
Moreover, young people will educate themselves better. 
Eventually, society will be more livable.)
(2) I chose A, because initiatives that involve people in society, so that 
that always leads to a er better, more livable society er becomes 
( . ) .  I find this a strong argument, because er because it is about
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er initiative, that people should take initiative. And if many people 
take initiative and if they are on the same level, then you get a 
better, or a more livable society.
(In Dutch:
Ik heb A gekozen, omdat initiatieven die mensen bij de 
samenleving betrekken, dat dus altijd dat dat tot een eh betere, 
leefbaardere samenleving eh wordt (...). Ik vind hier sterk aan, 
omdat eh omdat het dus gaat over eh dat initiatieven, dat mensen 
initiatieven moeten nemen. En als veel mensen initiatief moeten 
nemen en veel neuzen dezelfde kant opstaan, dan krijg je  gewoon 
een betere, of een leefbaardere samenleving.)
(Argument A was:
Initiatives that involve people in society generally lead to a more 
livable society.)
These are considered two separate fragments, because each 
fragment deals with a different argument (‘A’ and ‘E’).
(3) Attaching criteria to the fragments. For the argument from 
authority, we defined a criterion as a norm for evaluating an argument 
that applies to every argument from authority (see also chapter 2). If I 
had used this definition, it would have caused problems in the 
analysis, because most respondents stayed close to the particular 
context in their verbalizations. In general, they did not use abstract 
phrases such as ‘This proposed action is enough to cause that 
consequence’, but rather "And if many people take initiative and if 
they are on the same level, then you get a better, or a more livable 
society” (see example 2 above). I assumed that more abstract norms 
underly these specific phrasings. To be able to identify and classify 
these abstract norms, I assigned symbols to the measures (M) and 
effects (G, I, J, E66) in the material. Then I assigned the same 
symbols to corresponding measures (M) and effects (G, I, J, E) in the 
respondents’ utterances. For instance, I attached the following criteria 
to the fragments above:
(3) Is it important to involve more young people in society (G)?/Is het 
belangrijk om meer jongeren te betrekken bij de maatschappij (G)?
(Argument E was: If more money is put at the disposal of youth 
drama schools (M), more young people will get the chance to
The closed case material contained arguments with more than one effect. For 
these arguments, I used a different letter for each different effect. So, for an 
argument in which four different effects were mentioned, I used the four different 
letters G, I, J, and E.
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become involved in society (G). Moreover, young people will 
educate themselves better (I). Eventually, society will be more 
livable (E).)
(4) If more people take initiative (M), do you get a more livable society 
(E)?/Als veel mensen initiatieven nemen (M), krijg je dan een 
leefbaardere samenleving (E)?
(Argument A was: Initiatives that involve people (M) in society 
generally lead to a more livable society (E).)
Assigning the symbols to elements within the utterances made it 
easier to abstract from the specific formulations of the respondents. In 
case of fragment (1) presented above, the abstract criterion became 
"Is the effect (G) important?” In case of fragment (2), the abstract 
criterion became: "If measure (M), then (E)?”
(4) Categorizing the questions that were registered in the previous 
analysis step on the basis of a shared characteristic. The questions in
(3) and (4), for instance, belonged to two different categories, as the 
former refers to the desirability of the effect and the latter to cause 
sufficiency. I provided each category with a label in the form of one or 
more catchwords (e.g. ‘desirability effect’ or ‘cause sufficiency’).
Interrater agreement
To assess the extent to which fragments could be reliably related to 
criteria, interrater agreement was determined. The second rater was 
a colleague working at the Department of Business Communication 
Studies of the Radboud University Nijmegen (the Netherlands), who 
has special knowledge in the field of argumentation. First, she 
received a written task instruction. It stated that she was to judge a 
number of fragments, in which phrases were marked. In addition, it 
explained that her task would be to label the phrases with criteria. 
The rater received a list of possible criteria to choose from. Each 
criterion on the list was defined. The rater was also asked to study a 
document with clarifications of the terms ‘necessary condition’, 
‘sufficient condition’ and ‘necessary and sufficient condition’, to make 
sure she would not have any troubles understanding these concepts 
in the criteria definitions. Furthermore, the rater received the closed 
cases used in the interviews.
Five training fragments were presented, to give the second 
rater the opportunity to familiarize herself with the instrument and to 
ask for clarification. Afterwards, 10 randomly selected test fragments
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were presented. The results showed that the Kappa Measure of 
Agreement value was .636 with a significance of p < .0005 (N = 12). 
According to Peat and Barton (2005, p. 268), this value generally 
represents good agreement.
3.3.2 Results
Next, I will discuss the laymen criteria for evaluating the argument 
from cause to effect. First, the results of the open case will be 
reported, followed by the results of the closed case.
Interviews open case
It appeared from an analysis of interviews in the open case that all 
respondents made up arguments with causal sequences. The 
sequences varied in the number of causal steps. Most respondents 
made one or two causal steps in one argument. Less frequently, they 
presented three steps in one argument. Table 3.10 provides an 
illustration:
Table 3.10^ Illustration of respondents' predictions in the open case.
Sentence to 
complete in 
the open 
case
One
prediction
Two predictions Three predictions
In
English:
Because if 
we lower the 
fat content 
in minced 
meat, 
th e n .
the chance of 
obesity will be 
reduced (1).
in any case the 
amount of fat 
people ingest per 
meat-containing 
meal will be 
lowered (1) and a 
strong increase of 
cholesterol level 
will be reduced 
(2).
the level of 
saturated fatty 
acids will be lower 
(1) which will 
lower the chance 
of cardiovascular 
diseases (2), and 
will reduce costs 
(3).
In
Dutch:
Want als we 
het
vetgehalte in 
gehakt 
verlagen, 
dan ....
neemt de 
kans op 
overgewicht 
af (1).
daalt sowieso het 
vetgehalte wat 
mensen per 
vleesmaal 
binnenkrijgen (1) 
en daalt ook de 
sterke toename 
van
cholesterolgehalte
(2).
is het gehalte aan 
verzadigde 
vetzuren lager (1) 
en daardoor de 
kans op hart- en 
vaatziekten kleiner 
(2), waardoor de 
kosten dalen (3).
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All respondents succeeded in creating arguments containing causal 
sequences. However, not all data were informative regarding criteria 
for evaluating the argument from cause to effect. Some explanations 
were simply not clear enough to serve as a basis for inferring 
evaluation criteria, others presented an argument in favor of the 
action in the claim as a strong argument and an argument against the 
action in the claim as a weak argument, as illustrated by the following 
fragment:
I_________________________________Fragment (1)________________________________
Claim to be supported:
If there is more greenery in and surrounding new housing estates, residents of 
these estates will use their cars less.
In English:
I: Er, can you read out loud what the strongest argument is?
R: Er, that civilians become more aware of the environments. And the less, er 
weaker argument is, yes, there is enough greenery so er, why should we?
In Dutch:
I: Ehm, kunt u voorlezen wat het sterke argument is?
R: Ehh, dat burgers zich meer bewust worden van het milieu. En het minder, ehh 
zwakke argument is, ja, er is toch genoeg groen dus ehh, waarom zouden we ook?
In addition, it appeared that some respondents made the distinction 
between the strong and the weak argument on the basis of the 
desirability of a consequence in the argument. For example:
________________________________ Fragment (2)________________________________
Claim to be supported:
If the maximum permitted fat content in minced meat is reduced from 35 to 25 
percent, the costs of health care will decrease.
In English:
R: The strong argument, because if we reduce the fat content in minced meat, then 
the number of cardiovascular diseases will go down and along with that the costs in 
health care (...) The weak argument. If we reduce the fat content in minced meat, 
then the pure taste of minced meat will come out more.
I: Okay, can you explain what er, why one argument is stronger than the other 
argument?
R: Er, well I think that the politician does not care much about the taste of pure 
minced meat in any case (...) And he does care about the health care costs (...) So 
er, that is the strong part of it, I think (...) And er yes, I think that it is a very obvious 
advantage, if you would do that (...) So the chance, that is cost number one in 
health care I think, so I think that would yield much profit. And the taste of, that 
taste of good minced meat does not, that is just pleasant, but that is not of any 
particular advantage to a politician.
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In Dutch:
R: Het sterke argument, want als we het vetgehalte in gehakt verlagen, dan daalt 
het aantal hart- en vaatziekten en daarmee de kosten in de gezondheidszorg (...) 
Het zwakke argument. Als we het vetgehalte in gehakt verlagen, dan komt de 
zuivere smaak van gehakt beter naar voren.
I: Oké, kunt u uitleggen wat ehh, waarom het ene argument sterker is dan het 
andere argument?
R: Ehh, nou ik denk dat de politicus zich sowieso niet zoveel zorgen maakt om de 
smaak van zuiver gehakt (...) En wel om de kosten van de gezondheidszorg (...) 
Dus ehm, dat is al het sterke daarvan, denk ik (...) En ehh ja, ik denk dat dat een 
heel evident voordeel is, als je  dat zou doen (...) Dus de kans, dat is toch 
kostenpost nummer één in de gezondheidszorg denk ik, dus ik denk dat dat veel 
voordeel op zou leveren. En die smaak van, die smaak van lekker gehakt niet, dat 
is alleen maar prettig, maar verder heeft dat voor een politicus geen enkel 
voordeel.
In the open case, the data of six out of twenty respondents were 
useful, as their norms were comprehensible and clearly related to the 
argument from cause to effect. Here I present fragments of interviews 
to illustrate these evaluation criteria. In each fragment, the strong 
argument is indicated by ‘(+)’, the weak argument by ‘(-)’ and the 
explanation about why one argument is stronger than the other by 
‘(E)’. The claim that was to be supported by the arguments is also 
given.
Three of six respondents referred to the extent to which the 
causal relation is established. For instance:
________________________________ Fragment (3)_______________________________
Claim to be supported:
If there is more greenery in and surrounding new housing estates, residents of 
these estates will use their cars less.
In English:
R: Er if there is more greenery in new housing estates, then people use public 
transport or bikes more often, because then it is pleasant to cycle through the area. 
(+)
I: Okay, and what did you choose as the weak argument?
R: Er if there is more greenery in the new housing estates, then civilians will use 
their cars less, because they want to preserve nature and the greenery as much as 
possible. (-)
I: And why do you think argument A is stronger in supporting the argument, or in 
supporting the standpoint than argument B?
R: Er, I think that A is somewhat more based on facts. Because I think that if there 
is more greenery, that they would really er really, you know, go by bike more often 
and use public transport (...) And er that other one is weaker, I think, because er, 
yes, you cannot check if civilians want to preserve nature. They may say so, but 
you cannot completely, that, yes, it is more like, well, an opinion. And that, that 
other one you can really er, is more of a fact, where you can really check if it is true 
or not. (E)
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In Dutch:
R: Ehh als de nieuwbouwwijken groener worden, dan gebruiken mensen vaker het 
openbaar vervoer of de fiets, want dan is het aangenaam om door de wijk te rijden. 
(+)
I: Oké, en wat heb je bij het zwakke argument?
R: Ehh als de nieuwbouwwijken groener worden, dan zullen de burgers minder 
vaak de auto gebruiken, omdat ze de natuur en het groen zo goed mogelijk willen 
behouden. (-)
I: En waarom vind je argument A sterker ter ondersteuning van argument, of ter 
ondersteuning van het standpunt dan argument B?
R: Ehh, ik denk dat A iets meer op feiten is gebaseerd. W ant ik denk dat als het 
groener wordt, dat ze echt ehh echt, zeg maar, vaker de fiets zullen pakken en het 
openbaar vervoer gebruiken (...) En ehh die andere is denk ik zwakker, omdat ehh 
ja, je kunt het niet nagaan of de burgers de natuur willen behouden. Dat kunnen ze 
wel zeggen, maar je kunt niet helemaal, dat, ja, het is eerder een beetje een 
mening, zeg maar. En die, die andere kun je echt ehh, is meer een feit dat je echt 
kunt nagaan of het nou klopt of niet. (E)_______________________________________
This respondent is of the opinion that the strong argument is strong 
because it is a proven principle, whereas the weak argument is weak 
because the causal relationship cannot be verified.
In three interviews, respondents referred to the strength of the 
causal relationship. Fragment (4) gives an example:
________________________________ Fragment (4)_______________________________
Claim to be supported:
If the maximum permitted fat content in minced meat is reduced from 35 to 25 
percent, the costs of health care will decrease.
In English:
R: Yeah, well, the strong argument is er if there is less fat in the minced meat then 
is, drops the cholesterol level (...). And the people get less heart complaints and 
that is of course er, then the health care costs will go down of course. (+). And well 
yeah, otherwise I found it difficult to think of a bad argument, but there I have said, 
there people become less fat and then, there bones become less burdened (-) (...). 
I: And can you explain why you find argument A stronger than argument B? What 
is the difference between those two?
R: Er well, in any case, that [the proposition in the strong argument] er is therefore 
a fact, that is, that is an established fact that still (...) But that if you necessarily get 
fat and your bones are bothering you, that is er, can happen but that does not 
always have to, so that relation seems less strong to me. (E)
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In Dutch:
R: Ja, nou, het sterke argument is ehh als er minder vet in het gehakt zit dan is, 
daalt het cholesterolgehalte (...) En dan krijgen dus de mensen minder 
hartklachten en dat is natuurlijk ehh, dan dalen de kosten van de gezondheidszorg 
natuurlijk. (+) En nou ja, anders vond ik moeilijk om een slecht argument te 
bedenken, maar daar heb ik gezegd, daar worden de mensen minder dik en dan 
worden hun botten minder belast (-) (...).
I: En kunt u uitleggen waarom u argument A sterker vindt dan argument B? W at is 
het verschil tussen die twee?
R: Ehh nou, in ieder geval, dat [de propositie in het sterke argument] ehh is dus 
een feit, dat is, dat is een vastgesteld feit dat toch (...) Maar dat als je  per se dik 
wordt dat je last van je botten krijgt, dat is ehh, kan wel voorkomen maar dat hoeft 
natuurlijk niet altijd, dus dat verband is minder sterk, lijkt mij. (E)__________________
This respondent argues that the causal relationship in the strong 
argument is a verified fact (using a criterion similar to the one 
mentioned in fragment 3), whereas the causal relationship in the 
weak argument is less strong than the one in the strong argument. 
So, in the explanation for what makes the weak argument relatively 
weak, the respondent refers to the strength of the causal relationship.
In three interviews, respondents referred to cause sufficiency. 
For instance:
________________________________Fragment (5)________________________________
Claim to be supported:
If there is more greenery in and surrounding new housing estates, residents of 
these estates will use their cars less.
In English:
R: The strong argument, er yes that then there are less er, parking facilities if there 
is more greenery. (+)
I: Yes, okay. And the weak argument?
R: Er, that then the neighbourhood er becomes a bit more attractive to walk around 
in, that er you are more tempted to leave your car. (-)
I: Okay, okay, and can you also explain why one argument is stronger than the 
other?
R: Er, yeah, yeah I think that er, yeah, if there is less, if there is more greenery, that 
there are indeed slightly less parking facilities. That, yeah, that is more plausible 
and likely to be the case (...) (E).
In Dutch:
R: Het sterke argument, ehh ja dat er dan minder ehh parkeergelegenheden zijn 
als er meer groen is. (+)
I: Ja, oké. En het zwakke argument?
R: Ehm, dat de omgeving dan ehh wat aantrekkelijker wordt om in te lopen, dus 
ehh laat je eerder je  auto staan. (-)
I: Oké, oké, en kunt u ook uitleggen waarom het ene argument sterker is dan het 
andere?
R: Ehh, ja, ja ik denk dat ehh, ja, als er minder, als er meer groen is, dat er dan
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inderdaad wel wat minder parkeergelegenheden zijn. Dat, ja, dat is meer 
aannemelijk dat dat zo is (...) (E).______________________________________________
The respondent in fragment (5) considers it plausible that if the cause 
in the strong argument occurs, the effect will follow.
In sum, the interviews on the open case revealed that laymen 
are concerned with the extent to which the causal relation is 
established, the strength of the causal relation and cause sufficiency.
Interviews closed case
The evaluation criteria that were generated by the respondents in the 
closed case can be grouped into (I) criteria specific to the argument 
from cause to effect and (II) criteria that are specific to a different 
argument scheme. Criteria that are not mentioned in theory are in 
italics.
(I) Specific to the argument from cause to effect 
Cause sufficiency criterion
Nearly all laymen in the current study (95%) use criteria referring to a 
sufficient condition. It appears that some apply the concept in a strict 
way and others in a more liberal way. Consider the following 
fragments:
________________________________ Fragment (6)________________________________
Evaluated argument (A):
Initiatives that involve people in society generally lead to a more livable society. 
Supported claim:
Giving more money to youth drama schools will promote livability in society.
In English:
I: Er, what do you think is strong about that [argument A], or weak?
R: I find this a strong argument, because er because it is about er initiative, that 
people should take initiative. And if many people take initiative and if they are on 
the same level, then you get a better, or a more livable society.
In Dutch:
I: Ehm, wat vindt u daar [argument A] sterk aan, of zwak?
R: Ik vind hier sterk aan, omdat eh omdat het dus gaat over eh dat initiatieven, dat 
mensen initiatieven moeten nemen. En als veel mensen initiatief moeten nemen en 
veel neuzen dezelfde kant opstaan, dan krijg je gewoon een betere, of een 
leefbaardere samenleving.___________________________________________________
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________________________________ Fragment (7)_______________________________
Evaluated argument (C):
Investing in youth drama schools generally leads to an enduring future.
Supported claim:
Giving more money to youth drama schools will promote livability in society.
In English:
R: Yeah I found that one [argument C] total nonsense. Investing in youth drama 
schools generally leads to an enduring future. It will contribute, you know, a small 
part of course, but I don't think that, that it really leads to an enduring future. It will 
do its share, but, yeah, I did not find it very strong. It is not the case that society all 
of a sudden completely changes, because more money is put in the art and culture 
youth drama schools, I think.
In Dutch:
R: Ja die [argument C] vond ik helemaal onzin. Het investeren in 
jeugdtheaterscholen leidt over het algemeen tot een duurzame toekomst. Het zal 
wel een klein deel, zeg maar, met zich meebrengen natuurlijk, maar ik denk niet 
dat, dat het echt leidt tot een duurzame toekomst. Het zal zijn steentje wel 
bijdragen, maar, ja, ik vond hem niet heel erg sterk. Het is niet dat de samenleving 
meteen helemaal omslaat, omdat er meer geld in de kunst en cultuur 
jeugdtheaterscholen wordt gestoken, denk ik.__________________________________
|_________________________________Fragment (8)________________________________
Evaluated argument (B):
If employees who have been ill for a long time are able to telework, then they will 
be tired less quickly. Eventually they will return to their regular workplace sooner.
Supported claim:
If employers give employees who are absent due to long-term illness the 
opportunity to telework, they will return to their regular workplaces sooner.
In English:
R: Then I have B. That is actually, yeah it is a bit similar to C. If they can telework, 
they are tired less quickly. So they have a higher chance of recovery and they will 
return sooner.
In Dutch:
R: Dan heb ik B. Dat is eigenlijk, ja  hij lijkt een beetje op C. Als ze kunnen 
telewerken, zijn ze minder snel vermoeid. Dus hebben ze meer de kans om te 
herstellen en keren ze sneller terug.____________________________________________
In fragment (6), the respondent appears to handle the concept of 
sufficient condition in a strict way: if the circumstance in which many 
people take initiatives is present, then we get a better society. In other 
words: if the cause occurs, the effect must follow. In fragment (7), the 
respondent talks in more graded terms: investing in youth drama 
schools will bring about "a small part” of an enduring future, but it "is
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not the case that society all of a sudden completely changes”. In 
other words, the sufficiency of the cause is denied not by the formal 
indication ‘cause, hence no effect’, but by the indication ‘cause, hence 
the effect to some extent but not completely’. In fragment (8), the 
respondent reasons in degrees of likelihood or probability: if the 
employees can telework, then it raises the probability of recovering 
and going back to work. So, respondents might treat the concept of 
sufficiency as stringent as in the formal definition, but they may also 
use the concept in a more flexible way.
Second, the respondents do not only regard causes as 
sufficient conditions for effects, but also as instrumental conditions. 
For example:
________________________________Fragment (9)_______________________________
Evaluated argument (D):
If ill employees can do their work from home behind the computer, then they won't 
have to travel to work. And if they won't have to travel to work, then they will be 
less burdened. And if they will be less burdened by traveling, then they will soon be 
able to take on a bit of work.
Supported claim:
If employers give employees who are absent due to long-term illness the 
opportunity to telework, they will return to their regular workplaces sooner.
In English:
R: Then I have D. I think that ill employees are ill mainly because they need rest 
and if they don't need to travel to work, then they become less burdened and they 
can recover more quickly. And the step to return to work is smaller. So I think that 
that is also a good reason to do that tele, telework.
In Dutch:
R: Dan heb ik D. Ik denk dat zieke werknemers vooral ziek zijn, omdat ze rust 
nodig hebben en als ze niet naar hun werk hoeven te reizen, dan worden ze 
minder belast en kunnen ze sneller genezen. En de stap om dan weer aan het 
werk te gaan is minder groot. Dus ik denk dat dat ook een goede reden is, om dat 
tele, telewerken te doen._____________________________________________________
_______________________________ Fragment (10)_____________________________
Evaluated argument (B):
If employees who have been ill for a long time are able to telework, then they will 
be tired less quickly. Eventually they will return to their regular workplace sooner.
Supported claim:
If employers give employees who are absent due to long-term illness the 
opportunity to telework, they will return to their regular workplaces sooner.
In English:
I: Right, okay, then B, on the second p o s itio n .
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R: Yes, then they are less tired. If the cause is fatigue, for example caused by long 
traveling, then this is a solution. Er I don't know if that will lead to them returning 
sooner, because they still have to travel of course, if they return to work, just as 
long as before, but perhaps then they have a temporary break to recover from the 
fatigue, and then they can return to work. So yeah, it's possible, I don't find it a 
great solution, but it's possible.
In Dutch:
I: Goed, oké, dan B, op de tweede p le k .
R: Ja, dan zijn ze minder vermoeid. Als de oorzaak moeheid is, bijvoorbeeld door 
lang reizen, dan is dit een oplossing. Ehh of ze daardoor eerder terug zullen keren 
weet ik niet, want het reizen blijft natuurlijk, als ze opnieuw beginnen, weer even 
lang, maar misschien hebben ze dan tijdelijk een pauze om bij te komen van de 
vermoeidheid, en komen ze dan weer terug. Dus ja, het kan, ik vind het niet 
geweldig, maar het kan.______________________________________________________
In fragment (9), the respondent regards the proposed cause (doing 
telework) as a "good reason” to establish the chain of events leading 
to the desired effect (returning to work). In other words: the cause 
sufficiently serves as a means to an end. In fragment (10), the 
respondent regards the cause (doing telework) as a possible but not 
very good solution to a problem (not being able to go to work). So, 
laymen ask whether they see the cause in the argument as 
sufficiently instrumental in achieving a goal or solving a problem.
Respondents appear to use certain tests to determine whether 
a cause is indeed sufficient to bring about an effect. First of all, they 
take into consideration contributing or counteracting factors: 
circumstances that might influence the occurrence of the effect. This 
is illustrated in fragment (11):
_______________________________ Fragment (11)_______________________________
Evaluated argument (B):
If employees who have been ill for a long time are able to telework, then they will 
be tired less quickly. Eventually they will return to their regular workplace sooner.
Supported claim:
If employers give employees who are absent due to long-term illness the 
opportunity to telework, they will return to their regular workplaces sooner.
In English:
R: But all right, let’s see, B, what did I have there? Yeah, the same. If they can 
telework, they won’t get tired as quickly, yeah or tired less quickly compared to the 
situation in which they have to go to work, that I believe. But that they eventually 
return sooner to their regular workplace, that has to do with a whole lot of other 
health-related factors of course (...). Because they should also be cured of er, it 
totally depends on what he’s got. So, so actually also er, you cannot just claim that. 
Actually not at all.
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In Dutch:
R: Maar goed, even kijken, B, wat had ik daarbij? Ja, hetzelfde. Als ze kunnen 
telewerken, zijn ze minder snel vermoeid, ja  of minder snel vermoeid als dat ze 
naar hun werk zouden moeten gaan, dat geloof ik weer wel. Maar dat ze 
uiteindelijk dan sneller terug naar hun gewone werkplek, dat heeft met een 
heleboel andere gezondheidsfactoren te maken natuurlijk (...) Want ze moeten ook 
genezen zijn van ehh, het hangt er helemaal van af wat hij heeft. Dus, dus eigenlijk 
ook ehh, kun je niet zo zeggen. Eigenlijk helemaal niet.__________________________
In fragment (11), the respondent decided that not getting tired as 
quickly does not necessarily lead to an earlier return to the regular 
workplace, because there are other health-related factors that may 
prevent the effect from occurring. So, laymen try to imagine factors 
that modify the chance that the effect occurs.
Secondly, laymen appear to focus on the strength of the 
causal generalization in the argument to test whether the cause is 
enough to bring about the effect. If they think the range of cases the 
generalization holds for is too narrow, then they doubt that the cause 
is sufficient in general to produce the effect. This is illustrated in 
fragment (12):
_______________________________ Fragment (12)_______________________________
Evaluated argument (B):
If youth drama schools get a financial impulse, then young people will be better 
educated in amateur theatre. Eventually, society will be more livable.
Supported claim:
Giving more money to youth drama schools will promote livability in society.
In English:
I: Hmmhmm. Okay, and you've got B on the fourth position?
R: Yeah, if youth drama schools get a financial impulse, then young people will be 
better educated in amateur theatre. But you first have to become a member of such 
a school. I don't think that you can say in general terms that young people will be 
better educated. And that that causes the society to become more livable, that will 
be caused by the students who, say, actually get that education (...). But there are 
more students who do not get that education. So it is written here as if the whole 
society flourishes, because a few students are better educated (...) So I found that 
a little weird.
In Dutch:
I: Hmmhmm. Oké, en B heb je op de vierde plaats?
R: Ja, als jeugdtheaterscholen een financiële impuls krijgen, dan wordt de jeugd 
beter opgeleid in amateurtheater. Maar dan moet je eerst wel lid worden van zo'n 
school dus. Ik denk niet dat je dat in het algemeen kan trekken dat de jeugd dan 
beter opgeleid wordt (...) En dat de samenleving daar leefbaarder van wordt, dat 
zal wel zo zijn door de studenten, die zeg maar, daadwerkelijk die opleiding volgen 
(...). Maar er zijn meer studenten, die die opleiding niet volgen. Dus het staat hier 
geschreven alsof de hele samenleving opbloeit, omdat een paar studenten beter
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opgeleid worden (...) Dus dat vond ik een beetje vreemd.
As this fragment shows, respondents might have problems accepting 
the causal generalization. As a consequence, they do not consider 
the effect certain or probable on the basis of the proposed cause.
Third, laymen in this study appear to judge the causation on 
the basis of backup evidence or explanation. For instance:
I________________________________ Fragment (13)________________________________
Evaluated argument (B):
If employees who have been ill for a long time are able to telework, then they will 
be tired less quickly. Eventually they will return to their regular workplace sooner.
Evaluated argument (D):
If ill employees can do their work from home behind the computer, then they won't 
have to travel to work. And if they won't have to travel to work, then they will be 
less burdened. And if they will be less burdened by traveling, then they will soon be 
able to take on a bit of work.
Supported claim:
If employers give employees who are absent due to long-term illness the 
opportunity to telework, they will return to their regular workplaces sooner.
In English:
R: Then I have B. That is actually, yeah it looks a bit like C. If they can telework, 
they are tired less quickly. So that means they have a higher chance of recovery 
and they will return sooner.
I: Hmmhmm, and why do you still think it is a weaker argument than D?
R: Er, because D is more specific about them not having to travel (...) And in B, 
yeah it's just about them being tired less quickly (...). And that does not necessarily 
have to be the case, because if they still have to work, they're basically tired just as 
quickly (...). That's why I think D is better.
In Dutch:
R: Dan heb ik B. Dat is eigenlijk, ja  hij lijkt een beetje op C. Als ze kunnen 
telewerken, zijn ze minder snel vermoeid. Dus hebben ze meer de kans om te 
herstellen en keren ze sneller terug.
I: Hmmhmm, en waarom vind je hem toch zwakker dan D?
R: Ehm, omdat D specifieker is over dat ze niet hoeven te reizen (...) En bij B, ja 
gaat het er eigenlijk alleen maar om dat ze minder snel vermoeid zijn (...) En dat 
hoeft niet per se zo te zijn, want als ze toch ook moeten werken, dan zijn ze in 
principe net zo snel vermoeid. En bij D gaat het erom waarom ze minder snel 
vermoeid zijn, omdat ze niet hoeven te reizen (...). Daarom vind ik D beter.________
Fragment (13) shows that if the causal steps in the chain of events 
are specified, laymen are more tempted to acknowledge that the 
effect will follow the cause.
In fragment (14), the respondent requires an explanation for 
how exactly the cause is supposed to lead to the effect:
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I________________________________ Fragment (14)________________________________
Evaluated argument (A):
Initiatives that involve people in society generally lead to a more livable society. 
Supported claim:
Giving more money to youth drama schools will promote livability in society.
In English:
I: Okay, and A? Because that one is exactly in the middle, in the third position.
R: Er, er. Yeah, I actually thought it had little foundation. So er, yeah it generally led 
to a more livable society, yeah, why? Yeah, I need to know more as to why. Why do 
they have that opinion? So that's why I had it a little, yeah, it can be the case, but I 
found it a little weak (...) Because it was not really further supported.
I: And what do you mean, that it...by supported?
R: Er, well, explanation why. Why, er, why it matters at all, er, causes the society to 
be more livable anyway and er, in what, in what respect then.
In Dutch:
I: Oké, en A? W ant die zit precies in het midden, op de derde plaats.
R: Ehm, ehm. Ja, ik vond hem eigenlijk weinig onderbouwing verder. Dus ehh, ja 
het leidde over het algemeen tot een leefbaardere samenleving, ja, waarom? Ja, ik 
moet meer weten waarom. Waarom vinden ze dat? Dus daarom had ik hem een 
beetje, ja, het kan wel zo zijn, maar ik vond dan ook een beetje zwak (...) Omdat hij 
niet echt verder onderbouwd was.
I: En wat bedoel je  daarmee, dat h e t .  met onderbouwd?
R: Ehh, nou uitlegging waarom, uitleg waarom. Waarom ehh, waarom het 
überhaupt geeft voor ehh, zorgt voor een leefbaardere samenleving en ehh in wat, 
in wat voor opzicht dan._______________________________________________________
Relevance criterion
A significant number of laymen (35%) doubt the relevance of the 
argument, so whether or not the argument is related to the matter at 
hand. Some focus on the applicability of the argument as a whole, as 
fragment (15) illustrates:
_______________________________ Fragment (15)_____________________________
Evaluated argument (A):
Employees who have been ill for a long time and who get a holiday will generally 
return sooner to their regular workplace.
Supported claim:
If employers give employees who are absent due to long-term illness the 
opportunity to telework, they will return to their regular workplaces sooner.
In English:
R: And A, er, here I don’t at all see the connection between these two reasonings, 
claims. Employees who have been ill for a long time and who get a holiday will 
generally return sooner to their regular workplace. That does not mean anything. 
Sooner than what? Employees who have been ill for a long time and who get a
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holiday will generally return sooner to their regular workplace. Sooner than who or 
what, it doesn't say, and it also does not say as a result of what. So, as if it is a 
conclusion, if If employers give employees who are absent due to long-term illness 
the opportunity to telework, they will return to their regular workplaces sooner. 
Those two sentences have nothing to do with each other. So A comes last.
In Dutch:
R: En A, eh, daar vind ik de samenhang tussen deze twee stellingen, 
redeneringen, volstrekt verloren. Langdurig zieke werknemers die vrijaf krijgen 
zullen over het algemeen sneller terugkeren naar hun gewone werkplek. Dat zegt 
helemaal niks. Sneller dan wat? Langdurig zieke werknemers die vrijaf krijgen 
zullen over het algemeen sneller terugkeren naar hun gewone werkplek. Sneller 
dan wie of wat, dat staat er niet bij, en waardoor staat er ook niet bij. Dus, alsof het 
een conclusie is, als werkgevers langdurig zieke medewerkers in de gelegenheid 
stellen om te telewerken, dan zullen ze eerder terugkeren naar hun gewone 
werkplek. Die twee zinnen hebben niets met elkaar te maken. Daarom A als 
laatste.
Others focus in particular on the relation between the cause in the 
argument and the cause in the conclusion, as the person in fragment 
(16) does:
I________________________________ Fragment (16)________________________________
Evaluated argument (A):
Employees who have been ill for a long time and who get a holiday will generally 
return sooner to their regular workplace.
Supported claim:
If employers give employees who are absent due to long-term illness the 
opportunity to telework, they will return to their regular workplaces sooner.
In English:
R: Well, I put A here be, because that's the only place, you know, that was left 
over, so A is in third place because I do not, actually do not see anything in it. Er 
yeah employees who have been ill for a long time and who get a holiday will 
generally return s o o n e r. yeah, I, a, an ill employee does not have a holiday, that 
er. I, I, you know, do not really see an argument in it. So er, I could not do anything 
with that.
In Dutch:
R: Nou, A staat hier om, omdat die enige plaats overbleef zeg maar, dus A staat op 
de derde plaats omdat ik er helemaal, eigenlijk helemaal niks in zie. Ehh ja 
langdurig zieke werknemers die vrijaf krijgen zullen over het algemeen sneller ...
Ja, ik, een, een zieke werknemer heeft geen vrij, dat ehh. Ik, ik zie daar, ik zie er 
geen argument in, zeg maar. Dus ehh, daar, daar kon ik even niks mee.___________
The respondents in the current study never focused on the relevance 
of the effect only.
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(II) Specific to different argument schemes
Both cause necessity and cause sufficiency criterion 
Respondents who consider the strength of an argument from cause 
to effect may require both sufficiency and necessity of the cause 
(30%). Not only do they argue that if the cause occurs, then the effect 
will follow (sufficiency cue), but they also argue that without the cause 
occurring, the effect will not follow (necessity cue). For example:
I________________________________ Fragment (17)________________________________
Evaluated argument (E):
If ill employees can telework, then they will take on more work. Moreover, they can 
stay involved with work and colleagues. Eventually they will return to their regular 
workplace sooner.
Supported claim:
If employers give employees who are absent due to long-term illness the 
opportunity to telework, they will return to their regular workplaces sooner.
In English:
I: Well, I see you put E on 1. Can you explain why you put it there, why you thought 
E was the best?
R: Let me think for a while why that was, er [Thinking] Yeah, I think that if they do 
stay involved with work at home, that then they feel more like going back to work, 
eventually (...) If they still know how their colleagues are doing and stuff like that. 
Because if that contact fades away, then I don't think that they really feel like going 
back to work and on the contrary, they will sooner feel left out or something (...)
And then they feel like working even less. So I think that, by doing telework, when 
they are ill, that that on the contrary er, that they will still feel like going to work.
In Dutch:
I: Nou, ik zie E op 1 staan. Kun je uitleggen waarom die daar staat, waarom je E 
het beste vond?
R: Even denken wat het ook alweer was, ehm [Denkt] Ja, ik denk dat als ze 
inderdaad thuis gewoon betrokken blijven bij het werk, dat ze dan nog meer zin 
hebben om weer terug te gaan naar het werk, op een gegeven moment (...). Als ze 
nog weten hoe het met hun collega's is enzo. Want als dat contact vervaagt, dan 
denk ik niet dat ze nog echt zin hebben om naar hun werk te gaan en dan zullen ze 
zich sneller juist buitengesloten voelen ofzo (...). En dan hebben ze er minder zin 
in. Dus ik denk dat, door telewerken, als ze eenmaal ziek zijn, dat dat juist wel dan 
ehh, dat ze dan wel nog zin hebben om naar hun werk te gaan.___________________
The respondent in fragment (17) considers job involvement not only a 
sufficient cause, but also a necessary cause. It is argued that staying 
involved does indeed lead to a return to work (indicating sufficiency) 
and that not staying involved will not lead to a return to work 
(indicating necessity).
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Cause necessity criterion
A fifth of the laymen in this study use criteria referring to a necessary 
condition. For example:
I________________________________ Fragment (18)________________________________ |
Evaluated argument C:
Measures to let employees who have been ill for a long time work from home lead 
generally to the solution of social and individual problems.
Supported claim:
If employers give employees who are absent due to long-term illness the 
opportunity to telework, they will return to their regular workplaces sooner.
In English:
I: Okay, and then in fourth place you put C...
R: Yeah, let's s e e .  Er, yeah I don't see it that way, that it, that working from home 
leads to the solution of social and individual problems. I think that it does not have 
so much to do with the workplace, whether it is at home or in the office. I don't 
really see the connection.
I: And why don't you really see the connection?
R: Er, well I think that social and individual problems are there and that they er can 
also be solved in all sorts of places, so that does not necessarily have to do with 
telework.
In Dutch:
I: Oké, en dan op de vierde plek heb je C s ta a n .
R: Ja, even k ijk e n . Ehm, ja  ik zie dat niet zo, dat het, dat thuiswerken leidt tot het 
oplossen van maatschappelijke en individuele problemen. Ik denk dat het niet 
zozeer met de werkplek te maken heeft, of dat nou thuis is of op je werk. Het 
verband zie ik niet zo.
I: En waarom zie je  dat verband niet zo?
R: Ehm, nou ik denk dat maatschappelijke en individuele problemen er zijn en dat 
die ook ehh op allerlei soorten plekken opgelost kunnen worden, dus dat heeft niet 
per se te maken met thuiswerken.______________________________________________
In fragment (18), the respondent makes clear that the proposed effect 
can occur without the proposed cause ever happening and that 
therefore, a causal link cannot be inferred.
Effect desirability criterion
A few respondents (15%) focus on the desirability of an effect in the 
argument. In fragment (19), the respondent appreciates the argument 
because he or she considers the effect of involvement desirable:
_______________________________ Fragment (19)____________________________
Evaluated argument (E):
If more money is put at the disposal of youth drama schools, more young people 
will get the chance to become involved in society. Moreover, young people will
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Supported claim:
Giving more money to youth drama schools will promote livability in society.
In English:
I: Okay, er, can you explain why you put E in 1st place?
R: Yes, er, I put E on 1, because it says, then more young people will get the 
chance to be involved in society. And I think that it is simply important that more 
young people are involved in society.
In Dutch:
I: Oké, ehm, kunt u uitleggen waarom E op 1 staat?
R: Ja, ehh, E heb ik op 1 gezet, omdat er staat, dan krijgen meer jongeren de kans 
om betrokken te worden bij de maatschappij. En ik denk dat het gewoon belangrijk 
is dat meer jongeren betrokken worden bij de maatschappij._____________________
educate themselves better. Eventually, society will become more livable.
Table 3.11 shows the laymen criteria for the argument from cause to 
effect.
Table 3.11 Laymen criteria for the argument from cause to effect (per type of 
stimulus material) and agreement among respondents (the number of closed case 
individual interviews in which the criterion was mentioned divided by the total number 
of closed case individual interviews) (laymen criteria that do not correspond to theory 
are in italics). _______________________________________________ ________________
Nature of 
criterion
Criterion Type of stimulus material Agreement 
among 
respondents, 
based on 
closed case 
individual 
interviews
Open
case
Closed
case
Specific to 
the
argument 
from cause 
to effect
Cause sufficiency + + 19 of 20 
(95%)
Relevance (of the 
cause or the 
argument as a whole)
- + 7 of 20 
(35%)
Specific to 
different 
argument 
schemes
Both cause necessity 
and cause suffiency
- + 6 of 20 
(30%)
Cause necessity - + 4 of 20 
(20%)
Effect desirability + + 3 of 20 
(15%)
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3.4 Conclusion and discussion
Conclusion
In section 3.2, I examined the normative considerations on the quality 
of the argument from cause to effect in argumentation theory. In 
section 3.3, I uncovered the considerations of laymen on the quality 
of the argument from cause to effect. In this section, the key question 
is: to what extent do laymen norms as uncovered in the previous 
section correspond to those formulated in argumentation theory?
Almost all laymen in this study judge the argument from cause 
to effect on the basis of cause suffiency and a smaller part of the 
laymen in this study judge this type of argument on the basis of cause 
relevance. Laymen’s evaluations on the basis of cause sufficiency are 
generally on a more concrete level and less strict than suggested in 
theory. For instance, they do not ask the abstract question if a certain 
cause is sufficient to bring about the effect, but rather whether the 
specific effect in the argument (e.g. recovering and going back to 
work) is likely to occur as a result of the specific cause in the 
argument (e.g. telework). In some cases, laymen also use tests for 
cause sufficiency that are suggested in theory. To determine cause 
sufficiency, for example, they concentrate on the presence of 
contributing and/or counteracting factors and on the strength of the 
causal generalization.
In argumentation theory, evaluation criteria have been 
suggested for causal reasoning that can be considered irrelevant to 
the argument from cause to effect. Some laymen do indeed use these 
irrelevant criteria: some question whether a cause is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition, others question if the cause is a 
necessary condition. However, it should be noted that only a minority 
of the respondents use these irrelevant criteria.
In sum, the laymen criteria that are also mentioned in 
argumentation theory are the following:
Corresponding criterion with relatively high agreement among respondents:
• The cause sufficiency criterion: the cause should be enough to 
probably bring about the effect (specific to the argument from 
cause to effect).
Corresponding criteria with relatively low agreement among respondents:
• The cause relevance criterion: the cause in the argument should 
connect adequately to the cause in the conclusion (specific to the 
argument from cause to effect).
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• The both cause necessity and cause suffiency criterion: the cause 
should not only be enough to probably bring about the effect, but 
should also be a condition without which the effect does not occur 
(unexpected, because irrelevant to the argument from cause to 
effect).
• The cause necessity criterion: the cause should be a condition 
without which the effect does not occur (unexpected, because 
irrelevant to the argument from cause to effect).
There are also differences between argumentation theory and 
laymen. Most of these differences, however, could be expected. 
Laymen do not attack the strength of the conclusion, as suggested in 
theory. This does not come as a surprise, because in the material, the 
conclusion did not differ from argument to argument. So, if they would 
have had this particular criterion in mind, they were not stimulated to 
use it.
Other differences between theory and laymen could be 
expected, considering the irrelevance of the particular criteria to the 
argument from cause to effect. Respondents did not mention that 
association should not be necessarily interpreted as causality, that 
other effects than those under consideration should not be 
(un)desirable or that there should not be better actions than the one 
proposed.
The cause accuracy criterion was not used by laymen, as 
expected. This criterion only applies to existing causes, not to causes 
that are hypothetical. In the material, only hypothetical causes were 
presented, so respondents did not have any reason to doubt them.
Finally, laymen in this study base their judgments upon the 
desirability of an effect in the argument, something that was not 
suggested in theory for the argument from cause to effect and that 
can also be considered irrelevant to this type of argument. However, 
only a small part of the respondents used this criterion. In sum, the 
non-corresponding criteria are:
Non-corresponding criteria that are not mentioned by respondents:
• The strength of conclusion criterion: the conclusion should not be 
too strong (in theory only, as expected, because of the material).
• The association or causation criterion: association should not be 
necessarily interpreted as causality (in theory only, as expected, 
because irrelevant to the argument from cause to effect)
• The nature of side-effects criterion: other effects than those under 
consideration should not be (un)desirable (in theory only, as 
expected, because irrelevant to the argument from cause to effect).
• The counterplan criterion: there should not be better actions than 
the one proposed (in theory only, as expected, because irrelevant 
to the argument from cause to effect).
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• The cause accuracy criterion: the cause should not be doubted (in 
theory only, as expected, because irrelevant to the hypothetical 
cause).
Non-corresponding criterion with relatively low agreement among
respondents:
• The effect desirability criterion: the effect in the argument should be 
desirable (laymen only, unexpected, because irrelevant to the 
argument from cause to effect).
Discussion
In general, laymen use norms that they are supposed to use 
according to those criteria formulated in argumentation theory, 
although the cause sufficiency criterion is the only criterion shared by 
a majority of laymen. Some norms that laymen use for the argument 
from cause to effect are in fact irrelevant to this type of argument. 
Some focus on the cause as a necessary condition and others on the 
desirability of the effect in the argument, something that they should 
not do for the argument from cause to effect. Rather, these criteria 
pertain to the argument from effect to cause and pragmatic 
argumentation, respectively.
The finding that laymen appear to use irrelevant criteria should 
be qualified: the agreement on these criteria was relatively low and it 
is understandable that they were used. The tendency to focus on the 
desirability of an effect in the argument can easily be explained by the 
pragmatic context created in the material. In the material, each of the 
presented claims was an action-consequence relation that could be 
used as a premise in a pragmatic argument. If someone considers an 
action and its consequence in the argument, it may be difficult to 
ignore the desirability of the effect, even though it is not relevant to 
the reasonableness of the argument. Similarly, the focus on the 
necessity of the cause might be inherent in the pragmatic context; if a 
certain (desirable) effect is presented, then people might be 
stimulated to think about alternative actions that might also lead to the 
effect.
The results of the closed case interviews showed that some 
laymen apply the notion of sufficient conditions more flexibly than 
they should according to formal logicians and some argumentation 
theorists. This result is in line with research by Verschueren, 
Schroyens, Schaeken and d’Ydewalle (2004). They investigated how 
lay people understand and assess the notions of necessity and 
sufficiency of a cause for the effect. Specifically, it was experimentally 
determined if the subjective conceptualization of necessity and
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sufficiency paralleled the formal concept. For sufficiency, the formal 
indications were (a) when the cause occurs the effect follows and (b) 
the absence of the effect implies the absence of the cause. For 
necessity, the indications were (c) the occurrence of the effect implies 
the occurrence of the cause and (d) the absence of the cause implies 
the absence of the effect.
Verschueren et al. (2004) reported that the laypeople’s notions 
are not completely identical to the formal definitions: they interpreted 
sufficiency in a more liberal (or graded) way whereas necessity was 
considered as an all-or-none affair. They concluded that it "seems to 
be more ecologically valid to define sufficiency in terms of for instance 
the likelihood that the cause brings about the effect, rather than in 
terms of an all-or-none property” (p. 13). After all, so they argue, in 
everyday language it is rarely the case that the cause is always 
followed by the effect, as in strict sufficiency67. This conclusion 
corresponds to the results of the study reported in this chapter, as the 
closed case interviews revealed that laymen may think in terms of 
probability when they judge causation and not necessarily in strict 
sufficiency. It also corresponds to the probabilistic approach to 
causality, in which it is assumed that events might change the 
probability of other events (see 3.1.1).
If the laymen criteria are compared with the approaches to 
causality that Hulswit (2002) discussed (see 3.1.1), it can be 
concluded that all different approaches are represented in the laymen 
criteria. In the results of this study, all contemporary philosophical 
accounts of causality show through: (I) a necessary and/or sufficient 
conditions approach, (II) a counterfactual approach, (III) an 
instrumental or agency approach and (IV) a probabilistic approach.
A limitation of the study reported in this chapter is the design 
of the open cases. The data generated by the open case were not as 
informative as expected. The pragmatic context might have 
complicated the task. In creating arguments and evaluating them, 
people were somehow stimulated to focus on the proposed measures 
(reducing fat content in minced meat and improving the greenery in 
new housing estates) instead of the prediction that the proposed 
measure will lead to a consequence. So, they were tempted to
67 This point of view can be found in argumentation theory. Hastings (1962) already 
argued: “The logician would have us require sufficient cause to obtain a certain 
relation, but in rhetoric we can usually only approach sufficient cause, since we 
deal with relations of probability” (p. 76). Schellens and Verhoeven (1994) must 
have had the same feeling, considering the critical question: “Is cause A in 
general sufficient to consider effect B probable?” (p. 82).
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present an argument in favor of the action in the claim and an 
argument against the action in the claim. The instruction and 
interview techniques might have been insufficient to prevent or 
correct that problem (the respondents were not corrected during the 
interview).
It was observed that respondents in this study never focused 
on the relevance of the effect only. However, this can be explained by 
overly subtle manipulations of the effects in the closed case. More 
specifically: the solution of social and individual problems was 
insufficiently unrelated to employees returning to their regular 
workplaces and an enduring future was insufficiently unrelated to a 
promoted livability of society. In that respect, the manipulations in the 
closed case might have been inadequate to reveal that laymen focus 
on the relevance of the effect in the argument.
Still, the results of this study are valuable, as insights are 
gained into the specific features that should make the argument from 
cause to effect strong. The ideas about what should make this 
argument type strong do not differ considerably between 
argumentation theory and laymen, although it should be noted that 
the sufficiency criterion is the only criterion that laymen in this study 
agree upon to a relatively high extent.
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4. The quality of the argument from example
This chapter deals with the quality of the argument from example. 
First, in section 4.1, I will discuss various functions of the example 
and indicate which function of the example is relevant to this study. 
Then, I will address the questions of what criteria are used in 
argument theory to evaluate the quality of the argument from example
(4.2) and what criteria are used by laymen to evaluate the quality of 
the argument from example (4.3). Finally, I will make a comparison 
between these conceptions (4.4).
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Functions of an example
Just like authority, ‘example’ may mean different things in different 
situations. Willer, Ruchatz and Pethes (2007) provide a systematic 
treatise on the functions of an example that abstracts from different 
research traditions. They present a typology of functions of the 
example. In categorizing these functions, they focus on the nature of 
the example as a source of knowledge (‘the epistemology of the 
exemplary’). I will review the typology developed by Willer et al. 
(2007) and use it as a starting point to narrow down my treatment to 
the type that is relevant to this study. In Figure 4.1-4.4, I present the 
diagrams Willer et al. (2007) use to represent the different functions 
of the example. The diagrams have been copied directly from the 
originals, but the captions have been translated from German into 
English.
Figure 4.1 The rhetorical Figure 4.2 The knowledge-
example representing example
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Figure 4.3 The knowledge-constructing Figure 4.4 The normative
example example
The first function of an example distinguished by Wilier et al. 
(2007) is the rhetorical function (“rhetorische Funktion” / "das 
rhetorische Beispiel”), referring to the function of the example as it 
has been treated in the rhetorical tradition (see Figure 4.1). In the 
traditional rhetorical treatment, the example is a particular case a 
(e.g. a story, a person, a historical event) from which a conclusion is 
drawn for a separate particular case a’. The reasoning may go 
directly from one particular case to another particular case, but may 
also proceed (explicitly or implicitly) via a general rule A or a tertium 
comparationis, the quality or qualities that the compared particulars 
have in common. To clarify the rhetorical function further and to show 
the function in an argumentative context, I present the following 
examples68:
(1) a: The other library I went to last week offered free web access.
(A: All libraries offer free web access. /
tertium comparationis: The library I'm about to visit and the one I 
went to last week have relevant qualities in common.) 
a ’: Therefore, the library I'm about to visit will probably offer free 
public internet access too.
(2) a: The library I went to last week was right to offer free web access. 
(A: All libraries are right to offer free web access./
tertium comparationis: The library I'm about to visit and the one I 
went to last week have relevant qualities in common.) 
a ’: Therefore, this library would be right to offer free public internet 
access too.
All examples in (4.1.1) are created by myself and not by Willer et al. (2007).
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On the basis of Willer et al. (2007), I could not determine the nature of 
the rule A that the rhetorical example may rely on, but the examples 
above show that the rule can be either descriptive (example 1) or 
normative (example 2). The examples also show that Willer et al.’s 
(2007) rhetorical example is in fact an argument by analogy in an 
argumentative context.
The second function Willer et al. (2007) ascribe to the 
example is the knowledge-representing function ("wissenabbildende 
Funktion” / "Das Belegbeispiel” , see Figure 4.2). In this function, 
example a serves as an illustration of a known rule A , a rule to which 
it at the same time contributes. In other words, an element of a group 
is used to make general regularities of this group concrete. The 
knowledge-representing example appeals to descriptive rules only, 
expressing what is (see also Willer et al., 2007, p. 42). In my opinion, 
the knowledge-representing function might play a role in an 
argumentative context, but the question is whether it is an 
argumentative role. I will return to this point at the end of this section.
Willer et al. (2007) call the third function of the example the 
knowledge-constructing function ("wissenbildende Funktion” / "Das 
Ausgangsbeispiel” , see Figure 4.3). The authors explain that the 
knowledge-constructing example is the mirror image of the 
knowledge-representing example. In the former, we start from a more 
general knowledge and illustrate this knowledge with a more specific 
example, whereas in the latter the more specific knowledge (the 
example) is used to construct the more general knowledge. For 
example:
(3) a: Yesterday you received unwanted messages and today you 
clicked on an attached Trojan horse.
A: Therefore, most emails are spam.
According to Willer et al. (2007, p. 42), the knowledge-constructing 
example makes reference to descriptive rules only, just like the 
knowledge-representing example. The example shows that the 
knowledge-constructing example becomes reasoning from example 
to a generalization in an argumentative context.
The normative function of the example is the last function 
identified by Willer et al. (2007) ("normative Funktion” / "Das 
normative Beispiel”, see Figure 4.4). In this role, something or 
somebody serves as a model to be imitated - or not be imitated in 
case the model is bad. Things that may serve as normative examples 
range from artworks to narratives; human normative examples may 
vary from teachers to saints. Willer et al. (2007) explain that the
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normative example is used to present abstract norms in a clear and 
attractive way to make them applicable to other individuals. The next 
example shows the normative function in an argumentative context:
(4) A: Managers should attempt to influence motivation.
a: Consider our former manager: he was recognized by his 
employees as an exceptional leader.
a ’: Therefore, as our new manager, you should try to be a motivator 
too.
Example 4 shows that the normative example only applies to 
prescriptive rules, rules about what ought to be (see also Willer et al., 
2007, p. 42). The normative example appears to be strongly related 
to the knowledge-representing example, because something general 
(‘Managers should attempt to influence motivation’) is illustrated by a 
specific example (‘our former manager’). In my opinion, one 
difference between the knowledge-representing example and the 
normative example is that the former illustrates a descriptive rule, 
whereas the latter illustrates a prescriptive rule. Another difference is 
that the knowledge-representing example is used with the purpose to 
illustrate, whereas the normative example is used with the ultimate 
goal to draw a conclusion for another particular case, which makes it 
similar to the rhetorical example. A difference, however, is that the 
rhetorical example does not have an illustrative function, whereas the 
normative example does. After all, the normative example is used to 
illustrate a prescriptive rule. About the rhetorical example, it was 
stated that it is in fact an argument by analogy in an argumentative 
context. The normative example as presented by Willer et al. (2007) 
on the other hand is in fact not an argument by analogy in an 
argumentative context, as it is not reasoned from a particular case to 
another particular case. In other words, the normative example in an 
argumentative context does not form a premise in the argumentation. 
Rather, it is reasoned from a prescriptive rule (illustrated by the 
normative example) to another particular case.
What function of the example is relevant within the framework 
of pragmatic argumentation? In chapter 1, I explained that I would 
focus on the evaluation of argument types supporting one of the 
premises in the pragmatic argumentation scheme: the premise 
expressing that action A (probably) leads to B. This premise can be 
conceived as a general rule - or rather a causal generalization - and it 
is possible to support such a causal generalization with one or more 
examples exhibiting the causal relation. For instance: "In Rotterdam, 
the introduction of a public transport chip card has led to better public
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transport. (In Amsterdam etc., the introduction of a public transport 
chip card has led to better public transport.). Therefore, introducing 
the public transport chip card usually improves public transport.”. Now 
I can specify the question further into: what function of the example is 
relevant to the causal generalization?
If we consider the functions distinguished by Willer et al. 
(2007), it appears that the rhetorical example and the normative 
example (Figure 4.1 and 4.4) are not relevant to the causal 
generalization, as they are used to support a claim about a particular 
case instead of a general principle. The knowledge-constructing and 
knowledge-representing example (Figure 4.2 and 4.3) appear to be 
more relevant: in the former, reasoning goes from one or several 
examples to a general principle whereas in the latter, a general 
principle is illustrated by one or several examples. The example can 
do both jobs for the causal generalization in the pragmatic 
argumentation scheme: it may justify that action A (probably) leads to 
B or it may illustrate that action A (probably) leads to B.
Although the knowledge-representing function appears to be 
relevant to the causal generalization in pragmatic argumentation, it is 
not relevant to the current research question. Considering this 
research question, I am interested in the quality of argumentation. By 
using the knowledge-representing example, however, someone does 
not aim to increase the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for 
the listener or reader, nor is the example put forward to justify the 
standpoint69. By using the knowledge-representing example, 
someone aimes to illustrate70, something I am not interested in within 
the framework of this study.
In addition, argumentation theory gives us insufficient reason 
to think that an illustrative example is in fact argumentative. According 
to Kienpointer (1992), the illustrative example can be considered to 
be argumentation, as appears from the difference that he makes 
between Induktive Beispielargumentation and Illustrative 
Beispielargumentation. In the first type of argument, a general rule
I rely on the following definition of argumentation: “Argumentation is a verbal and 
social activity o f reason aimed at increasing (or decreasing) the acceptability o f a 
controversial standpoint for the listener or reader, by putting forward a 
constellation o f propositions intended to justify  (or refute) the standpoint before a 
rational judge" (Italics in orginal, Van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck 
Henkemans, 1996, p. 5).
70 According to the Oxford English Dictionary (online second edition, 1989), 
illustration can be defined as “The action or fact of making clear or evident to the 
mind; setting forth clearly or pictorially; elucidation; explanation; exemplification” 
(retrieved online, March 4th, 2009).
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that has not been established yet is induced from one or more 
examples. Therefore, this is similar to the knowledge-constructing 
function of an example. In the second type, one or more examples 
are used to illustrate or to confirm a general rule serving as a premise 
in an argumentation. This is similar to the normative example, which 
is not an argument, but an illustration of a rule that is an argument. I 
disagree with Kienpointer’s (1992) suggestion than an illustrative 
example is argumentative, because it does not form a premise upon 
which the conclusion is based. Instead, the illustrated rule is the 
argument here.
Schellens (1985) suggests that an illustrative example is not 
an argument: "In some cases it is the question if the presumption of 
argumentation is rightfully ascribed to examples. Does the writer give 
the example to support a general statement, or does he just want to 
illustrate the statement?”71 (p. 192, translated from Dutch). Walton 
(1996) appears to agree with Schellens (1985): "One must be careful 
in identifying argument from example in a given case, because the 
citing of an example is also used in explanations and other speech 
acts that are not arguments” (p. 51).
Although it is not always possible in concrete cases to 
determine if an example has an illustrative or an argumentative 
function, only the knowledge-constructing example is in my opinion 
relevant to the causal generalization, as the specific case is used as 
support for the knowledge that action A (probably) leads to B. 
Therefore, I will limit my discussion to the knowledge-constructing 
example. Next, I will consider the quality of the knowledge- 
constructing example according to common views in the scientific 
community.
4.1.2 Sampling principles in scientific methodology
Inducing general principles from particular examples is linked to 
scientific, inductive ways of reasoning. In this scientific approach, the 
particular example is usually part of a sample. Sampling may be part 
of quantitative research, aiming to make (statistical) inferences about 
a population. The requirements for sound quantitative sampling have 
become a matter of common knowledge in modern science. The 
sample ought to be representative of the population, which means
71 In Dutch: “In sommige gevallen is het de vraag of aan voorbeelden met recht de 
pretentie van argumentatie wordt toegeschreven. Geeft de schrijver het voor­
beeld ter verdediging van een algemene uitspraak, of wil hij er de uitspraak 
alleen maar mee illustreren?” (1985, p. 192).
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that it should give an accurate representation of the population's 
distribution. The representativeness depends on two factors: the size 
of the sample and the random selection of the members of the 
sample. The larger the sample, the higher the chance that it truly 
reflects the population. A sample is chosen randomly, if every 
member of the population is given an equal and known chance of 
being selected for the sample.
Sampling strategies are not only used in quantitative research 
methods, but also in qualitative research methods. As qualitative 
samples are not meant to be statistically representative, different 
sampling principles have been developed. According to Ritchie, Lewis 
and Elam (2003), the first principle of qualitative sampling is the 
requirement for ‘symbolic representation’, as opposed to statistical 
representation required in quantitative research. According to this 
sampling principle, "Units are chosen because they typify a 
circumstance or hold a characteristic that is expected or known to 
have salience to the subject matter under study” (pp. 82-83). This 
corresponds with what Shadish, Cook and Cambell (2002) call 
‘purposive sampling of typical instances’: "the aim is to explicate the 
kinds of units, treatments, observations, and settings to which one 
most wants to generalize and then to select at least one instance of 
each class that is impressionistically similar to the class mode” (p. 
24).
The second principle listed by Ritchie et al. (2003) is the 
requirement for diversity. They explain why a qualitative sample 
needs to be diverse: "it optimises the chances of identifying the full 
range of factors or features that are associated with a phenomenon 
[and] it allows some investigation of interdependency between 
variables such that those that are most relevant can be disengaged 
from those of lesser import” (p. 83). Shadish et al. (2002) refer to the 
same principle discussing the ‘purposive sampling of heterogeneous 
instances’: "the aim is to include instances chosen deliberately to 
reflect diversity on presumptively important dimensions, event though 
the sample is not formally random” (p. 23).
Shadish et al. (2002) explain and illustrate the difference 
between the two sampling options as follows:
"The starting point for purposive sampling of heterogeneous instances is the 
same as the starting point for purposive sampling of typical instances -  
defining the characteristics of the persons, settings, treatments, or 
outcomes to which one wants to generalize. However, whereas PSI-Typ 
[purposive sampling of typical instances] aims to create a sample that is 
typical on those characteristics, PSI-Het [purposive sampling of 
heterogeneous instances] aims to create a sample that is heterogeneous
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and that need not include a typical instance at all. For example (...), if one's 
goal was to study elderly residents of nursing homes, PSI-Type would lead 
the researcher to include residents whose ages were all about, say, the 
mean age of nursing home residents in the population of interest, or at least 
whose average age was about the mean of all residents. But PSI-Het would 
lead the researcher to select patients whose ages vary widely, from the 
youngest to the oldest such patients. Not only would PSI-Het not require 
including a patient whose age was actually at the mean, it would not even 
require the average age of the sample to match that mean” (p. 376).
Translated to the argument from example: if we want to 
defend the claim that elderly residents of nursing homes show health 
improvements if they are visited by their children more often, we may 
choose typical instances and present examples of residents whose 
ages are close to the mean age of all residents, e.g. residents aged 
77, 75 and 73. The other option would be to select heterogeneous 
examples, e.g. residents aged 65, 72 and 80.
In sum: according to quantitive sampling principles, a sample 
formed by particular examples should be statistically representative. 
According to qualitative sampling principles, it is considered desirable 
that sampling units stand for the object under investigation (typicality) 
or are as diverse as possible (diversity).
4.2 Argumentation-theoretical criteria
In argumentation theory, the argument from example is often treated 
as inductive generalization. The frequent association between the 
argument from example and inductive generalization has been 
observed by, for instance, Schellens (1985), who states that "All 
treatments, more or less directly, also make a connection with 
induction on the basis of a sample”72 (p. 190). In more recent years, 
Arthos (2003) remarked along similar lines: "Virtually all of the 
available textbooks on argumentation written from a rhetorical 
perspective teach argument from example as a species of inductive 
generalization” (p. 320). It has been argued that this conception of the 
argument from example is problematic, because in persuasive texts 
inductive generalizations usually occur in the form of one or more 
typical examples (Schellens, 1985).
In my opinion, treating the argument from example as 
inductive generalization is not necessarily problematic, as long as it is 
not treated as the statistical kind of inductive generalization
72 Translated from Dutch: "Alle behandelingen leggen ook meer of minder direct 
een verband met inductie op basis van een steekproef” (1985, p. 190).
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connected to statistical representativeness. If the argument from 
example is treated as inductive generalization of the qualitative kind - 
arriving at general or universal propositions on the basis of a 
purposive sample - there should not be a problem. After all, in 
purposive sampling, the instances are selected subjectively, because 
they appear typical or heterogeneous (see also 4.1.2). In that respect, 
it resembles the form that the argument from example takes in 
persuasive texts.
In argumentation theory, there is not much evidence that the 
argument from example is approached as a statistical kind of 
inductive generalization. Here is a selection from the various 
characterizations: "The process of reasoning by example consists of 
inferring conclusions from specific cases (...) Sometimes a single 
case may be used to establish the conclusion or generalization. More 
often a number of cases will be offered as the basis for the 
conclusion. Reasoning by example is a form of inductive reasoning 
(...)” (Freeley & Steinberg, 2000, pp. 153-154), "In a generalization 
one reasons that what is true of certain members of a class will also 
be true of other members of the same class or of the class as a whole 
(...) The generalization (...) involves more than two instances and 
often makes claims about a whole class of objects” (Warnick & Inch, 
1989, p. 105)”, "In this process one or more examples are examined 
and then a generalization is made describing all examples of the 
same type. The conclusion is not just a description of the examined 
examples, but applies to examples not observed” (Windes & 
Hastings, 1969, p. 168). From the various definitions, it appears that 
the authors do not necessarily refer to inductive generalization of the 
statistical kind73.
In argumentation theory, critical questions have been 
formulated to evaluate the quality of the argument from example. In 
general, no distinction is made between reasoning from example to a
73 It can be argued that these authors refer to inductive generalization of the 
statistical kind in their evaluation questions: they often require 
representativeness and a sufficient number of examples (see also section 4.2.2). 
However, it is uncertain whether they mean statistical representativeness and 
whether they require a sufficient number of examples, because it increases 
statistical representativeness. They might as well require representativeness of 
the qualitative kind, and a sufficient number of examples to create diversity in the 
argument. In addition, if they would aim at inductive generalization of the 
statistical kind, they would probably also mention the criterion of random 
selection, as that criterion is - like sample size - associated with statistical 
representation. Therefore, I maintain the conclusion that they do not necessarily 
refer to the statistical kind of inductive generalization.
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descriptive generalization and reasoning from example to a causal 
generalization (except for Windes & Hastings, 1969, pp. 168-173). 
Instead, the two kinds are grouped together in argumentation theory 
and ‘disappear’ under the label argument from example (to a 
generalization).
In this section, the key question is: what evaluation questions 
have been suggested in argumentation theory for the evaluation of 
the argument from example? To address this question, a literature 
study was carried out.
4.2.1 Method
I refer to section 3.2.1 for a description and justification of the 
selection of literature. The same literature was employed in this study.
4.2.2 Results
In this section, I will report on the criteria that have been formulated in 
argumentation theory for the argument from example. One group of 
criteria is specific to the argument from example (I) and another group 
of criteria not only applies to the argument from example, but also to 
other argument schemes (II).
(I) Specific to the argument from example
(I.1) Typicality/representativeness criterion
The words ‘typical’ and ‘representative’ occur frequently in the 
evaluation questions (see Table 4.1). Often, however, it is not clear 
how these terms should be understood. Should the examples, for 
instance, give an accurate representation of the population 
distribution, or should they embody the essential characteristics of the 
matter under discussion? The elaborations of the authors are not 
always clear in this respect. Freeley and Steinberg (2000), for 
instance, explain the question "Are the examples typical?” as follows: 
"The advocate must determine whether the cases offered are really 
representative” (p. 155). Garssen (1997) claims that to answer the 
question whether or not the examples are typical, "the antagonist 
should first wonder whether the individual cases are representative 
and whether enough individual cases are considered"74 (pp. 11-12,
74 In Dutch: “(...) zal de antagonist zich eerst moeten afvragen of de afzonderlijke 
gevallen wel representatief zijn en of er genoeg afzonderlijke gevallen in 
ogenschouw zijn genomen” (1997, pp. 11-12).
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translated from Dutch). He does not explain the terms ‘typical’ and 
‘representative’ any further and does not clarify why the antagonist 
should ask the preliminary questions before being able to judge the 
typicality of the examples.
Schellens and Verhoeven (1994), on the other hand, define 
‘typical’: "(...) examples can be typical for a class for various reasons: 
an example can be part of a representative sample; it can be a 
representative of the average in a class and it can be an extreme 
example that takes a known position in relation to the rest of the 
class"75 (p. 136, translated from Dutch). To illustrate that an example 
can be typical thanks to its extreme position, Schellens and 
Verhoeven (1994) use the following example: “The last chemistry 
exam for pre-university education was certainly not difficult. Even 
Joris got a 7”76 (p. 135, translated from Dutch). The word ‘even’ in this 
example indicates that Joris usually gets marks lower than 7 and that 
his mark for the last chemistry exam is unusual, or extreme. So it can 
be reasoned that if the exam was not even difficult for Joris, it 
certainly was not difficult for the other examinees. Thanks to its 
extreme position, the case of Joris is typical for the exam’s difficulty 
level.
Apart from the problem that the terms ‘typical’ and 
‘representative’ are generally loosely defined in argumentation theory, 
it can be challenged -  and it has been challenged - that examples in 
the argumentation should reflect the population well (e.g. Schellens, 
1985, pp. 193-194). One single example, or two, or three, will not 
succeed in giving such an accurate representation, unless the 
population is homogeneous.
75 In Dutch: “(...) voorbeelden om verschillende redenen typerend kunnen zijn voor 
een klasse: een voorbeeld kan deel uitmaken van een representatieve 
steekproef; het kan een representant zijn van het gemiddelde in een klasse en 
het kan een extreem voorbeeld zijn dat een bekende positie inneemt ten 
opzichte van de rest van de klasse” (1994, p. 136).
76 In Dutch: “Het laatste examen scheikunde voor het VWO was beslist niet 
moeilijk. Zelfs Joris had er een 7 voor” (1994, p. 135). For a correct interpretation 
of this example, it is relevant to mention that in the Netherlands, grades from 1 
up to 10 are generally used, with 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest.
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Table 4.1 Evaluation questions falling under the category of (I.1) 
Typicality/representativeness criterion._______________________
Evaluation question Source
I.1 Typicality/representativeness criterion
Are the examples typical for the class the conclusion relates 
to?77
Schellens (1985, 
p. 196); Schellens 
& Verhoeven 
(1994, p. 136)
Are the examples typical or representative of the class of 
objects about which the generalization is made?
Warnick & Inch 
(1989, p. 107)
Are the examples representative? Reinard (1991, p. 
196)
Is the example typical of the kinds of cases that the 
generalization ranges over?
Walton (1996, p. 
50)
Are the specific cases typical for the state of affairs?78 Garssen (1997, p. 
11)
Are the individual cases representative?79 Garssen (1997, p. 
12)
Are the examples typical? Freeley & 
Steinberg (2000, 
p. 155)
Are the examples typical of the category the speaker wants to 
generalize about?
Meany & Shuster 
(2002, p. 61)
I.1.1 Special circumstances criterion
Is there different information available that makes the 
conclusion less probable?80
Schellens & 
Verhoeven (1994, 
p. 136)
Were there special circumstances present in the 
example that would impair its generalizability?
Walton (1996, p. 
50)
I.1.1.1 Critical period criterion
Do the examples cover a critical period of time? Reinard (1991, p. 
196)
Do the examples cover a critical period of time? Freeley & 
Steinberg (2000, 
p. 155)
(I.1.1) Special circumstances criterion
Walton (1996, p. 50) proposes the question: "Were there special 
circumstances present in the example that would impair its 
generalizability?” (see Table 4.1). He adds: “Presumptive
77 In Dutch: “Zijn de voorbeelden typerend voor de klasse waarop de conclusie 
betrekking heeft?” (1985, p. 196; 1994, p. 136).
78 In Dutch: “Zijn de specifieke gevallen typerend voor de betreffende stand van 
zaken?” (1997, p. 11).
79 In Dutch: “Zijn de afzonderlijke gevallen representatief?” (1997, p. 12).
80 Not mentioned in Schellens (1985), only in Schellens and Verhoeven (1994). In 
Dutch: “ Is er andersoortige informatie beschikbaar die de conclusie minder 
aannemelijk maakt?” (1994, p. 136).
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generalizations are inherently defeasible, or subject to exceptions. 
One can always examine a cited example to look for indications that 
special circumstances are present in it” (p. 50). It can be argued that 
this question is a heuristic one, helping someone decide whether or 
not an example is typical of the kinds of cases the generalization 
ranges over. After all, from the fact that a case has particular 
circumstances it follows automatically that the example is atypical -  
unlike other instances of the same class.
Schellens and Verhoeven (1994) suggest the question "Is 
there different information available that makes the conclusion less 
probable?” (p. 136, translated from Dutch). If we interpret ‘different 
information’ as ‘other information than presented in the examples’, 
they refer, among other things, to the presence of special 
circumstances in the example. It is unlikely that they also refer to 
counterexamples, as they mention counterexamples in a different 
question. So, the question appears to be similar to Walton’s (1996) 
question "Were there special circumstances present in the example 
that would impair its generalizability?” (p. 50). Again, this test can 
serve to answer the question of typicality.
(I.1.1.1) Critical period criterion
As Table 4.1 shows, the question "Do the examples cover a critical 
period of time?” was proposed by Freeley and Steinberg (2000, p. 
155), and by Reinard (1991, p. 196), who cites Freeley. Freeley and 
Steinberg (2000) explain why this question is important: "In many 
cases the time at which the examples were studied or the time period 
covered by the examples may be critical. The advocate should try to 
find examples representative of the period of time critical to the 
argument” (p. 155). This question appears to be a way to answer the 
question whether or not the example is typical or representative. If the 
example does not cover a critical period of time, it is not.
If the critical period question is answered with a ‘no’ (‘no, the 
examples do not cover a critical time period’), it means that there are 
special circumstances present in the example impairing its 
generalizability. After all, the particular time period covered by the 
examples form a special condition that cannot be generalized to the 
critical time period. Therefore, in the classification of criteria, the 
critical period category is a subcategory under the special 
circumstances category.
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(I.2) Number of examples criterion
It has been suggested in argumentation theory that enough examples 
should be given to support a claim (see Table 4.2). Warnick and Inch 
(1989), for instance, explain that the number of examples that should 
be given “depends on the nature of the audience and the situation”, 
but “in many cases the greater the number of examples the more 
cogent and persuasive the generalization will become” (p. 107). 
According to Freeley and Steinberg (2000), “advocates have to 
present enough cases to convince a reasonable person that there is a 
high degree of probability that a conclusion is correct” (p. 154). 
Garssen (1997) suggests that the question whether or not enough 
cases are cited should precede the question of typicality. Why this is 
necessary, is not clear. It seems to me that the typicality of the given 
examples can be judged regardless of the total number of examples.
Others, however, deny that giving enough examples is a fair 
requirement for the argument from example (e.g. Schellens, 1985; 
Walton, 1996). They note that it is typical for this type of 
argumentation that only a few examples are given and that the 
number of examples should not be a reason to reject the argument.
If the criterion of sufficient examples has been suggested to 
increase statistical representation - the phrasing of the critical 
questions and clarifications does not give a definite answer - it is 
remarkable that the criterion of random selection, indicating that each 
element should have an equal chance of being chosen, has not been 
proposed. After all, in sampling theory, statistical representation 
depends on both sample size and random selection. Windes and 
Hastings (1969) did mention the method of random selection (pp. 
168-173). They also pointed to the diversity of characteristics in the 
examples, the principle common to qualitative sampling (see 4.1.2). It 
is striking that this criterion is not mentioned in more recent literature.
Table 4.2 Evaluation questions falling under the category of (I.2) Number of
examples criterion.
Evaluation question Source
I.2 Number of examples criterion
Are there enough examples to reliably predict a general trend 
or characteristic?
Warnick & Inch 
(1989, p. 107)
Are enough examples cited? Reinard (1991, p. 
196)
Are there enough individual cases mentioned?81 Garssen (1997, p. 
12)
Is there a reasonable number of examples? Freeley &
In Dutch: “Worden er genoeg afzonderlijke gevallen genoemd?” (1997, p. 12).
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Steinberg (2000, 
p. 154)
Are there enough examples to prove the claim? Meany & Shuster 
(2002, p. 61)
(I.3) Counterexamples criterion
The next test that has been suggested is to ask whether there are 
any examples that undermine the generalization (see Table 4.3). 
According to Warnick and Inch (1989), “In some cases, even one 
powerful counterexample can undermine the most carefully 
constructed generalization” (p. 107). Schellens (1985) explains that 
the effect of a counterexample depends on the form of the 
generalization. The more universal the conclusion, the more damage 
a counterexample can inflict. The conclusion that all party guests 
were amused can be falsified by giving a single counterexample, 
whereas such a counterexample is insufficient to refute the 
conclusion that most party guests were amused.
Walton (1996) and Garssen (1997) do not include the 
counterexample-test in their lists of critical responses. Nevertheless, 
Walton (1996) notes elsewhere in his discussion of the argument 
from example that “One type of critical reponse to [the] use of the 
argument from example is to present a counterexample - another 
example that falsifies or refutes the given generalization” and that “the 
response to this reply is for the proponent of the original 
generalization to qualify it with terms like “usually,” “sometimes,” 
“rarely,” and so forth” (p. 50).
Table 4.3 Evaluation questions falling under the category of (I.3) Counterexamples 
criterion.
Evaluation question Source
I.3 Counterexamples criterion
Are there any counterexamples that undermine the 
conclusion in the given form?82
Schellens (1985, 
p. 196); Schellens 
& Verhoeven 
(1994, p. 136)
Are examples that counter the claim made in the 
generalization noncritical?
Warnick & Inch 
(1989, p. 107)
Are contrary examples unimportant? Reinard (1991, p. 
196)
Are negative examples noncritical? Freeley & 
Steinberg (2000, 
p. 155)
Are there examples that might directly counter the given Meany & Shuster
82 In Dutch: “Zijn er tegenvoorbeelden die de conclusie in haar gegeven vorm 
ondergraven?” (1985, p. 196; 1994, p. 136).
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examples? (2002, p. 61)
(I.4) Strength of conclusion criterion
Walton (1996) suggests the question "How strong is the 
generalization?” (p. 50, see also Table 4.4). He indicates how this 
should be understood: "If the generalization holds only for a narrow 
range of cases, it is not very reliable. In such cases, the argument 
may hold, but may be weak" (p. 50). A comparable critical question 
comes from Schellens and Verhoeven (1994): "Are the certainty and 
the range of the conclusion not larger than made probable by the 
examples?” (p. 136, translated from Dutch). The questions appear to 
be similar, because they both refer to the strength of the conclusion. 
Even if there is nothing wrong with the given example(s), the 
conclusion may be formulated in such absolute terms that it is not 
acceptable. For instance: for the generalization ‘At all times, all 
students work harder for cash’, the cases of Rose, Sophia and Carl 
are presented. If you know Rose, Sophia and Carl as typical students 
who always work harder if they receive cash rewards and you cannot 
think of one single counterexample -  a student who is not at all times 
motivated by cash incentives -  you still might find the generalization 
too strong, because you are not convinced that the characteristic 
holds invariably true for all students. So, the generalization in the 
conclusion can be formulated too strongly, even though the argument 
holds.
Table 4.4 Evaluation questions falling under the category of (I.4) Strength of 
conclusion criterion and (I.5) Example accuracy criterion._________ ________
Evaluation question Source
I.4 Strength of conclusion criterion
How strong is the generalization? Walton (1996, 
p. 50)
Are the certainty and the range of the conclusion not larger than 
made probable by the examples?83
Schellens 
(1985, p. 196); 
Schellens & 
Verhoeven 
(1994, p. 136)
I.5 Example accuracy criterion
Are the examples probable?84; Are there any reasons to doubt 
the correctness of the examples?85
Schellens 
(1985, p. 196); 
Schellens & 
Verhoeven 
(1994, p. 136)
83 In Dutch: “Zijn de stelligheid en de reikwijdte van de conclusie niet groter dan de 
voorbeelden aannemelijk maken?” (1985, p. 196; 1994, p. 136)
84 In Dutch: “Zijn de voorbeelden aannemelijk?” (1985, p. 196).
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Is the proposition presented by the example in fact true? Walton (1996,
.p_50______
(I.5) Example accuracy criterion
Questions have been suggested regarding the accuracy of the 
example (see Table 4.4). These questions ask "whether the example 
is a true report of reality” (Walton, 1996, p. 50). For the argument 
from cause to effect, a similar question was formulated: Are there any 
reasons to doubt fact A? As indicated in 3.2.2, such a question can 
be traced back to the more general acceptability criterion. However, 
as the question is formulated so specifically that it applies only to the 
argument from example, I consider it a question belonging to the 
category ‘specific to the argument from example’ (I).
(II) Generally applicable to all argument schemes: relevance criterion
For the argument from example, it has been proposed that the 
example should be relevant to the conclusion (see Table 4.5). Freeley 
and Steinberg (2000), for instance, write that "Advocates should 
determine whether the cases offered are relevant to the matter under 
consideration” (p. 154). Warnick and Inch (1989) are more specific 
and indicate the condition the examples should meet to be relevant to 
the conclusion: "To be relevant the examples must belong to the 
class of objects about which the claim is made” (p. 107). In other 
words, the examples should be selected from the group of people or 
things the conclusion applies to.
It is open to argument whether the questions of relevance, 
expressed in the current terms, are specific to the argument from 
example. In my opinion, they are not, as the relevance criterion 
concerns other types of argumentation as well. If they would be 
formulated in more specific terms, e.g. ‘Does the instance fall within 
the category of instances the generalization ranges over?’ I would 
consider them (more) unique for the argument from example.
Table 4.5 Evaluation questions falling under the category of (II) Relevance criterion.
Evaluation question Source
(II) Relevance criterion
Are the examples relevant to the claim of generality? Warnick and Inch 
(1989, p. 107)
Does the example support the general claim it is supposed 
to be an instance of?
Walton (1996, p. 50)
85 In Dutch: “Zijn er redenen om aan de juistheid van de voorbeelden te twijfelen?” 
(1994, p. 136).
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Are the examples germane? Reinard (1991, p. 
196)
Is the example relevant? Freeley and 
Steinberg (2000, p. 
154)
4.2.3 Conclusion and discussion
In argumentation theory, critical questions have been formulated that 
aim to evaluate the argument from example to a generalization. 
These questions can be classified according to six main categories:
(1.1) the typicality/representativeness criterion, (I.2) the number of 
examples criterion, (I.3) the counterexamples criterion, (1.4) the 
strength of conclusion criterion, (I.5) the accuracy of the example 
criterion and (II) the relevance criterion. I argued that the first five 
categories of questions should be regarded as specific to the 
argument from example, whereas the last category should be 
considered as applicable to other types of argument as well. It should 
also be noted that in the present formulations of the evaluation 
questions, it is not always clear how the notions of typicality and 
representativeness should be conceived.
It can be argued that for the argument from example to a 
causal generalization, it is reasonable to distinguish between cause 
relevance and effect relevance, similar to the argument from cause to 
effect (see 3.2.3). For the argument from cause to effect, it sounds 
reasonable to require that the cause in the conclusion (Ai) is a clear 
member of the kind of causes (A) presented in the argument and also 
that the effect in the conclusion (Bi) is a clear member of the kind of 
effects (B) presented in the argument. For the argument from 
example to a causal generalization the principle is similar, but goes in 
a different direction: it sounds reasonable to require that the cause in 
the argument (Ai) is a clear member of the kind of causes (A) 
presented in the conclusion and also that the effect (Bi) in the 
argument is a clear member of the kind of effects (b ) in the 
conclusion.
The requirements for quantitative and qualitative sampling, as 
described in 4.1.2, are obviously reflected in the argumentation- 
theoretical norms for evaluating the argument from example. More 
specifically, criteria referring to (I.1) typicality/representativeness and
(1.2) the number of examples can be directly related to common 
requirements in sampling and scientific generalization. Other common 
principles in sampling theory, like the need for diversity and the 
criterion of random selection, are not included in the argumentation-
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theoretical criteria. It appears reasonable, however, to demand that 
multiple examples are heterogeneous.
How about the categories (I.3) counterexamples criterion and
(I.4) strength of conclusion criterion? In logic, a counterexample is an 
exception to a proposed false universal claim (e.g. “all visitors are 
bored”). So, counterexamples are considered to be important tools for 
evaluating the plausibility of universal assertions. In argumentation 
theory, that view has probably been adopted. However, unlike logic, 
argumentation theory has made insufficiently clear that the strength of 
the counterexample is dependent on the generality (or particularity) of 
the claim (exceptions are Schellens, 1985; Walton, 1996). 
Furthermore, overgeneralization, or drawing a conclusion that is too 
general, is considered a common reasoning fallacy (Walton, 1996, 
1999). So, as expected, argumentation theory points to the risk of too 
certain or too strong a generalization.
4.3 Laymen criteria
In section 4.2, argumentation-theoretical conceptions of the quality of 
the argument from example have been reported. In this section, the 
central question is: what criteria are used by laymen for the 
evaluation of the argument from example? Next, the method to 
address this question will be discussed.
4.3.1 Method
The method was the same as the one used in chapter 3, except for 
material and respondents.
Material
The material consisted of an open case and a closed case. Individual 
interviews, in which respondents are stimulated by an open and a 
closed case to reflect on norms for argument quality, appeared to be 
the most effective method to uncover laymen criteria (see chapter 2 
and Sorm, Timmers & Schellens, 2007).
Open case (appendix 4A-B). In the open case, respondents were 
asked to imagine themselves in a job interview applying for a job as a 
speechwriter for a certain ministry (the name of the ministry was 
dependent on the claim). During the interview, they received an 
assignment to test whether they could write good speeches. The
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assignment was to write down one strong and one weak argument 
supporting a claim in one of the minister’s speeches. The claim to be 
supported was either (1) "If children are read to from childhood, they 
will be more proficient in the Dutch language” (in Dutch: "Als kinderen 
van jongs af aan worden voorgelezen, dan zullen ze de Nederlandse 
taal beter beheersen”) or (2) "If employers contribute more to 
childcare, employees will be able to combine work and care more 
easily” (in Dutch: "Als werkgevers meer bijdragen aan de 
kinderopvang, dan zullen werknemers werk en zorg gemakkelijker 
kunnen combineren”). I chose these claims, because they were both 
causal generalizations that could potentially serve as premises in 
pragmatic argumentation. The respondents were told that the 
interviewer would ask them: why is one argument stronger than the 
other?
To increase the chance that the respondents would come up 
with the intended argument type, the respondents were told that they 
"had decided to support the minister’s claim with examples”. 
Furthermore, the respondents filled in a sentence leading to the right 
argument type: "Because I know a case in which that held t ru e : . ” (in 
Dutch: "Want ik ken wel een geval waarin dat opging:...”). After the 
respondents had written down their arguments, the interviewer asked 
them to read their arguments aloud and to explain why one argument 
was stronger than the other. The explanation allowed for identifying 
the respondents’ criteria for evaluating the argument from example.
Closed case (Appendix 4C-D). The closed case consisted of a claim 
and a list of six supporting arguments. The claim was either (3) "If you 
strive for a healthy lifestyle, you will reduce the chance of illness” (in 
Dutch: "Als je een gezonde leefstijl nastreeft, dan verklein je de kans 
op ziektes”) or (4) "If you choose an exact science as a subject, you 
will draw a high salary in future” (in Dutch: "Als je een exacte 
studierichting kiest, dan verdien je later een hoog salaris"). Again, I 
chose causal generalizations that could be used in pragmatic 
argumentation. Each claim was introduced by a few sentences about 
the claim’s topic. For instance, as an introduction to the claim about 
exact science, it was stated that the government stimulates pupils to 
choose an exact science due to an expected shortage of science 
students and technicians in 2010.
The first of the six supporting arguments was supposed to be 
strong. The next five supporting arguments were considered weak as 
they violated one or two normative evaluation criteria found in 
argumentation theory (see also 4.2.2). The evaluation criteria that I
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aimed to violate were the typicality/representativeness criterion, the 
number of examples criterion, the example accuracy criterion and the 
relevance criterion, all suggested in argumentation theory for the 
argument from example to a generalization. I specified the relevance 
criterion further into (a) cause relevance and (b) effect relevance. 
Although this distinction had not been made explicitly in 
argumentation theory, I argued that such a distinction would be 
reasonable (see 4.2.3). So, I wanted to know whether in practice 
people pay attention to relevance and if they do, whether they focus 
on the relevance of the action, the relevance of the effect or on both. I 
did not use the counterexamples criterion and the strength of 
conclusion criterion proposed in argumentation theory, as it proved 
impossible to adequately manipulate the strength of the arguments by 
means of these two criteria. Instead, I used the diversity criterion. 
This criterion has not been proposed in argumentation theory for the 
argument from example (except for Windes & Hastings, 1969), but it 
is nevertheless a common principle in sampling theory (see 4.1.2). In 
addition, making the premises less diverse appeared to be an easy 
way to weaken an argument. Table 4.6 shows the evaluation criteria 
that the arguments were supposed to violate.
Table 4.6 Evaluation criteria violated in closed-case arguments (translated from 
Dutch).______  ______________________________________________________
Claim (3) Claim (4)
If you strive for a healthy 
lifestyle, you will reduce the 
chance of illness.
If you choose an exact science 
as a subject, you will draw a 
high salary in future.
Criteria
violated
Argument Argument
Strong, no
criteria
violated86
A Simon de W it started drinking 
less alcohol and once again 
has a well-functioning liver. 
Bart van Maanen quit 
smoking and now has less 
trouble with his bronchial 
tubes. Sander Schaafstal 
started to exercise more, and 
he now feels far more vital.
Geert-Jan van Harmelen 
studied dental surgery and now 
earns 5500 Euros a month. Bert 
Linthorst studied computer 
science and earns 3000 Euros a 
month. Jasper Simons studied 
architecture and now has an 
income of 4500 Euros a month.
Weak, B Theo van Gogh87 (director, Philip Freriks88, presenter of the
After a re-examination of the material, I noticed that the argument (A) could be 
valued relatively low in diversity, because Simon, Bart and Sander are all male -  
unlike Maria, Edgar and Frederieke in argument (F).
87 Theo van Gogh (1957-2004), a famous figure in the Netherlands, was a 
notorious chain smoker, heavy drinker and drug user. Therefore, the example 
saying that he lived healthily can be regarded as inaccurate.
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violates:
(1) example 
accuracy 
criterion
(2) number 
of
examples
criterion
television producer and 
columnist) lived healthily and 
he had built up a fierce 
resistance to illnesses.
NOS news, studied chemistry 
and is in the top ten of the 
richest Dutchmen.
Weak,
violates:
(1) cause 
relevance 
criterion
(2) number 
of
examples
criterion
C Hanneke de Waal has had 
stomach reduction surgery 
and now she is less troubled 
by aching joints.
Janneke Oorthuys did a 
psychology degree and earns 
an above-average income.
Weak,
violates:
(1) effect 
relevance 
criterion
(2)
numbers of
examples
criterion
D Robert de Graaf started 
drinking more water and his 
skin now looks less sallow.
Peter Philips studied veterinary 
medicine and has a nice job.
Weak,
violates:
(1)
typicality/ 
repres. 
criterion 
(2) number 
of
examples
criterion
E Robin van Persie89 eats a 
balanced diet and is 
therefore in good condition.
The managing director of Shell 
studied physics and now earns 
millions of Euros a year.
Weak,
violates:
(1) diversity 
criterion
F Maria de Graaf started to eat 
less fat, Edgar Ritmeester 
eats more fibre and grain 
than he used to, and 
Frederieke van Loon now 
eats more vegetables and 
fruit than before. All of them 
get sick less often than they 
used to.
Erna Bruin studied medical 
science, Paul Blok studied 
pharmacy and Renske Atsma 
studied biomedical sciences. 
They earn 4000 Euros a month.
Philip Freriks, a well-known Dutch journalist and 8 o'clock News presenter, 
studied political sciences and never reached the top 10 of richest Dutchmen. So, 
the example can be considered inaccurate.
Robin van Persie is a well-known Dutch football player who plays for the Dutch 
national team and has an international career.
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The respondents were asked to put the arguments in order of 
strength, with the strongest argument in the first place and the 
weakest in the sixth place. After the respondents had ranked the 
arguments, the interviewer asked why a particular argument was put 
first, why another argument was put second and so on. Criteria were 
derived on the basis of their explanations.
Respondents
Twenty respondents were interviewed. All respondents were visitors 
to a public library in Nijmegen, the Netherlands. Each of the 
respondents was paid ten Euros for participating. Among them, 
eleven were male and nine were female. The ages of the 
respondents varied from 17 to 62, and the average age was 31.7. 
The level of education varied from university education (‘WO’) to 
preparatory vocational education (‘VMBO’). The majority (12) was on 
the level of pre-university education (‘VWO’) and higher vocational 
education (‘HBO’). None of the respondents had received any formal 
training in the field of argumentation theory.
Booklet, Design, Procedure and Data-analysis
Booklet, design, procedure, and data-analysis were similar to those of 
the study described in the previous chapter (see 3.3.1).
Interrater agreement
To assess the extent to which fragments could be reliably related to 
criteria, interrater agreement was determined. The second rater was 
a colleague working at the Department of Business Communication 
Studies of the Radboud University Nijmegen (the Netherlands), who 
has special knowledge in the field of argumentation. First, she 
received a written task instruction. It stated that she would judge a 
number of fragments, in which phrases were marked. In addition, it 
explained that her task would be to label the phrases with criteria. 
The rater received a list of possible criteria she could choose from. 
Each criterion on the list was defined. Furthermore, the rater received 
the closed cases used in the interviews.
Five training fragments were presented, to give the second 
rater the opportunity to get familiar with the instrument and to ask for 
clarification. Afterwards, 11 randomly selected test fragments were 
presented. The results showed that the Kappa Measure of Agreement
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value was .634 with a significance of p < .0005 (N = 15). According to 
Peat and Barton (2005, p. 268), this value generally represents good 
agreement.
4.3.2 Results
Next, I will discuss the laymen criteria for evaluating the argument 
from example. First, the results of the open case will be reported, 
followed by the results of the closed case.
Interviews open case
It was first determined whether or not the arguments that the 
respondents had provided as a response to the open case were 
arguments from example to a causal generalization. The desired 
argument scheme underlying the arguments was ‘In example A, 
measure M led to effect E’. Although the respondents were stimulated 
to use this desired scheme (see ‘Material’ in 4.3.1), none of the 
respondents produced both a strong and a weak argument from 
example according to this particular scheme. As a matter of fact, 
respondents were inclined to produce an argument in favor of the 
proposed action and an argument against the proposed action 
(instead of a strong and weak argument from example in favor of the 
claim), or to present other types of argument.
However, the interviews of six respondents can still be 
considered relevant to this study. Four respondents contrasted a 
generalization about multiple cases (as a strong argument) with a 
single case (as a weak argument). In explaining the qualitative 
difference between the two arguments, all four respondents referred 
to the importance of the number of examples upon which the 
conclusion is based. Three of them also referred to the coincidence 
that might be involved in a single case and one also mentioned the 
possibility of refuting by a counterexample. Here I present three 
fragments of interviews (held with different respondents) to illustrate 
these evaluation criteria. In each fragment, the strong argument is 
indicated by ‘(+)’, the weak argument by ‘(-)’ and the explanation 
about why one argument is stronger than the other by ‘(E)’. The claim 
that was to be supported by the arguments is also given. Consider 
the first fragment:
________________________________Fragment (1)__________________________
Claim to be supported:
If children are read to from childhood, they will be more proficient in the Dutch
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language.
In English:
R: (...) as the strong argument I wrote down: research shows that children who are 
often read to will read more books in future so they will be better at spelling, better 
in sentence structuring and er stuff like that. (+ no. 1)
I: Hmmhmm.
R: An example, I can serve as an example myself, my mother has often read to me 
and now I like to read books myself. (+ no. 2)
I: Yes ...
R: So that applies, like, more when speaking of a large group. (E)
I: Yes, and what have you got for argument B, the weak argument?
R: The weak argument I thought up, my aunt never read to anyone and now my 
cousin is bad at Dutch. (-)
I: Okay, can you explain er, why argument A [the strong argument marked by '+ no. 
1'] is stronger in supporting the standpoint than argument B [the weak argument 
marked by '-']?
R: Er yes, argument A [the strong argument marked by '+ no. 1 ’], suppose that it, 
that it is the case, right, that research has shown that. Then you have something er 
that is about a large group of people, and a conclusion is drawn from that, so that 
one is much better supported. And if you say in the case of argument B [the weak 
argument marked by '-’], my aunt never read to someone, so now my cousin is bad 
at spelling or something, that can also simply be a co inc idence . (E)
In Dutch:
R: (...) bij het sterke argument had ik opgeschreven: uit onderzoek is gebleken dat 
kinderen die vaak worden voorgelezen ook zelf later meer boeken gaan lezen 
waardoor ze ook beter in spelling zullen zijn, beter in zinsbouw en dat soort ehh 
dingen. (+ no. 1)
I: Hmmhmm.
R: Een voorbeeld daarvan, kan ik zelf als voorbeeld staan, mijn moeder heeft veel 
voorgelezen en nou lees ik graag zelf boeken. (+ no. 2)
I: Ja ...
R: Dus dat is dan meer over een grote groep gesproken zeg maar. (E)
I: Ja, en wat heb je bij argument B, het zwakke argument?
R: Het zwakke argument heb ik bedacht, mijn tante las nooit voor en nu is mijn 
neefje slecht in Nederlands. (-)
I: Oké, kun je uitleggen ehm, waarom argument A [het sterke argument 
aangegeven met '+ no. 1’] sterker is ter ondersteuning van het standpunt dan 
argument B [het zwakke argument aangegeven met '-’]?
R: Ehm ja, argument A [het sterke argument aangegeven met '+ no. 1’], stel dat 
het, dat het zo is hè, dat uit onderzoek is uitgebleken. Dan heb je iets ehm dat over 
een grote groep mensen gaat, waar wel een conclusie over getrokken is, dus die is 
veel beter onderbouwd. En als je gaat zeggen bij argument B [het zwakke 
argument aangegeven met '-’], mijn tante las nooit voor, dus nu is mijn neefje 
slecht in de spelling ofzo, dat kan ook gewoon toeval zijn ... (E)___________________
In fragment (1), the respondent gives two strong arguments. The first 
strong argument (+ no. 1) is in fact an argument from authority: the 
respondent cites a certain study in which an inductive generalization 
was made. Then, another strong argument is given (+ no. 2) that can
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be classified as an argument from example to a causal 
generalization. The weak argument (-) appears to be a variant of the 
desired argument scheme: in the particular case mentioned, the 
measure as proposed in the claim (reading from childhood) was not 
taken and the effect E (more proficiency) did not occur. In explaining 
(E) the qualitative difference between the arguments, the respondent 
refers to the inductive generalization in the first strong argument (+ 
no. 1) and suggests that the number of cases determines argument 
quality and that if only one case is cited, coincidence might play a 
role. In the next fragment, another respondent appears to apply the 
same criteria:
________________________________ Fragment (2)_______________________________
Claim to be supported:
If children are read to from childhood, they will be more proficient in the Dutch 
language.
In English:
R: Okay, as a er strong argument I wrote that children used to be read to more 
often and that they had a more thorough command of Dutch back then. (+)
I: Yes.
R: And as a weaker argument I have filled in that my parents used to read to me 
often and that I’m good at Dutch now. (-)
I: Okay, thank you. Er, can you explain why argument A is stronger in supporting 
the standpoint than argument B?
R: Well er, the most important thing is that er argument 1 is about a very large 
group of people and argument 2 about only one case and that er the chance that 
there is a coincidence, is bigger for the second argument. (E)
In Dutch:
R: Oké, als eh sterk argument heb ik ingevuld dat vroeger kinderen meer werden 
voorgelezen en dat ze toen het Nederlands ook beter beheersten. (+)
I: Ja.
R: En als zwakker argument heb ik ingevuld dat mijn ouders mij vaak voorlazen en 
dat ik nu goed Nederlands kan. (-)
I: Oké, dankjewel. Eh kun je uitleggen waarom argument A sterker is ter 
ondersteuning van het standpunt dan argument B?
R: Nou ehm, het belangrijkste punt is dat eh argument 1 over een heel grote groep 
mensen gaat en argument 2 over slechts één geval en dat eh de kans dat het van, 
toeval gewoon sprake is, groter is bij het tweede argument. (E)__________________
In the following fragment (3), the respondent suggests that by using a 
single instance, a counterexample may prove that the claim is false:
________________________________Fragment (3)__________________________
Claim to be supported:
If children are read to from childhood, they will be more proficient in the Dutch 
language.
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In English:
I: Can you read aloud first what you selected as the strong argument?
R: Er children who have been adopted, from a different country, and who are 
raised in a Dutch family, achieve a thorough command of the language. (+)
I: Yes, okay. What do you have as the weak argument?
R: Er, reading a story on a regular basis stimulated my child to tell the story word 
for word in the same way, including intonation and sentence structure. (-)
I: (...) Er why is one argument stronger than the other?
(■■■)
R: And er in my personal situation it is also a confirmation of, well that defi... or that 
theory, that it does work like that, because I can see in the case of my one child 
that it er by reading aloud regularly, er little children copy and imitate things, that 
that works as an example and that he copies it. But because it is a personal 
argument, I can also refute it, because another child er picks it up in a different way 
and is influenced a lot less with respect to language, in spite of er reading aloud a 
lot, reading. So there is also an individual difference between that. (E)
I: Hmmhmm.
R: And if you make a general theory, is a, you know broader proof, right, of many 
more cases in which that occurs you can then draw a conclusion more quickly, 
than if you simply, if there is just one person who, you know, experienced it. (E)
In Dutch:
I: Kunt u misschien eerst even voorlezen wat u bij het sterke argument heeft?
R: Ehm kinderen die geadopteerd zijn, uit een ander land dus, en in een 
Nederlands gezin opgroeien, leren de taal goed beheersen. (+)
I: Ja, oké. W at heeft u bij het zwakke argument?
R: Ehmm, regelmatig een verhaal voorlezen stimuleerde mijn kind om het verhaal 
op dezelfde wijze inclusief intonatie en zinsbouw woordelijk te vertellen. (-)
I: (...) Eh waarom het ene argument sterker is dan het andere argument?
(■■■)
R: En ehh in mijn persoonlijke geval is dat dan nog eens een bevestiging van, nou 
die defi... of die theorie, dat dat dus inderdaad ook zo werkt, omdat ik dan aan mijn 
eigen kind kan zien dat het ehh door regelmatig voor te lezen, ehh kleine kinderen 
kopiëren en doen dingen na, dat dat dus als voorbeeld werkt en dat hij het 
overneemt. Maar omdat het een persoonlijk argument is, ik kan het ook 
weerleggen, omdat een ander kind ehh dat op een andere manier oppikt en veel 
minder in de taal beïnvloed is, ondanks het ehh het vele voorlezen, lezen. Dus er 
zit op zich ook nog een individueel verschil tussen. (E)
I: Hmmhmm.
R: En als je een algemene theorie maakt, is een, zeg maar een breder ehh bewijs, 
hè, van veel meer gevallen waarin dat voorkomt kun je dan eerder een conclusie 
uit trekken, dan als je het gewoon, als er maar één persoon is die het meemaakt, 
zeg maar. (E)________________________________________________________________
In the strong argument (+), a group of children (adopted children) is 
mentioned that exhibits the causal relation in the claim, although it is 
not made explicit that this group is read to from childhood. This strong 
argument is contrasted with the weak argument (-) in which one case 
is mentioned. Like in fragment (1) en (2), the respondent clarifies (E)
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that the number of cases determines argument quality, but here he or 
she also indicates that by using one example, the claim can be 
challenged by a counterexample.
Two respondents do not compare a generalization with a single 
instance. In the next fragment (4), two instances are presented in the 
strong argument and one instance in the weak argument:
I_________________________________Fragment (4)________________________________
Claim to be supported:
If children are read to from childhood, they will be more proficient in the Dutch 
language.
In English:
R: Er, for the strong argument I have er, because I know a case in which this held 
true. My sister had more time to read to her eldest. However, she had more tasks 
after her youngest was born. The eldest started speaking in full sentences earlier 
than the youngest. (+)
I: Okay.
R: And for the weak argument, because I know a case in which this held true, I was 
never read to and I fell behind in linguistic development and I needed a lot of 
coaching, Dutch . (-)
I: Okay. Can you explain why one argument is stronger than the other?
R: The first argument is stronger because it er, because it to, because you can, 
because you have two cases that you can compare with each other. So, it can be 
tested. The second er cannot be tested that easily and the question is er, it is a 
weaker argument because [it] does not always have to do with needing to be 
coached, because you haven’t been read to, that correlation is not always clear.
(E)
In Dutch:
R: Ehh, bij het sterke argument heb ik ehh, want ik ken een geval waarin opging 
dat mijn zus heeft meer tijd gehad haar oudste voor te lezen. Ze kreeg echter meer 
taken nadat haar jongste werd geboren. De oudste maakt sneller volzinnen dan de 
jongste. (+)
I: Oké.
R: En bij het zwakke argument, want ik ken een geval waarin opging, ik ben zelf 
nooit voorgelezen en heb in mijn taalontwikkeling een achterstand opgelopen en 
moest veel bijlessen, Nederlands. (-)
I: Oké. Kunt u uitleggen waarom het ene argument sterker is dan het andere?
R: Het eerste argument is sterker omdat het ehh, omdat het te, omdat je het, 
omdat je twee gevallen hebt die je aan elkaar kan vergelijken. Dus, het is 
toetsbaar. Het tweede ehh is niet zo goed toetsbaar en de vraag is ehh, het is een 
zwakker argument omdat [het] niet altijd te maken heeft of dat je  bijles moet 
hebben, omdat je niet voorgelezen bent, want die correlatie is niet duidelijk. (E)
As a strong argument (+), the respondent presents two cases. In one 
case, more reading led to better proficiency, whereas in the second 
case, less reading led to less proficiency. As a weak argument (-)
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only one case is presented, in which a child (the respondent him- or 
herself) was not read to and got behind in linguistic development. The 
respondent then explains (E) that by comparing the two individual 
cases in the strong argument, it can be tested whether or not a 
correlation exists between two events, whereas on the basis of one 
case someone cannot be sure whether or not two events are related 
by correlation. Last, consider fragment (5):
________________________________ Fragment (5)________________________________
Claim to be supported:
If employers contribute more to childcare, employees will be able to combine work 
and care more easily.
In English:
R: Okay, er, the strong argument, because I know a case in which that held true. 
The woman next door has three children. Besides doing her job she of course has 
to take care of her children. That is difficult in her situation, because she cannot do 
this at the same time. (+)
I: Okay.
R: The weak argument er, my neighbour owes money to various people. Therefore, 
he has to work very long at the office and he has no time to take care of his 
children. (-)
I: Thank you. Can you explain why A is stronger?
R: Er, well it, er, it is about a woman next door who has to work and she also has 
children and er, be, and, yeah it is stronger, because for the weak argument, er it 
is, that is more a very personal reason why that neighbour cannot take care of his 
children and work at the same time. Whereas, for the women next door, it is more 
of a general problem in society, so I think, because one is somewhat more 
personal than the other, yeah. (E)
I: Okay, and what do you mean exactly by er more a general problem?
R: Er, I think that a lot of people, a lot of families with children have this problem.
(E)
(■■■)
I: And what did you mean exactly by personal?
R: Er, well that it does not hold true for everybody and that it is really er the 
problem for the person, the individual himself.
I: Yeah, okay.
R: And therefore er not representative of others. (E)
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In Dutch:
R: Oké, eh, het sterke argument, want ik ken wel een geval waarin dat opging. Mijn 
buurvrouw heeft drie kinderen. Naast haar werk moet ze natuurlijk ook voor haar 
kinderen zorgen. Dit gaat in haar situatie moeilijk, omdat ze dit niet tegelijk kan 
doen. (+)
I: Oké.
R: Het zwakke argument eh, mijn buurman heeft schulden bij verschillende 
kennissen. Hij moet daarom erg veel lange dagen maken op werk en heeft geen 
tijd om voor zijn kinderen te zorgen. (-)
I: Dankjewel. Kun je uitleggen waarom A sterker is?
R: Ehm, nou het, eh, het gaat over een buurvrouw die moet werken en ze heeft 
ook kinderen en eh, om, en, ja het is sterker, omdat bij het zwakke argument, eh 
het is, dat is meer een heel erg persoonlijke reden waarom die buurman niet voor 
zijn kinderen kan zorgen en werken tegelijk. Terwijl, bij de buurvrouw, dat is meer 
een algemeen probleem in de samenleving, dus ik denk, omdat de ene wat 
persoonlijker is dan de andere, ja. (E)
I: Oké, en wat bedoel je met eh meer een algemeen probleem precies?
R: Ehm, ik denk dat heel veel mensen, heel veel gezinnen met kinderen met dit 
probleem eh zitten. (E)
(■■■)
I: En wat bedoelde je precies met persoonlijk?
R: Eh, nou dat het niet voor iedereen geldt en dat het echt eh het probleem bij de 
persoon, de individu zelf zit. (E)
I: Ja ja.
R: En dus eh niet representatief is voor anderen. (E)____________________________
The respondent in fragment (5) gives examples of people having a 
hard time combining work and care, whereas the open case actually 
aimed at cases exhibiting the causal relation stated in the claim. So, 
the arguments appear to support a descriptive generalization (that is 
not stated in the claim to be supported) instead of a causal 
generalization (that is actually stated in the claim). Then the 
respondent explains that one argument is weaker than the other, 
because the example in the weak argument is not representative of 
others.
In sum, the following evaluation criteria were drawn from the 
interviews about the open case: criteria concerning the number of 
examples, coincidence, counterexamples, correlation between events 
and representativeness.
Interviews closed case
The evaluation questions that have been found among the 
respondents can be grouped into (I) questions specific to the 
argument from example and (II) questions that are specific to a 
different argument scheme. Criteria that do not occur in theory are in 
Italics.
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(I) Specific to the argument from example
Typicality criterion
Some respondents (15%) indicated that they found an argument 
relatively weak because an exceptional case was presented. This is 
illustrated by the next fragments:
________________________________ Fragment (6)______________________________
Evaluated argument (E):
The managing director of Shell studied physics and now earns millions of Euros a 
year.
Supported claim:
If you choose an exact science as a subject, you will draw a high salary in future. 
In English:
I: Okay, and argument E is in position 3, so I see. Can you explain that?
R: Yes because er, it is, you know, an extreme case, so not er, not so you know, 
important, or yeah it is, there is a big chance that it is simply, like, an exception, 
and not er, not a logical consequence of the fact that you’re going to do an exact 
science.
In Dutch:
I: Oké, en argument E staat op plaats 3 zie ik. Kun je dat uitleggen?
R: Ja want ehm, het is wel zeg maar een extreem geval, dus niet zo ehh, niet zo 
belangrijk zeg maar, of ja het is, het is een grote kans dat het gewoon een 
uitzondering is zeg maar, en niet ehh, niet een logisch gevolg van dat je een 
exacte studie gaat doen.___________________________________________________
________________________________ Fragment (7)_______________________________
Evaluated argument (E):
The managing director of Shell studied physics and now earns millions of Euros a 
year.
Supported claim:
If you choose an exact science as a subject, you will draw a high salary in future.
In English:
I: You found this stronger than argument E? [inaudible] position 2.
R: Yes, er in general er, the director of Shell studied physics and now earns 
millions of Euros. Er so if you choose an exact science, then you will draw a high 
salary in the future. Er how many directors of Shell are there actually and how is 
his study er in physics directly connected to his high salary? In general, if you 
studied physics, you indeed have a, a good, well, a considerable analytical ability I 
think, that I definitely believe. You also see indeed that executives have often done 
exact sciences already. He could just as easily have done economics, or maybe 
law and maybe he's just a very clever guy, who at that, at that moment didn't know 
exactly in what direction he wanted to go. So er I find it an exception.
153
In Dutch:
I: U vond hem sterker dan argument E? [onverstaanbaar] plek 2.
R: Ja, ehh over het algemeen ehh, de directeur van Shell heeft natuurkunde 
gestudeerd en verdient nu miljoenen euro’s. Ehh dus als je een exacte 
studierichting kiest, dan verdien je later een hoog salaris. Ehh hoeveel directeuren 
van Shell zijn er eigenlijk en wat heeft zijn studie ehh natuurkunde nu rechtstreeks 
verband te houden met zijn hoge salaris? Over het algemeen, als je  natuurkunde 
hebt gestudeerd, dan heb je inderdaad wel een, een goeie, nou, een behoorlijk 
analytisch vermogen denk ik, dat geloof ik zeker. Je ziet ook inderdaad van 
topmensen hebben vaak al inderdaad exacte studierichtingen gedaan. Voor 
hetzelfde geld had hij economie gedaan, of misschien rechten en is het gewoon 
een slimme kerel inderdaad, die op dat, in dat moment nog niet precies weet welke 
richting die op wil gaan. Dus ehh ik vind het een uitzondering._____________________
Number of examples criterion
The results show that laymen regard the number of examples as an 
indication of argument quality (45%). Some simply explain that giving 
more examples is better, but others explain what it is exactly that 
makes the number of examples important. The following respondent, 
for instance, explains that a single example might be an exception 
that accidentally justifies the conclusion:
________________________________ Fragment (8)_______________________________
Evaluated argument (F):
Maria de Graaf started to eat less fat, Edgar Ritmeester eats more fibre and grain 
than he used to, and Frederieke van Loon now eats more vegetables and fruit than 
before. All of them get sick less often than they used to.
Supported claim:
If you strive for a healthy lifestyle, you will reduce the chance of illness.
In English:
I: Next, I see that you put argument F in second p la c e .
R: Yes.
I: Can you explain why?
R: (...) And it is also about more people, so I found that rather good. That one and 
that one and that one, they stopped eating and now they have fewer diseases.
I: And why did you find that good, more people?
R: Er, yes, the same in the previous case, that you think like, if you say one person 
has started to eat better and now he has fewer diseases, then you can think, yeah, 
gosh nice, that can also be a simple coincidence. But if you say that one and that 
one and that one, then I think after all, gosh it may be right after all. So that's why I 
put that one in second place.
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In Dutch:
I: Dan zie ik dat je op de tweede plaats argument F hebt g e z e t.
R: Ja.
I: Kun je uitleggen waarom?
R: (...) En het gaat ook over meerdere mensen, dus dat vond ik wel goed. Die en 
die en die, zijn gestopt met eten en nou hebben ze minder kwaaltjes.
I: En waarom vond je dat goed, meerdere mensen?
R: Ehm, ja hetzelfde bij de vorige casus een beetje, dat je  denkt van, als je zegt 
één persoon is beter gaan eten en die heeft nou minder kwaaltjes dan kan je 
denken, ja, goh leuk, dat kan ook gewoon toeval zijn. Maar als je zegt van die en 
die en die allemaal, dan denk ik toch, goh misschien zit er dan toch wel wat in. Dus 
die had ik daarom op de tweede plek gezet._____________________________________
Another respondent relates the number of examples to the diversity of 
characteristics in the examples:
|_________________________________Fragment (9)________________________________
Evaluated argument (D):
Robert de Graaf started drinking more water and his skin now looks less sallow. 
Supported claim:
If you strive for a healthy lifestyle, you will reduce the chance of illness.
In English:
I: Okay, yes. And then you put D in fourth p la c e .
R: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Basically also a rather er, a er good one, but I don’t find it all 
that strong. (...) Maybe also because it er, because one, one person is mentioned. 
With one change in his lifestyle and mentioning three persons, maybe that sounds 
a bit stronger.
I: And why does that sound stronger?
R: Don’t know, probably because of three different aspects, that that, that that 
strengthens the claim a bit. More argumentation for why a healthy lifestyle reduces 
the chance of illness.
In Dutch:
I: Oké, ja. En dan heb je nog D op de vierde plaats ...
R: Tja, tja, ja. An sich ook wel een ehh, een ehh goeie, maar dat vind ik niet zo 
sterk. (...) Misschien ook omdat het ehh, omdat er één, één persoon wordt 
genoemd. Met één verandering in zijn leefpatroon en het noemen van drie 
personen, dat dat misschien wat sterker overkomt.
I: En waardoor komt dat sterker over?
R: Weet ik niet, waarschijnlijk door drie verschillende aspecten, dat dat, dat dat de 
stelling wat ehh sterker maakt. Meer beargumentatie waarom een gezonde leefstijl 
kans op ziektes verkleint._____________________________________________________
The next respondent thinks that the more confirmations of the 
generalization are given, the higher the chance is that the 
generalization will be confirmed again:
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I________________________________ Fragment (10)________________________________
Evaluated argument (F):
Maria de Graaf started to eat less fat, Edgar Ritmeester eats more fibre and grain 
than he used to, and Frederieke van Loon now eats more vegetables and fruit than 
before. All of them get sick less often than they used to.
Supported claim:
If you strive for a healthy lifestyle, you will reduce the chance of illness.
In English:
I: Okay, okay, because you put F in er second place, I see.
(■■■)
R: Yes, well actually also because there are more than the others, because for the 
rest, it is all one. For B, C, D and E.
I: Okay, and why do you find that to be a stronger argument, that there are more?
R: E r .  yeah, because then there are more examples at once of, er, people, to 
whom that argument, you know, applies.
I: Hmmhmm, and why is that strong?
R: Er well yeah, the more people something holds true for, the more plausible it is 
that that holds true for you too.
In Dutch:
(I: Oké, oké, want je  had F op ehh nummer 2 hè, zie ik.
(■■■)
R: Ja, nou eigenlijk ook omdat het er ehh meer zijn dan de anderen, want voor de 
rest zijn het allemaal één. Bij B, C, D en E.
I: Oké, en waarom vind je dat sterker, dat het er meer zijn?
R: Ehm ... ja, omdat het dan in één keer meer voorbeelden zijn van, ehh, mensen 
voor, voor wie dat argument geldt, zeg maar.
I: Hmmhmm, en waarom is dat sterk?
R: Ehh nou ja, voor hoe, hoe meer mensen iets geldt, ehh ja, hoe aannemelijker 
het is dat dat dan ook voor jou geldt.___________________________________________
And one person simply prefers more examples because it is more 
impressive:
_______________________________ Fragment (11)______________________________
Evaluated argument (A):
Simon de W it started drinking less alcohol and once again has a well-functioning 
liver. Bart van Maanen quit smoking and now has less trouble with his bronchial 
tubes. Sander Schaafstal started to exercise more, and he now feels far more vital.
Supported claim:
If you strive for a healthy lifestyle, you will reduce the chance of illness.
In English:
I: But, you did find this one weaker than argument A.
R: Yes, yes. But maybe also because there is a lot of information in A and that it is 
therefore somewhat, somewhat more impressive, I don’t k n o w . yeah. In A you
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see three things, you know, so those together perhaps lead to a bigger er bigger 
argument.
In Dutch:
I: Maar, je  vond hem wel zwakker dan argument A, dat wel.
R: Ja, ja. Misschien ook omdat er bij A heel veel staat en dat daarom wat, wat 
imposanter overkomt, ik weet het niet ... ja. Bij A  zie je drie dingen staan, zeg 
maar, die dus samen ook misschien zorgen voor een groter ehh groter argument.
It may be argued that this particular evaluation does not concern the 
content of the argument. After all, the respondent appears to use the 
number of examples criterion as a peripheral cue: ‘the more 
information given, the stronger the argument’.
Example accuracy criterion
Laymen use criteria referring to the accuracy of the example (45%). 
As illustrated by the following fragment, some doubt if the example 
corresponds to reality:
_______________________________ Fragment (12)_______________________________
Evaluated argument (B):
Theo van Gogh (director, television producer and columnist) lived healthily and he 
had built up a fierce resistance to illnesses.
Supported claim:
If you strive for a healthy lifestyle, you will reduce the chance of illness.
In English:
R: B is er last, because er should we know, we all remember him on TV, smoking 
and sweating and fat. So really he does not have such a healthy lifestyle. That 
taken into consideration, you have to have prior knowledge, if you don’t know that 
man then er, it, then that argument would not belong under B, but I know this man 
and he was not healthy, did not have a healthy lifestyle. So yeah, he has not built 
up a good resistance, so that’s why that one is on B.
I: That’s why that one is in last place.
R: In, yeah in last place, yeah.
In Dutch:
R: B is ehh op het laatst, omdat ehh zouden wij weten, wij weten allemaal dat hij 
rokend en zwetend en dik op de tv zat. Dus echt zo gezond leeft die niet. Dat 
meegenomen, dus je moet wel voorkennis hebben, als je die meneer niet kent dan 
ehh schiet, dan hoort die dus niet op B, maar ik ken deze meneer en die had geen 
gezonde leeftijd, gezonde leefstijl. Dus ja, die heeft dus ook geen goede weerstand 
opgebouwd, dus daarom komt die op B.
I: Daarom komt die op de laatste.
R: Op, ja op de laatste plek, ja._______________________________________________
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So, the respondent in fragment (12) questions if Theo van Gogh had 
a healthy lifestyle and built up fierce resistance to illnesses, as 
proposed in the example.
Another respondent doubts that Philip Freriks, the NOS-news 
presenter, studied chemistry:
I________________________________ Fragment (13)_______________________________
Evaluated argument (B):
Philip Freriks, presenter of the NOS news, studied chemistry and is in the top ten of 
the richest Dutchmen.
Supported claim:
If you choose an exact science as a subject, you will draw a high salary in future.
In English:
I: Okay, and B?
R: B .
I: W hat can you say about that?
R: Philip Freriks, well I, I, I think he is a linguistics guy. And I don’t believe he, he 
studied chemistry.
In Dutch:
I: Oké, en B?
R: B .
I: W at kunt u daarover zeggen?
R: Philip Freriks, nou ik, ik, volgens mij is dat een talenkerel. En ik geloof niet dat 
hij scheikunde gestudeerd heb, heeft.__________________________________________
Concreteness criterion
The criterion of concreteness was also used by the respondents in 
this study (35%). Some explicitly mention the term ‘concrete’ in 
relation to argument quality, like the respondent in the next fragment 
does:
_______________________________ Fragment (14)______________________________
Evaluated argument (A):
Simon de W it started drinking less alcohol and once again has a well-functioning 
liver. Bart van Maanen quit smoking and now has less trouble with his bronchial 
tubes. Sander Schaafstal started to exercise more, and he now feels far more vital.
Evaluated argument (E):
Robin van Persie eats a balanced diet and is therefore in good condition.
Supported claim:
If you strive for a healthy lifestyle, you will reduce the chance of illness.
In English:
R: Er, but why I find it [argument E] weaker than A, is because A er also gives 
concrete examples. Yeah, no, E does that too by the way.
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In Dutch:
R: Ehm, maar waarom ik hem [argument E] zwakker vind dan A, is omdat A ehh 
geeft concrete voorbeelden ook. Ja, nee dat doet E trouwens ook._____________
Others just refer to concreteness, as the next fragment shows:
_______________________________ Fragment (15)_______________________________
Evaluated argument (A):
Simon de W it started drinking less alcohol and once again has a well-functioning 
liver. Bart van Maanen quit smoking and now has less trouble with his bronchial 
tubes. Sander Schaafstal started to exercise more, and he now feels far more vital.
Evaluated argument (F):
Maria de Graaf started to eat less fat, Edgar Ritmeester eats more fibre and grain 
than he used to, and Frederieke van Loon now eats more vegetables and fruit than 
before. All of them get sick less often than they used to.
Supported claim:
If you strive for a healthy lifestyle, you will reduce the chance of illness.
In English:
R: Er I have argument A on 1 ( . )  And each example also indicates what is good 
about it, you know, because Simon de Wit, less alcohol, a well-functioning liver.
Bart van Manen, quit smoking, less trouble with his bronchial tubes, you know 
separately indicated. And that’s why that one is before F, because in F it’s also only 
about three people, but then it says only sick less often than they used to.
I: And why do you find that weaker? That it only says sick less often than they used 
to?
R: Er, I don’t find the word sick all that convincing. Because, yeah, what is sickness 
then? And er, it says a lot less as a result.
I: Hmmhmmm, less th a n .?
R: Less than er in answer A where er it was indicated each time what was exactly 
good about it.
In Dutch:
R: Ehm ik heb argument A op 1 ( . )  En bij elk voorbeeld is er ook aangegeven wat 
er dan goed aan is, zeg maar, want Simon de Wit, minder alcohol, een goed 
functionerende lever. Bart van Manen, gestopt met roken, minder last van zijn 
luchtwegen, zeg maar los van elkaar aangegeven. En daarom staat die boven F, 
want bij F staat er alleen voor drie mensen ook, maar dan staat er alleen minder 
last van kwaaltjes.
I: En waarom vind je dat zwakker? Dat er alleen minder last van kwaaltjes staat.
R: Ehm, ik vind kwaaltjes als woord vind ik niet zo overtuigend. Want, ja, wat zijn 
kwaaltjes dan? En ehm, daardoor zegt het ook veel minder.
I: Hmmhmm, minder dan . ?
R: Minder dan ehh bij antwoord A waarbij ehh steeds werd aangegeven wat er 
precies goed is._____________________________________________________________
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It is possible that the concreteness-question is asked prior to other 
evaluation questions, like the question of relevance. After all, if an 
instance is not clear-cut, it will be more difficult or even impossible to 
judge whether or not and to what degree it belongs to a category. For 
instance, the respondent in fragment (15) could have been unable to 
judge if ‘sickness’ is a good member of the category ‘illness’, as he 
finds it unclear what this ‘sickness’ precisely is.
Causality criterion
Laymen question the causality suggested in the example (85%). 
When they do so, they sometimes refer to necessity and sometimes 
to sufficiency. If someone refers to necessity, then it is asked whether 
the effect would have occurred in the absence of the action. If 
someone refers to sufficiency, it is questioned whether the 
occurrence of the action brings about the consequence90. In the 
following fragment, the respondent refers to necessity:
_______________________________ Fragment (16)_______________________________
Evaluated argument (B):
Philip Freriks, presenter of the NOS news, studied chemistry and is in the top ten of 
the richest Dutchmen.
Supported claim:
If you choose an exact science as a subject, you will draw a high salary in future.
In English:
I: (...) and on to B, you put that one in second to last place.
R: Hmmhmm.
I: Can you explain why?
R: Yes, because, it seems to me that there is no real relation between studying 
chemistry and then ending up at the NOS-news, so er, I mean then I would have 
rather a study journala, journalalism or er something in that direction, yeah, it 
doesn't seem necessary to me to study chemistry, so, yeah.
I: Okay.
R: I don't think that it's true that, just because he studied chemistry, he [is?] in the 
top 10 of richest Dutchmen then. He probably became a presenter coincidentally, 
so I don't find that one such a strong one, actually.
I: Okay.
R: Not really a logical connection.
90 For a more extensive discussion about sufficiency and necessity, see chapter 3 
about the argument from cause to effect.
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In Dutch:
I: ( . )  en dan gaan we naar B, die heb je op de één na laatste plek.
R: Hmmhmm.
I: Kun je uitleggen waarom?
R: Ja, omdat, het lijkt me niet echt verband hebben dat je scheikunde studeert en 
dan bij het NOS-journaal terecht komt, dus ehh, ik bedoel dan zou ik eerder een 
studie journala, journalastiek of ehh iets in die richting, ja, lijkt me niet dat je 
daarvoor scheikunde gestudeerd moet hebben, dus, ja.
I: Oké.
R: Ik denk niet dat het zo is dat, omdat hij scheikunde heeft gestudeerd, dat hij dan 
in de top 10 van rijkste Nederlanders [staat?]. Hij is waarschijnlijk toevallig 
presentator geworden, dus dat vind ik eigenlijk niet zo ’n sterke.
I: Oké.
R: Niet echt logisch verband.__________________________________________________
So, here the respondent questions whether the action (studying 
chemistry) was necessary to reach the effect (being in the top 10 of 
richest Dutchmen). In the next fragment, the respondent refers to 
sufficiency:
I________________________________ Fragment (17)________________________________
Evaluated argument (E):
The managing director of Shell has studied physics and now earns millions of 
Euros a year.
Supported claim:
If you choose an exact science as a subject, you will draw a high salary in future.
In English:
I: Okay, and if you were to say something about the arguments separately, about E 
for example?
R: Arguments separately, the managing director of Shell studied physics and now 
earns millions of Euros a, a year. Well, that is nonsense of course, because 
physics does not garantuee millions of Euros a year. That is simply a false 
argument, of er simply, there are also people who studied physics simply like, who 
earn ten Euros a month, for instance.
In Dutch:
I: Oké, en als u iets moet zeggen over de argumenten afzonderlijk, over E 
bijvoorbeeld?
R: Argumenten afzonderlijk, de directeur van Shell heeft natuurkunde gestudeerd 
en verdient nu miljoenen per, euro’s per jaar. Nou, dat is natuurlijk een onzin, want 
natuurkunde staat niet garant voor miljoenen euro’s per jaar. Dat is gewoon een 
vals argument, van ehh gewoon, er zijn ook mensen die natuurkunde gestudeerd 
hebben gewoon van, die een tientje per maand verdienen, bij wijze van spreken.
So, the respondent in fragment (17) questions if the action (studying 
physics) is sufficient to bring about the effect (earning millions of 
Euros a year).
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Relevance criterion
Laymen pay attention to the relevance of the example to the claim 
(85%), so they decide whether or not the argument is connected to 
the matter under consideration. Some focus on the relevance of the 
action in the argument to the action in the claim, some on the 
relevance of the effect in the argument and some focus on the 
relevance of the argument as a whole. The next fragment illustrates a 
case in which someone focuses on the relevance of the effect in the 
argument:
I________________________________ Fragment (18)________________________________
Evaluated argument (D)
Peter Philips studied veterinary medicine and has a nice job.
Supported claim:
If you choose an exact science as a subject, you will draw a high salary in future.
In English:
I: Okay, I see that D is left, in the second to last place, argument D.
R: That is Peter Philips. Yes, he has a really nice job and er, so if you [choose?] an 
exact science, you will draw a high salary in the future, of course th e .  one thing 
does not have to do a damned thing with the other actually. He has a nice job, 
okay, but it tells me nothing about how much he earns.
I: And for that reason you find er weaker th a n .
R: Y e a h . well if you choose an exact science, then you will draw a high salary in 
future, then you should not be using this one indeed. If you choose an exact 
science and then you get a really nice job, then that one would be perfect of 
course.
In Dutch:
I: Oké, D zie ik dan nog, op de één na laatste plek, argument D.
R: Dat is Peter Philips. Ja, die heeft een hele leuke baan en ehh, dus als je  een 
exacte studierichting [kiest?], verdien je later een hoog salaris, natuurlijk e e n . 
heeft er eigenlijk, geen zak met elkaar te maken. Hij heeft een leuke baan, oké, 
maar dat zegt me niets over hoeveel hij verdient.
I: En om die reden vindt u ehm zwakker d a n .
R: J a .  nou als je een exacte studierichting kiest, dan verdien je later een hoog 
salaris, dan zou je deze niet in moeten gebruiken inderdaad. Als je een exacte 
studierichting kiest en dan krijg je  een ontzettend leuke baan, dan zou die natuurlijk 
perfect zijn.__________________________________________________________________
It also appears that respondents in this study judge category 
membership before they determine the relevance of the argument. In 
other words, they appear to use the heuristic: ‘if an instance in the 
argument falls within a claim category, then the argument is relevant’. 
The next fragment illustrates this phenomenon:
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Fragment (19)
Evaluated argument (C):
Janneke Oorthuys did a psychology degree and earns an above-average income. 
Supported claim:
If you choose an exact science as a subject, you will draw a high salary in future.
In English:
R: No, in the, yes, in last place I put er the one who did the psychology degree 
because yeah, that is simply not an exact science.
I: Hmmhmm.
R: And, yeah, that just doesn’t have anything to do with it, you know.
I: It does not have anything to do with what?
R: With er exact sciences leading to a er high salary.
I: Hmmhmm.
R: Because it is simply not an exact science, so, yeah, then er, it is simply not an 
argument at all.
In Dutch:
R: Nee, op de, ja, op de laatste plaats had ik dus ehh degene die de psychologie- 
opleiding heeft gedaan want ja, dat is gewoon geen exacte studie.
I: Hmmhmm.
R: En, ja, dat heeft er gewoon niks mee te maken, zeg maar.
I: W aar heeft het niks mee te maken?
R: Met ehh dat exacte studies tot een ehm hoog salaris leiden.
I: Hmmhmm.
R: Want het gaat gewoon niet over een exacte studie, dus, ja, dan ehh, het is 
gewoon helemaal geen argument._____________________________________________
So, the respondent in fragment (19) suggests that ‘Psychology’ in the 
argument is not an instance of the category ‘exact science’ in the 
claim, so that the argument cannot be related to the claim.
Some refer to the degree of category membership and also to 
the degree of relevance. Consider the next fragments:
_______________________________ Fragment (20)_______________________________
Evaluated argument (F):
Maria de Graaf started to eat less fat, Edgar Ritmeester eats more fibre and grain 
than he used to, and Frederieke van Loon now eats more vegetables and fruit than 
before. All of them get sick less often than they used to.
Supported claim:
If you strive for a healthy lifestyle, you will reduce the chance of illness.
In English:
I: Then I would like to know why you put F in first place.
R: Er, I put F in first place, because I think that that one is most er about a healthy 
lifestyle. Namely eating less fat, more fibre and grain and more vegetables and 
fruit. Those are all positive things, you know, for working on your health in a 
positive way. Whereas in the others it says a lot of er stopping with negative things
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In Dutch:
I: Dan wilde ik graag weten waarom je F op 1 hebt staan.
R: Ehh, ik heb F op 1 gezet, omdat ik vind dat daarin het meest ehh gaat over een 
gezonde leefstijl. Namelijk minder vet eten, meer vezels en granen en meer 
groenten en fruit. Dat zijn allemaal positieve dingen, zeg maar, voor op een 
positieve manier aan je gezondheid werken. Terwijl in de anderen staan veel ehh 
stoppen met negatieve dingen en dit is ehh beginnen met positieve dingen, zeg 
maar.
and this is er starting with positive things, you know.
_______________________________ Fragment (21)_______________________________
Evaluated argument (E):
The managing director of Shell studied physics and now earns millions of Euros a 
year.
Supported claim:
If you choose an exact science as a subject, you will draw a high salary in future.
In English:
I: Well, in er first place you put E, I see.
R: Yes.
I: Can you tell why you put that one in first place?
R: Yes, it er has to do with er, what does exact mean? What is an exact science? 
Well, in any case it is physics, chemistry in my opinion. Er computer science, for 
example architecture, and er in E it is the director of Shell, has studied physics ...
I: Hmmhmm.
R: ... and now earns millions of Euros. Er Shell is also an er, an er exact field, you 
know. I don’t know what, what, what he does exactly as a director. But I assume 
that he got in Shell with physics and did something there and moved up eventually.
I: Hmmhmm.
R: So from then, then it connects to er an exact science. And I ranked them in that 
way, you know, the less er, exact it is, the less important it is as an argument.
In Dutch:
I: Nou, op ehh de eerste plek staat E, zie ik.
R: Ja.
I: Kun je vertellen waarom je die op de eerste plek hebt gezet?
R: Ja, dat ehh heeft met ehh, wat is exact? W at is een exacte studierichting? Nou, 
het is in ieder geval natuurkunde, in mijn ogen scheikunde. Ehh informatica, 
bijvoorbeeld bouwkunde, en ehh bij E is het de directeur van Shell, heeft 
natuurkunde gestudeerd ...
I: Hmmhmm.
R: ... en verdient nu miljoenen euro’s. Ehh Shell is ook nog een ehh, een ehh exact 
veld, zeg maar. Ik weet niet wat, wat, wat hij als directeur precies doet. Maar ik 
neem aan dat hij met natuurkunde binnen is gekomen bij Shell en daar wat heeft 
gedaan en uiteindelijk op is geklommen.
I: Hmmhmm.
R: Dus vanuit dan, dan sluit het aan bij ehh een exacte studierichting. En zo is het 
naar beneden gegaan zeg maar, hoe minder ehh, exact, hoe minder belangrijk als 
argument, zeg maar._________________________________________________________
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In fragment (20), the respondent states that the strongest argument is 
‘most’ about a healthy lifestyle, suggesting that the single measures 
taken in that argument (eating less fat etc.) are relatively clear 
members of the category ‘healthy lifestyle’. In fragment (21), the 
respondent suggests that the evaluation of the arguments is 
dependent on the degree to which the study named in the premise is 
a member of the category ‘exact science’ in the claim.
(II) Specific to a different argument scheme: action desirability 
criterion
In a few interviews (15%), respondents appeared to be concerned 
with the desirability of the action proposed in the argument. Some 
judgments are based on attitudes towards the action mentioned in the 
example, as the next fragment illustrates:
I________________________________ Fragment (22)________________________________
Evaluated argument (D):
Robert de Graaf started drinking more water and his skin now looks less sallow. 
Supported claim:
If you strive for a healthy lifestyle, you will reduce the chance of illness.
In English:
I: Hmmhmm, okay. And in fifth place you put argument D...
R: Yes, I find that a lesser argument, I mean, drinking water is healthy, b u t .  I find 
it less strong, less important. I think that it is more important to, to inform people on 
things like fish, like more vegetables and fruit, that way you know. Drinking water, 
that I think is a somewhat lesser, a less important argument.
In Dutch:
I: Hmmhmm, oké. En op de vijfde plek staat argument D...
R: Ja, dat vind ik ook wat minder, zo van water drinken is wel gezond, maar ... ik 
vind hem minder sterk, minder belangrijk. Ik denk dat het belangrijker is om, om 
mensen te informeren over dingen als vis, als meer groenten en fruit, op die manier 
zeg maar. En dan water drinken vind ik dan wel iets, een minder belangrijk 
argument.___________________________________________________________________
So, in fragment (22) the argument is evaluated negatively, because 
the action of drinking water is considered relatively unimportant.
Table 4.7 shows the laymen criteria for the argument from example. 
Criteria that do not correspond to argumentation theory are in Italics.
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Table 4.7 Laymen criteria for the argument from example (per type of stimulus 
material) and agreement among respondents (the number of closed case individual 
interviews in which the criterion was mentioned divided by the total number of closed 
case individual interviews) (laymen criteria that do not correspond to theory are in 
italics). ___________________________ ______________________________________
Nature of 
criterion
Criterion Type of stimulus 
material
Agreement 
among 
respondents, 
based on 
closed case 
interviews
Open
case
Closed
case
Specific 
to the 
argument 
from 
example
Typicality + + 3 of 20 (15%)
Number of examples + + 9 of 20 (45%)
Counterexample + - 0 of 20 (0%)
Example accuracy - + 9 of 20 (45%)
Concreteness - + 7 of 20 (35%)
Causality - + 17 of 20 (85%)
Relevance (of the cause, of 
the effect or of the 
argument as a whole)
- + 17 of 20 (85%)
Specific 
to a
different
argument
scheme
Action desirability + 3 of 20 (15%)
4.4 Conclusion and discussion
In section 4.2, I examined the normative considerations on the quality 
of the argument from example in argumentation theory. In section 4.3,
I uncovered laymen’s considerations on the quality of the argument 
from example. The central question in this chapter was: to what 
extent do lay criteria for the argument from example correspond to 
the criteria formulated in argumentation theory?
A considerable number of laymen in this study judge the 
quality of the argument from example on the basis of the number of 
examples and on the basis of the accuracy of the example. This is in 
agreement with argumentation theory. A large majority of the laymen 
in this study use the relevance criterion. This criterion, however, is 
sometimes used on a more concrete level than is suggested in 
argumentation theory, as some focus on the relevance of the cause in
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the argument and others on the relevance of the effect in the 
argument. In addition, it appears that category membership plays a 
role in relevance judgments: laymen in this study appear to determine 
whether, and to what degree, an instance falls into a conclusion 
category before they judge relevance. Only a small minority of laymen 
in this study focus on typicality, which means that they wonder if the 
case presented is an exceptional one involving atypical 
circumstances. Only one respondent mentioned the possibility of 
undermining generalizations by counterexamples, in the interview on 
the open case. This was to be expected considering the setup of the 
material: all generalizations were presumptive in nature (cf. Walton, 
1999). If the respondents would have compared an argument from 
example resulting in a universal generalization ("e.g. All individuals 
striving for a healthy lifestyle will at all times reduce the chance of 
illness”), with the same argument resulting in a presumptive 
generalization (“Individuals striving for a healthy lifestyle will reduce 
the chance of illness”), for instance, they would have possibly been 
more triggered to refer to counterexamples.
In sum:
Corresponding criteria with relatively high agreement among respondents:
• The relevance criterion: the example should connect adequately to 
the conclusion.
• The number of examples criterion: there should be enough 
examples cited.
• The example accuracy criterion: the example should correspond to 
reality.
Corresponding criteria with relatively low agreement among respondents:
• The typicality criterion: the example should be typical of the kinds 
of cases the generalization ranges over.
• The counterexample criterion: there should not be a 
counterexample undermining the conclusion.
There are also differences between laymen criteria for the 
argument from example and theoretical criteria. Laymen did not refer 
to the strength of conclusion in their evaluations, as suggested in 
theory. This was, however, expected on the basis of the setup of the 
material, as the claims that were presented in the cases did not vary 
in this respect. A reasonable number of respondents used a 
concreteness norm; a norm that is familiar in argumentation theory91,
91 The pragma-dialecticians, for example, refer to concreteness in their tenth 
commandment: “Discussants may not use any formulations that are
167
but that has not been included in evaluation criteria for the argument 
from example specifically. A large majority of laymen evaluated the 
argument from example on the basis of causality, something that is 
not suggested in argumentation theory for the argument from 
example. It appears justified that laymen do focus on causality, 
considering the fact that they judged causal generalizations 
supported by examples that were supposed to exhibit the causal 
relation in the claim. The theoretical criteria were aimed at the 
argument from example in general and not specifically at 
argumentation from example to a causal generalization. Therefore, 
the disagreement between laymen and argumentation theory could 
be expected. Last, a few laymen judged the desirability of the action 
in the argument from example, something they should not do 
according to argumentation theory. The pragmatic context may have 
triggered such a criterion. However, using this criterion appears to be 
irrelevant to this type of argument, because even if the action in the 
argument is not desirable, the causal generalization it supports may 
still hold. In sum, the non-corresponding criteria are:
Non-corresponding criterion that was not mentioned by respondents:
• The strength of conclusion criterion: the conclusion should not be 
too strongly formulated (theory only, as expected, because of 
material).
Non-corresponding criterion with relatively high agreement among 
respondents:
• The causality criterion: the examples should exhibit a causal 
relation (laymen only, as expected, because theory did not aim 
particularly at the argument from example to a causal 
generalization).
Non-corresponding criteria with relatively low agreement among 
respondents:
• The concreteness criterion: the examples should be concrete 
(laymen only, unexpected on the basis of theoretical scheme- 
dependent criteria).
• The action desirability criterion: the action in the example should 
be desirable (laymen only, unexpected, because irrelevant to the 
argument from example).
unsufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous” (Van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 
2006, p. 18).
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Discussion
Laymen criteria for the evaluation of the argument from example 
correspond to a considerable extent to the theoretical criteria. About 
the corresponding criteria, however, it can be said that the relevance 
criterion, the number of examples criterion and the example accuracy 
criterion are agreed upon by a considerable number of laymen in this 
study, whereas the typicality criterion and the counterexample 
criterion are agreed upon by a relatively small number of laymen in 
this study.
The fact that most laymen in this study did not focus on 
counterexamples could be expected considering the set-up of the 
material, but the relatively low agreement on the typicality criterion 
was rather unexpected. It is possible that the causality in the material 
stimulated respondents to focus primarily on causality conditions and 
also on the relevance of the action and the effect in the argument. 
Had the material contained arguments from example to a descriptive 
generalization, respondents might have given more attention to 
typicality in the examples.
A reasonable number of laymen apply a concreteness- 
criterion, which was not advised in argumentation theory for the 
argument from example specifically. How can that result be 
explained? I already argued in 4.3.2 that concreteness may enable 
laymen to adequately judge whether instances in the premises are 
clear members of conclusion categories (and as a consequence, to 
adequately judge the relevance of the argument). Although from a 
normative point of view it is desirable for each argumentation that it is 
specific, it is quite natural that in practice, this requirement becomes 
extra important in the case of the argument from example, having 
instances and categories as its essential characteristics. Therefore, it 
should not come as a surprise that respondents in this study clearly 
focus on concreteness.
An alternative explanation is that respondents have not 
interpreted the arguments from example in the material as 
argumentative, but as illustrative. In that case, it is understandable 
that they wanted the examples to be concrete. After all, considering 
the fact that an illustrative example’s (main) purpose is to put out 
something clearly or pictorially, it should be at least concrete.
This study gives reason to think that evaluation questions for 
the argument from example need some refinement. A few laymen in 
this study are concerned with typicality/representativeness as advised 
in argumentation theory. They wonder whether or not exceptional
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circumstances are taken into account before generalizing - for 
instance in the case of the Shell managing director on the basis of 
which the conclusion is drawn that choosing an exact science as a 
subject will bring about a high salary. It appears that what laymen are 
wondering about comes close to Walton’s (1996) question: “Were 
there special circumstances present in the example that would impair 
its generalizability?” (p. 50), for which I suggested that it might in fact 
be a heuristic question to answer the typicality-question (see 4.2.2). I 
also stated that in argumentation theory, it is usually unclear what the 
typicality/representativeness questions are aimed at; perhaps it is 
more sensible to replace these by questions explicitly asking for 
atypical or exceptional circumstances, for instance: ‘is the 
generalization based on examples that may involve atypical 
circumstances?’.
Second, laymen focus on the number of examples as 
suggested in argumentation theory. That is interesting, because it is 
also noted in argumentation literature that the number of examples 
should not be a reason to reject the argument, as it is typical that only 
a few examples are given. It appears from the closed interviews that if 
three individual cases are contrasted with one, number matters. 
Respondents find it important for several reasons, among which the 
diversity of characteristics that can be established by presenting 
multiple cases. As I already explained in 4.2, the diversity principle is 
common in qualitative research practice, so in that respect, it is 
remarkable that normative argumentation theory has not formulated a 
requirement for diversity (except for Windes & Hastings, 1969). So, if 
multiple cases are cited, the following question should be asked: ‘Are 
the characteristics in the examples diverse?’
Third, a heuristic question could be asked to help determine 
the relevance of the argument: ‘Are instances in the argument (clear) 
members of the conclusion categories?’. In addition, for the argument 
from example to a causal generalization, a distinction can be made 
between relevance of the action in the argument and relevance of the 
effect in the argument.
Last, it can be argued that in argumentation theory, a 
distinction should be made between reasoning from example to a 
descriptive generalization and reasoning from example to a causal 
generalization as Windes and Hastings (1969) do, because causality 
plays a role in laypersons’ evaluation of the latter mode of reasoning 
and should, in my opinion, play a role in evaluation. Then, within 
reasoning from example to a causal generalization, another 
refinement is possible: one type of argument in which reasoning goes
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from causal examples to a causal generalization and one type of 
argument in which reasoning goes from correlational examples to a 
causal generalization. In this study, my aim was to focus on the 
former type.
There are some limitations to this study. The design of the 
open cases in this study did not evoke the intended responses. The 
intention was for the respondents to spontaneously generate one 
strong example and one weak example in support of the causal 
generalization to find out what properties make a good example. It 
turned out that instead, respondents tended to present a statistical 
kind of generalization as a strong argument and a single example as 
a weak argument, or even other types of argument. The task or the 
task instruction might be regarded as unsuccessful in this respect (if 
the respondents were asked to read their arguments aloud and it 
became clear that they had not given the ‘proper’ arguments, they 
were not corrected). Hence, this raises the question as to what kind of 
criteria would have been generated if respondents had compared a 
single strong example with a single weak example.
Second, in the open case, the respondents filled in the 
following sentence: “Because I know a case in which that held 
t ru e : . ”. That means that the respondents were not given the 
opportunity to give more than one individual example and as a result, 
the number-of-examples-criterion was not to be expected in the open 
case interviews. Nevertheless, some respondents referred to this 
particular criterion in the open case interviews as they compared a 
group of cases with a single case after all, but this appeared to be 
rather coincidental.
Third, although I aimed at the argument from causal examples 
to a causal generalization as I mentioned above and not the 
argument from correlational examples to a causal generalization, the 
closed case material appeared to have contained both types. In some 
arguments, causality was expressed, e.g. “Robin van Persie eats a 
balanced diet and is therefore in good condition”. In other arguments, 
correlation was expressed, e.g. “Robert de Graaf started drinking 
more water and his skin looks less sallow now”. In other words, the 
argument type I was interested in was not adequately 
operationalized.
All in all, this study revealed that there is little discrepancy 
between theory and laymen when it comes to the quality of the 
argument from example; most criteria laymen use do not conflict with 
argumentation theory. The number of examples criterion, the example 
accuracy criterion, the relevance criterion and the causality criterion
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are shared by a considerable number of laymen in this study. 
Therefore, these criteria are likely to be part of laymen’s 
argumentative baggage. In addition, criteria concerning causality and 
the relevance of action and effect are specific to the argument from 
example to a causal generalization, the subtype of the argument from 
example investigated in this study.
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PART II: THE RELATION BETWEEN ARGUMENT 
QUALITY AND ACTUAL PERSUASIVENESS: 
AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH
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5. The perceived reasonableness and actual 
persuasiveness of normatively strong and 
normatively weak arguments92
5.1 Introduction
In part I of this dissertation, I addressed the question to what extent 
laymen criteria for the argument from authority, the argument from 
cause to effect and the argument from example correspond to those 
formulated in argumentation theory. In chapter 1, it was argued that 
according to the ELM, normatively strong arguments should be more 
persuasive than normatively weak arguments in conditions in which 
messages are processed centrally. However, according to empirical 
findings, there may be a difference between what people believe to 
be a strong argument and what actually is persuasive (e.g. Hoeken, 
2001a). What people believe to be a strong argument is expressed in 
the evaluation criteria they use to distinguish strong arguments from 
weak arguments. However, arguments that do conform to those 
criteria, or normatively strong arguments, are not necessarily more 
persuasive than arguments that violate those criteria, or normatively 
weak arguments. Therefore, the following research question was 
formulated:
Are normatively strong arguments from authority, arguments from cause to 
effect and arguments from example actually more persuasive than 
normatively weak arguments?
This will be the central research question in part II of the dissertation. 
An experiment was conducted to address this question. This 
experiment will be reported in chapter 6. However, before this 
experiment was conducted, a preliminary study was carried out. This 
study was performed in order to determine if it would be wise to 
measure other dependent variables besides actual persuasiveness. 
After all, the assumption underlying the second research question is 
that normatively strong arguments will be actually more persuasive 
because they are conceived as stronger arguments. Therefore, to test 
this assumption, it appears wise to first explore the relation between
92 This study has been published earlier (Timmers, Sorm, Schellens & Hoeken, 
2008). This publication is the result of an intensive collaboration between the first 
and the second author who contributed in equal measure to the design, 
execution, and reporting of the study.
175
the concept of what I call perceived reasonableness and the concept 
of actual persuasiveness.
In this chapter, a preliminary study will be reported in which 
the relation between perceived reasonableness and actual 
persuasiveness was investigated. First, I will further elaborate on the 
concepts of perceived reasonableness and actual persuasiveness 
and discuss if these concepts have already been investigated in 
previous empirical studies and if so, how they have been defined and 
operationalized.
Perceived reasonableness and actual persuasiveness
In the study of argumentation, the concept of reasonableness is used 
to indicate the quality of arguments (Schellens, 1985; Van Eemeren, 
Garssen & Meuffels, 2007). Schellens (1985, p. 6) considers an 
argument reasonable if it, after being critically evaluated, increases 
the plausibility or acceptability of another statement. Empirical studies 
on the reasonableness of arguments are limited to fallacies, which 
are usually defined as unreasonable moves in argumentative 
discourse (Van Eemeren, 2001). Van Eemeren et al. (2007) carried 
out an extensive research project on ordinary language users’ 
conceptions of reasonableness. They conducted a series of 
experiments, in which they investigated the perceived 
reasonableness of 24 different fallacies. In these studies, the concept 
of reasonableness has been consistently operationalized by asking 
participants to indicate on a seven-point scale how reasonable they 
found a discussion move. The results show that participants 
consistently consider fallacies to be less reasonable than their non- 
fallacious counterparts. Thus, the normative quality of an argument 
appears to influence the judgment of the reasonableness of that 
argument.
I wish to make three remarks on the research of Van Eemeren 
et al. (2007) that make additional research worthwhile. First, as the 
researchers were interested in conceptions of reasonableness, the 
actual persuasiveness has not been considered in these studies. In 
other words, is has not been tested whether fallacies that were found 
to be less reasonable than their non-fallacious counterparts were also 
less persuasive.
Second, to test the conventional validity of the argumentation 
scheme rule, the fallacies argumentum ad consequentiam, 
argumentum ad populum, slippery slope and false analogy were 
investigated. It is possible that ordinary judges are more sensitive to
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the unreasonableness of such traditional fallacies than to the 
unreasonableness of normatively weak arguments that cannot be 
considered traditional fallacies. Moreover, as far as I know, no fallacy 
was used in the studies of Van Eemeren et al. (2007) that is related to 
one of the argument types that this dissertation focuses on.
Other empirical studies are concerned with the relation 
between what is perceived as persuasive and what actually is 
persuasive (e.g. Hoeken, 2001a; Dillard, Weber & Vail, 2007a; 
Dillard, Shen & Vail, 2007b). The studies of Dillard et al. (2007a; 
2007b) show a substantial association between perceived 
persuasiveness and actual persuasiveness. Hoeken (2001a), by 
contrast, finds a difference between what people consider persuasive 
arguments and what they are in fact persuaded by.
The construct that is referred to in the study of Dillard, Weber 
and Vail (2007a), perceived persuasiveness, is apparently different 
from the concept of perceived reasonableness that I am interested in. 
Consider, for instance, how they defined the concept of perceived 
persuasiveness -  for which they in fact use the term perceived 
effectiveness (PE):
“we inferred a conceptual definition of PE as an estimate of the degree to 
which a persuasive message will be favorably evaluated— in terms of its 
persuasive potential— by recipients of that message” (p. 617)
Hoeken (2001a) refers to the concept of perceived persuasiveness as 
“perception of the argument’s quality” (p. 429). It remains somewhat 
unclear whether that is the quality to persuade message recipients or 
the quality to be a reasonable argument. This ambiguity is reflected 
by the indicators that Hoeken (2001a) uses for perceived 
persuasiveness: “sound”, “relevant”, “strong” and “convincing”. Only 
the last indicator “convincing” clearly points at the intended concept of 
perceived persuasiveness. The indicators “sound” and “relevant” are 
more connected with perceived reasonableness. The indicator 
“strong” is an ambiguous term that may apply to perceived 
reasonableness as well as to perceived persuasiveness.
Dillard et al. (2007b) use the word pairs “convincing/not 
convincing”, “believable/not believable” , “sensible/not sensible”, 
“wise/foolish”, “right/wrong” and “important/unimportant” to measure 
perceived persuasiveness. For this study too, it goes that some 
indicators are more appropriate to measure perceived 
reasonableness than to measure perceived persuasiveness, namely 
“wise/foolish”, “sensible/not sensible” and “right/wrong”.
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All in all, some scales in the studies of Dillard et al. (2007b) 
and Hoeken (2001a) unintentionally cover the concept of perceived 
reasonableness instead of the intended concept of perceived 
persuasiveness. This leads to the question of what the relation is 
between perceived reasonableness and actual persuasiveness, if 
perceived reasonableness is not (unintentionally) operationalized as a 
sub-aspect of perceived persuasiveness, but as a separate concept. 
It is possible that people will react differently to the question of what 
would persuade (perceived persuasiveness) than to the question of 
what would increase the plausibility or acceptability of another 
statement (perceived reasonableness). So, the association between 
perceived reasonableness and actual persuasiveness might be less 
substantial than the association between perceived persuasiveness 
and actual persuasiveness.
Furthermore, asking people to judge the reasonableness of an 
argument may stimulate them to focus on the supporting qualities of 
the argument. In judgments of claim acceptability, however, other 
factors besides supporting qualities might come to play a role, such 
as the opinions that people already hold. This means that someone 
may find a certain argument reasonable, but may nevertheless reject 
the claim that is supported by that argument. Therefore, it may be 
expected that the manipulation of argument quality by means of 
evaluation criteria will have more effect on perceived reasonableness 
scores than on claim acceptability scores.
Next, I will report a preliminary study on this issue. The study 
investigated the relation between perceived reasonableness and 
actual persuasiveness. The argument types that were selected to 
address this question were the argument from authority and the 
argument from cause to effect. This leads to the following research 
questions:
(1) What is the relation between the perceived reasonableness and 
the actual persuasiveness of normatively strong and weak 
arguments from authority and normatively strong and weak 
arguments from cause to effect?
(1a) Are normatively strong arguments from authority perceived as 
more reasonable and are they more persuasive than normatively 
weak arguments from authority?
(1 b) Are normatively strong arguments from cause to effect perceived 
as more reasonable and are they more persuasive than 
normatively weak arguments from cause to effect?
These questions were addressed in an experimental study. The 
method used in the experiment will be discussed in the next section.
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5.2 Method
5.2.1 Material
The material consisted of 16 short texts in which the argument from 
authority or the argument from cause to effect was used. Each text 
was composed according to one of the following argument schemes:
Scheme (1) - argument from authority:
Source A says that measure M leads to effect E 
Therefore: measure M leads to effect E
Scheme (2) - argument from authority:
Source A says that effect E is desirable 
Therefore: effect E is desirable
Scheme (3) - argument from cause to effect:
Measures like M generally lead to effects like E 
Therefore: measure M will lead to effect E
Scheme (4) - argument from cause effect:
Measure M leads to effect G 
G leads to effect E
Therefore: measure M will lead to effect E
In scheme (1), the argumentation results in a descriptive claim stating 
that a certain measure (an action or a policy) leads to a certain effect. 
In scheme (2), in which the argumentation results in a normative 
claim, the conclusion is drawn that the effect of a certain measure is 
desirable. In scheme (3), the conclusion is based on a general 
prediction stating that measures like the measure mentioned in the 
conclusion generally lead to effects like the effect mentioned in the 
conclusion. In scheme (4), the conclusion is based on two 
predictions, leading in two steps from the proposed measure to the 
proposed effect. The texts were composed in accordance with Table 
5.1.
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Table 5.1 Design with Argument Type, Argument Scheme, Criterion and Quality as
independent variables.
Argument from authority Argument from cause to effect
Scheme (1) Scheme (2) Scheme (3) Scheme (4)
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Strong (1) (3) (5) (7) (9) (11) (13) (15)
Weak (2) (4) (6) (8) (10) (12) (14) (16)
Of the 16 texts, 8 were based on the argument from authority. 
Of these 8, 4 were composed according to scheme (1) and 4 
according to scheme (2). Eight texts contained an argument from 
cause to effect. Of these 8, 4 used scheme (3) and 4 scheme (4). The 
result was that 4 claims expressed the desirability of a measure’s 
effect, for instance: "It is a positive trend that more and more people 
practice two sports” . Twelve other claims expressed an effect’s 
occurrence as a result of a proposed measure, for instance: "Taking a 
cold shower after a tough game will lead to relaxation”.
A pre-test was executed to be sure that the claims were not 
too acceptable or too unacceptable. In reasoning research, evidence 
has been found for the belief bias effect, which means that people are 
more tempted to accept a conclusion or argument when it 
corresponds with their beliefs than when it does not, regardless of the 
strength of the argumentation (see, e.g., Thompson, Striemer, 
Reikoff, Gunter & Campbell, 2003). A possible explanation for this 
effect is that reasoners are more likely to search for reasons to refute 
or disconfirm a conclusion they do not believe compared to a 
conclusion they find acceptable. In addition, Social Judgment Theory 
(Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif & Nebargall, 1965) predicts 
that if someone judges a message to lie within his latitude of 
rejection, attitude change will be reduced or nonexistent. In fact, the 
discrepant message may actually increase someone’s position on the 
issue (boomerang effect) (Littejohn, 2002, p. 131). As prior beliefs 
may influence the acceptance of a conclusion or argument and as 
attitude change is less likely with messages laying within the latitude 
of rejection, I preferred to use claims in the experiment that were 
neither extremely accepted nor extremely unaccepted.
Fourty participants were asked to indicate for each of 32 
claims on a seven-point scale to what degree they agreed with the 
claim (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Claims scoring on
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average between 3.00 and 5.00 were considered appropriate for the 
main experiment. Of the 32 pre-tested claims, 16 were selected.
The quality of the arguments was manipulated, resulting in a 
strong and a weak version of an argument in support of a claim. In 
the weak version, a criterion was violated, whereas in the strong 
version, that same criterion was met. The following criteria were 
selected for manipulating the argument from authority (scheme 1 and 
2):
(1) The relevant expertise criterion: the source’s expertise is relevant 
to the opinion.
(2) The trustworthiness criterion: the source should not have a vested 
interest in acceptance of the opinion.
The criteria that were selected for the manipulation of the argument 
from cause to effect (scheme 3 and 4) are:
(3) The cause relevance criterion: the cause in the argument should 
connect adequately to the cause in the claim.
(4) The effect relevance criterion: the effect in the argument should 
connect adequately to the effect in the claim.
These criteria were selected for several reasons: they have 
been formulated in argumentation theory, they are used by laymen, 
they can be considered specific to the argument from authority and 
the argument from cause to effect, and they also appeared 
appropriate for manipulation of argument quality (for further 
justification, I refer to section 6.1 in the next chapter).
Tables 5.2-5.5 contain a number of examples, showing how 
the arguments were composed according to a certain argument 
scheme and how the quality of the arguments was manipulated. All 
arguments in the examples are translated from Dutch.
Table 5.2 Example of the manipulation of the argument from authority according to 
scheme (1) and criterion (1)._________________________________________________
Scheme (1) - the argument from authority
Strong:
Meets relevant expertise criterion
Weak:
Violates relevant expertise criterion
Frans de Heer, who has been a club 
owner for over twenty years, states 
that the 'no alcohol’ rule for young 
people under sixteen has led to a 
decline in street vandalism. Therefore, 
banning the use of alcohol among 
young people under sixteen will lead 
to a reduction in vandalism.
Erben Wennemars, first-class ice skater, 
states that the 'no alcohol’ rule for young 
people under sixteen has led to a decline 
in street vandalism. Therefore, banning 
the use of alcohol for young people under 
sixteen will lead to a reduction in 
vandalism.
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Table 5.3 Example of the manipulation of the argument from authority according to 
scheme (2) and criterion (2)._________________________________________________
Scheme (2) - the argument from authority
Strong:
Meets trustworthiness criterion
Weak:
Violates trustworthiness criterion
According to Karl Nooten, sports 
physiotherapist and fitness guru, it is a 
good development that more and more 
people do two sports. Therefore, it is a 
positive trend that more and more 
people practice two sports.
According to Annemiek van Rijn, 
working at the marketing department of 
the fitness club chain Health Groups, it 
is a good development that more and 
more people do two sports. Therefore, it 
is a positive trend that more and more 
people practice two sports.
Table 5.4 Example of the manipulation of the argument from cause to effect 
according to scheme (3) and criterion (3)._______________________________
Scheme (3) - the argument from cause to effect
Strong:
Meets cause relevance criterion
Weak:
Violates cause relevance criterion
Each form of publicity improves the 
reputation of a product. Therefore, an 
ad in a school paper will lead to a 
product become more known among 
young people.
Ads in the daily paper improve the 
reputation of a product. Therefore, an 
ad in a school paper will lead to a 
product become more known among 
young people.
Table 5.5 Example of the manipulation of the argument from cause to effect 
according to scheme (4) and criterion (4)._______________________________
Scheme (4) - the argument from cause to effect
Strong:
Meets effect relevance criterion
Weak:
Violates effect relevance criterion
A developing child who has a pet 
learns to treat the animal in a social 
and careful way. When a child is able 
to treat an animal in a social and 
careful way, it will be able to apply 
these skills to contact with people as 
well. Therefore, developing children 
who have a pet will have a better 
social interaction with other people 
than developing children without a pet.
A developing child who has a pet learns 
to take responsibility for taking care of 
the pet. If a child is able to take care of 
an animal, it will also be able to take 
care of people. Therefore, developing 
children who have a pet will have a 
better social interaction with other 
people than developing children without 
a pet.
Before the main experiment, a manipulation check was carried out to 
test if the manipulation of argument quality was perceived as such. 
This pre-test was designed as a forced choice test. Each participant 
received sixteen claims and in addition to each claim, the strong as 
well as the weak version of the supporting argument. Then 
participants had to indicate for each argument pair (A and B) whether 
or not they regarded one argument stronger than the other. An
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example of such an item can be found in Table 5.6. The exemplary 
item is translated from Dutch.
Table 5.6 Exemplary manipulation check item93.
Therefore, immigration of highly educated young people to the Netherlands is 
necessary.
A B
There is an urgent need for a 
substantial immigration of highly 
educated young people from 
European and non-European countries 
to the Netherlands, says Dr. Karel van 
Lier of the Social and Cultural 
Planning Office in his report on the 
aging population problem.
There is an urgent need for a substantial 
immigration of highly educated young 
people from European and non- 
European countries to the Netherlands, 
says Dutch teacher Karel van Lier in a 
letter to the Volkskrant editor on the 
aging population problem.
Choose from the following options:
O I find A strongest in supporting the claim.
O I find B strongest in supporting the claim.
O I find A and B equally strong in supporting the claim.
Just as in the main experiment, eight claims were supported by 
arguments from authority according to scheme (1) and (2); eight 
claims were supported by arguments from cause to effect according 
to scheme (3) and (4). Four different versions of the questionnaires 
were created by varying the argument types (authority/cause to 
effect) and varying the position of the strong or weak argument 
(left/right).
25 participants took part in the forced choice test, 13 men and 
12 women. The ages varied from 21 to 63. The average age was 42.4 
(SD = 14.36). The level of education varied from primary school to 
university education. All participants were laymen in the field of 
argumentation studies.
For each claim, it was tested by means of a chi-square test 
whether the strong argument or the weak argument was preferred. 
The results show that except for one item, there was a preference for 
the strong versions of the arguments in support of the claims (x2(2)- 
values > 6.31, x2(1)-values > 11.56, p-values < .05)94. The
93 This item shows the original layout of the manipulation check items. The claim 
was presented above the alternative arguments. This layout does not 
correspond to the target items, in which the claim was presented after the 
argument.
94 One item did not show a significant effect (x2(1) = 1.00, p = .32). However, we 
can maintain that this item has been successfully manipulated, as none of the 
respondents preferred the weak version of the argument. Furthermore, the 
reason for degrees of freedom (df) varying, is that for some items, not all values 
occurred in the dataset. More specifically: three different values could occur
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manipulation of the arguments in the strong and weak versions 
appears to be successful.
5.2.2 Instrumentation
Sixteen claims and supporting arguments were presented in a 
questionnaire titled "Opinions on social issues”. The questionnaire 
started with an instruction, in which an example was given. In 
addition, it emphasized that no wrong answers could be given. The 
argument was always presented before the conclusion. For example:
In winter, light therapy causes people with stressful jobs to be less stressed.
So, if you are suffering from a small winter depression, a few treatments
with infrared light will improve your mood.
Two different kinds of questionnaires were used: one aimed at 
perceived reasonableness and the other aimed at actual 
persuasiveness. In the questionnaire about perceived 
reasonableness, the respondents were asked to indicate for each 
item on a seven-point scale to what degree they agreed with the 
statement that the argument is a good support for the conclusion in 
the last sentence (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). In the 
questionnaire about actual persuasiveness, the respondents were 
asked to indicate for each item on a seven-point scale to what degree 
they agreed with the last sentence (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree).
Each dependent variable was measured with one single scale 
instead of multiple scales. It has been argued regularly that multiple 
item-measures are better than single-item measures (for a recent 
review of arguments for and against multiple item-measures, see 
Bergkvist & Rossiter, 2007). However, it has also been argued that 
multiple items are unnecessary if the object being rated is concrete 
singular and the attribute (dimension of judgment) is concrete 
(Bergkvist & Rossiter, 2007; Rossiter, 2002). In this study there was 
only one object to be rated (namely the argument or last sentence in 
the text presented) and the assumption was that (nearly) all raters 
would describe ‘quality of support’ and ‘agreement with the last 
sentence’ identically (indicating the concreteness of the attributes).
(preference for strong; preference for weak; not any preference) and sometimes 
only two of those three values were given to an item, leading to only one degree 
of freedom.
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Therefore, it was decided that using one item for each dependent 
variable would be sufficient (cf. Van Eemeren, Garssen & Meuffels, 
2007, p. 261, defending the use of one item for the reasonableness 
concept).
At the end of each questionnaire, the respondent was asked 
to indicate age, sex and education.
5.2.3 Design
Two questionnaires were used in the experiment. Each questionnaire 
was presented to a different sample. The two questionnaires 
contained the same sixteen items, but differed with respect to the 
dependent variable. The first questionnaire focused on the perceived 
reasonableness of strong and weak arguments; the second was 
aimed at the actual persuasiveness of strong and weak arguments.
Each respondent judged either the strong or the weak version 
of the argumentation and in total judged eight strong and eight weak 
arguments. The order of the items was varied by rotating argument 
type (authority/cause to effect) and argument quality (strong/weak). 
This resulted in four different versions of a questionnaire.
5.2.4 Respondents
The two samples consisted of 100 respondents, recruited by students 
in Dutch Language and Literature among their acquaintances, friends 
and family members. Half of them filled out the perceived 
reasonableness questionnaire and the other half filled out the actual 
persuasiveness questionnaire. The questionnaires were randomly 
assigned to the respondents. The male-female ratio in both groups 
was 50:50 and 48:52, respectively. In the perceived reasonableness 
group, the age varied between 17 and 58, with an average age of 36 
(SD = 14.33). In the actual persuasiveness group, the age of the 
respondents varied between 18 and 59, with an average age of 33 
(SD = 13.18). The level of education varied from primary school to 
university education. All respondents were laymen in the field of 
argumentation studies.
5.2.5 Procedure
The respondents were asked to participate voluntarily in a study, in 
which their opinions on different social issues would be questioned. If 
they agreed, they received a questionnaire and any questions were
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answered. The actual purpose of the study was revealed after they 
had completed the questionnaire. Completing the questionnaire took 
approximately fifteen minutes.
5.3 Results
A multivariate analysis of variance with repeated measures 
(MANOVA) was used to investigate for each argument type the 
effects of argument quality (‘Quality’), argument scheme (‘Scheme’) 
and criterion used for manipulation (‘Criterion’) on perceived 
reasonableness and actual persuasiveness (‘Type of Judgment’). The 
decision was made to carry out the MANOVA’s for each argument 
type, because the variables Scheme and Criterion for the argument 
from authority differed from the variables Scheme and Criterion for 
the argument from cause to effect.
5.3.1 Argument from authority
First, the question was addressed what the relation was between the 
perceived reasonableness and the actual persuasiveness of 
normatively strong and weak arguments from authority (research 
question 1). In other words, it was determined if the difference 
between normatively strong and normatively weak arguments was 
influenced by Type of Judgment (perceived reasonableness and 
actual persuasiveness). If this were the case, then interaction would 
occur between Type of Judgment (perceived reasonableness and 
actual persuasiveness) and Quality. The results, however, show that 
this effect did not occur (F < 1). A main effect of Type of Judgment 
did not appear either (F < 1).
From the analyses of the between subjects factor Type of 
Judgment, it appears that this factor does not have any influence. As 
a consequence, one single answer will be given for research question 
1a: are normatively strong arguments from authority perceived as 
more reasonable and are they more persuasive than normatively 
weak arguments from authority? In Table 5.7, the results are 
presented for perceived reasonableness and actual persuasiveness.
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Table 5.7 Perceived reasonableness and actual persuasiveness of the argument 
from authority in function of argument quality, argument scheme and criterion (SD 
between parentheses)._________ ___________________________________________
Argument scheme and 
criterion
Perceived
Reasonableness
Actual
Persuasiveness
Strong Weak Strong Weak
Scheme
1:
Source A says that 
measure M leads 
to effect E 
Therefore: 
measure M leads 
to effect E
Relevant expertise 
criterion
4.04
(1.80)
8 
7) 
LO 
CO
4.08
(1.74)
6 
2) 
to
CO
Trustworthiness
criterion
4.56
(1.99)
3.34
(1.91)
4.58
(1.49)
6 
1) 
CO 
CO 
CO
Scheme
2:
Source A says that 
effect E is desirable 
Therefore: effect E 
is desirable
Relevant expertise 
criterion
4 
5) 
&
CO 4 
6) 
CO 
LO 
CN 
¿
.
6 
6) 
lo
2.88
(1.49)
Trustworthiness
criterion
3.84
(1.86)
3.34
(1.48)
4 
7) 
<N 
LO
4 
6) 
Lo
CO
The results showed significant main effects of Quality (F(1,98) = 
31.11, p < .001, n2 = .24), Scheme (F(1,98) = 13.55, p < .001, n2 = 
.12) and Criterion (F(1,98) = 7.79, p < .01, n2 = 07). The interaction 
between Scheme * Criterion almost reached the required level of 
significance (F(1,98) = 3.61, p = .06). The main effects were qualified 
by a significant threeway-interaction between Scheme * Criterion * 
Quality (F(1,98) = 6.44, p < .05, n2 = 06). There were no other 
interactions between the variables (F(1,98) < 1.26, p > .26. The 
results indicate that differences between normatively strong and weak 
arguments from authority are dependent on the argument scheme 
used and the criterion used for manipulation.
Analyses were performed separately for each argument 
scheme. For scheme 1, the interaction between Criterion * Quality 
reached the required level of significance (F(1,98 = 5.05, p < .05, n2 = 
.05). From a paired comparison analysis using the LSD test, no 
significant difference in judgment appeared between strong 
arguments meeting the relevant expertise criterion and weak 
arguments violating the relevant expertise criterion (p = .12). 
However, strong arguments meeting the trustworthiness criterion led 
to more positive judgments than weak arguments violating the 
trustworthiness criterion (p < .001).
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For scheme 2, the interaction between Criterion * Quality did 
not reach the required level of significance (F(1,98 = 1.94, p = .17). 
The only significant effect that was found, was that strong arguments 
led to more positive judgments than weak arguments (F(1,98) = 
21.04, p < .001, n2 = .18).
So, when defending a descriptive claim, violating the criterion 
of trustworthiness makes a difference in judgment, whereas violating 
the criterion of relevant expertise does not. When defending a 
normative claim, strong arguments are more positively judged than 
weak arguments, but that effect does not depend on the criterion that 
is used for manipulation.
5.3.2 Argument from cause to effect
First, the question was addressed as to what the relation is between 
the perceived reasonableness and the actual persuasiveness of 
normatively strong and weak arguments from cause to effect 
(research question 1). So, it was determined if the difference between 
normatively strong and normatively weak arguments was influenced 
by Type of Judgment (perceived reasonableness and actual 
persuasiveness). It goes for this argument type as well that an 
interaction should occur between Type of Judgment and Quality. The 
results show that this interaction nearly reached the conventional 
levels of significance: (F(1,98) = 3.54, p = .06. The mean scores 
suggest that the judgments on the reasonableness of arguments from 
cause to effect are more extreme than the judgments on the 
acceptability of the conclusion of the same arguments. Hence, a 
weak argument from cause to effect is found to be weaker when one 
has to judge reasonableness than when one has to judge the 
acceptability of the conclusion. However, this interpretation should be 
dealt with carefully, as the effect did not meet conventional levels of 
significance. A main effect of Type of Judgment did not occur (F < 1).
From the analyses of the between-subjects-factor Type of 
Judgment, it appears that this factor does not have a main effect. 
Therefore, one single answer will be given for the research question 
1b: are normatively strong arguments from cause to effect perceived 
as more reasonable and are they more persuasive than normatively 
weak arguments from cause to effect? In Table 5.8, the results are 
presented for perceived reasonableness and actual persuasiveness.
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Table 5.8 Perceived reasonableness and actual persuasiveness of the argument 
from cause to effect in function of argument quality, argument scheme and criterion 
(SD between parentheses).__________________________________________________
Argument scheme and 
criterion
Perceived
Reasonableness
Actual
Persuasiveness
Strong Weak Strong Weak
Scheme
3:
Measures like M 
generally lead to 
effects like E 
Therefore: 
measure M will 
lead to effect E
Cause relevance 
criterion
CM 
LOto
 ^
¿
.
O 
CIO
CM 
h­no
 ^
¿
.
4.06
(1.65)
Effect relevance 
criterion
CM 
CO
 
00 
CIO 
 ^
¿
.
CM 
h
- 
& 
<j)
3.92
(1.54)
3.58
(1.46)
Scheme
4:
Measure M leads 
to effect G 
G leads to effect 
E
Therefore: 
measure M will 
lead to effect E
Cause relevance 
criterion
O 
h
- 
00 
0
0
4.36
(1.89)
8 
2) 
°9 
™
 ^
¿
.
2 
9) 
 ^
CO
 ^
¿
.
Effect relevance 
criterion
4.30
(2.01)
3.00
(1.58)
3.98
(1.53)
4 
9) 
to
CO
The main effect of Quality is significant (F(1,98) = 26.48, p < .001, n2 
= .21), just as the main effect of Criterion (F(1,98) = 43.98, p < .001, 
n2 = .31). The main effect of Criterion is qualified by a significant 
interaction between Scheme * Criterion (F(1,98) = 7.67, p < .01, n2 = 
.07) and by a significant interaction between Scheme * Criterion * 
Type of Judgment (F(1,98) = 4.41, p < .05). The main effect of 
Scheme was not significant (F(1,98) = 1.73, p = .19). There were no 
other interactions between the variables (F(1.98) < 2.35, p > .12. 
These results show that normatively strong arguments from cause to 
effect are perceived as more reasonable and are more persuasive 
than normatively weak arguments from cause to effect.
Analyses were performed separately for each type of 
judgment. For the perceived reasonableness judgments, the 
interaction between Scheme * Criterion reached the required level of 
significance (F(1,49 = 11.40, p = .001, n2 = 19). For the actual 
persuasiveness judgments, the interaction between Scheme * 
Criterion did not reach the required level of significance (F(1,49 < 1, p 
= .63). This indicates that arguments manipulated on the basis of the 
cause relevance criterion lead to more positive judgments than
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arguments manipulated on the basis of the effect relevance criterion, 
except when it concerns perceived reasonableness judgments of 
scheme 3 -  the scheme based on a general causal relation.
5.4 Conclusion and discussion
The central research question was: what is the relation between the 
perceived reasonableness and the actual persuasiveness of 
normatively strong and weak arguments? We did not find significant 
differences between the perceived reasonableness and the actual 
persuasiveness of arguments. This result indicates that these two 
concepts are strongly related. Argumentation that is found to be more 
reasonable is generally also more persuasive in conditions in which 
central processing occurs. This is in line with Dillard et al. (2007a; 
2007b) who showed a substantial association between perceived 
persuasiveness and actual persuasiveness.
The fact that no significant difference has been found between 
perceived reasonableness and actual persuasiveness may be the 
result of the claims that were used in this study. These claims were 
not too acceptable or too unacceptable. Had we used more ‘extreme’ 
claims, claims about which people were more likely to have an 
opinion, a significant difference might have been found. After all, the 
opinions that people already hold possibly influence their claim 
acceptability scores, so that the difference between claim 
acceptability scores and perceived reasonableness scores becomes 
more salient.
It should be noted that for the argument from cause to effect, 
the difference between the perceived reasonableness and the actual 
persuasiveness of normatively strong and weak arguments almost 
reached the conventional level of significance. Possibly, the 
difference between perceived reasonableness and actual 
persuasiveness of normatively strong and weak arguments is 
asymmetrical: if a claim is supported by an argument found 
reasonable by respondents, then they will be tempted to accept this 
claim. If a claim is supported by an argument that respondents find 
unreasonable, then they can nevertheless accept the claim, because 
they themselves have strong arguments in support of that claim. This 
suggests that one can expect stronger effects of argument quality on 
reasonableness judgments than on claim acceptability judgments.
The answers to the research questions, which ask whether 
normatively strong arguments are perceived as more reasonable than 
normatively weak arguments and whether they are more persuasive,
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are affirmative. For the argument from cause to effect, it is clear that 
arguments meeting the normative criteria are seen as more 
reasonable and are more persuasive than arguments that do not 
meet these criteria. For the argument from authority, the matter is 
more complex. The results clearly show that arguments from authority 
that meet the criteria are perceived as more reasonable and are 
actually more persuasive than the arguments from authority that 
violate the criteria. This effect, however, is dependent on the scheme 
that is used and the criterion used for manipulation. If a descriptive 
claim is presented, meeting the trustworthiness criterion leads to 
more positive judgments than violating the trustworthiness criterion, 
whereas a manipulation on the basis of the relevant expertise 
criterion does not make any difference. If a normative claim is 
presented, strong arguments from authority lead to more positive 
judgments than weak arguments from authority; the effect of 
argument quality does not depend on criterion. In this study, it is 
difficult to interpret three-way-interactions between the variables, as 
each combination of variables (Scheme * Criterion * Quality) has 
been measured with only one item. Further research should 
demonstrate whether or not this interaction is too item-dependent.
It can be stated that the perceived reasonableness and actual 
persuasiveness of arguments are influenced by differences in 
argument quality. Furthermore, the argument scheme that is used 
and the criterion that is manipulated have an effect on perceived 
reasonableness and actual persuasiveness. This corresponds to the 
results of Hoeken and Hustinx (2009). They showed that people react 
differently to different kinds of evidence. Evidence can be defined as 
data (facts or opinions) presented as proof for an assertion (Reynolds 
& Reynolds, 2002). From the study reported here, it appears that we 
should not only differentiate between different types of data, but also 
that we should consider different argument schemes if we want to 
investigate the relation between argument quality and perceived 
reasonableness or actual persuasiveness.
This preliminary study was intended to investigate the relation 
between perceived reasonableness and actual persuasiveness. The 
results imply that measuring only actual persuasiveness as a 
dependent variable appears to be sufficient. After all, what is more 
persuasive is generally also perceived to be more reasonable.
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6. The actual persuasiveness of normatively 
strong and weak arguments from authority, 
arguments from cause to effect and arguments 
from example
6.1 Introduction
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model, taking the central 
route to persuasion should involve a critical evaluation of message 
content. What people do during such a critical evaluation is 
underspecified, but it has become clear that in critical evaluation of 
message content, argument quality should play a crucial role in the 
persuasiveness of the message. The ELM predicts that if people are 
highly motivated and able to process a message attentively, strong 
arguments will probably result in persuasion, whereas weak 
arguments will not. What it is exactly that makes arguments strong or 
weak, however, has been ill-defined. Instead, in previous empirical 
ELM-research, argument quality has been defined in terms of its 
observed persuasive effects rather than in an independent, 
conceptual meaningful way (e.g. Areni, 2003; Areni & Lutz, 1988; O’ 
Keefe, 1995, 2002; Hornikx, 2005a; Van Enschot-Van Dijk, Hustinx & 
Hoeken, 2003). This problematic definition of argument quality has 
led to this dissertation’s research aim to clarify what exactly makes 
arguments strong and what makes them weak. The focus is on the 
argument types that may be used to support the pragmatic 
argument’s probability claim, expressing that a certain act may lead to 
a certain consequence. The argument types concerned are the 
argument from authority, the argument from cause to effect and the 
argument from example.
The previous studies reported in this dissertation have 
revealed the quality criteria for the argument from authority, the 
argument from cause to effect and the argument from example, as 
formulated in argumentation theory and according to laymen (chapter 
2-4). According to the ELM, normatively strong arguments should be 
more persuasive than normatively weak arguments in conditions in 
which messages are processed centrally. There is a possibility, 
however, suggested by several studies (Hoeken, 2001a; O’Keefe, 
1993), that arguments that do conform to criteria for argument quality 
are not necessarily more persuasive than those arguments that do 
not conform to criteria for argument quality. Therefore, the research 
question I intend to address in this chapter, is:
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Are normatively strong arguments from authority, arguments from cause to 
effect and arguments from example actually more persuasive than 
normatively weak arguments?
The previous chapter (5) reported a study on the perceived 
reasonableness and actual persuasiveness of normatively strong and 
normatively weak arguments. The results showed that both variables 
are related - arguments that are perceived as more reasonable are 
generally more persuasive - and that they are influenced by 
differences in argument quality - normatively strong arguments are 
regarded as more reasonable and are more persuasive than 
normatively weak arguments. In the current study, only actual 
persuasiveness of the arguments will be investigated, not perceived 
reasonableness.
Although the current study is more limited with respect to the 
dependent variables, it is more elaborate than the previous one with 
respect to the independent variables. In the study reported in chapter 
5, two argument types were investigated: the argument from authority 
and the argument from cause to effect. For the argument from 
authority, two criteria were used to manipulate normative argument 
quality: the relevant expertise criterion and the trustworthiness 
criterion. For the argument from cause to effect, the cause relevance 
criterion and the effect relevance criterion were used. The 
experimental study reported in this chapter is more elaborate than the 
one reported in chapter 5: the argument from example is added to the 
experimental design and more criteria are used for manipulating the 
quality of the argument from authority and the argument from cause 
to effect. Next, I will discuss the criteria that were chosen to 
investigate the impact of meeting and violating certain criteria on 
actual persuasiveness.
Selection of normative evaluation criteria
To answer the research question above, a careful consideration 
should be made as to how to operationalize ‘normatively strong 
arguments’ and ‘normatively weak arguments’. In other words, a 
careful decision must be made on which criteria to select for 
manipulating argument quality. In this study, the starting point was a 
list of scheme-specific criteria that were mentioned by argumentation 
experts as well as by laymen. To recapulate the findings reported in 
chapter 2-4, the scheme-specific laymen criteria that are also 
mentioned in argumentation theory are the following:
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For the argument from authority:
• The relevant expertise criterion: the source’s expertise should be 
relevant to the opinion.
• The expert criterion: the source should be a genuine expert.
• The trustworthiness criterion: the source should be trustworthy.
• The external consistency criterion: the source’s statement should 
be externally consistent.
• The internal consistency criterion: the source’s statement should be 
internally consistent.
• The ability to provide evidence criterion: the source should be able 
to provide evidence.
• The recency criterion: the source’s statement should be recent.
For the argument from cause to effect:
• The cause sufficiency criterion: the cause should be enough to 
probably bring about the effect.
• The cause relevance criterion: the cause in the argument should 
connect adequately to the cause in the conclusion.
For the argument from example:
• The number of examples criterion: there should be enough 
examples cited.
• The example accuracy criterion: the example should correspond to 
reality.
• The relevance criterion: the example should connect adequately to 
the conclusion.
• The typicality criterion: the example should be typical of the kinds 
of cases the generalization ranges over.
• The counterexample criterion: there should not be a 
counterexample undermining the conclusion.
Next, it was determined which of these criteria were suitable for the 
manipulation of argument quality. In Table 6.1, it is indicated for each 
of the criteria above whether or not it could be used for manipulation 
and if not, what the reason was.
Tabel 6.1 Suitability of criteria for manipulation of argument quality.
Criteria Suitable for manipulation?
For the argument from authority:
• The relevant expertise criterion Yes.
• The expert criterion Yes.
• The trustworthiness criterion Yes.
• The external consistency criterion No. Adding other sources with 
equal/other opinions to the argument 
changes the basic argument scheme, 
in which only one source is cited.
• The internal consistency criterion No. Adding inconsistent opinions 
from the same source will create an 
unnatural and incredible text, as in
195
‘real’ argumentation, we are rarely 
confronted with a supporting 
argument containing contradictory 
statements from the same source. In 
addition, adding opinions from the 
same source will change the basic 
argument scheme, in which one 
opinion is cited and not several.
• The ability to provide evidence criterion No. Adding/removing evidence 
creates length differences at the 
same time. So, if an effect on actual 
persuasiveness would be found, an 
alternative explanation (‘one text is 
longer than the other’) may be valid.
• The recency criterion Yes.
For the argument from cause to effect:
• The cause sufficiency criterion Yes.
• The cause relevance criterion Yes.
For the argument from example:
• The number of examples criterion Yes.
• The example accuracy criterion No. By making examples more or 
less accurate, the respondent’s 
knowledge of the world is relied upon 
too much. It is dangerous to assume 
that someone knows whether a given 
example is true in real life or not.
• The relevance criterion Yes.
• The typicality criterion Yes.
• The counterexample criterion No. It is impossible to manipulate an 
argument from example on the basis 
of this aspect. Whether or not there is 
an undermining counterexample is 
fully dependent on the respondent’s 
knowledge or imagination.
After determining the suitability of each criterion for manipulation, a 
few other decisions were made. First, it was decided to add the 
following criteria to the study:
For the argument from authority:
• Opinion-to-conclusion relevance criterion: the source's opinion 
should be relevant to the conclusion.
For the argument from cause to effect:
• The effect relevance criterion: the effect in the argument should 
connect adequately to the effect in the conclusion.
For the argument from example:
• The diversity criterion: the examples should be diverse.
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I used the criterion that the source’s statement should be relevant to 
the claim at hand, as this criterion can be considered to be a specific 
interpretation of the general relevance criterion (see 2.2.2). After all, if 
the source’s presumed opinion is insufficiently connected to the 
conclusion it is supposed to support, it is less relevant to the matter at 
hand. Thus, it is relevant from a theoretical perspective to investigate 
arguments from authority that do or do not meet this criterion. 
Furthermore, the criterion appeared suitable for manipulation.
Second, the criterion that the effect should be relevant, 
associated with the argument from cause to effect, was used in this 
study. This criterion was not mentioned in theory and it was observed 
in the empirical study that the respondents never focused on the 
relevance of the effect only. However, it was explained in chapter 3 
that this criterion is reasonable from a theoretical perspective (see 
3.2.3). Furthermore, the observation that laymen do not focus on the 
effect in the argument can be explained by overly subtle 
manipulations of the effects in the closed case (see 3.4). The criterion 
also appeared to be suitable for manipulation. Therefore, in this 
study, I decided to apply the relevance criterion to the effect as well.
Third, I used the criterion that examples should be diverse, 
which is associated with the argument from example. This criterion is 
generally not mentioned in argumentation theory (except for Windes 
& Hastings, 1969), but I stated earlier that this appears to be a 
reasonable criterion (see 4.2.3). Furthermore, it became clear from 
the empirical study on laymen criteria that laymen do pay attention to 
diversity (see 4.3). The diversity criterion can also be used for 
manipulation. Therefore, this criterion was selected for the current 
study.
Finally, to optimize the balance of conditions across the 
argument types, the decision was made to leave out the recency 
criterion, pertaining to the argument from authority95. For the same 
reason, I did not use the relevance criterion, pertaining to the 
argument from example.
In sum, the following criteria were used in the current study:
For the argument from authority:
(1) The expert criterion
(2) The relevant expertise criterion
(3) The trustworthiness criterion
(4) The opinion-to-conclusion relevance criterion
95 I refer to Timmers (to appear), who did use the recency criterion in a similar 
experiment.
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For the argument from cause to effect:
(5) The cause sufficiency criterion
(6) The cause relevance criterion
(7) The effect relevance criterion
For the argument from example:
(8) The typicality criterion
(9) The number of examples criterion
(10) The diversity criterion
A remark should be made with respect to the expert criterion (1) and 
the relevant expertise criterion (2), associated with the argument from 
authority. In the previous study, the relevant expertise criterion (the 
expertise of the source should be relevant to the field the statement is 
in) appeared to be mixed with the expert criterion (someone should 
have expertise, regardless of the field the statement is in). Here is an 
example to illustrate this problem (the example was also presented in 
chapter 5):
Strong:
Meets relevant expertise criterion
Weak:
Violates relevant expertise criterion
There is an urgent need for a 
substantial immigration of highly 
educated young people from European 
and non-European countries to the 
Netherlands, says Dr. Karel van Lier of 
the Social and Cultural Planning Office 
in his report on the aging population 
problem. Therefore, immigration of 
highly educated young people to the 
Netherlands is necessary.
There is an urgent need for a 
substantial immigration of highly 
educated young people from European 
and non-European countries to the 
Netherlands, says Dutch teacher Karel 
van Lier in a letter to the Volkskrant 
editor on the aging population problem. 
Therefore, immigration of highly 
educated young people to the 
Netherlands is necessary.
If the strong argument is more persuasive than the weak argument, it 
cannot be determined what exactly caused the effect: was it the fact 
that Dr. Karel van Lier in the strong argument has a higher degree 
than the teacher Karel van Lier in the weak argument? Or is the 
difference due to the fact that in the strong version, Karel van Lier’s 
knowledge is apparently more relevant to the opinion than in the 
weak version? In other words: the property of being more credible as 
an expert source (expert criterion) was confounded by having 
relevant expertise (relevant expertise criterion). Therefore, in this 
study, I decided to disentangle these two properties of the argument 
from authority. This decision can also be justified by the fact that in 
theory and in practice, these two criteria also appear to be 
disconnected (see chapter 2).
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An experiment was conducted to answer the research 
question above. For this experiment, a number of short texts were 
constructed. In each of these texts, either an argument from authority, 
an argument from cause to effect or an argument from example was 
used. Different variants of an argument were created: strong ones, 
meeting particular criteria, and weak ones, failing to meet these 
standards. The respondents were asked to judge the degree to which 
they (dis)agreed with the claim supported by the argument. In a pre­
test, I collected agreement ratings on claims only, without any 
arguments. The purpose of this pre-test was to select relevant stimuli 
for the experiment. In the next section, the method of the study will be 
described.
6.2 Method
6.2.1 Pre-test
A pre-test was conducted to select claims that are not perceived as 
extremely acceptable or extremely unacceptable (for an explanation, 
see the previous chapter, section 5.2.1). A set of 70 claims was 
composed, including 5 claims that were expected to be perceived as 
extremely acceptable and another 5 claims that were expected to be 
perceived as extremely unacceptable. The 10 ‘extreme’ claims can be 
considered as anchor points, giving respondents the opportunity to 
give extreme scores once in a while. These 10 ‘extreme’ claims were 
included to prevent respondents exaggerating the differences 
between the 60 ‘moderate’ claims and judge them as relatively 
acceptable or unacceptable. Each of the 70 claims, listed in appendix 
6A, contained an act leading to a consequence. For instance: "Eating 
lots of vegetables leads to a healthier blood pressure”. Two versions 
of the list were created to counter possible order effects96.
Respondents received one of the two versions, and were 
requested to rate each claim on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = 
Completely disagree; 7 = Completely agree,) to what extent they
Version 1: the order in which the claims were presented corresponds to the 
order in appendix 6A. Version 2: was version 1 in reverse order. I checked 
whether there were any order effects. More specifically, I checked whether the 
effect of claim on agreement depended on version. I conducted a repeated 
measures analysis of variance, where claim was a within-subjects factor and 
version a between-subjects factor. If version had influenced the relationship 
between claim and agreement, a significant interaction effect between claim and 
version should have occurred. However, this interaction effect did not appear: F 
(69, 2622) = 1.13, p = .216.
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agreed with that claim. The pre-test was held in a public library in 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands. Fourty people participated, of which 40% 
were male, 52.5% were female and 7.5% did not indicate their sex. 
The mean age of the respondents was 45.50 (SD = 14.81) and 
ranged from 19 to 74. Their level of education ranged from primary 
education to university education, and most respondents had 
received higher vocational education (40%)97. Each respondent 
received 10 Euros for participating. The procedure took 10 to 15 
minutes.
Appendix 6A lists the 70 claims and the mean agreement 
ratings on a seven-point scale. Claims for which the mean agreement 
ratings ranged from 3.00 to 5.00 were considered suitable for the 
experiment. From a pool of 41 suitable claims, 34 claims were 
selected for the experiment.
6.2.2 Material
The material used in the experiment consisted of short texts. Each 
text consisted of a claim and a supporting argument. The claim and 
argument were always presented in the same order: first the 
argument, then the claim. For claims selected on the basis of the pre­
test results, arguments were developed in accordance with Table 6.2.
97 Three respondents did not fill out whether they were male or female, two 
respondents did not fill out their age and three respondents did not indicate their 
level of education.
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Table 6.2 Experimental design.
Argument from authority Argument from cause to effect Argument from example
Scheme (A): Scheme (B): Scheme (C) Scheme (D): Scheme (E):
A says that M leads to E 
Therefore: M leads to E
M leads to G 
G leads to E 
Therefore:
M leads to E
Measures like M 
generally lead to 
effects like E 
Therefore: M 
leads to E
In A1, M leads to 
E
Therefore:
M leads to E
In A1, M leads to E 
In A2, M leads to E 
Therefore: M leads 
to E
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(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) (XI) (XII) (XIII) (XIV) (XV)
Table 6.2 shows that the arguments varied in argument type, 
argument scheme and the criterion for argument quality that was 
violated. For the argument from authority, one argument scheme was 
used98. Four different evaluation criteria were applied to create the 
strong arguments and the weak arguments from authority. According 
to the criteria, a strong argument from authority is one in which the 
source is an expert (1) in a field relevant to the claim (2), who does 
not have a vested interest in the audience accepting this claim (3), 
and whose statement is relevant to the claim at hand (4). Apart from 
an authority who meets all these criteria, four versions were created. 
In each version, one of these criteria was violated whereas the others 
were met.
Contrary to the design of the experiment reported in chapter 5, in which two 
different argumentation schemes were used - one with a descriptive claim and 
one with a normative claim - I only used a scheme with a descriptive claim. I 
refer to Timmers (to appear) who, in a similar experiment, focuses on the 
argument from authority supporting a normative claim.
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Next, I present some examples. In the questionnaire, the texts 
were presented in Dutch. Here, the Dutch texts have been translated 
into English. I refer to appendix 6B for the Dutch source texts.
Condition (I): argument from authority; scheme (A); strong: meets criteria
(1)-(4).
Dr. Masha van Rijn, who obtained her doctorate with a thesis on new media 
and business administration and currently works for the Department of 
Trade and Industry, claims that representatives show a higher involvement 
with their companies if they can use new media. Therefore: representatives 
feel more involved with their companies if they can use new media, such as 
a laptop with an internet connection, at home or on the way.
Condition (II): argument from authority; scheme (A); weak: violates (1) the 
expert criterion.
Masha van Rijn, a student participating in the HVE [Higher Vocational 
Education] programme New Media and Business Administration at the 
INHOLLANd  University of Applied Sciences, claims that representatives 
show a higher involvement with their companies if they can use new media. 
Therefore: representatives feel more involved with their companies if they 
can use new media, such as a laptop with an internet connection, at home 
or on the way.
Condition (III): argument from authority; scheme (A); weak: violates (2) the 
relevant expertise criterion.
Dr. Masha van Rijn, who obtained her doctorate with a thesis on law and 
economics and currently works for the Department of Trade and Industry, 
claims that representatives show a higher involvement with their companies 
if they can use new media. Therefore: representatives feel more involved 
with their companies if they can use new media, such as a laptop with an 
internet connection, at home or on the way.
Condition (IV): argument from authority; scheme (A); weak: violates (3) the 
trustworthiness criterion.
Dr. Masha van Rijn, who obtained her doctorate with a thesis on new media 
and business administration and currently works for internet provider UPC, 
claims that representatives show a higher involvement with their companies 
if they can use new media. Therefore: representatives feel more involved 
with their companies if they can use new media, such as a laptop with an 
internet connection, at home or on the way.
Condition (V): argument from authority; scheme (A); weak: violates (4) the 
opinion-to-conclusion relevance criterion.
Dr. Masha van Rijn, who obtained her doctorate with a thesis on new media 
and business administration and currently works for the Department of 
Trade and Industry, claims that representatives are engaged in their
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activities somewhat more intensively, if they can use new media. Therefore: 
representatives feel more involved with their companies if they can use new 
media, such as a laptop with an internet connection, at home or on the way.
For the argument from cause to effect, two different argumentation 
schemes were used: a scheme based on two causal connections and 
a scheme based on a causal generalization. For the former scheme, 
one criterion was used to develop the strong and the weak argument. 
According to this criterion, a strong argument from cause to effect is 
one in which the occurrence of the cause should probably bring about 
the effect (5) and a weak argument from cause to effect is one in 
which this criterion is violated. For the latter scheme, two criteria were 
used99. According to these criteria, a strong argument from cause to 
effect is one in which the cause in the conclusion is a clear case of 
the kind of causes in the argument (6) and in which the effect in the 
conclusion is a clear case of the kind of effects in the argument (7). 
Apart from an argument from cause to effect that meets these two 
criteria, two versions were created. In each version, one of these two 
criteria was violated whereas the other was met.
The following examples concern the argument from cause to 
effect (see appendix 6B for the Dutch source texts):
Condition (VI): argument from cause to effect; scheme (B); strong: meets (5) 
the cause sufficiency criterion.
Playing Mozart in home furnishing shops will have a positive effect on the 
mood of consumers. This will raise the turnover. So, playing Mozart's music 
in home furnishing shops leads to a higher turnover.
Condition (VII): argument from cause to effect; scheme (B); weak: violates
(5) the cause sufficiency criterion.
Playing Mozart in home furnishing shops means consumers will stay there 
longer and listen to the music. This will raise the turnover. So, playing 
Mozart's music in home furnishing shops leads to a higher turnover.
Condition (VIII): argument from cause to effect; scheme (C); strong: meets 
criteria (6) & (7).
In the experiment reported in chapter 5, these criteria were applied on both 
argumentation schemes. In the current experiment, the criteria were only used 
for the scheme based on a causal generalization. After closer inspection of the 
material in the previous experiment, it appeared more natural to apply the criteria 
on the scheme based on a causal generalization.
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In most cases, home furnishing shops benefit financially if they play 
classical music. So, playing Mozart's music in home furnishing shops leads 
to a higher turnover.
Condition (IX): argument from cause to effect; scheme (C); weak: violates
(6) the cause relevance criterion.
In most cases, home furnishing shops benefit financially if they play popular 
music. So, playing Mozart's music in home furnishing shops leads to a 
higher turnover.
Condition (X): argument from cause to effect; scheme (C); weak: violates (7) 
the effect relevance criterion.
In most cases, home furnishing shops benefit promotionally if they play 
classical music. So, playing Mozart's music in home furnishing shops leads 
to a higher turnover.
Two argumentation schemes were used concerning the argument 
from example: one based on a single example and the other based 
on two different examples. For the former scheme, a strong argument 
from example is one in which the example in the argument is typical 
of the category in the conclusion (8). In the weak version, this 
criterion was violated. The argumentation scheme that was based on 
a single example was inherently weak, as it automatically violated the 
number of examples criterion: there should be enough examples cited
(9).
For the latter scheme, there was no absolute strong argument 
from example, because each version violated one or more criteria. 
However, two versions were stronger than a third version, as they 
only violated one criterion, whereas the third version violated two 
criteria. Therefore, I call these two versions relatively strong. A 
relatively strong argument from example is one in which both 
examples in the argument are typical of the category in the 
conclusion (8), but in which the examples are not diverse (10). 
Furthermore, a relatively strong argument from example is one in 
which the examples presented are diverse (10), but in which one of 
the examples is atypical (8). Apart from these two relatively strong 
versions, one relatively weak version was created that violated both 
criterion (8) and (10). In this version, both examples presented were 
atypical and hence not diverse. The argumentation scheme using two 
examples was inherently strong, as it automatically met the number of 
examples criterion: there should be enough examples cited (9). 
These are examples of texts containing an argument from example 
(see appendix 6B for the Dutch source texts):
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Condition (XI): argument from example; scheme (D); strong: meets (8) the 
typicality criterion; violates (9) the number o f examples criterion.
If people with a balance disorder play handball regularly, they can recover 
more quickly. Therefore, people with a balance disorder benefit from playing 
ball sports.
Condition (XII): argument from example; scheme (D); weak: violates (8) the 
typicality criterion and (9) the number o f examples criterion.
If people with a balance disorder play water polo regularly, they can recover 
more quickly. Therefore, people with a balance disorder benefit from playing 
ball sports.
Condition (XIII): argument from example; scheme (E); strong: meets (8) the 
typicality criterion and (9) the number o f examples criterion; violates (10) the 
diversity criterion.
If people with a balance disorder play handball regularly, they can recover 
more quickly. Or basketball: that also helps to develop balance. Therefore, 
people with a balance disorder benefit from playing ball sports.
Condition (XIV): argument from example; scheme (E); strong: meets (9) the 
number o f examples criterion and (10) the diversity criterion; A2 violates (8) 
the typicality criterion.
If people with a balance disorder play handball regularly, they can recover 
more quickly. Or water polo: that also helps to develop balance. Therefore, 
people with a balance disorder benefit from playing ball sports.
Condition (XV): argument from example; scheme (E); weak: A1 and A2 
violate (8) the typicality criterion and (10) the diversity criterion; meets (9) 
the number o f examples criterion.
If people with a balance disorder play water polo regularly, they can recover 
more quickly. Or ice hockey: that also helps to develop balance. Therefore, 
people with a balance disorder benefit from playing ball sports.
This resulted in a design with a total of 15 conditions. Of each 
condition, there were two different cases. In other words: each 
condition was represented by two different texts. So, a questionnaire 
contained 10 texts with an argument from authority, 10 texts with an 
argument from cause to effect and 10 texts with an argument from 
example. A questionnaire consisted of a total number of 34 texts. The 
remaining four texts contained circular arguments100. These circular
100 In this traditional fallacy, also known as begging the question, petitio principii or 
circular reasoning, “the arguer assumes that what needs to be proven (the 
question at issue) has already been shown to hold” (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst 
& Snoeck Henkemans, 1996, p. 68).
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arguments were included in the material to be able to determine 
afterwards whether or not a respondent had studied the arguments 
attentively. After all, one might expect people who focus all their 
attention on the argumentation to recognize such traditional fallacies 
and not to be extremely persuaded by them. Here is an example of a 
text with a circular argument (see appendix 6B for the Dutch source 
text):
A government that keeps a better eye on clubs for adolescents prevents the 
youth from becoming mentally and physically dependent on beer. So if 
youth clubs are better supervised by the government, this will lead to less 
beer addiction among adolescents.
6.2.3 Respondents
The respondents were approached in (the vicinity of) the public library 
in Nijmegen, the Netherlands, in line with the pre-test of this study. No 
respondent had participated in any of the other studies reported in 
this dissertation. A total of 200 people responded to the paper-and- 
pencil questionnaire. Three questionnaires were excluded from the 
analyses because the scales were interpreted incorrectly and one 
because there were doubts about the respondent’s mastery of the 
Dutch language. Furthermore, four respondents' data were rejected 
as they scored extremely high (seven on a seven-point Likert 
scale)101 on all four claims supported by circular arguments. From 
these scores, it was inferred that these four respondents had not paid 
enough attention to the arguments. Finally, the data of five 
respondents were excluded from analysis, as they appeared to 
possess special knowledge in the field of argumentation102.
101 To decide what would be an 'extremely high score', I took the data resulting from 
the pre-test as a starting point (see appendix 6A, nr. 14, 33, 35, 58). For each 
claim, I added up the value of one standard deviation to the mean agreement 
rating. Each outcome approached a value of six. So, I decided to consider a 
score of seven on the claims supported by circular arguments as an 'extremely 
high score'.
102 To measure the degree of expertise in the field of argumentation, questions were 
asked about the concepts argument types, argument schemes and argument 
evaluation/tests (also see 'Instrumentation'). On each question, respondents 
could score zero (indicating “never heard of the concept”), one (“heard of the 
concept but does not give an example”), two (“heard of the concept but gives a 
bad example”) and three (“heard of the concept and gives a good example”). 
Respondents who scored three on two out of three questions, were not 
considered laymen anymore.
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On average, the respondents were 36.67 (SD = 17.65) years 
old (range: 15 - 79)103. The percentage of male respondents was 
39%; that of female respondents 61%. Their level of education varied 
from primary education to university education, but most respondents 
had received vocational education (27.3%) and university education 
(29.9%).
6.2.4 Design
Ten versions of the questionnaire were made. A balanced Latin 
square design was used to establish the first five versions that varied 
in argument quality. For example, the first claim presented in version
1 was supported by a strong argument from authority; in version 2, 
the same claim was supported by an argument from an authority that 
was not credible as an expert source; in version 3, the same claim 
was supported by an argument from an authority that did not assert 
what was expressed in the claim; etcetera.
The next five versions were created by putting the texts in 
each of the first five versions in reverse order. For example, the first 
text in version 1 became last in version 6; the text on the second 
position became second last, etcetera. In this way, the position of the 
texts also varied across versions.
The texts with circular arguments were placed between the 
other texts. Their order of appearance was identical in the first five 
versions; in the next five versions, they appeared in reverse order.
6.2.5 Instrumentation
The questionnaire was titled “Opinions on societal issues”. 
Respondents were requested to indicate for each text on a seven- 
point Likert-scale the degree to which they (dis)agreed “with the 
conclusion in the last sentence”. It was emphasized in the written 
instruction that it were their personal opinions that were relevant and 
that their answers could not be wrong. In addition, an example was 
presented.
After the 34 texts, control items were presented about the 
texts that each respondent had judged. The control items enabled a 
check whether or not the manipulations were successful. Each 
respondent received control items, but which items a respondent
103 One respondent did not indicate his or her age.
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received depended on the target items judged in the previous part of 
the questionnaire. For (a number of) target items that respondents 
had judged in the first part, corresponding control items were 
presented in the second part of the questionnaire.
First, control items were presented allowing a manipulation 
check of a part of the arguments from authority. In the control items, 
the same arguments from authority were presented as in the target 
items, but without the supported claim. For instance:
Dr. Masha van Rijn, who obtained her doctorate with a thesis on new media 
and business administration and currently works for the Department of 
Trade and Industry, claims that representatives show a higher involvement 
with their companies if they can use new media.
Respondents had to indicate on a seven-point Likert scale the degree 
to which “the underlined source is (in)competent in the field that the 
statement is in” (1 = very incompetent in the field that the statement is 
in; 7 = very competent in the field that the statement is in) and/or “the 
underlined source is (un)biased with respect to the field that the 
statement is in” (1 = very unbiased with respect to the field that the 
statement is in; 7 = very biased with respect to the field that the 
statement is in). Indeed, the source was underlined in the control 
items to avoid confusion among the respondents about what exactly 
was meant by “the source”.
Whether or not both scales were presented depended on the 
particular text the respondents had judged in the first part of the 
questionnaire. If they had judged a text representing condition I 
(meeting all criteria), both scales were presented; if they had judged a 
text representing condition III (violating the relevant expertise 
criterion), only the first scale was presented; if they had judged a text 
representing condition IV (violating the trustworthiness criterion), only 
the second scale was presented. The texts representing condition II 
(violating the expert criterion) and V (violating the opinion-to- 
conclusion relevance criterion) were not controlled for.
The reason for not controlling these manipulations in condition
II and V was that in my opinion, the messages did or did not differ in 
source expertise (condition II) and relevance of the presumed opinion 
(condition V), independent of respondent perceptions. According to 
O'Keefe (2003), it is unnecessary to check the adequacy of the 
manipulation of such intrinsic measure properties (e.g. message 
length). After all, if the check fails, it cannot be concluded that the 
researcher must have manipulated the message property improperly.
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No matter the respondent’s perception of the property, the message 
did differ with respect to the property.
Second, control items were presented, allowing a check of the 
manipulation of arguments from cause to effect. More specifically, 
perceived probability was checked for condition VI (meeting the 
cause sufficiency criterion) and VII (violating the cause sufficiency 
criterion), in order to determine if it indeed differed significantly 
between conditions. For conditions VIII (meeting the cause relevance 
criterion and the effect relevance criterion), IX (violating the cause 
relevance criterion) and X (violating the effect relevance criterion), the 
perceived probability was also checked. However, here the objective 
was to determine if this factor could offer an alternative explanation 
for differences in persuasiveness, in case these were revealed.
In the control items, the same arguments from cause to effect 
were presented as in the target items, but without the supported 
claim. In addition, arguments representing conditions VI and VII were 
split up into two separate causal connections. For example, consider 
the following target item:
Playing Mozart in home furnishing shops means consumers will stay there 
longer and listen to the music. This will raise the turnover. So, playing 
Mozart’s music in home furnishing shops leads to a higher turnover.
In the corresponding control item, the two causal connections that 
can be identified in the target argument were separately presented:
(1) Playing Mozart in home furnishing shops means consumers will stay 
there longer and listen to the music.
(2) If consumers in home furnishing shops stay longer and listen to the 
music, the turnover will be raised.
Arguments representing conditions VIII, IX and X were presented 
again in the control items. For instance:
In most cases, home furnishing shops benefit financially if they play 
classical music.
Respondents had to rate the causal connections in terms of 
(im)probability. They were asked to indicate for each sentence 
(containing a causal connection) on a seven-point Likert scale the 
degree to which they found "the relation between the cited events 
(im)probable” (1 = very improbable; 7 = very probable).
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Third, control items were presented, allowing a check of the 
manipulation of arguments from example. The arguments from 
example were controlled for the typicality of the example. The 
respondents judged a proposition of the type ‘[member in argument] 
is a typical example of [category in claim]’. For instance, if someone 
had seen the target item
If people with a balance disorder play water polo regularly, they can recover 
more quickly. Therefore, people with a balance disorder benefit from playing 
ball sports.
the following corresponding check item was presented:
W ater polo is a typical example of the category of ball sports.
Then respondents had to indicate on a seven-point Likert scale the 
degree to which they “(dis)agreed with the proposition” (1 = 
Completely disagree; 7 = Completely agree).
To avoid confusion among respondents, the control items 
concerning a particular argument type were grouped together. In 
each version, the control items regarding the argument from authority 
were presented first, then the control items with respect to the 
argument from cause to effect and last, the items for the argument 
from example. Within groups of control items, the order in which the 
items appeared varied across versions. As a result, for example, 
version 6 contained exactly the same control items as version 1, 
grouped the same way according to argument type, but the items 
within a group were presented in reversed order.
The questionnaire ended with questions about the 
respondents' age, sex, and level of education. In addition, the 
respondents were questioned about the perceived goal of the current 
study. Last, the respondents were to answer questions that enabled 
me to check the amount of knowledge in the field of argumentation. 
Specifically, the question was asked if respondents had come into 
contact with argumentation studies104, if they had ever heard of 
argument types, if they had ever heard of argument schemes, and 
finally, if they had ever heard of ways to evaluate or test arguments. If 
respondents answered with ‘yes' in each of the last three cases, they 
were invited to give an example.
104 I acknowledge that in English as well as in Dutch ('Bent u wel eens in aanraking 
gekomen met argumentatieleer?'), the formulation is awkward. A better 
alternative would have probably been if someone had ever been occupied 
with/engaged in argumentation studies.
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6.2.6 Procedure
Respondents willing to participate were brought into a separate room 
in the public library. Eight tables and chairs were placed in the room, 
so that groups of respondents could work simultaneously. As soon as 
the respondents had taken a seat, they were asked to read the 
instructions attentively and ask for clarification if necessary. After the 
questionnaire had been filled in, the respondents were rewarded with 
10 Euros and thanked for their cooperation. The real research 
purpose was revealed, if asked for. The whole procedure took about 
25 minutes.
6.2.7 Statistical tests
The data on the argument from authority were analyzed by means of 
a 5 (condition) x 2 (case) repeated measures analysis of variance, 
where condition and case were both within-subject factors. As 
mentioned in the method section, each condition was represented by 
two different cases. It is possible that the persuasiveness differed 
between the first case and the second case judged by a respondent. 
After all, the second time the respondent was confronted with a 
certain condition, the particular manipulation may have been more 
likely to be noticed. Therefore, I involved case as a factor in the 
analysis. Given that I wanted to assess the impact of violating a 
criterion for argument quality, planned comparisons were conducted 
between the strong argument from authority on the one hand, and the 
other four conditions on the other hand (using the LSD test).
The data on the argument from cause to effect were analyzed 
for the two argument schemes separately. First I tested whether the 
strong argument using two causal steps was more persuasive than 
the weak argument using two causal steps. I used a 2 (condition) x 2 
(case) repeated measures analysis of variance, where condition and 
case were both within-subject factors. Then, I tested the difference in 
persuasiveness for the three conditions in which causal 
generalizations were used. I used a 3 (condition) x 2 (case) repeated 
measures analysis of variance, where condition and case were both 
within-subject factors. I also performed planned comparisons (LSD), 
as I wanted to compare the strong variant with each of the two weak 
variants.
The data on the argument from example were analyzed by 
means of a 2 (number) x 2 (typicality) x 2 (case) repeated measures 
analysis of variance, where number, typicality and case were all
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within-subject factors. In this particular analysis, I did not include the 
condition in which one typical and one atypical example was used. 
This condition, however, was included in a separate analysis I carried 
out for the three conditions in which two examples were used 
(scheme E), to compare the three conditions: two typical examples, 
one typical and one atypical example and two atypical examples. This 
was done by means of a 3 (condition) x 2 (case) repeated measures 
analysis of variance, where condition and case were within-subject 
factors. A planned comparison analysis (LSD) was conducted to 
compare the relatively strong versions with the relatively weak 
version.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Manipulation checks
In this section, the results of the manipulation checks will be reported.
I will indicate which manipulations were succesful.
The argument from authority
I wanted to know whether the sources used in the strong arguments 
from authority were indeed perceived by the respondents as more 
competent in the field the statement is in (‘relevant expertise') and 
less biased towards the field the statement is in (‘bias') than the 
sources in the weak arguments from authority. More specifically, I 
expected the sources in the strong condition I to be perceived as 
more competent in the field than the sources in the weak condition III.
I also expected the sources in the strong condition I to be perceived 
as less biased than the sources in the weak condition IV (see Table 
6.2).
If the material had been manipulated successfully, 
independent-samples t-tests should have shown significant 
differences in scores for the conditions concerned. I used 
independent-samples t-tests, as I wanted to compare the mean 
scores in two different conditions: the strong condition I with the weak 
condition III and the strong condition I with the weak condition IV.
It appears that the majority of the material was successfully 
manipulated. There are two exceptions: for two texts (texts 5 and 6), 
the differences in mean scores between the two conditions I and III 
were not significant. That means that the sources in these text 
conditions were perceived as equally competent in the field the
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statement is in (Appendix 6C1 shows the results of the manipulation 
checks. I refer to appendix 6B for texts 5 and 6.).
The argument from cause to effect
Regarding the argument from cause to effect, I checked the 
perceived probability of the causal connections in each argument. For 
arguments using scheme (B), there were two causal connections to 
be judged. I compared the perceived probability scores for the first 
causal connection in the strong condition VI with the weak condition
VII. I also compared the perceived probability scores for the second 
causal connection in the strong condition VI with the weak condition
VII. For example, the scores for ‘Playing Mozart in home furnishing 
shops will have a positive effect on the mood of consumers' (first 
causal connection in the strong condition) were compared with the 
scores for 'Playing Mozart in home furnishing shops means 
consumers will stay there longer and listen to the music' (first causal 
connection in the weak condition). Then, the scores for ‘If the mood of 
consumers in home furnishing shops is more positive, the turnover 
will be raised' (second causal connection in the strong condition) 
were compared with the scores for ‘If consumers in home furnishing 
shops stay longer and listen to the music, the turnover will be raised' 
(second causal connection in the weak condition). I used 
independent-samples t-tests, as I wanted to compare the mean 
scores for two different conditions.
If the material had been successfully manipulated, there 
should have been a significant difference in perceived probability 
scores between the strong and the weak condition. To ‘pass' the 
manipulation check, I required that either the first or the second 
causal connection in the strong condition VI would be perceived as 
more probable than the one in the weak condition VII, as long as the 
other causal connection would not be perceived as less probable than 
the one in the weak condition (equally probable was permitted).
Independent-samples t-tests revealed that the majority of the 
manipulations were successful (see appendix 6C2). There were two 
exceptions, in which the manipulation failed. For two texts (texts 7 
and 9), it was found that although the second causal connection in 
the strong condition VI was judged to be more probable than the one 
in the weak condition VII, the first causal condition was considered to 
be less probable (I refer to appendix 6B for texts 7 and 9).
For arguments using scheme (C), there was only one causal 
connection to be judged. After all, scheme (C) was based on a causal
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generalization. One-way analyses of variance were performed to 
compare the perceived probability scores across the three conditions
VIII, IX and X. For example, scores for the following generalizations 
were compared: ‘In most cases, home furnishing shops benefit 
financially if they play classical music' (strong condition), ‘In most 
cases, home furnishing shops benefit financially if they play popular 
music' (weak condition) and ‘In most cases, home furnishing shops 
benefit promotionally if they play classical music' (weak condition). 
Post-hoc tests (LSD) were performed to find out which of the 
conditions were statistically significant different from one another.
Condition VIII was supposed to be strong, condition IX was 
supposed to be weak because of a less relevant cause, and condition 
X was supposed to be weak because of a less relevant effect. So, the 
intended difference between the conditions concerned the relevance 
of cause or effect. If a significant difference in persuasiveness would 
have been found between the strong condition on the one hand and 
each of the weak conditions on the other, this difference should be 
due to the intended difference in relevance. However, as the 
conditions might have possibly differed in the perceived probability of 
the causal connections, the differences in persuasiveness could have 
also been due to this factor. In other words, the strong condition VIII 
could have been more persuasive than the weak condition IX and the 
weak condition X because the causal connection in the strong 
condition VIII was perceived as more probable by the respondents.
The post-hoc test results (see appendix 6C3) show that in two 
cases only, the causal connection in the strong condition VIII was 
perceived as more probable than the causal connection in a weak 
condition (p = .003 for text 2 and p = .019 for text 4; see appendix 6B 
for these texts). To be more specific, in both cases it concerned the 
weak condition X, which aimed to violate the relevant effect criterion. 
So, it can be said that just in these cases differences in perceived 
probability might offer a plausible alternative explanation for 
differences in persuasiveness between the strong condition on the 
one hand and the weak condition on the other hand. For the better 
part of the material, however, this alternative explanation appears to 
be invalid.
The argument from example
Regarding the argument from example, I checked if the examples that 
were supposed to be typical were indeed perceived as more typical of 
a category than the examples that were supposed to be atypical of a
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category. More specifically, I wanted to know whether the typical 
example A1 presented in condition XI and the typical example A2 
presented in condition XIII were indeed regarded as more typical than 
the atypical example A1 presented in condition XII and the atypical 
example A2 presented in condition XV (see Table 6.2). Thus, I was 
interested in comparisons between specific groups. Univariate 
analyses of variance with planned comparisons (LSD) were used to 
compare perceived typicality scores between these groups.
If the material had been successfully manipulated, there 
should have been differences in mean scores between each of the 
two typical examples on the one hand and each of the atypical 
examples on the other hand.
The majority of the material was successfully manipulated 
(see appendix 6C4). There were two exceptions (text number 5 and 
8): examples that were supposed to be perceived differently in terms 
of typicality were in fact perceived as equally typical (I refer to 
appendix 6B for texts 5 and 8).
In the next section (6.3.2) reporting the results of the target items, I 
will indicate (in notes) how the results turn out to be when the data 
analyses exclude scores on unsuccessfully manipulated items.
6.3.2 Target items 
The argument from authority
Table 6.3 shows the persuasiveness of the strong and weak 
arguments for the argument from authority.
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Table 6.3 Means of persuasiveness scores for the argument from authority with 
condition as independent variable (SD between parentheses; N = 186; * = differs 
significantly from condition I, p < .05).___________________________________________
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Scheme (A) Strong:
meets
criteria
(1)-(4)
Weak:
violates
expert
criterion
(1)
Weak:
violates
relevant
expertise
criterion
(2)
Weak:
violates
trustworthi
-ness
criterion
(3)
Weak:
violates
opinion-to-
conclusion
relevance
criterion
(4)
A says that 
M leads to E 
Therefore: M 
leads to E
4.43
(1.28)
4 
6) 
CO 
CM
CO 
C
D
 
CO 
C
N
4.17*
(1.32)
4 
2) 
CM 
CM
First, I tested whether there was a main effect for condition. 
From tests of within-subjects effects, no statistically significant main 
effect for condition appeared: F (4, 740) = 1.65, p = .159. The 
interaction effect between condition and case, F (4, 740) = .89, p = 
.469, was not statistically significant either. This means that when we 
compare persuasiveness scores across each of the five conditions, 
all conditions are equally persuasive.
Based on the research question, however, I was interested in 
conducting specific comparisons: between the strong argument and 
each of the weak arguments. So, I tested whether the strong 
argument from authority was more persuasive than each of the weak 
arguments from authority. A planned comparisons analysis (LSD) 
revealed a statistically significant difference between the strong 
argument from authority and the weak argument violating the 
trustworthiness criterion (p = .020). The differences between the 
strong argument from authority and each of the other weak 
arguments from authority were not significant (p > .080), although the 
difference between the strong argument from authority and the weak 
argument violating the opinion-to-conclusion relevance criterion may 
be considered as a trend towards significance (p = .080).
In conclusion: if the weak conditions were systematically 
compared to the condition meeting all criteria, the results suggest that 
the strong argument from authority is more persuasive than the 
argument from an untrustworthy authority. There is also a trend 
towards the strong argument from authority being more persuasive 
than the argument from an authority whose opinion differs from what 
is concluded. Using an authority who is not credible as an expert 
source or not an expert in the relevant field does not make any
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difference in persuasiveness, compared with using an authority who 
meets all standards105.
The argument from cause to effect
Table 6.4 shows the persuasiveness of the strong and weak 
argument for the argument from cause to effect, based on two causal 
connections (scheme (B)) or based on a causal generalization 
(scheme (C)).
Table 6.4 Means of persuasiveness scores for the argument from cause to effect with 
condition as independent variable (SD between parentheses; scheme (B): N = 187; 
scheme (C): N = 186; * = differs significantly from condition VI/VIII, p < .01).________
(VI) (VII)
Scheme (B) Strong: 
meets cause 
sufficiency 
criterion (5)
Weak: 
violates 
cause 
sufficiency 
criterion (5)
M leads to G 4.33 3.97*
G leads to E 
Therefore: M leads to E
(1.28) (1.43)
(VIII) (IX) (X)
Scheme (C) Strong: Weak: Weak:
meets criteria violates violates
(6)&(7) cause 
relevance 
criterion (6)
effect 
relevance 
criterion (7)
Measures like M generally lead 4.01 3.42* 3.65*
to effects like E 
Therefore: M leads to E
(1.23) (1.41) (1.39)
First, I tested for scheme (B) whether there was a main effect 
for condition. Tests of within-subjects effects showed a statistically 
significant main effect for condition F (1, 186) = 9.89, p = .002 (partial 
eta squared = .050). The interaction effect between condition and 
case was not statistically significant (F < 1).
105 I conducted the analysis of variance again, excluding the scores on the 
improperly manipulated items. Although this time a main effect for condition (F 
(4, 428) = 5.04, p = .001, partial eta squared = .045) and a main effect for case 
( f  (1, 107) = 4.78, p = .031, partial eta squared = .043) appeared from the 
overall test, a planned comparisons analysis (LSD) revealed similar results. 
Again, the analysis revealed a statistically significant difference between the 
strong argument from authority and the weak argument violating the 
trustworthiness criterion (p = .000). The differences between the strong 
argument from authority and each of the other weak arguments from authority 
were, again, not significant (p s .128).
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These results indicate that the strong argument from cause to 
effect using scheme (B) is more persuasive than the weak argument 
violating the cause sufficiency criterion. The influence of argument 
quality on persuasiveness did not depend on whether it was the first 
or the second representation of a condition (case). In other words, if 
people judge an argument based on two causal connections, they are 
more persuaded by a sufficient cause than by an insufficient cause106.
Second, I tested for scheme (C) whether there was a main 
effect for condition. There appeared to be one: F (2, 370) = 11.20, p = 
.000, (partial eta squared = .057). There was no significant interaction 
effect between condition and case: F (2, 370) = .43, p = .652. This 
indicates that persuasiveness differed across the three conditions
VIII, IX and X. The difference in persuasiveness, however, did not 
depend on whether it was the first or the second representation of a 
condition (case).
Before conducting the experiment, I planned to make two 
specific comparisons: between the strong argument and each of the 
two weak arguments. A planned comparisons analysis revealed a 
statistically significant difference in persuasiveness between the 
strong argument and the weak argument violating the cause 
relevance criterion (p = .000) and also between the strong argument 
and the weak argument violating the effect relevance criterion (p = 
.002).
The results suggest that if people judge an argument based 
on a causal generalization, they are more persuaded by a 
generalization with a relevant cause and a relevant effect than by a 
generalization with a less relevant cause or by a generalization with a 
less relevant effect.
The argument from example
Table 6.5 shows the persuasiveness of different conditions for the 
argument from example, using one example (scheme (D)) or using 
two examples (scheme (E)).
106 I conducted the analysis of variance again, excluding the scores on the 
improperly manipulated items. Again, tests of within-subjects effects showed a 
statistically significant main effect for condition F  (1, 69) = 22.78, p = .000 (partial 
eta squared = .248). The interaction effect between condition and case, F  (1, 69) 
= 1.42, p = .238, was not statistically significant. These results are comparable to 
the results including scores on the improperly manipulated items, only the effect 
size is larger (compare partial eta squared values .248 and .050).
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Table 6.5 Means of persuasiveness scores for the argument from example with 
condition as independent variable (SD between parentheses; N = 187).____________
(XI) (XII)
Scheme (D) Strong: 
meets typicality 
criterion (8) 
violates number of 
ex. crit. (9)
Weak: 
violates typicality 
criterion (8) 
violates number of 
ex. crit. (9)
In A1, 3.60 3.55
M leads to E 
Therefore: M 
leads to E
(1.33) (1.42)
(XIII) (XIV) (XV)
Scheme (E) Strong: Strong: Weak:
meets typicality A2 violates violates typicality
criterion (8) typicality crit. (8) criterion (8)
meets number of meets number of meets number of
ex. crit. (9) ex. crit. (9) ex. crit. (9)
violates diversity meets diversity violates diversity
criterion (10) criterion (10) criterion (10)
In A1, 3.96 3.83 3.70
M leads to E 
In A2,
M leads to E 
Therefore: M 
leads to E
(1.45) (1.33) (1.44)
First, I tested whether there was a main effect of the number 
of examples. There was a statistically significant difference between 
using one example and using two examples: F (1, 186) = 10.27, p = 
.001 (partial eta squared = .052; one-tailed). I also wanted to know 
whether there was a main effect of typicality. The difference between 
the two levels of typicality (typical - not typical) was also significant: F 
(1, 186) = 3.20, p = .038 (partial eta squared = .017; one-tailed). The 
results almost showed a significant main effect for case; the values 
nearly reached statistical significance (F (1, 186) = 3.88, p = .050, 
partial eta squared = .020). No significant interaction effects were 
identified (p > .270).
These results indicate that presenting two examples is more 
persuasive than presenting one example and that typicality is more 
persuasive than atypicality. It was also suggested that the 
persuasiveness depended on whether the respondents were 
confronted with the first or the second representation of a condition: 
the first representation was more persuasive than the second. 
However, it should be noted that the p-value concerned was exactly 
equal to .050.
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Second, I conducted an analysis for the argument from two 
examples separately (scheme (E)). I tested whether there were any 
differences in persuasiveness for the three conditions: two typical 
examples (not diverse), one typical and one atypical example 
(diverse) and two atypical examples (not diverse). No main effect of 
condition was found: F (2, 372) = 1.92, p = .147. A main effect of case 
or an interaction effect between condition and case were not found 
either.
I conducted follow-up tests (planned comparisons) to look at 
the results for each of the sublevels separately. After all, I wanted to 
know whether the typical -  typical (not diverse) variant and the typical 
-  atypical (diverse) variant were superior to the atypical -  atypical 
(not diverse) variant. The argument containing two typical examples 
(not diverse) did not significantly differ from the argument containing 
one typical and one atypical example (diverse) (p = .359) and was 
nearly significantly different from the argument with two atypical 
examples (not diverse) (p = .050). It also appeared that the typical -  
atypical variant (diverse) and the variant with two atypical examples 
(not diverse) were equally persuasive (p = .299).
Again, I conducted an analysis for the argument from two 
examples separately (scheme (E)), excluding the scores on the 
improperly manipulated items. I tested whether there were any 
differences in persuasiveness for the three conditions: two typical 
examples (not diverse), one typical example and one atypical 
example (diverse), and two atypical examples (not diverse). This 
time, a main effect of condition appeared: F (2, 76) = 3.21, p = .046 
(partial eta squared = .078). I also conducted follow-up tests (planned 
comparisons) to look at the results for each of the sublevels 
separately. Again, the argument from two typical examples (not 
diverse) did not significantly differ from the argument from one typical 
and one atypical example (diverse) (p = .640) and the difference with 
the argument containing two atypical examples (not diverse) revealed 
a trend towards significance (p = .077). This time, however, the 
results showed that the variant with one typical and one atypical 
example (diverse) was more persuasive than the variant with two 
atypical examples (not diverse) (p = .016). So, if we disregard the 
scores on the inadequately manipulated material, it appears more 
persuasive to use one typical example and one atypical example, by 
which diversity is established, than to use two atypical examples, by 
which the diversity criterion is violated. If the scores on the 
inadequate material are taken into consideration, this significant 
difference between conditions disappears.
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In sum: if we consider the results for scheme (E) separately 
and disregard the scores on the inadequately manipulated material, it 
is suggested that using two typical examples, which violates the 
diversity criterion, appears more persuasive than using two atypical 
examples, which also violates the diversity criterion, although it 
should be kept in mind that only a trend towards significance was 
revealed. Compared to the use of two atypical examples, which 
violates the diversity criterion, presenting one typical and one atypical 
example, by which diversity is established, is more persuasive.
6.4 Conclusion and discussion 
Conclusion
This study addressed the research question for the argument from 
authority, the argument from cause to effect and the argument from 
example whether or not normatively strong arguments are more 
persuasive than normatively weak arguments.
First, the argument from authority. The normatively strong 
argument from authority was more persuasive than the argument 
from an untrustworthy authority. Compared to the normatively strong 
argument, using an authority who is less credible as an expert source 
did not make any difference in persuasiveness. Using an authority 
who is an expert in the wrong field did not make a difference either. 
The difference between the strong argument from authority and the 
argument from an authority whose opinion differs from what is 
concluded, almost reached the conventional significance level.
Second, the argument from cause to effect: the normatively 
strong argument was consistently more persuasive than the 
normatively weak argument. If people evaluated argumentation based 
on two causal connections, they were more persuaded by a sufficient 
cause than by an insufficient cause. If they evaluated argumentation 
based on a causal generalization, they were more convinced by a 
relevant cause and effect than by a less relevant cause or a less 
relevant effect.
Last, the argument from example. Overall, two examples were 
more persuasive than one and typical examples were more 
persuasive than atypical examples. Furthermore, looking at the data 
for the argument containing two examples specifically and 
disregarding the scores on inadequately manipulated material, the 
difference between two typical examples and two atypical examples 
(in either case violating the diversity criterion) approached the
221
conventional level of significance. In addition, using one typical 
example and one atypical example, by which diversity is established, 
is more persuasive than an argument containing two atypical 
examples, by which the diversity criterion is violated.
Discussion
Normatively strong arguments are not necessarily more persuasive 
than normatively weak arguments. It depends on the particular 
argument type that is used and the criteron that is violated in the 
normatively weak argument. Summarized:
• Violating the trustworthiness criterion had a negative impact 
on the actual persuasiveness of the argument from authority. 
Violating the expert criterion or the relevant expertise criterion 
did not. Violating the opinion-to-conclusion relevance criterion 
appeared to have a negative impact on the actual 
persuasiveness; a trend toward significance was revealed.
• Violating the cause suffiency criterion, the cause relevance 
criterion or the effect relevance criterion had a negative impact 
on the actual persuasiveness of the argument from cause to 
effect.
• Violating the number of examples criterion and the typicality 
criterion had a negative impact on the actual persuasiveness 
of the argument from example. Violating the diversity criterion 
had a negative impact on the actual persuasiveness of the 
argument from example, only if both homogeneous examples 
presented were also atypical.
In this study, the arguments from authority that violated the expert 
criterion and the relevant expertise criterion were just as persuasive 
as the strong argument from authority. This outcome does not 
correspond with earlier findings that for Dutch participants, strong 
expert evidence is more persuasive than weak expert evidence - 
created by changing the relevant field of expertise into a less relevant 
field of expertise (Hornikx, 2005a; Hornikx & Hoeken, 2007). The 
results also contradict the conclusion of Kruglanski, Raviv, Bar-Tal, 
Raviv, Sharvit, Ellis et al. (2005) that in social judgment, "the 
hierarchy of epistemic authorities matters” (p. 369). The preliminary 
study reported in chapter 5 revealed that respondents were sensitive 
to differences in relevant expertise, but only when a normative claim 
was defended. When a descriptive claim was defended, the results
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were similar to those of the current study: violating the trustworthiness 
criterion made a difference in judgment, whereas violating the 
relevant expertise criterion did not.
A possible explanation for the difference between the current 
study’s results and those of Hornikx (2005a) is formed by the 
characteristics of the respondents. In Hornikx (2005a), the 
respondents were university students. In the current study, the 
respondents varied more in age and level of education. So, it is 
possible that university students, who are confronted regularly with 
the hierarchy of epistemic authorities during their study, are more 
sensitive to differences in expertise and field relevance. However, it 
can be argued that this is not a sufficient explanation, as in the 
preliminary study reported in chapter 5, the respondents were not 
university students either, but still showed sensitivity to differences in 
relevance of expertise. However, on that study it can be commented 
that the manipulations were less subtle than the ones in the current 
study, because both expertise and field relevance were manipulated 
at the same time. This combination may have been more obvious 
than the more subtle manipulations in the current experiment. In the 
current study, it appears from the manipulations checks that in 
general, respondents noticed the intended differences in argument 
quality. Still, it is possible that they only became aware of these 
manipulations when answering the manipulation check items.
The preliminary experiment showed that the nature of the 
claim supported by the argument from authority might play a role in 
the relationship between argument quality and respondents’ 
judgments. More specifically, when a descriptive claim was 
presented, the untrustworthiness of the source had a negative effect 
on judgments, whereas the irrelevance of expertise did not influence 
judgments. When a normative claim was presented, there was no 
such interaction between criterion and argument quality. In this 
experiment, a similar pattern was found: it does matter if the source of 
the descriptive assertion is untrustworthy, but it does not matter if the 
descriptive expression comes from someone with lower expert 
credibility or less relevant expertise. For future research on the effect 
of message source properties on persuasion, I suggest that the 
nature of the claim (descriptive versus normative) should be studied 
more carefully. To my knowledge, such effect studies have not yet 
been attempted (I refer to Pornpitakpan, 2004, for a review of the 
researched variables interacting with source credibility). It can also be 
argued that claim type should be considered in empirical research, 
based on the distinction that is made in theory between different
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types of authorities and the kinds of opinions these are associated 
with (see also chapter 2).
An alternative explanation for the results is the lack of prior 
beliefs. I intentionally selected claims for the main test that were not 
extremely acceptable or unacceptable, to prevent prior beliefs effects. 
This might have caused a certain modesty among the respondents 
who were confronted with sources low in expert credibility or 
relevance of expertise. The following thoughts might have entered 
their minds: ‘This source is clearly not a real expert/an expert with 
relevant expertise, but who am I -  somebody without any relevant 
knowledge concerning this matter - to reject the source’s opinion? At 
least this source has been thinking about the issue’). Relying on an 
untrustworthy authority or less relevant opinions, however, might 
have been a bridge too far, even for those without any prior beliefs.
Violating the numbers of examples criterion, the typicality 
criterion and the diversity criterion in the argument from example 
appeared to have a negative impact on actual persuasiveness. This is 
in line with findings in psychological empirical research. According to 
Heit (2000), reviewing psychological studies on inductive reasoning 
over 25 years, the main findings are that number of cases and 
diversity of cases promote induction if people make inferences from 
multiple cases, although the results are particularly variable for 
diversity effects (p. 579). If people make inferences from single 
cases, the typicality of the premise category promotes induction. 
Sloman and Lagnado (2005) characterize the psychological 
phenomena of typicality and diversity as follows:
Typicality: "The more typical premise categories are of the
conclusion category, the stronger is the argument. For 
example, people are more willing to project a predicate 
from robins to birds than from penguins to birds because 
robins are more typical birds than penguins” (pp. 102­
103).
Diversity: "The less similar premises are to each other, the stronger
the argument tends to be. People are more willing to draw 
the conclusion that all mammals love onions from the fact 
that hippos and hamsters love onions than from the fact 
that hippos and rhinos do because hippos and rhinos are 
more similar than hippos and hamsters” (p. 103).
More recently, Rhodes, Brickman and Gelman (2008) investigated 
how people evaluate whether limited samples of evidence provide a 
good basis for induction. They found that young children valued item 
typicality, whereas older children and adults valued overall sample
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diversity. So, according to previous psychological studies, there is a 
significant amount of evidence that people are guided by number, 
typicality and diversity in inductive reasoning, something that also 
appears from the results of this study.
In this experiment, I used criteria from both scholars and 
laymen in the field of argumentation to create differences in argument 
quality and I investigated the impact of meeting or violating criteria on 
actual persuasiveness. The results suggest that the normatively 
strong arguments are not necessarily more persuasive than the 
normatively weak arguments. It depends on the particular criterion 
that is violated in the normatively weak argument.
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7. General conclusion and discussion
In this chapter, I will first review the results of the studies presented in 
this dissertation and answer the research questions that were raised 
in the introduction (chapter 1). I will discuss the results (7.2) and 
suggest further research (7.3).
7.1 Conclusion
The aim of this dissertation was to provide insight into the specific 
characteristics that determine the quality of the argument from 
authority, the argument from cause to effect and the argument from 
example in support of a probability claim. This was necessary, 
because the concept of argument quality in the Elaboration Likelihood 
Model (ELM) had been insufficiently specified.
I focused on the argument from authority, the argument from 
cause to effect and the argument from example, because these three 
types of argument can be used to support the pragmatic argument: a 
type of argument that is often used in ordinary argumentative practice 
as well as in persuasion research.
A combination of a normative and a descriptive approach to 
argumentation was considered a valuable framework for studying 
argument quality. In normative argumentation studies, criteria have 
been formulated for the assessment of argument quality. These 
criteria may be of a more general nature, but they may also be 
attuned to the specific characteristics of certain types of argument. 
Descriptive, more empirically based argumentation studies 
investigate to what extent norms that are formulated on a more 
theoretical-analytical basis are part of laymen’s argumentative 
competence. The role these norms play in the persuasion process is 
also examined.
Part I of this dissertation investigated to what extent laymen 
criteria for evaluating the argument from authority, the argument from 
cause to effect and the argument from example correspond to criteria 
formulated in argumentation theory for these argument types. The 
ELM suggests that people who engage in central processing make a 
critical evaluation of message arguments. That implicates that they 
use evaluation criteria to distinguish stronger from weaker arguments. 
However, it is unclear what these criteria are and how these relate to 
criteria that have been suggested in normative argumentation theory. 
Therefore, in part I, I addressed the following questions:
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Research question 1: To what extent do laymen criteria for the 
argument from authority, the argument from 
cause to effect and the argument from example 
correspond to those formulated in argumentation 
theory?
Research question 1a: What criteria have been formulated in 
argumentation theory to evaluate the quality of 
the argument from authority, the argument from 
cause to effect and the argument from example?
Research question 1b: What criteria do laymen use to evaluate the 
quality of the argument from authority, the 
argument from cause to effect and the argument 
from example?
Research question 1a was addressed by means of a literature study. 
From a selection of publications in the field of argumentation, I made 
an inventory and a classification of criteria formulated for the 
evaluation of the three types of argument. Research question 1b was 
addressed by conducting individual interviews and focus groups with 
laymen. In these settings, laymen were stimulated by cases to reflect 
upon the criteria they use to assess argument quality.
The answer to research question 1 is: laymen use scheme- 
specific criteria and these scheme-specific criteria are generally 
similar to those identified within normative, argumentation-theoretical 
literature. However, it appears that respondents do not agree on all 
criteria to the same extent. Some criteria were mentioned by the 
majority of the respondents (i.e. agreement is relatively high for some 
criteria), whereas other criteria were only mentioned by a few of them 
(i.e. agreement is relatively low for other criteria). For the argument 
from authority, there is relatively high agreement on the relevant 
expertise criterion, the expert criterion, the trustworthiness criterion, 
the ability to provide evidence criterion, the recency criterion and the 
hedged statement criterion. The first five criteria correspond to the 
criteria identified in argumentation theory, whereas the last mentioned 
criterion does not. For the argument from cause to effect, there is 
relatively high agreement on the cause sufficiency criterion, which 
has also been identified as an important criterion in argumentation 
theory. For the argument from example, considerable agreement 
exists on the relevance criterion, the number of examples criterion, 
the example accuracy criterion and the causality criterion. The first 
three criteria correspond to criteria formulated in argumentation 
theory; the last mentioned criterion does not. About the criteria for
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which considerable agreement exists, it appears likely that they are 
part of the laymen’s toolkits in assessing argument quality.
Some evaluation criteria that have been suggested in 
argumentation theory are not used by laymen, but this can in most 
cases be explained by the material that did not give respondents any 
reason to use these criteria. In case irrelevant criteria were used by 
respondents, i.e. criteria that were in fact related to a different 
argument scheme than the one under consideration, this was often 
understandable on the basis of the fact that the context created in the 
material was pragmatic in nature.
According to the ELM, normatively strong arguments should be more 
persuasive than normatively weak arguments in conditions in which 
messages are processed centrally. However, empirical research 
indicates this is not necessarily the case (see, e.g., Hoeken, 2001a). 
Therefore, the following research question was addressed in part II of 
this dissertation:
Research question 2: Are normatively strong arguments from authority,
arguments from cause to effect and arguments 
from example actually more persuasive than 
normatively weak arguments?
Before this research question was addressed, a pilot experiment was 
carried out to investigate the relation between the perceived 
reasonableness and the actual persuasiveness of normatively strong 
and weak arguments. In this study, one group of respondents judged 
to what extent they considered an argument good support for the 
conclusion (indicating perceived reasonableness), whereas another 
group of respondents indicated to what extent they agreed with the 
conclusion (indicating actual persuasiveness). The argument types 
concerned were arguments from authority and arguments from cause 
to effect, varying in argument strength as they did or did not meet 
certain normative evaluation criteria. The pattern of results was 
similar for perceived reasonableness and actual persuasiveness. 
Therefore, in the next experiment, addressing research question 2, 
the decision was made to measure one dependent variable only: the 
actual persuasiveness.
This experiment, much like the pilot study, measured to what 
extent respondents agreed with the conclusion (indicating actual 
persuasiveness). The argument types concerned were the argument 
from authority, the argument from cause to effect and the argument 
from example. For each argument type, a specific set of criteria was
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selected to manipulate argument strength. Generally, a strong 
argument was one meeting certain normative evaluation criteria. 
Apart from this strong argument, weak versions were created that 
violated (at least) one criterion and met (all) other criteria.
The answer to research question 2 is: normatively strong 
arguments from cause to effect and arguments from example are 
indeed more persuasive than the normatively weak variants, but 
normatively strong arguments from authority are not always more 
persuasive than the normatively weak variants. More specifically: for 
the argument from cause to effect, the violation of all selected criteria 
mattered: violating the cause suffiency criterion, the cause relevance 
criterion or the effect relevance criterion had a negative impact on 
actual persuasiveness. For the argument from example as well, the 
violation of all selected criteria appeared to make a difference in 
persuasiveness: violating the typicality criterion, the number of 
examples criterion or the diversity criterion had a negative impact on 
actual persuasiveness, although violating the last mentioned criterion 
only mattered if both homogeneous examples were also atypical. For 
the argument from authority, the violation of two of four selected 
criteria appeared to have a negative impact on actual 
persuasiveness: the trustworthiness criterion and the opinion-to- 
conclusion relevance criterion (for the former criterion, there was a 
significant effect, but for the latter criterion only a trend toward 
significance was revealed). Violating the expert criterion or the 
relevant expertise criterion did not make any difference in 
persuasiveness. These results indicate that laymen use scheme- 
specific criteria in conditions in which they process arguments 
centrally. They are less persuaded by arguments from cause to effect 
and arguments from example that violate these criteria. Arguments 
from authority that violate some of these criteria, however, can still 
persuade them.
The results of the main experiment generally correspond to 
the results of the pilot experiment, except that respondents in the pilot 
study were sensitive to differences in relevant expertise in the 
argument from authority. This difference, however, can be explained 
by the fact that in the pilot study, the manipulations of expertise 
included both the level of education as the relevance of the expertise, 
whereas in the main experiment, expertise was only manipulated 
through violating the relevant expertise criterion.
All in all, it may be concluded that the ELM’s prediction about 
normatively strong arguments being more persuasive than 
normatively weak arguments during central processing, can not be
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fully confirmed by the results of this study. Indeed, normatively strong 
arguments from cause to effect and arguments from example are 
actually more persuasive than the normatively weak variants. 
However, about the argument from authority, it can be said that what 
should be strong according to argumentation theory and to laymen, is 
not necessarily more persuasive.
7.2 Discussion
In this section, I will present explanations for the findings in this 
dissertation (7.2.1) and discuss the implications of the results for 
persuasion research and argumentation studies (7.2.2).
7.2.1 Explanations
Although laymen use certain evaluation criteria for the evaluation of 
the argument from authority, they may still be persuaded by 
arguments from authority that violate these evaluation criteria. In this 
study, there appears to be a discrepancy between the specific norms 
for the argument from authority that laymen are aware of and what 
they are actually persuaded by. This observation is not in accordance 
with the ELM’s hypothesis that normatively strong arguments lead to 
greater persuasion than normatively weak arguments.
The first explanation is that the task that respondents 
performed to have their evaluation criteria uncovered, differed from 
the task respondents performed in the experimental study. To 
uncover laymen criteria, respondents were presented with cases. 
They were asked to compare arguments, rank arguments and explain 
why they considered certain arguments stronger than others. This 
type of task might have caused the respondents to pay much 
attention to the quality of the argument. In other words: respondents 
probably elaborated highly upon argument quality. In the 
experimental study, on the other hand, respondents judged the extent 
to which they agreed with the conclusion at hand; they were not 
asked to compare arguments with respect to quality. Although it is 
likely that much attention was paid to this task as well, it was up to the 
respondent to focus on the quality of the argument, the acceptability 
of the claim, or on both. This may have decreased the chance that 
respondents indeed elaborated upon argument quality. It is possible 
that in the experimental situation, in which the respondent’s attention 
was not necessarily drawn towards the quality of the argument, 
certain manipulations became too subtle, even though the evaluation
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criteria concerned appeared from the studies in which the case-task 
was used.
It is also possible that some weaknesses in arguments are 
harder to identify than other weaknesses, so that more effort is 
required in spotting the weaknesses that are hard to identify. This 
might explain why laymen in this study could still be persuaded by 
arguments from authority violating the expert criterion and the 
relevant expertise criterion; it may have been more difficult for 
respondents to see that a source had lower expert credibility or that 
the expertise was less relevant, than to notice untrustworthiness or a 
less relevant opinion (the degree of elaboration being equally high).
An alternative explanation is that although laymen are aware 
of criteria they should use in their evaluations of arguments, they find 
some criteria more important than other criteria. For example: it is 
possible that people are aware that sources need to have relevant 
expertise and should be trustworthy, but that they only apply the 
trustworthiness norm, as they regard this norm as relatively more 
important than the other criterion they know. An analogy can be 
drawn with someone evaluating a letter and only focussing on typing 
errors and not on other aspects, like text structure, or grammatical 
errors, although he or she knows that these are also aspects to pay 
attention to.
Finally, it is possible that it can be difficult for people to test a 
certain argument against all critical tests that are stored in memory. 
Evaluating the quality of an argument may be very a demanding task: 
one needs to read the text, to understand what is written, to form a 
representation in the mind, to identify the type of argument, to recall 
his or her own beliefs, to retrieve the relevant evaluation criteria from 
memory and to use them. In that demanding situation, cognitive 
resources are perhaps too limited to recall and use all critical 
questions. In addition, if the particular task is to judge the 
acceptability of the claim, as in the experimental study, people might 
be less tempted to use their cognitive resources for all these subtasks 
and might prefer focussing on claim acceptability.
7.2.2 Implications for argumentation studies and persuasion 
research
In argumentation studies, research has been done on whether 
discussion moves that are considered fallacies in (pragma-dialectical) 
theory, are considered unreasonable by laymen in the field of 
argumentation (Van Eemeren et al., 2007). However, more insight
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was needed into the conventional validity of normative-theoretical 
criteria pertaining to specific argument schemes. The results of the 
current study indicate that normative-theoretical criteria and laymen 
criteria correspond to a considerable extent, although laymen do not 
report on all criteria to the same extent. Hence, it appears as if, 
similar to fallacies, the criteria that should be used to assess 
argument quality are part of laymen’s argumentative competence.
However, if we take the actual persuasiveness of normatively 
strong and weak arguments into consideration, the conventional 
validity of evaluation criteria appears limited. In a situation in which 
laymen compare arguments, they mention criteria that also occur in 
literature. However, in an experimental situation, they are persuaded 
by arguments that do not meet these criteria. Therefore, the 
conventional validity of evaluation criteria can, in a generalizing 
sense, only for a part apply to the setting in which people judge the 
acceptability of the claim supported by arguments that do or do not 
meet these criteria.
Second, the concept of central processing in the ELM can now 
be further specified. The studies reported here indicate that if people 
carefully examine arguments from authority, arguments from cause to 
effect and arguments from example, they are able to apply evaluation 
criteria related to these types of argument. Schellens and De Jong 
(2004) claimed, on the basis of the patterns of argumentation found in 
persuasive brochures, that readers who process these texts centrally 
will have to be able to ask and answer relevant evaluation questions 
related to certain types of argument, among which the argument from 
cause to effect, the argument from example and the argument from 
authority. The results of this study show that people who are engaged 
in central processing are indeed able to do so.
Third, there has repeatedly been a call for a conceptually 
meaningful definition of argument quality and better insight into the 
specific characteristics that determine argument strength (see, e.g., 
Areni, 2003; O’Keefe, 1995, 2002, 2008; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a). 
The studies reported here show that it will be a difficult mission to 
develop one meaningful definition of argument quality. After all, 
argument quality depends on what type of argument is used, and by 
defining the specific characteristics that determine argument strength, 
one has to take into consideration that what is strong in theory, is not 
necessarily considered strong by laymen. In addition, the 
characteristics that laymen claim make up a strong argument do not 
necessarily correspond to characteristics that persuade them. In 
testing ELM-predictions concerning the relationship between
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argument quality and persuasive effects, it is important that one 
selects a type of argument for which the evaluation criteria of lay 
people are known and to manipulate precisely these criteria. Under 
conditions of central processing, the ELM would predict that people 
apply these criteria, and on the basis of the outcome of the evaluation 
process decide upon the strength of the argument. The cognitive 
responses generated by centrally processing participants should 
reveal the employment of these criteria.
Fourth, the introduction stated that differences in argument 
quality also play an important methodological role in persuasion 
research, as they can be used to assess whether respondents have 
been scrutinizing the message or not. Only participants who pay 
close attention to the arguments will notice the difference between 
messages containing strong arguments and those containing weak 
arguments. If differences in argument quality are used as a 
methodological tool, it is important to create differences that are likely 
to be noticed by participants. Therefore, it is relevant that differences 
in argument quality are not only based on theoretical considerations, 
but also on knowledge of what laymen believe is normatively strong 
and normatively weak. As the results of this study provide that kind of 
knowledge, they can be regarded as a contribution to methodology in 
persuasion research.
Scholars with a normative approach to argumentation studies 
should also reconsider their typologies of argument schemes with 
respect to the argument from example, for which it appears wise to 
distinguish between subtypes that ask for different evaluation 
questions: the example to a descriptive generalization and the 
example to a causal generalization. In addition, some evaluation 
criteria may need some refinement, such as the strictly formulated 
sufficiency criterion for the argument from cause to effect, or the 
loosely defined criterion referring to typicality/representativeness 
(pertaining to the argument from example).
7.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research
Part I
Reliability
An assessment was made on the extent to which raters agreed on 
the criteria that should be attached to certain phrases within a 
fragment (see chapter 2, 3 and 4). However, the question remains to
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what extent agreement would have existed on other steps in the data- 
analysis, such as dividing transcripts into fragments, deciding whether 
or not a respondent uses a certain evaluation criterion, and the 
grouping of criteria on the basis of a shared characteristic.
The sample size used in the reliability tests may pose an 
additional problem. According to Neuendorf (2002), there is no set 
standard for the number of units that should be used in a reliability 
assessment, but in general, the reliability sample should probably 
never be smaller than 50 and should rarely need to be larger than 
about 300 (p. 159). However, only in the study on the argument from 
authority (chapter 2), the sample size exceeded 50 (n =79). In the 
studies on the argument from cause to effect and the argument from 
example, sample sizes were 12 and 15, respectively.
In determining reliability, I relied on Peat and Barton’s (2005) 
guidelines. According to Neuendorf (2002), however, it is open to 
debate what should be an acceptable level of intercoder reliability. 
From a review of the work on reliability, she concludes "that reliability 
coefficients of .90 or greater would be acceptable to all, .80 or greater 
would be acceptable in most situations, and below that, there exists 
great disagreement. In general, the beyond-chance statistics, such as 
Scott’s pi and Cohen’s kappa, are afforded a more liberal criterion” (p. 
143). Relying on this conclusion, the value of .804 found in the study 
on the argument from authority would (in general) be acceptable, but 
the acceptability of values found in the other studies (.636 for the 
argument from cause to effect; .634 for the argument from example), 
would probably be cause for discussion.
Validity
First, comments can be made on the cases that were used to uncover 
laymen criteria. The open cases used in the study on the argument 
from authority (chapter 2) appeared to be more successful in 
uncovering laymen criteria than the open cases used in the studies 
on the argument from cause to effect (chapter 3) and the argument 
from example (chapter 4). In the studies on the argument from cause 
to effect and the argument from example, a considerable amount of 
respondents presented argument types and evaluation criteria that 
were not intended. Possibly, the task of inviting one suitable guest 
and one unsuitable guest for a television programme is easier to 
accomplish than the task of finding a strong and a weak argument 
from cause to effect/argument from example, especially if it concerns
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arguments in support of a claim predicting that a certain consequence 
will occur as a result of a certain measure.
In addition, respondents that did not come up with the desired 
argument types were not corrected by the interviewer. For instance, if 
a respondent presented a pragmatic argument instead of an 
argument from example, the respondent was not told that he or she 
should have come up with an argument from example instead of a 
pragmatic argument. Had the interviewer corrected respondents, the 
open cases might have been more useful. On the other hand, 
correcting respondents would have increased the risk of interviewer 
bias: the interviewer is searching for an answer that supports a 
preconceived idea. In this case, the preconceived idea would be that 
a certain argument scheme plays a role in the respondent’s mind, 
whereas in fact that idea may be wrong. It is possible, for instance, 
that it would never come to mind to use an argument from example to 
support a causal generalization. So if an interviewer were to tell a 
respondent to use an argument from example to support a causal 
generalization instead of a pragmatic argument, this could cause a 
response effect. In future research, interview techniques should be 
found that enable the researcher to determine whether or not a 
respondent has knowledge of a certain argument type.
It should also be emphasized that the evaluation criteria used 
by the laymen in this study are rarely formulated on the same abstract 
level as the argumentation-theoretical criteria. Rather, respondents 
expressed themselves in concrete terms, induced by the material 
they were to judge. This observation is in line with Van Eemeren et al. 
(2007) who found that lay people generally do not refer to abstract- 
general discussion rules but rather indicated in concrete terms why 
they found a certain discussion move reasonable or unreasonable.
One may also raise the following objection to using cases: the 
cases are not used to uncover laymen criteria, but to create laymen 
criteria. The norms might as well be created during the interviews, in 
which laymen, possibly for the first time in their lives, were explicitly 
confronted with differences in argument quality. So, how do we know 
that laymen already used these norms when they stepped into the 
door to the research setting? My answer is: we do not know for sure. 
It is possible that some respondents, by doing the tasks they were 
requested to do, creating a strong and a weak argument in the open 
case and by ranking arguments in the closed case, developed their 
norms during the tasks. This suggestion applies especially to those 
criteria that were mentioned by a relatively small number of
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respondents; the suggestion is less plausible for those criteria that 
were mentioned by a relatively high number of respondents.
Part II
In the experiments in chapter 5 and 6, no control condition was used. 
A control condition would be a condition in which only claims are 
presented to respondents, without any supporting arguments. One 
function of such a control condition would be to check whether adding 
arguments would be more persuasive than no arguments at all, in 
case the strong and the weak condition would not have shown any 
significant difference. Another function would be to see - in case the 
strong and the weak condition would differ significantly - whether the 
strong and the weak condition would lead to significantly higher claim 
acceptance scores compared with the control condition. The reason 
for not including control conditions in the designs, was that in the 
within-subjects designs as used in the experiments, respondents 
would have probably noticed the difference between the items with 
and the items without any supporting arguments and as a result, 
inferred the aim of research (or at least the intended difference 
between the control condition and the other conditions).
Part II argued that it is important to select claims for the 
experiments that are neither extremely acceptable nor extremely 
unacceptable, as what respondents already strongly believe or reject 
might influence the results. However, the problem of selecting neutral 
claims is that it decreases the chance that respondents become 
involved with the topic of the message. This might be particularly 
problematic in cases where an argument from authority is used, as 
the source might be believed for the (only) reason that the source is 
more involved with the topic than the receiver. Furthermore, as 
according to the ELM topic involvement is expected to increase the 
chance that arguments are examined attentively, the selection of 
neutral, ‘unloaded’ claims might have prevented some respondents 
from identifying weaknesses in arguments that require deep thinking. 
In addition, it may be difficult for respondents to stay involved with 
each new topic presented in the questionnaire. It will be a challenge 
to create material that maximizes the chance of involvement and 
minimizes the chance of claims being too acceptable or too 
unacceptable.
In the experimental studies reported in this dissertation, 
argumentative texts were used that consisted of a few sentences 
only. Hoeken and Hustinx (2007) showed that ordinary language
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users have difficulties differentiating between strong and weak 
arguments, if the arguments are presented in a longer text. Therefore, 
it is uncertain whether or not people are more easily persuaded by 
normatively weak arguments if these arguments are part of a larger 
text. In addition, the question remains to what extent the short texts 
as used in the experiments reflect true argumentation, i.e. 
argumentation occurring in real-life persuasive documents. On the 
one hand, by using short texts, influences on the measurements can 
be well-controlled, but on the other hand, generalizability would be 
improved by using less artificial, experimental material. Experimenting 
with argument quality in texts that are likely to occur in real life, 
without losing experimental control, is a future research challenge 
that should be addressed.
In future ELM research, the relationship of argument quality and 
persuasive effects can now be explored directly and empirically. 
O’Keefe (1995) claimed that this would be possible, once an 
independently-motivated account of argument quality was offered (p. 
15). Obviously, the current study does not offer a universal, all­
embracing account of argument quality, but for the argument from 
authority, the argument from cause to effect and the argument from 
example, it gives insight into what makes for stronger and weaker 
arguments, from an argumentation-theoretical perspective as well as 
lay people’s perspectives. Therefore, in subsequent ELM research, 
these insights may be used for creating experimental material and 
determining what exact argument characteristics contributed to the 
effects.
In addition, the results of the current study clarify why 
normatively strong arguments may lead to greater persuasiveness 
under conditions of central processing: because people use specific 
criteria during their careful evaluations, on the basis of which they 
assess argument strength. If, in future ELM research, participants will 
be instructed to record their thoughts elicited by a strong or weak 
message that they have evaluated carefully (see, e.g., Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986b), these recorded thoughts should reveal the use of 
(specific) evaluation criteria. This means that in coding these 
thoughts, special attention should be paid to whether or not 
participants used these criteria. This kind of information may not only 
provide evidence that messages were indeed scrutinized 
systematically, but may also explain why, subsequently, people react 
favorably, unfavorably, or neutrally to the standpoint advocated. The
238
nature of argument quality will remain a topic of study, but prospects 
should be good for empirical work on persuasion in future.
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Wij willen je vragen om je in de volgende situatie te verplaatsen: je hebt gesolliciteerd 
naar een positie in de redactie van het actualiteitenprogramma Nova. Je bent nu op 
sollicitatiegesprek. Ik ben de P&O manager van Nova. Je  krijgt de volgende casus:
Appendix 2A Material used for uncovering laymen criteria for the argument
from authority: open case with desirability claim
Nova wil een special uitzenden met als standpunt:
Televisiereclam e gericht op kinderen is slecht.
Jouw taak in de redactie is het uitnodigen van de gasten. Je  dient twee gasten uit 
te nodigen, die het beiden met dit standpunt eens zijn:
Eén gast waarvan je denkt dat die dit standpunt goed kan verdedigen, 
en
Eén gast waarvan je denkt dat die dit standpunt juist niet goed kan 
verdedigen.
Het doel van deze opdracht bij jouw sollicitatie is erachter komen of je in staat 
bent on derschei d te maken tussen geschikte en ongeschikte gasten.
Omdat het hier om een denkbeeldige special gaat, kan in principe iedereen (ook 
mensen die de Nederlandse taal niet machtig zijn of reeds overleden zijn) worden 
uitgenodigd. Mocht je eventueel geen naam weten van de persoon die je zou 
willen uitnodigen, maar wel diens functie (bijv. postbode of stucadoor) dan mag je 
ook een omschrijving geven van die gast.
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Wij willen je vragen om je in de volgende situatie te verplaatsen: je hebt gesolliciteerd 
naar een positie in de redactie van het actualiteitenprogramma Nova. Je  bent nu op 
sollicitatiegesprek. Ik ben de P&O manager van Nova. Je  krijgt de volgende casus:
Appendix 2B Material used for uncovering laymen criteria for the argument
from authority: open case with probability claim
Nova wil een special uitzenden met als standpunt:
Televisiereclam e gericht op kinderen heeft schadelijke effecten.
Jouw taak in de redactie is het uitnodigen van de gasten. Je  dient twee gasten 
uit te nodigen, die het beiden met dit standpunt eens zijn.
Eén gast waarvan je denkt dat die dit standpunt goed kan verdedigen, 
en
Eén gast waarvan je denkt dat die dit standpunt juist niet goed kan 
verdedigen.
Het doel van deze opdracht bij jouw sollicitatie is erachter komen of je in staat 
bent onderscheid te maken tussen geschikte en ongeschikte gasten.
Omdat het hier om een denkbeeldige special gaat, kan in principe iedereen 
(ook mensen die de Nederlandse taal niet machtig zijn of reeds overleden zijn) 
worden uitgenodigd. Mocht je eventueel geen naam weten van de persoon die 
je zou willen uitnodigen, maar wel diens functie (bijv. postbode of stucadoor) 
dan mag je ook een omschrijving geven van die gast.
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Er zijn verschillende manieren om energie op te wekken. Al deze methoden hebben 
hun eigen voor- en nadelen. Eén van de meest bediscussieerde methoden is het 
gebruik van kernenergie. Stel dat je het volgende standpunt moet verdedigen:
Kernenergie is de beste manier om energie op te wekken.
Om dit standpunt te onderbouwen, kun je een keuze maken uit onderstaande 
argumenten. Welke van deze argumenten zou je het liefst gebruiken om dit 
standpunt te verdedigen? Welke argumenten vind je juist erg zwak ter ondersteuning 
van het standpunt? Zou je een ordening aan kunnen brengen, waarbij 1 het beste 
argument is en 7 het slechtste argument?
Appendix 2C Material used for uncovering laymen criteria for the argument
from authority: closed case with desirability claim
A. Sommige natuurkundigen van de Vrije Universiteit van Amsterdam vinden 
kernenergie de beste manier om energie op te wekken.
B. Robert Oppenheimer, de vader van de atoombom, noemde kernenergie in 
de jaren 50 al de beste manier om energie op te wekken.
C. De bekende voetballers Ruud van Nistelrooij, Edgar Davids en Edwin van 
der Sar vinden dat kernenergie de beste manier van energie-opwekking is.
D. Ruud van Wijk, de voorzitter van Greenpeace Nederland, is van mening dat 
er geen betere manier van energie-opwekking bestaat.
E. Dr. Frank Verbeet, als kernfysicus verbonden aan kerncentrale Borssele, is 
al jaren van mening dat kernenergie de beste wijze van energie-opwekking 
is.
F. Dat kernenergie de beste methode van energie-opwekking is, vindt ook Wil 
Derben, 17-jarige VMBO-scholier.
G. Prof. dr. G. Verhoeven, hoogleraar kernfysica aan de Technische 
Universiteit Delft, vindt dat onder bepaalde omstandigheden met behulp van 
kernenergie relatief goed energie opgewekt kan worden.
Keuze:
1._______2.________3.________4 ._______ 5.________6._______ 7________
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Al jarenlang is het broeikaseffect een belangrijk item. Er zijn verschillende manieren 
bedacht om het broeikaseffect terug te dringen. Eén van de meest bediscussieerde 
methoden is het gebruik van kernenergie. Stel dat je het volgende standpunt moet 
verdedigen:
Het veel meer gebruikmaken van kernenergie leidt tot een sterke  
terugdringing van het broeikaseffect.
Om deze stelling te onderbouwen, kun je een keuze maken uit onderstaande 
argumenten. Welke van deze argumenten zou je het liefst gebruiken om de stelling 
te verdedigen? Welke argumenten vind je juist erg zwak ter ondersteuning van de 
stelling? Zou je een ordening aan kunnen brengen, waarbij 1 het beste argument is 
en 7 het slechtste argument?
Appendix 2D Material used for uncovering laymen criteria for the argument
from authority: closed case with probability claim
A. Sommige natuurkundigen van de Vrije Universiteit van Amsterdam denken 
dat met behulp van kernenergie het broeikaseffect sterk teruggedrongen 
kan worden.
B. Robert Oppenheimer, de vader van de atoombom, noemde kernenergie in 
de jaren 50 al veelbelovend als een manier om het broeikaseffect tegen te 
gaan.
C. De bekende voetballers Ruud van Nistelrooij, Edgar Davids en Edwin van 
der Sar vinden dat met behulp van kernenergie het broeikaseffect het beste 
verminderd kan worden.
D. Ruud van Wijk, de voorzitter van Greenpeace Nederland, is van mening dat 
het broeikaseffect het best bestreden kan worden door over te stappen op 
kernenergie.
E. Dr. Frank Verbeet, als kernfysicus verbonden aan kerncentrale Borssele, is 
al jaren van mening dat kernenergie de beste methode om het 
broeikaseffect te bestrijden.
F. Dat kernenergie de beste oplossing is voor het broeikaseffect, vindt ook Wil 
Derben, 17-jarige VMBO-scholier.
G. Prof. dr. G. Verhoeven, hoogleraar kernfysica aan de Technische 
Universiteit Delft, vindt dat onder bepaalde omstandigheden kernenergie 
een zekere bijdrage kan leveren aan het tegengaan van het broeikaseffect.
Keuze:
1._______2.________3.________4 .________5.________6.________7_______
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Ik zou u willen vragen om u zich eens in de volgende situatie te verplaatsen. U hebt 
gesolliciteerd naar een baan als speechschrijver voor het ministerie van 
Volksgezondheid. U bent nu op sollicitatiegesprek. Ik ben de manager van de 
afdeling Personeelszaken en ik moet testen of u goede toespraken kunt schrijven. U 
krijgt de volgende opdracht:
Appendix 3A Material used for uncovering laymen criteria for the argument
from cause to effect: open case with claim 1
U moet een toespraak schrijven voor de minister. In deze toespraak verdedigt hij de 
volgende stelling:
A ls we het maximaal toegestane vetgehalte in gehakt van 35 naar 25 procent 
verlagen, dan zullen de kosten voor de gezondheidszorg dalen.
Als speechschrijver weet u dat u een standpunt moet ondersteunen met sterke 
argumenten. Uw taak is nu om twee argumenten te geven die het standpunt 
ondersteunen. U kiest ervoor om het standpunt te ondersteunen met voorspellingen. 
Geef
één sterk argument dat het standpunt goed ondersteunt 
en
één zwak argument dat het standpunt juist niet goed ondersteunt.
Nadat u een sterk en een zwak argument heeft gegeven, krijgt u de vraag waarom 
het ene argument sterker is ter ondersteuning van het standpunt dan het andere 
argument.
Het doel van deze opdracht bij uw sollicitatie is erachter te komen of u in staat bent 
onderscheid te maken tussen sterke en zwakke argumenten.
A ls we het maximaal toegestane vetgehalte in gehakt van 35 naar 25 procent 
verlagen, dan zullen de kosten voor de gezondheidszorg dalen.
A. Het sterke argument: B. Het zwakke argument:
Want als we het vetgehalte in gehakt 
verlagen, dan
Want als we het vetgehalte in gehakt 
verlagen, dan
De vraag die u straks wordt gesteld, luidt: waarom is argument A sterker ter 
ondersteuning van het standpunt dan argument B?
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Ik zou u willen vragen om zich eens in de volgende situatie te verplaatsen. U hebt 
gesolliciteerd naar een baan als speechschrijver voor het ministerie van 
Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer. U bent nu op 
sollicitatiegesprek. Ik ben de manager van de afdeling Personeelszaken en ik moet 
testen of u goede toespraken kunt schrijven. U krijgt de volgende opdracht:
Appendix 3B Material used for uncovering laymen criteria for the argument
from cause to effect: open case with claim 2
U moet een toespraak schrijven voor de minister. In deze toespraak verdedigt hij de 
volgende stelling:
A ls er meer groen in en rond nieuwbouwwijken komt, dan zullen de bewoners 
van die wijken minder gebruik maken van de auto.
Als speechschrijver weet u dat u een standpunt moet ondersteunen met sterke 
argumenten. Uw taak is nu om twee argumenten te geven die het standpunt 
ondersteunen. U kiest ervoor om het standpunt te ondersteunen met voorspellingen. 
Geef
één sterk argument dat het standpunt goed ondersteunt 
en
één zwak argument dat het standpunt juist niet goed ondersteunt.
Nadat u een sterk en een zwak argument heeft gegeven, krijgt u de vraag waarom 
het ene argument sterker is ter ondersteuning van het standpunt dan het andere 
argument.
Het doel van deze opdracht bij uw sollicitatie is erachter te komen of u in staat bent 
onderscheid te maken tussen sterke en zwakke argumenten.
A ls er meer groen in en rond nieuwbouwwijken komt, dan zullen de 
bewoners van die wijken minder gebruik maken van de auto.
A. Het sterke argument: B. Het zwakke argument:
Want als de nieuwbouwwijken 
groener worden,
dan.............................................................
Want als de nieuwbouwwijken 
groener worden,
dan.................................................................
De vraag die u straks wordt gesteld, luidt: waarom is argument A sterker ter 
ondersteuning van het standpunt dan argument B?
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Telewerken is thuis werken met behulp van een computeraansluiting met het bedrijf. 
De werknemer doet zijn werk dan thuis achter de computer in plaats van op kantoor. 
Dit kan een manier zijn om langdurig zieke werknemers weer aan het werk te krijgen, 
of om te voorkomen dat werknemers langdurig uitvallen. Stel dat u het volgende 
standpunt moet verdedigen:
A ls werkgevers langdurig zieke medewerkers in de gelegenheid stellen om te 
telewerken, dan zullen ze eerder terugkeren naar hun gewone werkplek.
Om dit standpunt te onderbouwen, kunt u een keuze maken uit de onderstaande 
argumenten. Welke van deze argumenten vindt u sterk ter ondersteuning van dit 
standpunt? En welke argumenten vindt u juist erg zwak ter ondersteuning van dit 
standpunt? Zou u de argumenten willen ordenen, waarbij 1 het beste argument is en
5 het slechtste argument?
A) Langdurig zieke werknemers die vrijaf krijgen zullen over het algemeen 
sneller terugkeren naar hun gewone werkplek. Dus: als werkgevers 
langdurig zieke medewerkers in de gelegenheid stellen om te telewerken, 
dan zullen ze eerder terugkeren naar hun gewone werkplek.
B) Als langdurig zieke werknemers kunnen telewerken, dan zijn ze minder snel 
vermoeid. Uiteindelijk keren ze dan sneller terug naar de gewone werkplek. 
Dus: als werkgevers langdurig zieke medewerkers in de gelegenheid stellen 
om te telewerken, dan zullen ze eerder terugkeren naar hun gewone 
werkplek.
C) Maatregelen om langdurig zieke werknemers thuis te laten werken leiden 
over het algemeen tot een oplossing van maatschappelijke en individuele 
problemen. Dus: als werkgevers langdurig zieke medewerkers in de 
gelegenheid stellen om te telewerken, dan zullen ze eerder terugkeren naar 
hun gewone werkplek.
D) Als zieke werknemers hun werk thuis achter de computer kunnen doen, dan 
hoeven ze niet naar hun werk te reizen. En als ze niet naar hun werk 
hoeven reizen, dan worden ze minder belast. En als ze minder worden 
belast door het reizen, dan kunnen ze snel weer een beetje werk verzetten. 
Dus: als werkgevers langdurig zieke medewerkers in de gelegenheid stellen 
om te telewerken, dan zullen ze eerder terugkeren naar hun gewone 
werkplek.
E) Als zieke werknemers kunnen telewerken, dan zullen ze meer werk 
verzetten. Bovendien kunnen ze betrokken blijven bij werk en collega's. 
Uiteindelijk zullen ze dan sneller terugkeren naar hun gewone werkplek.
Dus: als werkgevers langdurig zieke medewerkers in de gelegenheid stellen 
om te telewerken, dan zullen ze eerder terugkeren naar hun gewone 
werkplek.
Appendix 3C Material used for uncovering laymen criteria for the argument
from cause to effect: closed case with claim 3
Keuze:
1 ._______2 .________3 .________4 .________5 .________
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Het streven van de overheid is om zoveel mogelijk mensen bij cultuur te betrekken. 
Ook kinderen en jongeren worden gestimuleerd om deel te nemen aan het culturele 
leven, bijvoorbeeld door naar jeugdtheaterscholen te gaan. Bij de 
jeugdtheaterscholen volgen kinderen en jongeren lessen in theater, beweging en 
stemvorming. Stel dat u het volgende standpunt moet verdedigen:
A ls er meer geld beschikbaar wordt gesteld voor jeugdtheaterscholen, dan zal 
de leefbaarheid van de samenleving bevorderd worden.
Om dit standpunt te onderbouwen, kunt u een keuze maken uit de onderstaande 
argumenten. Welke van deze argumenten vindt u sterk ter ondersteuning van dit 
standpunt? En welke argumenten vindt u juist erg zwak ter ondersteuning van dit 
standpunt? Zou u de argumenten willen ordenen, waarbij 1 het beste argument is en
5 het slechtste argument?
A) Initiatieven die mensen bij de samenleving betrekken leiden over het 
algemeen tot een leefbaardere samenleving. Dus: als er meer geld 
beschikbaar wordt gesteld voor jeugdtheaterscholen, dan zal de 
leefbaarheid van de samenleving bevorderd worden.
B) Als jeugdtheaterscholen een financiële impuls krijgen, dan wordt de jeugd 
beter opgeleid in amateurtheater. Uiteindelijk wordt de samenleving dan 
leefbaarder. Dus: als er meer geld beschikbaar wordt gesteld voor 
jeugdtheaterscholen, dan zal de leefbaarheid van de samenleving 
bevorderd worden.
C) Het investeren in jeugdtheaterscholen leidt over het algemeen tot een 
duurzame toekomst. Dus: als er meer geld beschikbaar wordt gesteld voor 
jeugdtheaterscholen, dan zal de leefbaarheid van de samenleving 
bevorderd worden.
D) Als jeugdtheaterscholen financiële ondersteuning krijgen, dan kunnen ze 
zich artistiek en organisatorisch versterken. En als jeugdtheaterscholen 
kwalitatief sterker zijn, dan worden kinderen en jongeren daar beter 
opgeleid. En als ze goed worden opgeleid op het gebied van kunst en 
cultuur, dan zullen ze zich in het algemeen ook beter ontplooien. Dus: als er 
meer geld beschikbaar wordt gesteld voor jeugdtheaterscholen, dan zal de 
leefbaarheid van de samenleving bevorderd worden.
E) Als er meer geld beschikbaar wordt gesteld voor jeugdtheaterscholen, dan 
krijgen meer jongeren de kans om betrokken te worden bij de maatschappij. 
Bovendien zullen jongeren zich beter ontwikkelen. Uiteindelijk wordt de 
samenleving dan leefbaarder. Dus: als er meer geld beschikbaar wordt 
gesteld voor jeugdtheaterscholen, dan zal de leefbaarheid van de 
samenleving bevorderd worden.
Appendix 3D Material used for uncovering laymen criteria for the argument
from cause to effect: closed case with claim 4
Keuze:
1 ._______2 .________3 .________4 .________5 .________
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Ik zou u willen vragen om u zich eens in de volgende situatie te verplaatsen. U hebt 
gesolliciteerd naar een baan als speechschrijver voor het ministerie van Onderwijs, 
Cultuur en Wetenschappen. U bent nu op sollicitatiegesprek. Ik ben de manager van 
de afdeling Personeelszaken en ik moet testen of u goede toespraken kunt schrijven. 
U krijgt de volgende opdracht:
Appendix 4A Material used for uncovering laymen criteria for the argument
from example: open case with claim 1
U moet een toespraak schrijven voor de minister. In deze toespraak verdedigt hij de 
volgende stelling:
A ls kinderen van jongs af aan worden voorgelezen, dan zullen ze de 
Nederlandse taal beter beheersen.
Als speechschrijver weet u dat u een standpunt moet ondersteunen met sterke 
argumenten. Uw taak is nu om twee argumenten te geven die het standpunt 
ondersteunen. U kiest ervoor om het standpunt te ondersteunen met voorbeelden. 
Geef
één sterk voorbeeld dat het standpunt goed ondersteunt 
en
één zwak voorbeeld dat het standpunt juist niet goed ondersteunt.
Nadat u een sterk en een zwak argument heeft gegeven, krijgt u de vraag waarom 
het ene argument sterker is ter ondersteuning van het standpunt dan het andere 
argument.
Het doel van deze opdracht bij uw sollicitatie is erachter te komen of u in staat bent 
onderscheid te maken tussen sterke en zwakke argumenten.
A ls kinderen van jongs af aan worden voorgelezen, dan zullen ze de 
Nederlandse taal beter beheersen.
A. Het sterke argument: B. Het zwakke argument:
Want ik ken wel een geval waarin dat 
opging:
Want ik ken wel een geval waarin dat 
opging:
De vraag die u straks wordt gesteld, luidt: waarom is argument A sterker ter 
ondersteuning van het standpunt dan argument B?
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Ik zou u willen vragen om u zich eens in de volgende situatie te verplaatsen. U hebt 
gesolliciteerd naar een baan als speechschrijver voor het ministerie van Sociale 
Zaken en Werkgelegenheid. U bent nu op sollicitatiegesprek. Ik ben de manager van 
de afdeling Personeelszaken en ik moet testen of u goede toespraken kunt schrijven. 
U krijgt de volgende opdracht:
Appendix 4B Material used for uncovering laymen criteria for the argument
from example: open case with claim 2
U moet een toespraak schrijven voor de minister. In deze toespraak verdedigt hij de 
volgende stelling:
A ls werkgevers meer bijdragen aan de kinderopvang, dan zullen werknemers 
werk en zorg gemakkelijker kunnen combineren.
Als speechschrijver weet u dat u een standpunt moet ondersteunen met sterke 
argumenten. Uw taak is nu om twee argumenten te geven die het standpunt 
ondersteunen. U kiest ervoor om het standpunt te ondersteunen met voorbeelden. 
Geef
één sterk voorbeeld dat het standpunt goed ondersteunt 
en
één zwak voorbeeld dat het standpunt juist niet goed ondersteunt.
Nadat u een sterk en een zwak argument heeft gegeven, krijgt u de vraag waarom 
het ene argument sterker is ter ondersteuning van het standpunt dan het andere 
argument.
Het doel van deze opdracht bij uw sollicitatie is erachter te komen of u in staat bent 
onderscheid te maken tussen sterke en zwakke argumenten.
A ls werkgevers meer bijdragen aan de kinderopvang, dan zullen werknemers 
werk en zorg gemakkelijker kunnen combineren.
A. Het sterke argument: B. Het zwakke argument:
Want ik ken wel een geval waarin dat 
opging:
Want ik ken wel een geval waarin dat 
opging:
De vraag die u straks wordt gesteld, luidt: waarom is argument A sterker ter 
ondersteuning van het standpunt dan argument B?
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De overheid streeft naar een gezonde samenleving. Niet alleen probeert ze ziekten 
te voorkomen en vroegtijdig op te sporen met bijvoorbeeld vaccinatieprogramma's en 
bevolkingsonderzoeken, maar ook probeert ze een gezonde leefstijl te bevorderen. 
Stel dat u het volgende standpunt moet verdedigen:
A ls je  een gezonde leefstijl nastreeft, dan verklein je  de kans op ziektes.
Om dit standpunt te onderbouwen, kunt u een keuze maken uit de onderstaande 
argumenten. Welke van deze argumenten vindt u sterk ter ondersteuning van dit 
standpunt? En welke argumenten vindt u juist zwak ter ondersteuning van dit 
standpunt? Zou u de argumenten willen ordenen, waarbij 1 het beste argument is en
6 het slechtste argument?
Appendix 4C Material used for uncovering laymen criteria for the argument
from example: closed case with claim 3
A) Simon de Wit is minder alcohol gaan drinken en heeft nu weer een goed 
functionerende lever. Bart van Maanen is gestopt met roken en heeft nu 
minder last van zijn luchtwegen. Sander Schaafstal is meer gaan sporten 
waardoor hij zich een stuk vitaler voelt. Dus: als je een gezonde leefstijl 
nastreeft, dan verklein je de kans op ziektes.
B) Theo van Gogh (regisseur, televisiemaker en columnist) leefde gezond en 
die had een goede weerstand opgebouwd tegen ziekten. Dus: als je een 
gezonde levenstijl nastreeft, dan verklein je de kans op ziektes.
C) Hanneke de Waal heeft haar maag laten verkleinen en nu heeft ze minder 
last van pijnlijke gewrichten. Dus: als je een gezonde leefstijl nastreeft, dan 
verklein je de kans op ziektes.
D) Robert de Graaf is meer water gaan drinken en nu ziet zijn huid er minder 
vaal uit. Dus: als je een gezonde leefstijl nastreeft, dan verklein je de kans 
op ziektes.
E) Robin van Persie volgt een uitgebalanceerd dieet en is daardoor in goede 
conditie. Dus: als je een gezonde leefstijl nastreeft, dan verklein je de kans 
op ziektes.
F) Maria de Graaf is minder vet gaan eten, Edgar Ritmeester eet meer vezels 
en granen dan vroeger en Frederieke van Loon eet tegenwoordig meer 
groenten en fruit. Ze hebben nu minder last van kwaaltjes. Dus: als je een 
gezonde leefstijl nastreeft, dan verklein je de kans op ziektes.
Keuze:
1 ._______2 .________3 .________4 .________5 .________6 ._______
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Uit prognoses van de overheid blijkt dat de vraag naar bèta's en technici in 2010 veel 
groter zal zijn dan het aanbod. De overheid stimuleert scholieren dan ook om een 
exacte studierichting te kiezen. Stel dat u het volgende standpunt moet verdedigen:
A ls je  een exacte studierichting kiest, dan verdien je  later een hoog salaris.
Om dit standpunt te onderbouwen, kunt u een keuze maken uit de onderstaande 
argumenten. Welke van deze argumenten vindt u sterk ter ondersteuning van dit 
standpunt? En welke argumenten vindt u juist zwak ter ondersteuning van dit 
standpunt? Zou u de argumenten willen ordenen, waarbij 1 het beste argument is en
6 het slechtste argument?
Appendix 4D Material used for uncovering laymen criteria for the argument
from example: closed case with claim 4
A) Geert-Jan van Harmelen heeft tandheelkunde gestudeerd en verdient nu 
5500 euro per maand. Bert Linthorst heeft informatica gestudeerd en 
verdient 3000 euro per maand. Jasper Simons heeft bouwkunde gedaan en 
heeft nu een inkomen van 4500 euro per maand. Dus: als je een exacte 
studierichting kiest, dan verdien je later een hoog salaris.
B) Philip Freriks, presentator bij het NOS-journaal, heeft scheikunde
gestudeerd en die staat in de top 10 van rijkste Nederlanders. Dus: als je 
een exacte studierichting kiest, dan verdien je later een hoog salaris.
C) Janneke Oorthuys heeft een opleiding psychologie gedaan en ontvangt nu 
een bovengemiddeld inkomen. Dus: als je een exacte studierichting kiest, 
dan verdien je later een hoog salaris.
D) Peter Philips heeft diergeneeskunde gestudeerd en die heeft een leuke 
baan. Dus: als je een exacte studierichting kiest, dan verdien je later een 
hoog salaris.
E) De directeur van Shell heeft natuurkunde gestudeerd en verdient nu
miljoenen euro's per jaar. Dus: als je een exacte studierichting kiest, dan 
verdien je later een hoog salaris.
F) Erna Bruin heeft geneeskunde gestudeerd, Paul Blok farmaceutische 
wetenschappen en Renske Atsma biomedische wetenschappen. Ze 
verdienen nu 4000 euro per maand. Dus: als je een exacte studierichting 
kiest, dan verdien je later een hoog salaris.
Keuze:
1 ._______2 ._______ 3 .________4 .________5 .________6 .________
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Appendix 6A Pre-test material and results
Table 6A1 The claims pre-tested, mean agreement ratings on a 7-point scale (SD 
between parentheses; ratings from 3.00 to 5.00 in bold) and an indication of the 
argument types in support of the selected claims in the experiment.________________
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1. Een cursus arbeidsmarktoriëntatie leidt tot betere kansen 
op de arbeidsmarkt voor studenten die afgestudeerd zijn in 
de psychologie. / A labour market orientation course leads to 
better chances in the labour market for students with a 
degree in Psychology.
5.25
(1.30)
2. Het draaien van Mozarts muziek in woonwinkels leidt tot 
een hogere omzet. / Playing Mozart's music in home 
furnishing shops leads to a higher turnover.
4.07
(1.35)
Cause to 
effect
3. Het drinken van appelsap kan ervoor zorgen dat je eerder 
aan gaatjes in je tanden moet worden behandeld. / Drinking 
apple juice may cause you to need treatment for dental 
caries sooner.
5.30
(1.11)
4. Het toenemend gebruik van mobiele telefoons achter het 
stuur leidt tot meer verkeersongelukken. / The increased use 
of mobile phones in traffic leads to more traffic accidents. (+)
6.43
(.71)
5. Communiceren via e-mail kan de band met een oom of 
tante in het buitenland versterken. / Communicating through 
email may strengthen the relationship with an uncle or aunt 
abroad.
6.17
(.81)
6. Het eten van gember verhoogt de prestaties bij hardlopen. 
/ Eating ginger increases running performance.
3.77
(.73)
Cause to 
effect
7. Het invoeren van strengere regels op het VMBO kan 
voorkomen dat jongeren de dupe worden van verbale 
intimidatie. / Introducing stricter rules in VMBO107 may 
prevent adolescents becoming victims of verbal intimidation.
4.87
(1.59)
8. Het geraas van auto's die langs scholen rijden leidt tot 
slechtere schoolprestaties van leerlingen met ADHD. / The 
noise of cars driving past schools leads to worsened 
scholastic results for pupils with ADHD.
5.05
(1.48)
9. Als kinderen een voorlichtingsfilmpje zien over veilig 
gebruik van een papierschaar, dan snijden ze zich minder 
vaak in de vingers. / If children watch an instructional film 
about the safe use of paper scissors, they will cut their 
fingers less often.
4.27
(1.59)
Cause to 
effect
107 VMBO (voorbereidend middelbaar beroepsonderwijs) is an educational level in 
the Netherlands, literally translated as preparatory middle-level vocational 
education.
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10. Als het Van Gogh museum in Amsterdam meer financiële 
ondersteuning krijgt, dan nemen de aantallen 
museumbezoekers uit het buitenland toe. / If the Van Gogh 
museum in Amsterdam receives more financial support, the 
amounts of museum visitors from abroad will increase.
4.18
(1.57)
Cause to 
effect
11. Het gebruik van shampoo heeft mogelijk schadelijke 
effecten op de waterkwaliteit in sloten. / The use of shampoo 
possibly has detrimental effects on the water quality in 
ditches.
4.25
(1.34)
Cause to 
effect
12. Het gebruik van insecticiden in land- en tuinbouw kan 
leiden tot een toename van rupsen. / The use of insecticides 
in agriculture and horticulture may lead to an increase in 
caterpillars.
3.70
(1.76)
Cause to 
effect
13. Het regelmatig eten van pizza's verkleint de kans op het 
krijgen van kanker. / The regular consumption of pizzas 
reduces the risk of cancer. (-)
2.70
(1.44)
14. Wanneer jeugdhonken beter gecontroleerd worden door 
de overheid, dan leidt dat tot minder bierverslaving onder 
jongeren. / If youth clubs are better supervised by the 
government, this will lead to less beer addiction among 
adolescents.
4.27
(1.89)
Circular
argument
15. Het eten van pindakaas beschermt tegen galstenen. / 
Eating peanut butter protects against gallstones.
3.60
(.98)
Cause to 
effect
16. Als immigranten een Nederlands dagblad lezen, dan 
gaan ze vlotter Nederlands spreken. / Immigrants reading 
Dutch newspapers will lead to them speaking Dutch more 
fluently.
5.28
(1.50)
17. Als sollicitanten zich beter voorbereiden op een 
sollicitatiegesprek, dan is bij een eventuele 
salarisonderhandeling de kans op een goed salaris groter. / If 
applicants prepare better on a job interview, the chance of a 
good salary increases during a salary negotiation.
5.58
(1.11)
18. Olijfolie kan pijn bij reumapatiënten bestrijden. / Olive oil 
may relieve pain in rheumatism patients.
3.45
(1.09)
Cause to 
effect
19. Als je regelmatig Poker speelt, dan leer je beter optellen 
en aftrekken. / Playing Poker regularly will lead to improved 
skill in adding and subtracting.
4.12
(1.62)
Cause to 
effect
20. Als de toegangsprijzen voor tentoonstellingen lager 
worden, dan melden meer studenten zich aan bij 
beroepsopleidingen voor beeldende kunsten. / If the 
entrance fees for expositions are reduced, more students will 
sign up for visual arts degree programmes.
3.15
(185)
21. Het gebruik van een lichtgewicht muis en regelmatig 
ontspannen vermindert de kans op RSI bij mensen die vaak 
urenlang achter de computer zitten. / The use of a lightweight 
mouse and regular relaxation reduces the risk of RSI for 
people who often spend hours sitting at their computers. (+)
5.78
(1.27)
22. Als de hoeveelheid testosteron bij jongeren wordt 
verlaagd, dan neigen ze minder naar hennepproducten. / If 
the amount of testosterone in adolescents is reduced they 
will be less inclined to use cannabis.
2.98
(1.48)
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23. Als er meer voorlichting komt over de werking van koffie 
en thee, dan zullen minder mensen daaraan verslaafd raken. 
/ If there is more information on the effects of coffee and tea 
less people will become addicted to them.
3.90
(1.72)
Cause to 
effect
24. Verplichte rijlessen voor mensen boven de 70 jaar 
kunnen hun angst in het verkeer verminderen. / Obligatory 
driving lessons for people over 70 may reduce their fear in 
traffic.
4.37
(1.76)
Authority
25. Vertegenwoordigers voelen zich meer betrokken bij hun 
bedrijf als ze thuis en onderweg gebruik kunnen maken van 
nieuwe media, zoals een laptop met internetverbinding. / 
Representatives feel more involved with their companies if 
they can use new media, such as a laptop with an internet 
connection, at home or on the way.
4.35
(1.69)
Authority
26. Zwangere vrouwen die hun cholesterolgehalte verlagen, 
lopen minder risico om een te vroeg geboren kind te baren. / 
Pregnant women who decrease their cholesterol level run a 
lower risk of having a preterm delivery.
3.80
(88)
Authority
27. Door veel te fietsen over hobbelige, slechte wegen krijg 
je sterkere botten. / Riding a bike on bumpy, bad roads 
promotes stronger bones. (-)
2.23
(1.25)
28. Minder kraamzorg kan leiden tot psychische problemen 
van de pasgeborene op latere leeftijd. / Less maternity care 
may lead to psychological problems for the infant at a later 
age.
3.05
(1.50)
29. Kinderen die op jonge leeftijd Monopoly leren spelen 
kunnen later beter met geld omgaan. / Children who learn to 
play Monopoly at a young age are more capable of handling 
money when they get older.
3.85
(1.76)
Authority
30. Het eten van honing leidt tot betere prestaties bij 
duursporten. / Eating honey leads to better performance in 
endurance sports.
3.90
(1.57)
Authority
31. Hoogrendementsketels leiden tot minder uitstoot van 
vervuilende gassen. / High efficiency boilers lead to less 
emissions of polluting gases.
5.00
(1.62)
32. Een stijging van de postzegeltarieven verhoogt de 
kwaliteit van de postbezorging. / Raising the price of stamps 
will increase the quality of mail delivery.
1.97
(1.17)
33. Als je vaak met het gezin eet in je jeugd, dan eet je op 
latere leeftijd waarschijnlijk gezonder. / Frequently eating 
together as a family during childhood, will probably lead to a 
healthier diet at a later age.
4.68
(1.69)
Circular
argument
34. Als er minder naar olie wordt geboord in zeeën, dan 
planten bruinvissen zich eerder voort. / If there is less oil 
drilling in seas, porpoises will reproduce earlier.
4.02
(1.35)
Authority
35. Het lopen op duurdere sportschoenen verlaagt het risico 
op spierscheuringen. / Walking on more expensive sneakers 
will lower the risk of muscular ruptures.
3.88
(2.00)
Circular
argument
36. Als je na een boswandeling je kleren wast op minimaal 
60 graden, dan heb je minder kans op een tekenbeet. / If you 
wash your clothes at at least 60 degree Celsius after a walk
2.28
(1.59)
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in the woods, this will reduce the chance of a tick bite.
37. De invoering van een voorlopig rijbewijs kan roekeloos 
rijgedrag van automobilisten die net hun rijbewijs hebben 
tegengaan. / The introduction of a provisional driving licence 
may prevent reckless driving by drivers who have just passed 
their driving test. (+)
5.48
(1.81)
38. Als je de hygiëne van je voeten verwaarloost, dan kun je 
eerder malaria krijgen in landen waar die ziekte heerst. / If 
you neglect foot hygiene, you will get malaria sooner in 
countries where the risk of malaria is high.
2.48
(1.68)
39. Met mate rode wijn drinken kan helpen tegen 
voedselvergiftiging. / Drinking red wine moderately may help 
against food poisoning.
2.98
(1.46)
40. Als bromfietsrijders gestimuleerd worden om het 
openbaar vervoer te nemen, dan neemt het aantal dodelijke 
ongevallen in het verkeer af. / If moped drivers are being 
stimulated to use public transportation, the number of deadly 
accidents in traffic will be reduced.
4.85
(1.63)
41. Mensen die lijden aan het chronische 
vermoeidheidssyndroom ME gaan zich waarschijnlijk beter 
voelen als ze melkchocolade eten. / People who suffer from 
the chronic fatigue syndrom ME will probably feel better if 
they eat milk chocolat.
3.28
(1.49)
Authority
42. Groene theebladeren kun je gebruiken ter voorkoming 
van ontstoken tandvlees. / Green tea leaves can be used to 
prevent infected gums.
3.75
(1.19)
Authority
43. Als vliegtuigen zo lang mogelijk hoog blijven vliegen, dan 
komt dat de leefomgeving van zoetwatervissen ten goede. / If 
airplanes fly high as long as possible, the living climate of 
freshwater fishes will be improved.
2.87
(1.54)
44. Een landelijke campagne vóór borstvoeding verkleint de 
kans op roken bij kinderen die geen borstvoeding hebben 
gehad. / A national campaign in favor of breastfeeding will 
decrease the chance of smoking for children who have not 
been breastfed. (-)
2.85
(1.59)
45. Het kijken naar praatprogramma's op televisie kan helpen 
om trauma's te verwerken. / Watching talkshows on 
television may help in processing traumas.
4.43
(138)
Authority
46. Als Nederlanders met verkooppromoties in supermarkten 
worden gestimuleerd om ovenfriet te kopen, dan gaan ze 
minder snel naar fastfoodketens, zoals McDonald's. / If the 
Dutch are stimulated to buy oven chips by special offers in 
supermarkets, they will go to fastfood chains like McDonald's 
less often.
3.20
(1.57)
Authority
47. De aanleg van extra voorsorteervakken op kruispunten 
leidt in grote steden tot een aanzienlijk betere 
verkeersdoorstroming. / The construction of extra traffic lanes 
on crossings leads to a substantially better flow of traffic in 
big cities.
5.00
(1.24)
48. Aandacht op televisie voor belangrijke 
wereldkampioenschappen leidt tot een toeloop van
5.68
(1.19)
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jeugdleden bij sportverenigingen. / Paying attention to 
important world championships on television leads to more 
youth joining sport clubs.
49. Ouders die door hun puberkinderen zijn geïnterviewd 
over hun levensverhaal krijgen een betere relatie met hun 
zoon of dochter. / Parents who have been interviewed by 
their adolescent children on their life stories will have a better 
relationship with their son or daughter.
4.83
(1.36)
50. Als je je kinderen thuis laat blijven bij slecht weer, dan 
snoepen ze meer. / If you let your children stay home in bad 
weather conditions, they will eat more sweets.
4.17
(1.81)
Example
51. Als mensen een keer per week een denksport 
beoefenen, dan kunnen ze op school of op het werk beter 
nadenken. / If people do a mental exercise once a week, this 
will improve their ability to think at school or work.
5.02
(1.41)
52. Basisscholen met een goede ventilatie zorgen ervoor dat 
hun leerlingen beter presteren in schoolvakken. / Elementary 
schools with good ventilation cause their pupils to perform 
better in school subjects.
5.80
(1.18)
53. Als grote Nederlandse dagbladen aandacht besteden 
aan vermiste personen, dan worden die eerder 
teruggevonden. / If large Dutch newspapers pay attention to 
missing persons, they will be found sooner.
5.23
(1.35)
54 Uitgaansgelegenheden die voorzien zijn van camera's 
geven de bezoekers een veiliger gevoel. / People feel safer 
going out in places with camera surveillance than places 
without. (+)
5.30
(1.49)
55. Het eten van veel groenten zorgt voor een gezondere 
bloeddruk. / Eating lots of vegetables leads to a healthier 
blood pressure.
5.05
(1.30)
56. Angst om auto te rijden kan worden opgelost door een 
dag mee te rijden met een vrachtwagenchauffeur. / Fear of 
driving can be cured by driving along with a truck driver for a 
day. (-)
3.15
(1.37)
57. Mensen met een evenwichtstoornis hebben baat bij het 
beoefenen van een balsport. / People with a balance disorder 
benefit from playing ball sports.
4.60
(1.15)
Example
58. Als politiemedewerkers op belangrijke feestdagen actie 
voeren, dan gaat dat ten koste van de reputatie van de 
politie. / If police officers protest during important holidays, 
this will damage the reputation of the police.
4.35
(2.11)
Circular
argument
59. Als bejaarden minder medicijnen slikken, dan lopen ze 
minder risico om te vallen. / If elderly people take less 
medication, they will run less risk of falling.
3.50
(1.90)
Example
60. Als meer mensen vogelkastjes in hun tuin maken voor 
zangvogels, dan zijn de nesten van die vogels beter 
beschermd. / If more people make birdhouses in their garden 
for songbirds, the nests of these birds will be better 
protected.
4.55
(1.87)
Example
61. Mensen die dagelijks een slaginstrument bespelen, lopen 
een groter risico om doofheid voor hoge tonen te
4.80
(1.59)
Example
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ontwikkelen. / People who play a percussion instrument each 
day run a higher risk of developing deafness to high tones.
62. Als je een kamerplant op je slaapkamer houdt, dan kan 
dat leiden tot een betere nachtrust. / If you have an indoor 
plant in your bedroom, this may lead to a better night's sleep.
3.68
(1.93)
Example
63. Als kinderen op de kinderboerderij dieren aaien, dan 
krijgen ze eerder last van huidproblemen. / If children pet 
animals at the children's farm, this will lead to a higher risk of 
skin problems.
2.40
(1.52)
64. Televisiereclame voor het gebruik van een openbaar 
vervoermiddel leidt ertoe dat meer mensen met dat 
vervoermiddel gaan reizen. / Television advertising for the 
use of a particular mode of public transport leads to more 
people using that mode of transport.
4.20
(1.68)
Example
65. Tweelingen die apart van elkaar opgroeien hebben vaker 
een identieke levensloop dan tweelingen die in hetzelfde 
gezin opgroeien. / Twins that do not grow up in the same 
family more frequently have a similar life course than twins 
that do grow up in the same family. (-)
3.10
(1.57)
66. Als je badtextiel naspoelt met schoonmaakazijn, dan heb 
je minder kans op huidziekten. / Re-rinsing bath textile with 
cleaning vinegar will reduce the risk of skin diseases.
3.40
(1.45)
Example
67. Het gebruik van een ontspanningsruimte op het werk 
brengt het ziekteverzuim omlaag. / The use of a relaxation 
room at work reduces absence at the workplace as a result 
of illness. (+)
5.63
(1.21)
68. Het eten van zuivelproducten verlaagt de kans op 
nachtblindheid. / Eating dairy products reduces the chance of 
night blindness.
3.25
(1.30)
Example
69. Echtgenoten die de naaste familieleden van hun man of 
vrouw af en toe een kaartje sturen, zullen aardiger worden 
gevonden door die familieleden. / Partners who send their 
husband or wife's close relatives a postcard once in a while, 
will be seen as more sympathetic by these family members.
5.18
(1.57)
70. Als scholieren les krijgen in klassieke talen, dan is de 
kans groter dat ze later geschiedenis gaan studeren. / If 
pupils are schooled in the classical languages, increases the 
chance that they will go on to study History.
4.22
(1.70)
Example
(+) : scored highly probable in Hornikx (2005a) 
(-) : scored highly improbable in Hornikx (2005a)
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Appendix 6B Experimental material 
Arguments from authority:
Text 1
I Volgens dr. Emiel Bentink, universitair docent Psychologie aan de 
Universiteit Utrecht en gepromoveerd op angststoornissen bij ouderen, zijn 
70-plussers minder angstig op de weg als ze verplicht worden om rijlessen 
te nemen.
II Volgens Emiel Bentink, een tweedejaars student Psychologie die zojuist 
een college over angststoornissen bij ouderen heeft gevolgd, zijn 70- 
plussers minder angstig op de weg als ze verplicht worden om rijlessen te 
nemen.
III Volgens dr. Emiel Bentink, universitair docent Psychologie aan de 
Universiteit Utrecht en gepromoveerd op angststoornissen bij jongeren, zijn 
70-plussers minder angstig op de weg als ze verplicht worden om rijlessen 
te nemen.
IV Volgens dr. Emiel Bentink, stafmedewerker van de Vereniging van 
Autorijschoolhouders en gepromoveerd op angststoornissen bij ouderen, 
zijn 70-plussers minder angstig op de weg als ze verplicht worden om 
rijlessen te nemen.
V Volgens dr. Emiel Bentink, universitair docent Psychologie aan de 
Universiteit Utrecht en gepromoveerd op angststoornissen bij ouderen, zijn 
70-plussers wat minder onzeker op de weg als ze bereid zijn om af en toe 
rijles te nemen.
Claim Verplichte rijlessen voor mensen boven de 70 jaar kunnen hun angst in het 
verkeer dus verminderen.
Text 2
I Dr. Masha van Rijn, gepromoveerd op nieuwe media en bedrijfskunde en 
nu in dienst van het Ministerie van Economische Zaken, stelt dat 
vertegenwoordigers een hogere betrokkenheid bij hun bedrijf vertonen 
wanneer ze nieuwe media kunnen gebruiken.
II Masha van Rijn, studente aan de HBO-opleiding Nieuwe Media en 
Bedrijfskunde aan de Hogeschool INHOLLAND, stelt dat 
vertegenwoordigers een hogere betrokkenheid bij hun bedrijf vertonen 
wanneer ze nieuwe media kunnen gebruiken.
III Dr. Masha van Rijn, gepromoveerd op recht en economie en nu in dienst 
van het Ministerie van Economische Zaken, stelt dat vertegenwoordigers 
een hogere betrokkenheid bij hun bedrijf vertonen wanneer ze nieuwe 
media kunnen gebruiken.
IV Dr. Masha van Rijn, gepromoveerd op nieuwe media en bedrijfskunde en 
nu in dienst van internetleverancier UPC, stelt dat vertegenwoordigers een 
hogere betrokkenheid bij hun bedrijf vertonen wanneer ze nieuwe media 
kunnen gebruiken.
V Dr. Masha van Rijn, gepromoveerd op het gebied van nieuwe media en 
bedrijfskunde en nu in dienst van het Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 
stelt dat vertegenwoordigers wat intensiever bezig zijn met hun 
werkzaamheden wanneer ze nieuwe media kunnen gebruiken.
Claim Dus: vertegenwoordigers voelen zich meer betrokken bij hun bedrijf als ze 
thuis en onderweg gebruik kunnen maken van nieuwe media, zoals een
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laptop met internetverbinding.
Text 3
I Dr. Karin Heimnitz, gepromoveerd op problemen bij pasgeboren kinderen, 
zegt dat zwangere vrouwen die hun cholesterolgehalte verlagen minder 
kans hebben op vroeggeboorte.
II Karin Heimnitz, student Verloskunde aan de Hogeschool Utrecht, zegt dat 
zwangere vrouwen die hun cholesterolgehalte verlagen minder kans 
hebben op vroeggeboorte.
III Dr. Karin Heimnitz, gepromoveerd op aandoeningen van het zenuwstelsel, 
zegt dat zwangere vrouwen die hun cholesterolgehalte verlagen minder 
kans hebben op vroeggeboorte.
IV Dr. Karin Heimnitz, gepromoveerd op problemen bij pasgeboren kinderen 
en nu werkzaam bij het Becel Institute, zegt dat zwangere vrouwen die hun 
cholesterolgehalte verlagen minder kans hebben op vroeggeboorte.
V Dr. Karin Heimnitz, gepromoveerd op problemen bij pasgeboren kinderen, 
zegt dat zwangere vrouwen die hun cholesterolgehalte in het laatste 
stadium van de zwangerschap onder controle houden minder kans hebben 
op vroeggeboorte.
Claim Zwangere vrouwen die hun cholesterolgehalte verlagen, lopen dus minder 
risico om een te vroeg geboren kind te baren.
Text 4
I Op de website van het vakblad Pedagogiek in de Praktijk beweren 
pedagogen dat kinderen die vroeg Monopoly leren spelen later beter met 
geld omgaan.
II Op het discussieforum van het elektronisch magazine Ouders Online 
beweren bezoekers dat kinderen die vroeg Monopoly leren spelen later 
beter met geld omgaan
III Op de website van het vakblad Geschiedenis van de Onderwijskunde 
beweren onderwijskundigen dat kinderen die vroeg Monopoly leren spelen 
later beter met geld omgaan.
IV Op de website “Speelwijzer” van de Verenigde Speelgoedfabrikanten 
beweren pedagogen dat kinderen die vroeg Monopoly leren spelen later 
beter met geld omgaan.
V Op de website van het vakblad Pedagogiek in de Praktijk beweren 
pedagogen dat kinderen die onder begeleiding van ouders en leraren 
Monopoly leren spelen eerder de waarde van geld leren kennen.
Claim Kinderen die op jonge leeftijd Monopoly leren spelen kunnen later dus 
beter met geld omgaan.
Text 5
I Onderzoekers van de afdeling Bewegingswetenschappen van de Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam zijn van mening dat het gebruik van honing de 
prestatie tijdens duurtraining verbetert.
II Leerlingen van het Holland College, opleiding MBO-Voeding en Sport, zijn 
van mening dat het gebruik van honing de prestatie tijdens duurtraining 
verbetert.
III Onderzoekers van de afdeling Revalidatiegeneeskunde van de Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam zijn van mening dat het gebruik van honing de 
prestatie tijdens duurtraining verbetert.
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IV Onderzoekers van de Vrije Universiteit die samenwerken met Langnese 
Honing, de Duitse honingproducent, zijn van mening dat het gebruik van 
honing de prestatie tijdens duurtraining verbetert.
V Onderzoekers van de afdeling Bewegingswetenschappen van de Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam zijn van mening dat bepaalde voedingsstoffen, die 
ook wel in honing zitten, sportprestaties kunnen verbeteren
Claim Het eten van honing leidt dus tot betere prestaties bij duursporten.
Text 6
I Volgens onderzoekers van de Universiteit Antwerpen, departement 
Biologie, zullen bruinvissen zich eerder voortplanten, wanneer het boren 
naar olie aan banden wordt gelegd.
II Volgens leden van de Vlaamse Werkgroep Biologie zullen bruinvissen zich 
eerder voortplanten, wanneer het boren naar olie aan banden wordt 
gelegd.
III Volgens onderzoekers van de Universiteit Antwerpen, departement 
Natuurkunde, zullen bruinvissen zich eerder voortplanten, wanneer het 
boren naar olie aan banden wordt gelegd.
IV Volgens onderzoekers van de Vlaamse tak van Save Our Oceans zullen 
bruinvissen zich eerder voortplanten, wanneer het boren naar olie aan 
banden wordt gelegd.
V Volgens onderzoekers van de Universiteit Antwerpen, departement 
Biologie, zal het leefklimaat van bruinvissen aanzienlijk aan kwaliteit 
winnen, wanneer het boren naar olie aan banden wordt gelegd.
Claim Als er dus minder naar olie wordt geboord in zeeën, dan planten 
bruinvissen zich eerder voort.
Text 7
I ME-specialisten in het Universitair Medisch Centrum Utrecht beweren dat 
melkchocolade bevorderlijk is voor het welbevinden van mensen die aan 
ME lijden.
II Co-assistenten die in het Universitair Medisch Centrum Utrecht met ME- 
patiënten werken, beweren dat melkchocolade bevorderlijk is voor het 
welbevinden van mensen die aan ME lijden.
III ADHD-specialisten in het Universitair Medisch Centrum Utrecht beweren 
dat melkchocolade bevorderlijk is voor het welbevinden van mensen die 
aan ME lijden.
IV ME-specialisten in het Universitair Medisch Centrum beweren op de 
website van Milka dat melkchocolade bevorderlijk is voor het welbevinden 
van mensen die aan ME lijden.
V ME-specialisten in het Universitair Medisch Centrum Utrecht vermoeden 
dat bestanddelen die ook wel in melkchocolade worden verwerkt, 
bevorderlijk kunnen zijn voor het welbevinden van mensen die aan ME 
lijden.
Claim Dus: mensen die lijden aan het chronische vermoeidheidssyndroom ME 
gaan zich waarschijnlijk beter voelen als ze melkchocolade eten.
Text 8 ___________________________________________________________________________________________
I In een recente publicatie in het vakblad voor tandheelkundigen worden
groene theebladeren geadviseerd, omdat ze beschermen tegen ontstoken 
tandvlees.
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II In een recente nieuwsbrief van de Patiëntenbelangenvereniging 
Tandheelkunde worden groene theebladeren geadviseerd, omdat ze 
beschermen tegen ontstoken tandvlees.
III In een recente publicatie in het vakblad voor erfelijkheidsdeskundigen 
worden groene theebladeren geadviseerd, omdat ze beschermen tegen 
ontstoken tandvlees.
IV In een recente publicatie op de website van Pickwick worden door 
tandheelkundigen groene theebladeren geadviseerd, omdat ze 
beschermen tegen ontstoken tandvlees.
V In een recente publicatie in het vakblad voor tandheelkundigen worden 
groene theebladeren geadviseerd, omdat ze, als ze voldoende vers zijn, 
beschermen tegen ontstoken tandvlees.
Claim Groene theebladeren kun je dus gebruiken ter voorkoming van ontstoken 
tandvlees.
Text 9
I In een rapport van media-onderzoekers van de Universiteit van Amsterdam 
staat dat slachtoffers van ongevallen en geweld gebaat zijn bij het kijken 
naar praatprogramma's op televisie.
II In een werkstuk van studenten van de HBO-opleiding Media en 
Samenleving staat dat slachtoffers van ongevallen en van geweld gebaat 
zijn bij het kijken naar praatprogramma's op televisie.
III In een rapport van verslavingsonderzoekers van de Universiteit van 
Amsterdam staat dat slachtoffers van ongevallen en geweld gebaat zijn bij 
het kijken naar praatprogramma's op televisie.
IV In een rapport van media-onderzoekers van de Universiteit van 
Amsterdam, geschreven in opdracht van Endemol, staat dat slachtoffers 
van ongevallen en geweld gebaat zijn bij het kijken naar praatprogramma's 
op televisie.
V In een rapport van media-onderzoekers van de Universiteit van Amsterdam 
staat dat slachtoffers van ongevallen en geweld gebaat zijn bij het kijken 
naar praatprogramma's op televisie, als dat gecombineerd wordt met 
andere vormen van therapie.
Claim Het kijken naar praatprogramma's op televisie kan dus helpen om trauma's 
te verwerken.
Text 10
I Volgens marketingprofessionals op Marketing Online, de website van het 
Tijdschrift voor Marketing, zullen minder Nederlanders fastfoodketens 
bezoeken wanneer ze in supermarkten aangespoord worden om ovenfriet 
aan te schaffen.
II Volgens Xanders weblog, een weblog over marketing, zullen minder 
Nederlanders fastfoodketens bezoeken wanneer ze in supermarkten 
aangespoord worden om ovenfriet aan te schaffen.
III Volgens IT-professionals op Automatisering Online, de website van het 
Tijdschrift voor Automatisering, zullen minder Nederlanders fastfoodketens 
bezoeken wanneer ze in supermarkten aangespoord worden om ovenfriet 
aan te schaffen.
IV Volgens marketingprofessionals op de website van Aviko, producent van 
friet en andere aardappelproducten, zullen minder Nederlanders
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fastfoodketens bezoeken wanneer ze in supermarkten aangespoord 
worden om ovenfriet aan te schaffen.
V Volgens Marketing Online, de website van het Tijdschrift voor Marketing, 
zullen minder Nederlanders geneigd zijn om friet te bestellen bij 
fastfoodketens wanneer ze in supermarkten aangespoord worden om 
ovenfriet aan te schaffen.
Claim Dus: als Nederlanders met verkooppromoties in supermarkten worden 
gestimuleerd om ovenfriet te kopen, dan gaan ze minder snel naar 
fastfoodketens, zoals McDonald's.
Argument from cause to effect:
Text 1
VI Als woonwinkels Mozart draaien, dan heeft dat een positief effect op de 
stemming van de consumenten. Dat verhoogt de omzet.
VII Als woonwinkels Mozart draaien, dan blijven consumenten daar langer 
naar de muziek luisteren. Dat verhoogt de omzet.
VIII In de meeste gevallen behalen woonwinkels financieel voordeel wanneer 
ze klassieke muziek spelen.
IX In de meeste gevallen behalen woonwinkels financieel voordeel wanneer 
ze populaire muziek spelen.
X In de meeste gevallen behalen woonwinkels reclamevoordeel wanneer ze 
klassieke muziek spelen.
Claim Het draaien van Mozarts muziek in woonwinkels leidt dus tot een hogere 
omzet.
Text 2
VI Als je gember eet, dan worden je spijsvertering en bloedcirculatie 
gestimuleerd. Dat leidt tot betere hardloopprestaties.
VII Als je gember eet, dan wordt je lichaamstemperatuur verhoogd. Dat leidt 
tot betere hardloopprestaties.
VIII Het eten van specerijen leidt over het algemeen tot betere prestaties bij 
duursporten.
IX Het eten van groenten leidt over het algemeen tot betere prestaties bij 
duursporten.
X Het eten van specerijen leidt over het algemeen tot betere prestaties bij 
krachtsporten.
Claim Het eten van gember verhoogt dus de prestaties bij hardlopen.
Text 3
VI Kinderen een voorlichtingsfilmpje laten zien over het veilig gebruik van een 
papierschaar zorgt ervoor dat ze een schaar op een veilige manier weten 
te gebruiken. Ze zullen zich dan minder gauw snijden.
VII Kinderen een voorlichtingsfilmpje laten zien over het veilig gebruik van een 
papierschaar zorgt ervoor dat ze minder snel een schaar durven gebruiken. 
Ze zullen zich dan minder gauw snijden.
VIII Voorlichtingsfilms over het veilig gebruik van handgereedschap zorgen 
meestal voor een afname van verwondingen.
IX Voorlichtingsfilms over het veilig gebruik van machinegereedschap zorgen
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meestal voor een afname van verwondingen.
X Voorlichtingsfilms over het veilig gebruik van handgereedschap zorgen 
meestal voor een afname van kneuzingen.
Claim Dus: als kinderen een voorlichtingsfilmpje zien over het veilig gebruik van 
een papierschaar, dan snijden ze zich minder vaak in de vingers.
Text 4
VI Met meer financiële ondersteuning kan het Van Gogh museum in 
Amsterdam meer geld steken in promotie-activiteiten. De aantallen 
buitenlandse museumbezoekers zullen daardoor stijgen.
VII Met meer financiële ondersteuning kan het Van Gogh museum in 
Amsterdam meer geld steken in sanitaire voorzieningen. De aantallen 
buitenlandse museumbezoekers zullen daardoor stijgen.
VIII Het financieel steunen van kunstmusea leidt doorgaans tot een toename 
van museumtoerisme.
IX Het financieel steunen van oudheidkundige musea leidt doorgaans tot een 
toename van museumtoerisme.
X Het financieel steunen van kunstmusea leidt doorgaans tot een toename 
van massatoerisme
Claim Dus: als het Van Gogh museum meer financiële ondersteuning krijgt, dan 
nemen de aantallen museumbezoekers uit het buitenland toe.
Text 5
VI Als je shampoo gebruikt, dan komen milieubelastende stoffen in de afvoer 
terecht. Dat kan een schadelijk effect hebben op de waterkwaliteit in sloten.
VII Als je shampoo gebruikt, dan blijf je wat langer onder de douche staan. Dat 
kan een schadelijk effect hebben op de waterkwaliteit in sloten.
VIII Cosmetica die het lichaam reinigen hebben doorgaans een negatieve 
invloed op het oppervlaktewater.
IX Cosmetica die het lichaam beschermen hebben doorgaans een negatieve 
invloed op het oppervlaktewater.
X Cosmetica die het lichaam reinigen hebben doorgaans een negatieve 
invloed op het grondwater.
Claim Het gebruik van shampoo heeft dus mogelijk schadelijke effecten op de 
waterkwaliteit in sloten.
Text 6
VI Als men insecticiden gebruikt, dan kunnen rupsen er op den duur resistent 
tegen worden. En dan wordt een rupsenplaag alleen maar erger.
VII Als men insecticiden gebruikt, dan kan het aantal kevers op den duur 
afnemen. En dan wordt een rupsenplaag alleen maar erger.
VIII Het gebruik van chemische bestrijdingsmiddelen zorgt meestal voor een 
toename van plaaginsecten.
IX Het gebruik van biologische bestrijdingsmiddelen zorgt meestal voor een 
toename van plaaginsecten.
X Het gebruik van chemische bestrijdingsmiddelen zorgt meestal voor een 
toename van stekende insecten.
Claim Het gebruik van insecticiden in land- en tuinbouw kan dus leiden tot een 
toename van rupsen.
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Text 7
VI Pindakaas verlaagt het cholesterolgehalte in het bloed en vermindert 
daarmee de kans op galstenen.
VII Pindakaas vermindert het hongergevoel en verlaagt daarmee de kans op 
galstenen.
VIII Broodbeleg van plantaardige oorsprong helpt doorgaans tegen 
galblaasaandoeningen.
IX Broodbeleg van dierlijke oorsprong helpt doorgaans tegen 
galblaasaandoeningen.
X Broodbeleg van plantaardige oorsprong helpt doorgaans tegen lymfe- 
aandoeningen
Claim Het eten van pindakaas beschermt dus tegen galstenen.
Text 8
VI Inname van olijfolie leidt ertoe dat je ontstekingsremmende stoffen 
binnenkrijgt. Dat kan een pijnstillende werking hebben.
VII Inname van olijfolie leidt ertoe dat je meer vocht binnenkrijgt. Dat kan een 
pijnstillende werking hebben.
VIII Plantaardige oliën helpen meestal bij gewrichtsaandoeningen.
IX Dierlijke oliën helpen meestal bij gewrichtsaandoeningen.
X Plantaardige oliën helpen meestal bij zenuwaandoeningen
Claim Dus: olijfolie kan pijn bij reumapatiënten bestrijden.
Text 9
VI Bij poker kun je spelen met fiches die een geldwaarde voorstellen. Dan leer 
je vanzelf beter optellen en aftrekken.
VII Bij poker kun je bluffen over de kwaliteit van je speelkaarten. Dan leer je 
vanzelf beter optellen en aftrekken.
VIII Van het spelen van kaartspellen word je doorgaans beter in rekenen.
IX Van het spelen van denkspellen word je doorgaans beter in rekenen.
X Van het spelen van kaartspellen word je doorgaans beter in schatten.
Claim Dus: als je regelmatig poker speelt, dan leer je beter optellen en aftrekken.
Text 10
VI Meer voorlichting over koffie en thee zorgt ervoor dat mensen een 
afwijzende houding ten aanzien van deze producten krijgen. Dat minder 
mensen er dan verslaafd aan raken, is het gevolg.
VII Meer voorlichting over koffie en thee zorgt ervoor dat bedrijven en 
kantoren minder koffieautomaten neerzetten. Dat minder mensen er dan 
verslaafd aan raken, is het gevolg.
VIII Meestal geldt: hoe meer voorlichting over stimulerende middelen, des te 
minder verslaving aan genotmiddelen.
IX Meestal geldt: hoe meer voorlichting over verdovende middelen, des te 
minder verslaving aan genotmiddelen.
X Meestal geldt: hoe meer voorlichting over stimulerende middelen, des te 
minder verslaving aan geneesmiddelen
Claim Dus: als er meer voorlichting komt over de werking van koffie en thee, dan 
zullen minder mensen daaraan verslaafd raken.
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Arguments from example:
Text 1
XI De 13-jarige Gertjan Vriesering greep vaker naar de chocolade, toen het 
weer slecht was en hij binnen moest blijven.
XII De 13-jarige Gertjan Vriesering greep vaker naar de chips, toen het weer 
slecht was en hij binnen moest blijven.
XIII De 13-jarige Gertjan Vriesering greep vaker naar de chocolade, toen het 
weer slecht was en hij binnen moest blijven. Of neem de 10-jarige Emilie 
Kruithof. Toen ze van haar moeder thuis moest blijven vanwege slecht 
weer, begon ze veel drop te eten.
XIV De 13-jarige Gertjan Vriesering greep vaker naar de chocolade, toen het 
weer slecht was en hij binnen moest blijven. Of neem de 10-jarige Emilie 
Kruithof. Toen ze van haar moeder thuis moest blijven vanwege slecht 
weer, begon ze veel chips te eten.
XV De 13-jarige Gertjan Vriesering greep vaker naar de chips, toen het weer 
slecht was en hij binnen moest blijven. Of neem de 10-jarige Emilie 
Kruithof. Toen ze van haar moeder thuis moest blijven vanwege slecht 
weer, begon ze veel pepermunt te eten.
Claim Als je je kinderen thuis laat blijven bij slecht weer, dan snoepen ze dus 
meer.
Text 2
XI Als mensen die problemen hebben met hun evenwicht regelmatig handbal 
spelen, dan kunnen ze sneller herstellen.
XII Als mensen die problemen hebben met hun evenwicht regelmatig 
waterpolo spelen, dan kunnen ze sneller herstellen.
XIII Als mensen die problemen hebben met hun evenwicht regelmatig handbal 
spelen, dan kunnen ze sneller herstellen. Of basketbal: dat helpt ook het 
evenwichtsgevoel te ontwikkelen.
XIV Als mensen die problemen hebben met hun evenwicht regelmatig handbal 
spelen, dan kunnen ze sneller herstellen. Of waterpolo: dat helpt ook het 
evenwichtsgevoel te ontwikkelen.
XV Als mensen die problemen hebben met hun evenwicht regelmatig 
waterpolo spelen, dan kunnen ze sneller herstellen. Of ijshockey: dat helpt 
ook het evenwichtsgevoel te ontwikkelen.
Claim Mensen met een evenwichtstoornis hebben dus baat bij het beoefenen van 
een balsport.
Text 3
XI Toen de 70-jarige Bert Tiemes op advies van de huisarts minder 
medicijnen innam, maakte hij minder valpartijen.
XII Toen de 60-jarige Bert Tiemes op advies van de huisarts minder 
medicijnen innam, maakte hij minder valpartijen.
XIII Toen de 70-jarige Bert Tiemes op advies van de huisarts minder 
medicijnen innam, maakte hij minder valpartijen. Of neem de 75-jarige 
Frans Lagerman. Toen hij stopte met bepaalde medicijnen, viel hij minder 
vaak.
XIV Toen de 70-jarige Bert Tiemes op advies van de huisarts minder 
medicijnen innam, maakte hij minder valpartijen. Of neem de 60-jarige 
Frans Lagerman. Toen hij stopte met bepaalde medicijnen, viel hij minder
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vaak.
XV Toen de 60-jarige Bert Tiemes op advies van de huisarts minder 
medicijnen innam, maakte hij minder valpartijen. Of neem de 63-jarige 
Frans Lagerman. Toen hij stopte met bepaalde medicijnen, viel hij minder 
vaak.
Claim Als bejaarden minder medicijnen slikken, dan lopen ze dus minder risico 
om te vallen.
Text 4
XI Als je een vogelkastje maakt voor nachtegalen, dan zijn hun eieren beter 
beschermd.
XII Als je een vogelkastje maakt voor huismussen, dan zijn hun eieren beter 
beschermd.
XIII Als je een vogelkastje maakt voor nachtegalen, dan zijn hun eieren beter 
beschermd. Ook zanglijsters broeden veiliger in je tuin.
XIV Als je een vogelkastje maakt voor nachtegalen, dan zijn hun eieren beter 
beschermd. Ook huismussen broeden veiliger in je tuin.
XV Als je een vogelkastje maakt voor huismussen, dan zijn hun eieren beter 
beschermd. Ook koolmezen broeden veiliger in je tuin.
Claim Dus: als meer mensen vogelkastjes in hun tuin maken voor zangvogels, 
dan zijn de nesten van die vogels beter beschermd.
Text 5
XI Mensen die iedere dag op een grote trom spelen, lopen een verhoogd 
risico op gehoorverlies bij hoge tonen.
XII Mensen die iedere dag op een tamboerijn spelen, lopen een verhoogd 
risico op gehoorverlies bij hoge tonen.
XIII Mensen die iedere dag op een grote trom spelen, lopen een verhoogd 
risico op gehoorverlies bij hoge tonen. Dat geldt trouwens ook voor 
diegenen die dagelijks gong spelen.
XIV Mensen die iedere dag op een grote trom spelen, lopen een verhoogd 
risico op gehoorverlies bij hoge tonen. Dat geldt trouwens ook voor 
diegenen die dagelijks tamboerijn spelen.
XV Mensen die iedere dag op een tamboerijn spelen, lopen een verhoogd 
risico op gehoorverlies bij hoge tonen. Dat geldt trouwens ook voor 
diegenen die dagelijks xylofoon spelen.
Claim Mensen die dus dagelijks een slaginstrument bespelen, lopen een groter 
risico om doofheid voor hoge tonen te ontwikkelen.
Text 6
XI Als je een geranium in je slaapkamer zet, dan zou je nachtrust daarbij 
gebaat kunnen zijn.
XII Als je bamboe in je slaapkamer zet, dan zou je nachtrust daarbij gebaat 
kunnen zijn.
XIII Als je een geranium in je slaapkamer zet, dan zou je nachtrust daarbij 
gebaat kunnen zijn. Ook een ficus wil nog wel eens bijdragen aan een 
goede nachtrust.
XIV Als je een geranium in je slaapkamer zet, dan zou je nachtrust daarbij 
gebaat kunnen zijn. Ook bamboe wil nog wel eens bijdragen aan een 
goede nachtrust.
XV Als je bamboe in je slaapkamer zet, dan zou je nachtrust daarbij gebaat
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kunnen zijn. Ook een cactus wil nog wel eens bijdragen aan een goede 
nachtrust.
Claim Als je dus een kamerplant op je slaapkamer houdt, dan kan dat leiden tot 
een betere nachtrust.
Text 7
XI Mensen gaan eerder met de metro als daarvoor reclame wordt gemaakt op 
TV.
XII Mensen gaan eerder met de treintaxi als daarvoor reclame wordt gemaakt 
op TV.
XIII Mensen gaan eerder met de metro als daarvoor reclame wordt gemaakt op 
TV. Of ze pakken eerder de tram, als daarover TV-spotjes worden 
uitgezonden.
XIV Mensen gaan eerder met de metro als daarvoor reclame wordt gemaakt op 
TV. Of ze pakken eerder de treintaxi, als daarover TV-spotjes worden 
uitgezonden.
XV Mensen gaan eerder met de treintaxi als daarvoor reclame wordt gemaakt 
op TV. Of ze pakken eerder de veerpont, als daarover TV-spotjes worden 
uitgezonden.
Claim Televisiereclame voor het gebruik van een openbaar vervoermiddel leidt er 
dus toe dat meer mensen met dat vervoermiddel gaan reizen.
Text 8
XI Het naspoelen van handdoeken met schoonmaakazijn verkleint de kans op 
aandoeningen van de huid.
XII Het naspoelen van strandlakens met schoonmaakazijn verkleint de kans op 
aandoeningen van de huid.
XIII Het naspoelen van handdoeken met schoonmaakazijn verkleint de kans op 
aandoeningen van de huid. Ook het naspoelen van washandjes kan de 
kans op huidaandoeningen verkleinen.
XIV Het naspoelen van handdoeken met schoonmaakazijn verkleint de kans op 
aandoeningen van de huid. Ook het naspoelen van strandlakens kan de 
kans op huidaandoeningen verkleinen.
XV Het naspoelen van strandlakens met schoonmaakazijn verkleint de kans op 
aandoeningen van de huid. Ook het naspoelen van badstoffen slippers kan 
de kans op huidaandoeningen verkleinen.
Claim Als je badtextiel dus naspoelt met schoonmaakazijn, dan heb je minder 
kans op huidziekten.
Text 9
XI Het eten van kaas kan nachtblindheid voorkomen.
XII Het eten van pudding kan nachtblindheid voorkomen.
XIII Het eten van kaas kan nachtblindheid voorkomen. Ook echte boter kan het 
risico op deze aandoening verlagen.
XIV Het eten van kaas kan nachtblindheid voorkomen. Ook pudding kan het 
risico op deze aandoening verlagen.
XV Het eten van pudding kan nachtblindheid voorkomen. Ook pap kan het 
risico op deze aandoening verlagen.
Claim Het eten van zuivelproducten verlaagt dus de kans op nachtblindheid.
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Text 10
XI Alexander kreeg als scholier onderwijs in Oud-Grieks en is geschiedenis 
gaan studeren.
XII Alexander kreeg als scholier onderwijs in Hebreeuws en is geschiedenis 
gaan studeren.
XIII Alexander kreeg als scholier onderwijs in Oud-Grieks en is geschiedenis 
gaan studeren. Of neem Stan. Hij kreeg lessen Latijn op de middelbare 
school en nu is hij begonnen aan een studie Geschiedenis.
XIV Alexander kreeg als kind onderwijs in Oud-Grieks en is geschiedenis gaan 
studeren. Of neem Stan. Hij kreeg lessen Hebreeuws op de middelbare 
school en nu is hij begonnen aan een studie Geschiedenis.
XV Alexander kreeg als kind onderwijs in Hebreeuws en is geschiedenis gaan 
studeren. Of neem Stan. Hij kreeg lessen Arabisch op de middelbare 
school en nu is hij begonnen aan een studie Geschiedenis.
Claim Als scholieren dus les krijgen in klassieke talen, dan is de kans groter dat 
ze later geschiedenis gaan studeren.
Circular arguments:
Text 1
Een overheid die clubhuizen voor jongeren beter in de gaten houdt, voorkomt dat
de jeugd geestelijk en lichamelijk afhankelijk wordt van bier.__________________________
Wanneer jeugdhonken beter gecontroleerd worden door de overheid, dan leidt dat 
dus tot minder bierverslaving onder jongeren.__________________________________________
Text 2_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Wie als kind vele malen in gezinsverband eet, heeft als volwassene mogelijk een
gezonder voedingspatroon._______________________________________________________________
Als je dus vaak met het gezin eet in je jeugd, dan eet je op latere leeftijd 
waarschijnlijk gezonder.__________________________________________________________________
Text 3_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Gescheurde spiervezels kun je voorkomen door te rennen op sportschoenen die
hoger zijn van prijs._______________________________________________________________________
Het lopen op duurdere sportschoenen verlaagt dus het risico op spierscheuringen.
Text 4
Politieagenten die staken of demonstreren op gedenkdagen van grote betekenis,
bezorgen hun werkgever een slechtere naam._________________________________________
Dus: als politiemedewerkers op belangrijke feestdagen actie voeren, dan gaat dat 
ten koste van de reputatie van de politie._______________________________________________
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Appendix 6C Results manipulation checks
Table 6C1 Mean scores on manipulation checks for arguments from authority (SD
between parentheses; text numbers correspond to texts numbers in appendix 6B).
Relevant expertise 
(1=very incompetent in the field the 
statement is in;
7= very competent in the field the 
statement is in)
Bias
(1=very unbiased towards the field 
the statement is in;
7=very biased towards the field the 
statements is in)
Text Strong Weak Test Strong Weak Test
condition condition result condition condition result
(I) (III)
violates
relevant
expertise
criterion
(all p- 
values 
one­
tailed)
(I) (IV)
violates
trustworthi
-ness
criterion
(all p- 
values 
one­
tailed)
1 5.51 4.13 t (76) = 3.89 5.28 t (75) = -
(1.52) (1.87) 3.59, p < 
.001***
(1.84) (1.50) 3.63, p < 
.001***
2 5.44 4.13 t (67) = 4.31 5.42 t (75) = -
(1.14) (1.41) 4.24, p < 
.001***
(1.75) (1.42) 3.06, p < 
.002**
3 5.55 4.51 t (64.4) = 3.29 5.26 t (68) = -
(1.03) (1.52) 3.39, p < 
.001***
(1.55) (1.76) 4.89, p < 
.001***
4 5.05 4.28 t (76) = 3.79 5.58 t (68) = -
(1.49) (1.57) 2.22, p < 
.02*
(1.47) (1.46) 5.07, p < 
.001***
5 5.21 4.87 t (76) = 3.13 5.13 t (76) = -
(1.15) (1.58) 107, p = 
.145
(1.52) (1.61) 5.64, p < 
.001***
6 5.49 5.03 t (76) = 4.10 5.58 t (75) = -
(1.17) (1.58) 147, p = 
.074
(1.60) (1.50) 4.17, p < 
.001***
7 5.67 4.06 t (68) = 2.97 4.36 t (68.4) = -
(1.58) (1.79) 3.98, p < 
.001***
(2.01) (1.50) 3.43, p < 
.001***
8 5.87 3.74 t (68) = 2.87 5.26 t (68) = -
(.92) (1.70) 6.28, p < 
.001***
(1.59) (1.62) 6.18, p < 
.001***
9 4.55 3.51 t (75) = 3.90 5.19 t (68) = -
(1.37) (1.88) 2.77, p < 
.004**
(1.80) (1.47) 3.24, p = 
.001***
10 4.13 2.56 t (76) = 4.37 5.82 t (75) = -
(1.54) (1.35) 4.76, p < 
.001***
(1.75) (1.50) 3.92, p < 
.001***
* < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001
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Table 6C2 Mean scores on manipulation checks for arguments from cause to effect 
with two causal connections (SD between parentheses; text numbers correspond to 
texts numbers in appendix 6B)._________________________ __________________________________
Probability 
(1=very improbable; 7 = very 
probable)
Text Causal Strong Weak Test result (all p-values
connection condition VI 
meets cause 
suffiency 
criterion
condition VII 
violates 
cause 
sufficiency 
criterion
one-tailed)
1 1 3.77 1.38) 3.56 1.59) t (68) = .58, p = .28
2 5.35 1.17) 4.56 1.48) t (68) = 2.43, p = .009**
2 1 4.59 .91) 4.41 1.45) t (64) = .66, p = .257
2 5.18 1.23) 3.97 1.46) t (76) = 3.94, p < .001***
3 1 4.77 1.56) 3.45 1.48) t (68) = 3.59, p < .001***
2 5.79 1.32) 4.48 1.90) t (51.6) = 3.27, p = .001***
4 1 6.10 1.17) 5.69 1.24) t (76) = 1.51, p = .068
2 5.31 1.00) 3.15 1.53) t (65.6) = 7.35, p < .001***
5 1 5.44 1.60) 5.28 1.61) t (76) = .42, p = .337
2 5.21 1.91) 3.49 1.57) t (76) = 4.34, p < .001***
6 1 5.39 1.36) 5.33 1.03) t (68) = .19, p = .426
2 5.55 1.36) 4.64 1.31) t (68) = 2.83, p = .003**
7 1 3.85 1.66) 4.97 1.46) t (76) = -3.18, p = .001*** 
(contrary direction)
2 4.44 1.27) 3.56 1.55) t (76) = 2.71, p = .004**
8 1 4.10 1.35) 3.90 1.81) t (68) = .53, p = .300
2 5.03 1.53) 4.06 1.61) t (68) = 2.55, p < .007**
9 1 5.72 1.69) 6.49 .94) t (59.7) = -2.49, p = .008** 
(contrary direction)
2 4.87 1.61) 3.23 1.95) t (76) = 4.05, p < .001***
10 1 3.59 1.37) 3.38 1.60) t (76) = .61, p = .273
2 5.08 1.33) 3.51 1.71) t (71.5) = 4.51, p < .001***
* < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001
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Table 6C3 Mean scores on manipulation checks for arguments from cause to effect 
with a causal generalization (SD between parentheses; different letters refer to 
significant differences between groups appearing from post hoc tests (LSD), p < .05; 
text numbers correspond to texts numbers in appendix 6B). ________________________
Probability 
(1=very improbable; 7 = very probable)
Text Condition (VIII) 
Strong: 
meets criteria 
(6)-(7)
Condition (IX) 
Weak: 
violates 
relevant cause 
criterion (6)
Condition (X) 
Weak: 
violates relevant 
effect criterion 
(7)
Test result
1 4.03 (1.20) 
a
4.79 (1.44) 
b
4.13 (1.49) 
a
F (2, 114) = 3.56, p 
= .032*
2 3.82 (1.25) 
a
4.77 (1.23) 
b
3.00 (1.45) 
c
F (2, 106) = 15.57, 
p = .000***
3 5.23 (.99) 5.62 (1.57) 4.90 (1.57) F (2, 114) = 2.57, p 
= .081
4 4.67 (1.66) 
a
4.49 (1.43) 
ab
3.77 (1.56) 
b
F (2, 106) = 3.09, p 
= .050*
5 4.90 (1.30) 4.92 (1.26) 5.00 (1.38) F (2, 106) = .06, p 
= .946
6 4.38 (1.39) 4.28 (1.59) 3.67 (1.42) F (2, 114) = 2.73, p 
= .070
7 3.38 (1.27) 
a
3.39 (1.36) 
a
4.08 (1.35) 
b
F (2, 106) = 3.42, p 
= .036*
8 3.82 (1.62) 3.85 (1.55) 4.13 (1.40) F (2, 114) = .49, p 
= .615
9 4.67 (1.28) 5.36 (1.35) 5.03 (1.22) F (2, 106) = 2.81, p 
= .065
10 4.57 (1.30) 4.46 (1.50) 4.41 (1.82) F (2, 105) = .09, p 
= .919
* < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001
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Table 6C4 Mean scores on manipulation checks for arguments from example (SD 
between parentheses; a lower number indicates lower perceived typicality; different 
letters a-d refer to significant differences between groups, p < .05).___________________
Text Condition 
(XI) 
typical 
example A1
Condition 
(XII) 
atypical 
example A1
Condition 
(XIII) 
typical 
example A2
Condition 
(XV) 
atypical 
example A2
Test result
1 5.54 (1.70) 
a
4.23 (1.94) 
b
6.03 (1.53) 
a
4.54 (2.06) 
b
F (3,144) = 
7.78, p = 
.000***
2 5.69 (1.54) 
a
4.05 (2.01) 
b
6.21 (1.26) 
a
2.71 (1.90) 
c
F (3,144) = 
30.83, p = 
.000***
3 5.82 (1.32) 
a
2.72 (1.82) 
b
5.81 (1.22) 
a
3.38 (1.91) 
b
F (3,144) = 
37.09, p = 
.000***
4 6.03 (1.05) 
a
3.05 (1.96) 
b
5.92 (1.42) 
a
4.69 (1.82) 
c
F (3,144) = 
27.06, p = 
.000***
5 5.69 (1.52) 
a
4.41 (2.09) 
b
4.46 (2.05) 
b
4.44 (2.00) 
b
F (3,152) = 
4.15, p = 
.007**
6 5.49 (1.85) 
a
3.00 (1.26) 
b
5.38 (1.50) 
a
4.10 (1.71) 
c
F (3,144) = 
18.41, p = 
.000***
7 6.23 (1.13) 
a
4.46 (1.94) 
b
5.85 (1.65) 
a
3.35 (1.85) 
c
F (3,144) = 
21.87, p = 
.000***
8 6.38 (.88) 
a
5.31 (1.61) 
b
5.77 (1.23) 
b
3.79 (1.91) 
c
F (3,144) = 
21.77, p = 
.000***
9 6.23 (.88) 
a
4.49 (1.83) 
b
5.90 (1.45) 
a
4.23 (2.03) 
b
F (3,144) = 
13.34, p = 
.000***
10 6.36 (1.22) 
a
4.18 (1.80) 
b
6.64 (.87) 
a
3.31 (1.82) 
c
F (3,152) = 
47.15, p = 
.000***
** < .01, *** < .001
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Summary in Dutch
Titel: The good, the bad and the persuasive
Ondertitel: Normatieve kwaliteit en daadwerkelijke overtuigings­
kracht van autoriteitsargumenten, argumenten van oorzaak naar 
gevolg en voorbeeldargumenten
Inleiding
Veel onderzoekers hebben zich de vraag gesteld hoe mensen een 
standpunt evalueren dat hun in een persuasieve boodschap wordt 
voorgelegd. Zogenaamde dual-process-modellen, zoals Petty en 
Cacioppo’s invloedrijke Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), 
veronderstellen dat mensen een standpunt op twee manieren kunnen 
evalueren: op basis van een zorgvuldige afweging van relevante 
argumenten (‘centrale route’) of op basis van niet-inhoudelijke 
kenmerken (‘perifere route’), zoals de aantrekkelijkheid of status van 
de bron. Op welke manier de verwerking van een boodschap 
plaatsvindt, hangt af van een aantal factoren. Als mensen 
gemotiveerd en in staat zijn om de boodschap te verwerken, dan zijn 
ze eerder geneigd de argumenten aandachtig te beoordelen; anders 
richten ze zich eerder op perifere signalen.
Onder de voorwaarden dat men voldoende gemotiveerd is en 
in staat is om de boodschap te verwerken, kan argumentkwaliteit een 
belangrijke rol spelen in het overtuigingsproces. Sterke argumenten 
leiden tot acceptatie van het standpunt, terwijl zwakke argumenten 
niet tot overtuiging leiden. Gezien de vooraanstaande plaats die 
argumentkwaliteit inneemt in modellen van het overtuigingsproces, 
zou men verwachten dat onderzoekers een helder idee hebben van 
wat het begrip argumentkwaliteit inhoudt en dat ze voldoende inzicht 
hebben in cognitieve processen bij taalgebruikers die 
argumentkwaliteit beoordelen. Dit is echter niet het geval.
Voor het onderzoek naar persuasieve processen is het van 
belang om scherp te stellen wat een argument precies sterk of zwak 
maakt. Omdat argumentkwaliteit en de beoordeling ervan kan 
afhangen van het type argument dat is gebruikt, is het van belang bij 
onderzoek naar argumentkwaliteit rekening te houden met 
argumenttype. Een veel gebruikt argumenttype, zowel in het 
dagelijkse taalgebruik als in persuasieonderzoek, is het pragmatische 
argument. In pragmatische argumentatie wordt verdedigd dat een 
bepaalde handeling wenselijk of juist onwenselijk is op basis van de 
voordelen en/of nadelen van die handeling. Deze dissertatie richt zich
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op drie verschillende argumenttypen, namelijk het autoriteits- 
argument, het argument van oorzaak naar gevolg en het 
voorbeeldargument. Deze argumenttypen kunnen worden gebruikt ter 
ondersteuning van één van de twee premissen van het pragmatische 
argument: de premisse die de waarschijnlijkheid uitdrukt dat er een 
bepaald effect zal optreden als gevolg van een handeling 
(‘waarschijnlijkheidsclaim’). Daarom luidt het onderzoeksdoel:
Inzicht verschaffen in de specifieke kenmerken die de kwaliteit bepalen van 
het autoriteitsargument, het argument van oorzaak naar gevolg en het 
voorbeeldargument ter ondersteuning van de waarschijnlijkheidsclaim.
De normatieve argumentatietheorie biedt hier uitkomst. Ten eerste 
zijn daarin criteria geformuleerd, waaraan sterke argumenten zouden 
moeten voldoen. Er zijn bovendien criteria opgesteld die specifiek zijn 
voor bepaalde argumentatietypen. Ook aan het concretiseren van het 
centrale verwerkingsproces kan de normatieve argumentatietheorie 
een bijdrage leveren: op basis van de argumentatietypen en 
evaluatievragen die worden onderscheiden kunnen we voorspellen 
wat er in taalgebruikers om zou moeten gaan als ze argumenten 
aandachtig bestuderen en beoordelen. Deze hypotheses kunnen we 
vervolgens testen, om na te gaan of dat wat daadwerkelijk plaatsvindt 
in overeenstemming is met wat normatief vereist is in de 
argumentatietheorie. Dergelijk empirisch argumentatieonderzoek 
levert niet alleen een bijdrage aan het persuasieonderzoek, maar ook 
aan de argumentatietheorie, waarin men zich bezighoudt met de 
vraag of normen die op basis van theoretisch-analytische 
overwegingen zijn opgesteld ook deel uitmaken van de 
argumentatieve bagage van leken. De eerste onderzoeksvraag luidt 
daarom:
In welke mate corresponderen lekencriteria voor het autoriteitsargument, 
het argument van oorzaak naar gevolg en het voorbeeldargument met de 
criteria die zijn geformuleerd in de argumentatietheorie?
Daarbij zijn de volgende deelvragen geformuleerd:
(a) Welke criteria zijn geformuleerd in de argumentatietheorie om de 
kwaliteit te beoordelen van het autoriteitsargument, het argument van 
oorzaak naar gevolg en het voorbeeldargument?
(b) Welke criteria gebruiken leken om de kwaliteit te beoordelen van het 
autoriteitsargument, het argument van oorzaak naar gevolg en het 
voorbeeldargument?
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Het ELM suggereert dat normatief sterke argumenten onder condities 
die centrale verwerking oproepen overtuigender zijn dan normatief 
zwakke varianten. Om die reden is de tweede onderzoeksvraag 
gesteld:
Zijn normatief sterke autoriteitsargumenten, argument van oorzaak naar
gevolg en voorbeeldargumenten daadwerkelijk overtuigender dan normatief
zwakke argumenten?
Deel I: Criteria voor argumentkwaliteit
In het eerste deel van de dissertatie staat de vraag centraal in welke 
mate lekencriteria corresponderen met argumentatietheoretische 
criteria (onderzoeksvraag 1). In hoofdstuk 2 wordt deze vraag 
onderzocht voor het autoriteitsargument, in hoofdstuk 3 voor het 
argument van oorzaak naar gevolg en in hoofdstuk 4 voor het 
voorbeeldargument. Ieder onderzoek is min of meer op dezelfde wijze 
opgebouwd: eerst werd uitgezocht welke criteria er in de 
argumentatietheorie voor een bepaald argumenttype zijn 
geformuleerd (deelvraag 1a), vervolgens werd achterhaald welke 
criteria leken gebruiken om dat type te beoordelen (deelvraag 1b) en 
ten slotte werd nagegaan hoe de lekencriteria zich precies verhouden 
tot de criteria uit de argumentatietheorie en welke verschillen en 
overeenkomsten er op te merken zijn (onderzoeksvraag 1).
De argumentatietheoretische criteria zijn telkens onderzocht 
met literatuuronderzoek. Eerst werd een selectie van publicaties 
gemaakt in het domein van de argumentatieleer en vervolgens 
werden de evaluatiecriteria die in deze publicaties werden gevonden 
voor de onderzochte argumenttypen geïnventariseerd en 
gegroepeerd op basis van gemeenschappelijke kenmerken.
Om na te gaan wat de beste manier was om de lekencriteria 
te onderzoeken, werd besloten een methodologische voorstudie uit te 
voeren. De studie werd uitgevoerd binnen het onderzoek naar 
lekencriteria voor het autoriteitsargument (hoofdstuk 2). In deze 
studie werden respondenten door middel van casussen gestimuleerd 
na te denken over hun criteria voor argumentkwaliteit. In een gesloten 
casus kregen respondenten een standpunt voorgelegd en een lijst 
met zeven argumenten die elk niet aan verschillende, 
argumentatietheoretische criteria voldeden. De taak van de 
respondenten was een rangordening te maken van de argumenten, 
waarbij het sterkste argument op de eerste positie stond en het 
zwakste op de laatste positie. Nadat de respondenten een
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rangordening hadden opgeschreven, werd hun om toelichting 
gevraagd.
Waar de gesloten casus bedoeld was om respondenten 
criteria te ontlokken, was de open casus bedoeld om na te gaan 
welke criteria leken spontaan genereren. In de open casus werd de 
respondenten een standpunt voorgelegd, maar bedachten ze zelf een 
sterk en een zwak argument ter ondersteuning van het standpunt. In 
een daaropvolgend gesprek werd de respondenten gevraagd om uit 
te leggen op basis waarvan het onderscheid tussen sterk en zwak 
gemaakt was. De casussen werden in twee verschillende 
omstandigheden voorgelegd: in een individueel interview of in een 
focusgroep waaraan zes respondenten deelnamen.
Op basis van deze methodologische voorstudie (N = 48) werd 
vastgesteld dat individuele interviews, waarin respondenten door 
middel van een open en een gesloten casus worden aangezet tot 
reflectie op argumentkwaliteit, de meeste lekencriteria boven water 
brengen. Om die reden werd in het onderzoek naar lekencriteria voor 
het argument van oorzaak naar gevolg (hoofdstuk 3) en het 
voorbeeldargument (hoofdstuk 4) verder gewerkt met deze methode.
Het antwoord op onderzoeksvraag 1 kan als volgt worden 
geformuleerd: zoals te verwachten valt op basis van de 
argumentietheorie, gebruiken leken schema-specifieke criteria om de 
kwaliteit te bepalen van het autoriteitsargument, het argument van 
oorzaak naar gevolg en het voorbeeldargument. Deze criteria 
corresponderen in belangrijke mate met de criteria die in de 
argumentatietheorie voor deze argumenttypen zijn opgesteld. Wel 
lijken sommige criteria breder gedragen te worden dan andere. Voor 
het autoriteitsargument geldt dat er relatief hoge overeenstemming 
bestaat onder respondenten over het relevante- expertise-criterium 
(‘the relevant expertise criterion), het expertcriterium (‘the expert 
criterion’), het betrouwbaarheidscriterium (‘the trustworthiness 
criterion’), het criterium dat verwijst naar het vermogen om bewijs te 
verschaffen (‘the ability to provide evidence criterion’), het 
recentheidscriterium (‘the recency criterion’) en het slag-om-de-arm- 
criterium (‘the hedged statement criterion’). De eerste vijf criteria zijn 
lekencriteria die met de argumentatietheorie corresponderen; het 
laatstgenoemde criterium stemt niet overeen met de 
argumentatietheorie. Voor het argument van oorzaak naar gevolg 
geldt dat er relatief hoge overeenstemming bestaat over het criterium 
dat verwijst naar de oorzaak als voldoende voorwaarde (‘the cause 
sufficiency criterion’). Dit lekencriterium correspondeert met de 
argumentatietheorie. Voor het voorbeeldargument gaat op dat er
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flinke overeenstemming bestaat over het relevantiecriterium (‘the 
relevance criterion’), het aantal-voorbeelden-criterium (‘the number of 
examples criterion), het correctheid-van-het-voorbeeld-criterium (‘the 
example accuracy criterion’) en het causaliteitscriterium (‘the 
causality criterion’). De eerste drie criteria corresponderen met de 
argumentatietheorie; het laatste criterium niet. Met betrekking tot de 
lekencriteria waarover aanzienlijke overeenstemming bestaat, kan 
voorzichtig geconcludeerd worden dat deze doorgaans deel uitmaken 
van de argumentatieve vaardigheden waarover kritische 
taalgebruikers kunnen beschikken.
Sommige criteria die in de argumentatietheorie zijn 
geformuleerd worden niet door leken gebruikt, maar in de meeste 
gevallen kan dat worden verklaard door het materiaal, dat 
respondenten geen enkele reden gaf om deze criteria te gebruiken. 
Werden irrelevante criteria gebruikt door leken, dat wil zeggen criteria 
die eigenlijk verbonden zijn met een ander argumentschema, dan 
was het gebruik van deze irrelevante criteria begrijpelijk op basis van 
het feit dat het in het materiaal ging om voorgenomen acties en de 
effecten ervan.
Deel II: De relatie tussen argumentkwaliteit en daadwerkelijke 
overtuigingskracht
In het tweede deel van de dissertatie staat de vraag centraal of 
normatief sterke autoriteitsargumenten, argumenten van oorzaak 
naar gevolg en voorbeeldargumenten daadwerkelijk overtuigender 
zijn dan normatief zwakke (onderzoeksvraag 2). Deze vraag is 
onderzocht met behulp van experimenteel onderzoek. Eerst werd een 
verkennend experimenteel onderzoek uitgevoerd (hoofdstuk 5), om 
uit te zoeken in hoeverre er een relatie is tussen de daadwerkelijke 
overtuigingkracht en de waargenomen redelijkheid van argumenten. 
In het experiment kregen respondenten een vragenlijst voorgelegd 
met 16 korte tekstjes. Ieder tekstje bestond uit een argument en een 
conclusie die door dat argument ondersteund werd. Het argument 
was een autoriteitsargument of een argument van oorzaak naar 
gevolg en was normatief sterk of normatief zwak. De daadwerkelijke 
overtuigingskracht werd gemeten door respondenten (N = 50) te laten 
aangeven op een zevenpunts-Likert-schaal in hoeverre ze het eens 
waren met de laatste zin van het tekstje (de conclusie). 
Waargenomen redelijkheid werd gemeten door een andere groep 
respondenten (N = 50) op een zevenpunts-Likert-schaal te laten
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aangeven in hoeverre ze het argument een goede ondersteuning 
vonden voor de conclusie in de laatste zin.
De voorstudie toonde aan dat de daadwerkelijke 
overtuigingkracht en waargenomen redelijkheid met elkaar verbonden 
zijn: argumentatie die redelijker wordt gevonden is over het algemeen 
ook overtuigender in de situatie waarin de argumentatie zorgvuldig 
wordt bestudeerd. Verder bleek uit de resultaten dat normatief sterke 
argumenten van oorzaak naar gevolg redelijker gevonden worden en 
ook overtuigender zijn dan normatief zwakke argumenten van 
oorzaak naar gevolg. Voor autoriteitsargumenten hangt het effect van 
argumentkwaliteit af van het argumentatieschema dat is gebruikt en 
ook van het evaluatiecriterium dat is gebruikt om het argument 
normatief sterk of zwak te maken. In specifieke termen: wanneer een 
descriptieve claim wordt verdedigd, krijgt een ondersteunend 
argument met een onbetrouwbare bron minder positieve oordelen 
dan een ondersteunend argument met een betrouwbare bron, maar 
de relevantie van de expertise maakt geen verschil. Wanneer een 
normatieve claim wordt verdedigd, kunnen sterke 
autoriteitsargumenten op hogere scores rekenen dan zwakke 
autoriteitsargumenten en is er geen interactie-effect tussen criterium 
en argumentkwaliteit, zoals voor het schema met een descriptieve 
claim wel gevonden is.
Al met al werd geconcludeerd uit het verkennende 
experimentele onderzoek dat de resultaten voor de daadwerkelijke 
overtuigingskracht en die voor de waargenomen redelijkheid een 
vergelijkbaar patroon laten zien. Er werd dan ook besloten in het 
daarop volgende hoofdexperiment alleen de daadwerkelijke 
overtuigingskracht als afhankelijke variabele te meten.
In het hoofdexperiment (hoofdstuk 6) kregen respondenten 
een vragenlijst voorgelegd. In de vragenlijst stonden 34 tekstjes. 
Ieder tekstje bevatte een argument en een conclusie die door het 
argument werd ondersteund. De gebruikte argumentatie was 
autoriteitsargumentatie, argumentatie van oorzaak naar gevolg, 
voorbeeldargumentatie of cirkelargumentatie. Cirkelargumentatie 
werd in het materiaal aangeboden om achteraf te kunnen vaststellen 
of respondenten de argumentatie met voldoende aandacht hadden 
beoordeeld. In het geval van de drie andere typen argumentatie was 
de argumentatie normatief sterk of normatief zwak. De 
daadwerkelijke overtuigingkracht werd gemeten door respondenten 
(N = 200) te laten aangeven op een zevenpunts-Likert-schaal in 
hoeverre ze het eens waren met de conclusie in de laatste zin van 
het tekstje.
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De resultaten lieten zien dat voor het argument van oorzaak 
naar gevolg en het voorbeeldargument in het algemeen geldt dat 
normatief sterke argumenten daadwerkelijk overtuigender zijn dan 
normatief zwakke argumenten. Voor het autoriteitsargument geldt dat 
het normatief sterke autoriteitsargument wel overtuigender is dan een 
argument op basis van een onbetrouwbare bron, maar even sterk is 
als een argument op basis van een bron die (a) minder waarschijnlijk 
is als expert, of (b) een minder relevant expertisegebied heeft. Het 
verschil tussen de sterke variant en de zwakke variant waarin de bron 
een mening heeft die minder aansluit bij de conclusie, bereikte net 
niet het conventionele significantieniveau.
Uit het onderzoek in deel II werd al met al geconcludeerd dat 
normatief sterke argumenten niet per se daadwerkelijk overtuigender 
zijn dan normatief zwakke argumenten; dat hangt af van het 
betreffende argumenttype en het specifieke evaluatiecriterium dat 
wordt geschonden in het normatief zwakke argument. De voorspelling 
die voortvloeit uit het ELM, namelijk dat normatief sterke argumenten 
eerder tot overtuiging leiden dan normatief zwakke argumenten, 
wordt dan ook niet volledig ondersteund door de resultaten van dit 
onderzoek.
Algemene conclusie en discussie
Hoofdstuk 7 blikt terug op de resultaten in deel I en II van de 
dissertatie. Als die resultaten aan elkaar gerelateerd worden, dan 
wordt het volgende geconcludeerd: ook al gebruiken leken bepaalde 
criteria om de kwaliteit van autoriteitsargumenten vast te stellen, de 
overtuigingskracht van autoriteitsargumenten die deze 
evaluatiecriteria schenden is er niet altijd minder om. Deze bevinding 
strookt niet met de hypothese dat normatief sterke argumenten bij 
centrale verwerking overtuigender zijn dan normatief zwakke 
argumenten, iets dat men op basis van het ELM wel zou verwachten.
Verklaringen kunnen ten eerste worden gezocht in het verschil 
tussen de taak die respondenten in het kwalitatieve onderzoek 
uitvoerden en de taak die respondenten in het kwantitatieve, 
experimentele onderzoek uitvoerden. De taak in het kwalitatieve 
onderzoek, waarbij argumenten vergeleken en gerangordend werden, 
stimuleerde respondenten waarschijnlijk veel aandacht te besteden 
aan de kwaliteit van het argument. In het experiment werd 
respondenten gevraagd in hoeverre ze het eens of oneens waren met 
de conclusie, dus is het maar de vraag of ze geneigd waren veel 
aandacht aan de argumentkwaliteit te schenken. In die situatie waren
290
sommige experimentele manipulaties wellicht te subtiel om een effect 
te vinden op de daadwerkelijke overtuigingskracht.
Als alternatieve verklaringen worden genoemd: leken vinden 
sommige criteria wellicht belangrijker dan andere criteria, ook al zijn 
ze van alle criteria op de hoogte, of ze zijn niet in staat alle criteria die 
in het geheugen opgeslagen zijn daadwerkelijk toe te passen tijdens 
de taak.
In hoofdstuk 7 komen ook beperkingen van de uitgevoerde 
studies aan de orde, die betrekking hebben op kwesties van validiteit 
en van betrouwbaarheid. Zo zijn er vraagtekens bij het ontwerp van 
de open casussen en het concrete niveau waarop leken hun 
evaluatiecriteria verwoordden (validiteit) en bij het gegeven dat 
slechts een stap in de kwalitatieve analyse is getest op 
overeenstemming met een tweede beoordelaar (betrouwbaarheid). 
Tegen de experimentele studies kan worden ingebracht dat er geen 
controleconditie is gebruikt en dat de claims te neutraal waren om 
voldoende betrokkenheid van respondenten op te roepen. Een 
andere kanttekening bij de experimenten is dat korte tekstjes zijn 
gebruikt, waardoor de manipulaties mogelijk opvallender waren dan 
wanneer langere, meer alledaagse betogen zouden zijn gebruikt.
Vanwege deze beperkingen is vervolgonderzoek aan te 
bevelen, waarbij vooral aandacht komt voor het ontwerp van 
materiaal dat bij respondenten voldoende betrokkenheid 
teweegbrengt en tegelijkertijd claims bevat die bij respondenten nog 
ter discussie staan. Daarnaast is het de moeite waard te 
onderzoeken wat er nog van de gevonden effecten overblijft, wanneer 
manipulaties van argumentkwaliteit in langere teksten worden 
verwerkt.
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